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
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


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
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**EXT MONTH : MODERNIZATION**

# 127

## INDIA'S LEFT

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the role of a  
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A select and relevant bibliography  
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Designed by Dilip Chowdhury

## The problem

The never-ending attempt to understand the present predicaments and the possible future of India's Left is a critical part of the probe into the political realities of a sub-continent. If the strategic line makes sense, the tactics in support are woolly and, very often, opportunist. If the tactics possess the necessary 'real politik', the strategy is ill-defined. Too much theory, divorced from the raw reality around, proves costly for the Left. While it is true that in this sense the Left is 'backward' in India and also comparatively untouched by the subtle theoretical controversies which ravage the proletarian vanguards in Europe, on this continent socialists of various hues are coping with perhaps the major challenge to the doctrine — will qualitative social change be achieved through the classic methods of the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois State or by less speedy peaceful and constitutional methods? In continental India, which projects many unique inhibitions and blockages to normal political growth and development, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Left will spend many long years grappling with the opposite models of revolutionary and constitutional practice. Class overlaps with caste, single-nation concepts

dominate multi-national situations, democracy and dissent slow down urgent change, the gaps in understanding are difficult to locate, the fears of the future are not dissolvable. Indeed, no gods fail — for, the new godhead has not been established. If the pendulum appears to swing devastatingly between the two extremes, and makes a mockery of a supposedly scientific technique of proletarian struggle, it is only because we are witnessing a complex transition to a specifically Indian revolutionary experience. Against the background of this transition, a large number of questions will have to be answered by India's Left before it can motivate our many-millioned people. The Left is a major stream in national political life. It has contributed to enlightenment in the orthodox, hierarchical and tradition-bound societies inhabiting the sub-continent. But there has been a general failure in creating an alternative value system capable of revolutionising the very processes of a peaceful, constitutional transition. The search for answers could, therefore, be more courageous and sustained. Then, and then only, could national leadership be sought. This issue of SEMINAR attempts to cover these essential areas of enquiry.

# Missed opportunities

J. MOHAN

WITH the United Fronts in both Kerala and West Bengal in shambles, the Left in India has lost a glorious opportunity of emerging on an India-wide scale as a progressive and viable alternative to the Congress. Like the 'base Indian who threw a pearl away richer than all his tribe' the Left parties have thrown away a chance that the Left hardly ever had anywhere in the world—the chance of proving that through democratic processes and on the basis of the support of the overwhelming majority of the population the levers of power—however circumscribed that power—could be used to unify the people,

consolidate their organisations and lead them forward.

The success of the Left in these two regions of India would not only have transformed the political landscape of India but enriched socialist 'thought' and practice, isolated the forces of reaction the world over who have never tired of repeating that socialism cannot be separated from dictatorship and violence, and thus paved the way for the advance of socialism everywhere.

Whether in the long run the Left will be able to recover from the effects of this setback or not,

it is difficult to predict at this stage. But it is clear that in the short run the performance of the Left in the two States where they had a chance to prove their mettle will only cause frustration and demoralisation amongst the masses and strengthen extremists both of the Right and Left variety in the country.

To understand why the parties of the Left of whom so much had been expected have failed the masses and proved unequal to the responsibilities that history has thrust on them, it is necessary to go back a little, analyse the composition of the different strands that make up the Left movement in India and study their record in the decades immediately preceding and following Independence.

Essentially, the Left in India comprises two strands—one the Left nationalist and the other the Marxian. The Left nationalist strand which is represented today by parties such as the Forward Bloc, the SSP and the PSP was born out of the womb of the Congress. Even though in the post-independence era it has managed to sever completely the umbilical cord binding it to its parent, it has sucked too long at the mother's breast to be free of the ills that have tainted the Congress in India. The other strand, which is today represented mainly by the CPI, the CPI(M), the RSP and other local groups, originated as a result of the influence of the International Communist movement in general and the Soviet Union in particular and was nourished by the working class movement as well as radical student and youth movements.

Its dependence in its earlier stages on centres of the international communist movement abroad is understandable but unfortunately it has not been able to outgrow that dependence and become completely self-reliant in working out its own theory and practice, its own strategy and tactics. Moreover, the nearly one century long span of Congress domination over the political life

of the country has not failed to have its impact on the communist movement either, especially as many of its leaders and important cadres were one time Congress workers. The disease that has led to the disintegration of that body has infected the communist parties too.

As is only too well known, the Congress was more a movement than a party. It represented the broad stream of national feeling in the country in the period of British rule. This was just what was needed in the pre-independence period when the struggle for freedom had to be given priority over everything else. But this feature of the Congress which was its main strength at one time became in the post-independence period an important source of weakness. It meant that it neither had any clear ideology, nor did it represent directly any particular class or classes immediately after it took over power.

Soon, however, the vested interests began to assert themselves and along with a group of newly created vested interests, namely the class of politicians who used their new found power to amass wealth, began to dominate that organisation. The broad nationalist masses continued in many parts of the country through sheer force of habit and force of tradition to support the organisation, but they had little say in the working out of its policies and in the running of the organisation.

It is these features of the Congress, the absence of any ideology, the spread of corruption, the hankering after the loaves and fishes of office, the unprincipled use of whatever opportunities were provided by entry into the legislatures, municipalities, union boards and other organs of authority that have permeated the political atmosphere and infected other parties. As already mentioned, the parties most directly effected were those that appeared on the scene as offshoots of the Congress. Having all the weaknesses and none of the strength

derived from the weight of tradition which the Congress could boast of, it is not surprising that despite their militant pose and their championship of mass issues and despite even the presence of certain charismatic personalities such as the late Dr. Lohia, the Left nationalist strand of the Left in India was never able to strike very firm root.

The success achieved by the Marxian element in the Left movement was by contrast much more spectacular. Because it based itself on some ideology, and because of the great influence of the Soviet Revolution throughout the world, the communist movement was able to set up a relatively much better organisation and to attract cadres who were by and large more devoted, better disciplined and of a superior order. Up to a certain point, the frank affinity of the communist movement to the Soviet Union proved a source of strength. The period during which the communist movement became a mass political force in India, the late forties and the early fifties, was also the period when the prestige of the Soviet Union was at its height. The successful war waged against Hitler Fascism which threatened to engulf the whole world, the great sacrifices incurred and the superb courage exhibited by the Soviet people had evoked tremendous admiration throughout the world. The period of the thirties when the great purges were taking place and the dark face of Stalinist terror was visible was a chapter of Soviet history that remained hidden from the eyes of all but a very few who had access to that information.

The victory of the Chinese revolution under the leadership of the communists in 1949 also helped tremendously in boosting the prestige of the Indian Communists. Here was a vast country that had been repeatedly subjected to invasion and exploitation by foreign imperialists at first from Europe and later from Japan. This country had not only

succeeded in repelling these invasions but also defeated the attempts of internal reactionaries who had unleashed civil war and all this had been achieved under the leadership of the communists. No wonder the tide in India during this period ran in favour of the Indian communists who emerged as the main challenge to the Congress in the Central Parliament and in some of the State assemblies.

But, from its very inception, there were weaknesses and negative features in the movement that frequently expressed themselves throughout its long history. It is these features that have culminated in turning what might have been stepping stones to a bright future into an occasion for bitter infighting and a suicidal war of mutual annihilation.

One of these features was a deep rooted sectarianism that has from the very inception of the communist movement dogged its footsteps and continues to be the bane of all wings of the movement even today. This sectarianism began with M. N. Roy who with his terroristic outlook and origins could not after all have been expected to think very differently. Perhaps the fact that many of the early leaders of the communist movement came from the ranks of the terrorists has something to do with the deep hold that sectarianism has over the movement. It was this sectarianism that prevented the communists from participating actively in the mass civil disobedience movements led by the Congress in the twenties and the thirties.

The international communist movement to which the Indian communists turned repeatedly for guidance did try at times to correct the course but it was itself, under Stalin's influence, imbued with a sectarianism of its own and rent with factional strife. During the period of the second world war, while some attempts were made to correct superficial symptoms of sectarianism, the most serious kind of sectarian mistake

was committed by isolating the communist movement from the broadstream of the national movement and coming in direct conflict with it through the slogan of People's War. An interesting aspect of this is the fact that even this policy was not arrived at independently but came as a result of prodding from international communist sources abroad.

This combination of sectarianism and a pathetic reliance on 'International' guidance continued to act as a drag on the movement even in the post-Independence era. Witness for instance the obstinate refusal to admit that India had really become independent just because the party programme, again prepared under 'international guidance', stated that the Indian Government was 'tied to the chariot wheels of British Imperialism'. When the correction was finally made, it again was only after the 'International' leadership had itself decided that the earlier interpretation was wrong and had put out a new analysis of the situation.

With this record it was not surprising that when the split in the international communist movement came, the formation of two parallel communist parties in India could not be far behind.

It is necessary to refer to another feature of this movement which had much to do with later developments that followed the assumption of office by communist parties in some of the States. This was the decline in standards of integrity that began to come to the surface with the opening of opportunities in Parliament and the State legislatures. Long before the stage of entering the ministries came, communists had become the main opposition in Parliament and in some of the State legislatures. This gave prestige and status to the party and speeches by leaders of the party in the legislatures were given wide publicity in the national press. For individuals who were elected it meant a better standard of living than they could afford on

party wages and also the chance to confer some limited favours by virtue of the direct access they had to ministers and government officials.

For the party as a whole, elections began to claim an inordinate share of the total energies and resources available and the itch to get nominations for the Parliament and assemblies began to spread amongst individual members and leaders. This distorted the functioning of the party in many ways. To cite only one example; building mass organisations requires a certain kind of approach which comes into conflict with the type of approach needed to win elections. The former requires the subordination of political differences in the interests of the unity of the mass organisation, the latter requires the sharpening of political differences. Again, building of mass organisations of agricultural workers for instance is likely to antagonise influential sections of the rich and even middle peasantry whose vote pulling power is considerably greater than that of the agricultural workers. One need not multiply such examples. Suffice it to say that this was the thin end of the wedge and the trends that manifested themselves at this stage were accentuated a hundred-fold as prospects of getting State power began to grow bright.

It was in 1957 that communists first formed a government in a State in India. The State was Kerala. It is not necessary to go into the history of that episode here and it is only relevant to mention in this context that even though the Communist Ministry at that time was short-lived and was never really able to settle down, allegations of corruption had been heard even then and opportunistic deals of various kinds had been concluded. The Ministry did not last very long. It was dismissed by the Centre in the face of a violent agitation by various opposition groups but the taste of power remained and the

policies of the communist and other Left parties from then onwards were noticeably influenced by considerations of coming back to power either by themselves or in coalition with other groups.

**T**he opportunity came in 1967 when all kinds of opportunistic alliances were made just to get ministerial portfolios, alliances with the Akalis, with the Jana Sangh, with the Muslim League. Real politik rather than principles became the guidelines of action. At the time of the Presidential election in 1967 there was a strange alliance stretching from the CPI(M) to the Swatantra in support of a candidate with pronounced right wing inclinations and against Dr. Zakir Husain whose election in the context of India's struggle for secularism was clearly of great importance.

The patch-up coalitions in Punjab, Bihar, U.P. into which the Left entered after the fourth general elections did not last. But in Kerala the position of the Left was unassailable and after the mid-term elections in 1969, so was it in West Bengal. The United Front governments in these States began well. Certain steps were taken to improve wage levels, extend trade union rights, establish the right to carry on democratic movements without interference and to give increased allowances to government employees. In the sphere of land relations, although nothing very startling was achieved, the issue of land reform was brought into focus and some land, even if the acreage involved was extremely small, was distributed.

While one should not try to ignore these positive aspects, it is unfortunately true that the negative features gradually began to eclipse the other aspect. Conflicts within the United Front began to sharpen until a stage was reached when, for all practical purposes, the very foundations of the Front were destroyed, one has collapsed and the other is on the verge of collapse. Accusations of corruption and use of State machinery to further party interests

which at one time used to be levelled against the Congress governments are being hurled by partners of the United Front against one another.

It is not difficult to see that this is no sudden development. The weaknesses and the many negative features of the Left movement referred to earlier have only been accentuated and given an opportunity to unfold their destructive potentialities to the full under conditions where the Left from being in the opposition has come to occupy seats of power in the State governments, all the limitations of that power notwithstanding. Labouring under the illusion that use of the State machinery could help the spread of party influence and build the strength of the party—the illusion that the Congress had at one time—and devoid of any principle policy for strengthening the United Front as an instrument for serving the people, the Front seems to have died a natural death and there is no dearth of forces in the country who will be anxious to give it a quick burial.

**O**ne significant fact that emerges from all this is that of the failure of the Left parties to develop an ideology suited to the present time and conditions. Neither the parties that have Left nationalist origins nor the Marxian parties, which swearing as they do by scientific socialism should have been expected to take the lead in this matter, have been able to evolve an integrated understanding of the problems of the democratic and socialist movement in India and to put before the people the strategy for advance.

There are obviously many features which make the Indian situation unique both economically and politically. The variegated pattern of land holdings, the complexities of achieving land reforms, the pattern of mixed economy that has evolved over the years and especially during the three plan periods, the framework of parliamentary democracy superimposed on a society that is

still largely caste ridden and riven by communal and linguistic divisions—these and many others are problems that call for deep study and serious research. No past precedents, no quotations, no principles can be found in the body of classical Marxist or current international communist literature to cope with the situation that confronts the Indian Left.

**T**he gap could have been filled by undertaking serious ideological work in this direction but this is, as the late communist leader, Ajoy Ghosh, ruefully once pointed out in an article, one of the chronic weaknesses of the Indian communist movement. There was, however little that he could do in his lifetime to overcome this weakness. After him even the realisation that this constitutes one of the main weaknesses seems to have disappeared. And that is the chief reason why the Indian Left presents today the spectacle of confusion and lack of purpose or principle. Like a rudderless boat adrift in a storm-tossed ocean it seems to be moving without a sense of direction and with its crew desperately engaged in a competition to see who scuttles the vessel first.

Unless Left cadres and Left intellectuals assert themselves and are able to reverse the dangerous trends that are beginning to destroy the Left movement the outlook for the future is bleak indeed. With the Congress disintegrating—and it seems doubtful whether even the face-lift that the Prime Minister is trying to give it will be able to arrest that process—and with the Left having missed the opportunity to forge a united front of progressive forces able to take its place, the vacuum is likely to be filled by the extreme Right sooner or later. When that happens it is only the extreme Left, the Naxalites, that will be happy for will that not have proved once and for all the truth of their theory that parliamentary democracy is a farce and all power comes from the barrel of a gun?

# **Independent political force**

E. M. S. NAMBOODIRIPAD

THE split in the Congress Party was hailed in non-Congress democratic circles as a welcome development. The monopoly of power enjoyed by the Congress for nearly a quarter of a century was the biggest single impediment in the way of democratic advance. That impediment is removed, since there is no Congress as such any more.

Against this, however, should be set the fact that the split in

the Congress is itself leading to the disruption of the democratic unity, built on the basis of the need for defeating the Congress. In other words, polarisation within the Congress, leading to the emergence of two Congress parties, has led also to polarisation within the non-Congress United Front. Instead of a straight fight between the Congress and the combined force of various non-Congress parties ranged against each other, the latter are ranging

themselves against one another and around one or the other of the two Congress groups.

In the process of building the united non-Congress force, it was clear, two antagonistic political forces had joined together in the common interest of defeating the Congress. On the one hand were the forces of obscurantism and the *status quo*, on the other were the forces of radical democracy, modern secularism and socialism. A confrontation between these two forces, between those who fought the Congress from the Right and from the Left, was inevitable.

Nobody would therefore have been surprised if the disruption of the non-Congress United Front had taken the form of a clear separation between two ideologically-well-defined groups of non-Congress parties. This, however, is not what is actually taking place. Those who fought the Congress from the Left have themselves started fighting one another, some of them joining one group of the now divided Congress, while the others join the other group, leaving a few who do not join either.

Such utter confusion in what was once considered the united camp of the democratic struggle against the Congress regime is naturally deplored by most of us. But few of us take the trouble to go deep into the reasons why such a development has taken place. The result is that many well-intentioned but thoroughly impracticable suggestions are made to restore the unity of democratic forces which had been forged in the course of the struggle against the Congress monopoly of power. Let us therefore try to understand the various ideological-political trends manifesting themselves in the democratic camp, trends which led to this much-deplored disruption of the unity of the non-Congress forces.

One of these trends would have us believe that the split in the Congress means that the cherished desire of the non-Congress democratic forces has been fulfilled. No

more is the Congress the all-powerful political party it used to be. No more can it hold undivided sway over the destinies of the nation. The whole party having been split, neither of its two groups can remain in power any more, unless it gets the support of one or other opposition forces.

This, it is said, would make it possible for those who have been fighting the Congress from the Left to put pressure on, and build unity with, that Congress group which is prepared to take a more radical stand on the basic social, economic and political questions facing the nation. Under these circumstances, non-Congressism of the old type is supposed to have ceased to have any relevance. What is relevant, on the other hand, is the unity of all the democratic forces outside the Congress with that Congress group which is obliged to take a more radical position in order that the obscurantist and *status quo* forces within and outside the Congress may be decisively defeated.

Against this is another ideological-political trend which holds that there is nothing to choose between the two groups that have emerged out of the split in the Congress. The struggle in the Congress, according to those who hold this view, has nothing to do with ideology and politics; it is purely factional. Democratic opposition forces should therefore refrain from joining this or that group within the Congress but fight whoever at the moment happens to be in power.

Still another trend would be prepared to cooperate with either of the two Congress groups which is prepared to accept and implement a time-bound programme.

It is obvious that, if the first of the three above-mentioned ideological-political trends were to prevail, those who have been fighting the Congress from the Left would be rallied behind the Ruling Congress. The second trend, on the other hand, would lead to the rallying of the radical

forces behind the Opposition Congress. As for the third trend, it can well lead to turning the radical movement into an instrument of incessant haggling with the two groups; it will make the Left-wing political parties and groups collective 'Aayarams and Gayarams'.

Every one of these alternatives would thus lead to further disintegration and disruption of the democratic movement. Adopting any one of them would be contrary to the objective with which the democratic forces in the country evolved the strategy of uniting the non-Congress forces and destroying the Congress monopoly of power.

The Left democratic political parties and groups unfurled the banner of non-Congressism because the Congress was the political organisation of the landlord-bourgeois ruling classes. Successful struggle against these ruling classes through the mobilisation of the millions of toilers was therefore the essence of non-Congressism as envisaged by those who fought the Congress from the Left.

On the other hand, those who fought the Congress from the Right inscribed on themselves the banner of anti-communism. Struggle against the Congress and its government was, for them, at best a temporary affair; it should, in no case, be allowed to blunt the edge of anti-communism. Some of these parties did indeed tolerate the presence of communists and socialists in such non-Congress governments as were formed in Bihar, U.P. and Punjab. But they did not allow such participation to become an excuse for soft-pedalling their struggle against radical political forces in the country.

Incidentally, the Communist Party of India(Marxist) was fully conscious of this. Hence its refusal to have anything to do with these United Front ministries, though some other Left

parties joined them with results that are well known.

The Left democratic parties, on the other hand, tried to give a radical orientation to non-Congressism. They did not allow the struggle against the Congress to be restricted to an effort to dislodge the Congress, as a political party, from power. That struggle was given the class content of determined struggle against those policies of the Congress which help the exploiting classes and hit the exploited classes. That was why the two non-Congress governments in which the Left democratic forces played a predominant role—those of Kerala and West Bengal—became the target of attack not only by the central Congress leadership but also by such parties as fought the Congress from the Right. This therefore was the really genuine, radical non-Congressism.

The question is: has this non-Congressism ceased to have any relevance with the Congress split? Is either of the two Congresses a class political force basically different from what the united Congress was? To put it more specifically, is the relatively more 'progressive' Ruling Congress, led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, so basically different from the pre-split Congress that the democratic forces which fought the Congress from the Left need not carry on that fight against it now?

The answer is given by the leaders of the ruling Congress themselves. For, their criticism of the leaders of the Opposition Congress is that, as opposed to the Prime Minister and her friends who want to implement the policies of the pre-split Congress, the Opposition Congress is trying to reverse those policies. The ruling Congress is thus committed to those very policies of the formerly united Congress, against which the forces of democratic opposition have been fighting.

Furthermore, if one carefully studies the material that has

emerged out of their Bombay Session, it will be seen, they have, in fact, gone back on some of the earlier declared policies of the Congress. For instance, many industries which had, in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, been reserved for the public sector have now been thrown open for the private sector. There is therefore not the slightest excuse for anybody to come to the conclusion that the new, Ruling Congress is more radical or anti-vested interest than the pre-split Congress.

It is also worthy of note that the Ruling Congress in its political resolution has made it clear that it will simultaneously fight the communal and *status quoist* forces on the Right and extreme political trends on the Left. Coming as this does in the wake of the unconcealed hostility to, and efforts to topple, the Left-dominated Governments of Kerala and West Bengal through organised dissensions in the non-Congress united front, it becomes clear that the basic strategy of the ruling Congress is to 'unite the centrist forces' to 'contain the extreme Right and the extreme Left'—a political strategy which had been perfected by the leaders of the pre-split Congress.

If this is the political strategy of the Ruling Congress, the Opposition Congress is striving to unite all 'like-minded' parties in an effort to 'isolate and crush' the forces of communism, both internally and internationally. The central point of their attack against the Ruling Congress is that its leaders are helping the growth of communism within the country, collaborating with and acting as the agents of the socialist countries.

Is it therefore possible for any genuinely Left democratic party to join either of these two Congress groups? Is it not necessary, on the other hand, that all those who have thus far been fighting the Congress from the Left join

together in a third force, a force which carries on a simultaneous struggle against the Ruling and Opposition Congress groups? The consolidation of all those political forces which call themselves communist, socialist or radical democratic into an independent joint front striving to strengthen themselves at the expense of both groups of the ruling party and develop the mass of toilers as an independent political force—such, according to my party, is the task of Left democratic forces.

In thus trying to consolidate the really militant Left democratic forces in the country, opportunities will certainly arise, on many issues, for this independent political force to work in cooperation with either of the two Congress groups. For, both Congress groups want to give an appearance of being radical and of fighting for the toiling people. Even the more *status quoist* Opposition Congress has to do this.

Far more is this true of the Ruling Congress which claims to be more radical than the Opposition Congress and, in fact, as radical as some of the Left democratic parties. Furthermore, they make the declaration that they are interested in inflicting a crushing defeat on the Jana Sangh with its fascist 'Indianisation' slogan and its reactionary allies of the Swatantra and Syndicate. To the extent to which the Ruling Congress carries out its declared policies, the independent political force of radical democracy should certainly cooperate with them.

This, however, should not be at the expense of the independent mobilisation of the Left democratic forces against the policies of both Congress groups. Nor should it be allowed to be utilised by them to disrupt the unity of the Left democratic forces—the main objectives of the ruling Congress, as is clear from its open support to the 'mini-front' in Kerala and its counter-part in W. Bengal.

# Irrelevance

MADHU LIMAYE

LET me at the very outset state that I am not much enamoured of the words Left and Right. The meanings of these expressions have not been precisely defined in the Indian context and they are vaguely used as signifying parties which profess some kind of a socialist creed.

The very vagueness enables a monstrosity such as 'Congress Left' to be not only coined but acquire wide currency. I cannot understand how any section of the major bulwark of the Establishment can be called Left.

But since these expressions are almost daily used by journalists and political commentators I am afraid I will also have to use them in the conventional sense in this article.

This traditional Left is at present not only in disarray; it is in deep crisis. In the late forties the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, with a few regional groups,

comprised the entire Left. Now this is no longer so. The main parties have divided and subdivided endlessly. The Congress dissidents in different States, with nebulousness and opportunism as their hallmark, have been walking on and off the leftist political stage, adding to the prevailing general confusion.

But splintering and fragmentation is only one aspect of the leftist malady. Much more serious is the state of utter aimlessness it finds itself in and the futility and irrelevance of many of its policies and a large segment of its activities.

The general paralysis of the Left affects the mass fronts also: the trade unions, the kisan movement and, despite the rise of student power in numerical terms, also the students' and youth organisations, all are in the doldrums.

A review of the political meanderings of the major leftist groups

and their mutual bickerings present a disgusting picture.

The Kerala United Front and Kerala coalition Government, despite their being held up as the prototype of the future Left democratic front at the national level by the Marxist leaders, conclusively demonstrated their incapacity to carry out basic administrative reforms and radical legislative measures, got bogged down in a grave controversy on corruption and faced a break-up.

Why could not E.M.S. Namboodiripad have resolved the dispute by referring the elementary probe, *prima-facie* inquiry, to an all-party committee of the Kerala Assembly?

In West Bengal, despite the blustering of Jyoti Basu against the deployment of Central Reserve Police and Industrial Security Force by the Central Government and constant harping on the Centre-State 'confrontation', which never materialises, the programmatic bankruptcy of the United Front Government is daily getting exposed and the crude pandering to the regional sentiment barely serves as a fig leaf to cover the inability of the Marxist-led coalition to tackle the urgent problems of the people.

A trade union bill providing compulsory recognition of unions and ballot for determining their representative character? It can wait. More important is to make attacks on brother parties of the United Front!

The shame of the absence of free primary education in the urban centres of West Bengal and the scandal of over 40 per cent of children of school-going age going without schooling in the Calcutta region that persisted during the Congress Raj? What is the urgency of this? That too will be tackled in course of time!

Removal of British imperialist statues that disfigure the public squares of revolutionary Bengal? Sheer narrow-mindedness and

chauvinism! Are we not cosmopolitans and internationalists? Why can we not be broad-minded enough to leave these statues alone?

Abolition of land revenue on small holdings in the State. Yes, of course, this is part of the 32-point programme. We intend to implement this gradually! But where is the need for hurry?

A comprehensive employment-oriented scheme of economic development? Nothing can be done about this as long as the Centre-States problem has not been settled!

An inquiry into corruption charges against former Congress Ministers and leaders? No, No. It provided good material for campaign oratory. But we do not wish to start a witch hunt. For, if we set up an inquiry against Congressmen, there would be demands for investigation into charges against J.F. Ministers also. So, why unnecessarily raise a hornets' nest?

The motive force that seems to drive the United Front is to stay in office—*bane raho!* Incidentally, if office can be used to further party interests, so much the better! This is probably the only bond that holds these coalitions together. KP 3857

The dominant partners of the West Bengal United Front trampled underfoot all principles and packed the Cabinet with Members of the Legislative Council which they were pledged to abolish; not only this, they also nominated people who were not members of either House! In the West Bengal Assembly Shailen Adhikari, an S.S.P. Member, forced the issue of Council abolition by tabling a resolution on the subject. The United Front Government finally decided to sponsor this resolution as an official resolution and, upon receiving Congress support, it was passed unanimously.

We of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha demanded that the Central Government introduce a bill to

give immediate effect to this unanimous decision of the State Assembly. Not only was the Bill introduced in the Lok Sabha in the Budget Session, but we secured its quick passage in the lower House. However, Bhupesh Gupta, the C.P.I. super-boss in Parliament somehow arranged with the Congress Whips for the Bill's not being brought on the Rajya Sabha Agenda at all!

Thereupon, we demanded that the Chief Election Commissioner be asked to put off the Council elections or, in the alternative, the United Front should boycott it.

The dilly-dallying of the communists gave the Left a bad name, and provided the Congress Opposition in the Vidhan Sabha with a new stick to beat the United Front. This is what happens when expediency is allowed to prevail over a principle.

Is the United Front Government above board in the matter of abuse of power? Is it not a fact that bus permits were issued to people who agreed to contribute to the coffers of the Marxists' Election Fund in West Bengal?

During the great Aminchand Pyarelal Debate, such public pressure had been generated that P. C. Sen dared not issue a licence to this group's Park Hotel in Calcutta. But when the United Front took over, Jeet Paul somehow succeeded in managing Jyoti Basu and now the Park Hotel of this notorious group is doing good business in Calcutta with Jyoti Basu's blessings.

Lest it be said that I am unnecessarily harsh on the two communist parties and the United Front Governments led by them, let me state that I was harsher towards our own party and the governments of which it was a constituent—in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Kerala.

When the Uttar Pradesh Government failed to legislate major items of the S.V.D.'s minimum programme, we asked our minis-

ters to withdraw from the government. This led to Charan Singh's tendering his resignation, although the S.V.D. majority had remained intact, there had been no defection and there was no outside threat to its existence. We were thoroughly dissatisfied not only with the functioning of the S.V.D. Government but also with the performance of our ministers.

In Bihar, the S.V.D. Government initially showed some drive, but later got bogged down in the politics of survival and came for the strictest censure from our party.

In Madhya Pradesh, our ministers resigned on account of non-fulfilment of the agreed programme and only after ordinances were issued and bills passed providing for abolition of land revenue on holdings below 10 acres, compulsory recognition of trade unions and ballot and a permanent anti-corruption tribunal that they were allowed to get back into office.

Another failure of the Left is in the sphere of 'law and order'. Of late, the Swatantra and BKD leaders have been making a lot of fuss about the deteriorating law and order situation. They want firm steps to be taken to curb lawlessness, including a ban on all gheraos, strikes and also on some political parties.

But police brutality, abuse by the bureaucracy of Sections 107 and 109 of the Criminal Procedure Code to harass the common people, violation by the employers of labour laws, smuggling, and tax evasion by the big, all this is not lawlessness in their eyes at all!

It is obvious that the parties of the Left can never accept this reactionary interpretation of the Rule of Law. But have they tried, through their united front governments, to apply a progressive and positive concept of the Rule of Law? Is it not a pity that a police minister of the SSP should refuse to order an inquiry into police firing and suspend firmly the use

of Sections 107 and 109 of the Cr.P.C. (Bihar) and should be pulled up by the party conference for this failure? Is it not deplorable that in relation to police excesses in mass movements at one end and police inaction in the face of organised goondaism at the other, the Marxist Home Minister should speak the familiar language of British rulers and their Congress successors (West Bengal)?

The sad truth is that the attitude of the police and bureaucracy vis-a-vis the common man has not undergone any change in Bihar, West Bengal and Kerala where Leftists had/have a big voice in the administration.

Absence of a strong will and determination among the ministers, the rank and file's tendency to gain small favours from them, lack of a firm and detailed direction from above and, above all, the low level of public opinion and mass pressures, it is all these that led to the failure of the United Front Governments and not any lack of ideological homogeneity. For, if ideological coherence and like-mindedness were the key to success, the Kerala Government should have done well and not foundered as it has been doing since its inception.

**T**he fact of the matter is that the socialists and communists have lost their *elan*, their fervour and enthusiasm, their capacity to efface the self for the sake of public good.

Power or lure of office, easy living and love of comfort has been the undoing of the Left.

The ruling classes know these weaknesses of the Left. They have permeated, by slow degrees, all the radical parties and have made them apologists of the Establishment.

The process of the bourgeoisification of the Left has been assisted by foreign trips and foreign money and patronage.

In the post-election period, parties of the Left found them-

selves in power in non-Congress coalitions in different States. The power that they gained was very limited power; limited by the semi-unitary constitution, limited by virtue of the fact that except the D.M.K. in Tamilnad no other opposition party secured an absolute majority and had to share power with other parties. The third limitation was the limitation of small numbers. The C.P.I. and P.S.P. numerical strength in almost all the States was slender and their influence could, therefore, be only marginal. The C.P.M. and S.S.P. were in a somewhat better position than these two parties. However, the C.P.M.'s importance in national politics is often exaggerated and the S.S.P.'s underestimated because the openness of its debates and controversies gives one an impression of division.

**A** significant fact is often ignored by political commentators in assessing the strength of the C.P.M., namely, that the C.P.M. is in a decisive position only in two States, Kerala and West Bengal. West Bengal is a leading industrial State and it no doubt contains one of the biggest urban concentrations in India. But it should be remembered that in terms of population, the two States comprise less than 60 million people, whereas the total population of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, where the S.S.P. is strong, is over 130 million. The point is that the limitation on power was a factor which could not be ignored by any Left party, whether the S.S.P. or the C.P.M.

In addition to the three limitations mentioned above, the real difficulty was that the parties of the Left—and more so of the Right—had never worked out the implications of acquiring limited power under the present constitution at the level of the States.

The classical communist theory had always taught the Communists to think in terms of absolute power, that is absolute control over the armed forces and other

repressive organs of the State. After having conquered this supreme power in the State, the communists experimented with coalition governments during the transitional period, but this kind of coalition is entirely different from sharing power under the present constitutional limitations in a State. Without a thorough understanding of the *limitations and opportunities* that this peculiar situation provided there was great danger of the Left parties rapidly slipping into office mentality and reformism.

**R**ammanohar Lohia understood the politics of limited power very well. He often likened the State governments to municipalities. He spoke with contempt of the bourgeois concern for stability, of balanced budgets, of bureaucracy's practical objections and politicians' soothing assurances about doing things gradually.

While he outlined the strategy of acquiring power he also spelled out how this limited power should be used for bringing about a change in people's temper, how to combine governmental action with mass action, how to cut out delays and red-tape and make the implementation of a time-bound programme the supreme test.

Just as he was eager to pull down Congress governments and instal non-Congress governments, he was also prepared to overthrow non-Congress governments if they got stuck in bureaucratic ruts and failed to implement the programme.

The S.S.P., therefore, inherited a theoretical grasp of this truth, but theoretical understanding is one thing and the will and organisational capacity to translate this into practice is another. The S.S.P.'s failure was in the sphere of organisation; without organisation neither the understanding nor the wish of the leadership can be put into effect. It was this that vitiated the S.S.P.'s performance in office.

The C.P.M. was relatively in a better position to do this both in

terms of its organisation as well as the legacy of disciplined functioning which it inherited from the pioneering days of Indian Communism. However, its understanding of the revolutionary mechanics of the use of limited power was defective. It lapsed into reformism and gradualism on the one hand and into temptation of abusing power for narrow, short term party advantage on the other.

In effect, however, both the S.S.P. and C.P.M. have thrown away the opportunities and have been defeated by these limitations albeit in different ways and for different reasons.

The present crisis of the Left is the result of its failure to work out a correct political line in relation to the Congress and Prime Minister Nehru. After a spell of adventurism in the late forties, the communist part of the Left settled down to the role of Nehru juniors in Parliament and outside. So great was the charm exercised by Nehru and so deceptive his radical phrase-making that the communists could never bring themselves to offering stiff opposition to the late Prime Minister.

**A**s to the socialists, they followed a face-both-ways policy in relation to the Congress and Nehru. Jayaprakash Narayan's 14-point programme as a basis for cooperation with the Congress, Asoka Mehta's theory of compulsion of the backward economy and lesser P.S.P. leaders' paying court to Nehru are so well known that they scarcely need any elaboration. These policies evoked strong opposition from the militant wing of the socialist movement.

Apart from this militant trend represented by Dr. Lohia, no leftist group was prepared to articulate the people's dissatisfaction with the Congress regime on a national scale. The communists and moderate socialists confined their anti-Congressism to local Congress bosses or to individual Congressmen at the Centre. They

were not prepared to attack the system and its architect, Jawaharlal Nehru.

It was only after Dr. Lohia's entry into Parliament in 1963 that firm and progressive anti-Congress positions were first expounded from the nation's highest forum, Nehru's pseudo-radicalism was unmasked and he was shown up as the reactionary defender of bureaucratic capitalism and the *status-quo*, as also the person mainly responsible for the national humiliation at the hands of China in 1962.

**T**he failure of the Left parties to articulate the anti-Congress feelings of the people, mount a political offensive against the Nehru Government and build a powerful mass movement to implement the political line gave opportunity for new parties of privilege to emerge and capture a part of the anti-Congress following and anti-Congress vote. This essential weakness of the Left and its entanglement with Mrs. Gandhi and Congress factions continues.

It is unnecessary, I think, to discuss at length the attitudes of the PSP. This party has not yet lived down its reactionary type of anti-communism. The anger with the communists owing to their subservience to outside powers during the second world war and the August 1942 struggle was quite justified and wide-spread among Indian leftists. But with some PSP leaders, hostility to Stalinism soon degenerated into a state of mind where reaction began to be considered a lesser evil than communism. It is well known that some PSP leaders had links with organisations like the D.R.S. and the Congress for Cultural Freedom. It is this kind of a mentality which led to the infamous Vimochan Samara of the Congress-PSP-Muslim League in Kerala in 1959.

This trend in the PSP is sustained by the connections it has with the Atlantic bloc institutions like the Socialist International and

the ICFTU. A critical approach to communism is not the same thing as the approach of professional anti-Communist organisations financed by the CIA. To refuse to take cognisance of the vast post-Stalinist changes: liberalisation, polycentricism, trends towards autonomism, Sino-Russian schism is sheer prejudice. But the PSP leaders refuse to come out of their old grooves of thought.

**T**he PSP leaders failed to realise that the main concern of a socialist party should be to fight the Establishment, its main party—the Congress, and values and institutions of bourgeois society. Its fear of communism paralysed its will, it could not keep itself in the forefront of the struggle for change. Its leaders broke away from the SSP at Banaras largely because of this reason.

Sometimes people wonder as to how a party calling itself socialist can bring itself to ally with the fascist like organisation that has arisen in Bombay—the Shiv Sena. There is nothing mysterious about this. It is not only the prospect of petty electoral advantage that attracts the PSP into the Shiv Sena camp. It is basically its anti-communism, its belief that the Shiv Sena will immunise the youth to the communist virus. To such absurd lengths has their anti-communism driven the PSP leaders!

It was, however, Soviet support of Nehru's politics that led the communist part of the Left to play second fiddle to him.

Again, it is the influence of Kosygin and his theory of 'positive socialist content' of Congress politics that has induced the communist part of the Left to raise on one hand the bogey of 'dark reaction' in and outside the Congress and the possibility of fruitful cooperation with Mrs. Gandhi and the so-called Congress Left on the other.

The whole unrealistic approach of the C.P.I. to the question of the

Congress 'Left' is governed by this basic thinking of that party.

For a little while before the elections, the C.P.I.(Right) got reluctantly drawn into the 'Remove the Congress' campaign; the defeat of the Congress in eight States compelled it to stay on the anti-Congress course and join coalition governments with Right parties like the Jana Sangh, Swatantra and Akali. While the C.P.I. leaders constantly deprecated the S.S.P.'s hobnobbing with Right parties in the anti-Congress cause, people with strong memories know that the C.P.I. joined the Bhola Paswan Coalition, with the Jana Sangh and the Ramgarh Raja as partners, even without waiting for the S.S.P. to come in!

**T**hese unpalatable facts I mention not for polemical reasons, or to denounce their office-hunting and opportunism, which now characterises all parties and not the C.P.I. alone, but to emphasise how after travelling some distance with the S.S.P. in 1966-68, the C.P.I. abandoned its ally in the only State which enabled the C.P.I. to survive as an all-India party when it was in dire straits as a result of the erosion of its strongholds in West Bengal and Kerala after the great split in the communist movement in 1964. For supporting the anti-Congress line it got a severe public reprimand from the Russians and thereafter it abandoned its anti-Congress stance.

The bogus A.I.C.C. 10-point programme and shadow boxing of the young Turks provided the CPI—(Right) with a pretext for reassessing the 'progressive possibilities' of the Congress Left at a time when even men like Krishna Menon and K. D. Malaviya had become so disillusioned as to call upon their friends to leave the Congress!

In the C.P.I.-post-election volte-face, it has gained, surprisingly, a new ally which till recently was its bitterest critic.

The most miraculous transformation to come in the last three

years is in respect of the Marxist C.P.I. It broke away from the 'revisionist' parent party because it disagreed with its 'reformist' evaluation of the domestic situation and had sympathy for the Chinese opposition to the Russian 'revisionist' ideological and tactical line.

But the Marxist Communists, after a good show in the general election, were to be rudely awakened from their complacency by the disillusionment and severe criticism which *dichotomy* between its theory and practice provoked among its younger sections and, above all, by the public rebuff which the Chinese gave the Marxist leadership's tactical line. The Marxist Party's theoretical denunciation of the parliamentary road and its actual partnership in a United Front Government with poor programmatic record and Peking propaganda led to large-scale secessions of 'extremist' elements in Andhra, West Bengal and Kerala.

**T**hirty years' long habit has made the communists pathetically dependent on outside support, both ideological and material. Having been repudiated by the Chinese and having already liberated themselves—of course, on China's prompting—from the Russians' apron-strings, a splendid opportunity opened up before the Marxist party of becoming the catalytic agent in the process of accelerating and strengthening the trend of revolutionary autonomism, drawing sustenance and strength from the soil and people of this country. But it messed up this opportunity and began to grope its way back into the motherly embrace of Mother Russia.

The Marxist party's open support of the Russian and Warsaw Pact countries' invasion of resurgent Czechoslovakia, at a time when the Chinese and Albanians at one end and the Rumanians, Yugoslavs, Italians and the French at the other end have

come out against it, was most shocking. What was still more shocking was this that while voices of protest were not only raised but were not easily muffled in the 'revisionist' party, in the Marxist Party no protest whatsoever was raised against the Politburo's support of the Soviet interventionist doctrine. Their ranks swallowed hook, line and sinker, the new pro-Moscow line. There was no public debate, no intra-party debate, no dissent at all against the leadership's surrender on this point. No greater proof is needed of the tragic moral degeneration of the Marxist Party which has merited the sobriquet 'neo-revisionist' from its break-away Naxalite wing.

With the Marxist C.P.'s Czechoslovak decision, the area of real differences between the C.P.I. and C.P. Marxist narrowed down rapidly. They moved closer to the pro-Indira position of the C.P.I. ordained by Moscow. They began to take a more 'positive' attitude towards the emergence of 'leftism' within the Congress—the phenomenon of 'young Turkism'. The road connecting 'neo-revisionism' with 'revisionism' was a very short road indeed!

The communists have advanced the slogan of a Left democratic front at the national level which needs to be critically examined.

What will be the main objective of this front? What will be its relationship with the various power groups in the Congress? How will it define its relationship with other non-Congress parties? What will be its attitude to outside interference, to the doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist States and limited autonomy of workers' parties? These are some of the questions that present themselves immediately and must be answered.

No communist with his critical faculties intact will seriously contend that any honest progressive has or can have a place in the Congress. He knows that Indira Gandhi does not believe in any programme except the programme

to keep herself in power. But they also know that the Soviet Government consider Mrs. Gandhi a pillar of stability, a known quantity to be preferred to an unknown one, to a change, to a plunge in the dark.

S. A. Dange, who supported our anti-Congress initiatives in 1967, told me last spring with remarkable candour that they would not support anything that would result in the debunking of Mrs. Gandhi or her removal from office. That is the desire of Kosygin and Brezhnev and, therefore, mandatory for the loyal communists. This being so, the C.P.I. is bound to take positions which do not involve a frontal attack on the Prime Minister. The assured communist support gives the Prime Minister wide scope for manoeuvring. She can use them to humiliate and attack her own colleagues when she likes; she can call off the attack when she feels that it has gone too far and might result in upsetting the balance which it is her constant endeavour to maintain.

The communists would, of course, like a coalition government to be set up at the Centre under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership in which they have a share, no matter how small. But this they are not going to get unless they single-mindedly pursue the goal of removing the Congress. For Mrs. Gandhi knows what control and leadership of a party like the Congress means. She remembers that greater and bigger men came to grief in the power game because they did not or could not acquire or retain control over the Congress, men like Netaji Subhas Bose, Rajagopalachari, Acharya Kripalani and Jayaprakash Narayan. That is the reason why she said at Faridabad that there is no question of polarising or dividing the Congress, that she has no intention of leaving it. The Congress must neither turn Left nor Right but must proceed on its own set course.

The communists often talk about the programmatic basis of

a Left democratic front. But when specific items are mentioned, they shy away from a fight to the finish.

**T**ake the question of privy purses. The socialists have been against it from the beginning; so have been the communists. The A.I.C.C. too, has adopted the 10-point programme which includes abolition of special princely privileges and privy purses. I took the lead in writing a joint letter to the Prime Minister in 1967 about taking firm executive and legislative measures and assuring her of our (Opposition) support in these measures. But when it came to pressing the issue, the communists and their friends began to drop hints that the matter was not that important after all, that it might lead to a princely revolt and the toppling of Mrs. Gandhi's government!

Then came the question of the growth of monopoly and the Birla inquiry. The communists are not unaware that the House of Birlas supported Mrs. Gandhi in the leadership contest. They also know that she made a deal with them on the eve of the mid-term poll. They know, too, that Birlas welcomed her as a family friend in Calcutta and financed her and the Congress campaign. They are not ignorant about the licences that continue to be issued to them by the ministries directly under the control of men close to Mrs. Gandhi. They have been informed that the Birlas' fertilizer projects in Goa and Mirzapur have been cleared by her on terms which are unusually favourable to them and to their foreign collaborators. And they also know that if the Mithapur project has not been cleared by her, it is not on account of any love for the public sector or hostility to the private sector or opposition to foreign collaboration, but only because the Tatas did not agree to the political conditions laid down by Mrs. Gandhi's negotiators.

What communist does not know that Mrs. Gandhi was a party to

the decision of not holding an inquiry against the Birlas? Or that the Prime Minister, if she had wished, could have ordered an investigation and can still order an investigation? But no communist will say this openly for they, too, are entangled in this business of monopoly capitalism. Nobody has forgotten the shock administered to all of us by the extremely favourable and anti-labour terms E.M.S. Namboodiripad of the undivided Communist Party granted to the Birlas for setting up a pulp factory in Kerala. And Jyoti Basu has lately 'discovered' that all Birlas are not alike, that some are less reactionary than others!

In no struggle against feudalism or monopoly capitalism or corruption, can the Left or progressive forces regard the establishment communists as dependable allies. They may travel some distance together, but if they come to feel that the fight is getting much too hot or intensified and will endanger Mrs. Gandhi's reputation, not to speak of her position as the Prime Minister, they would immediately apply the brakes and call off the struggle. This they will do, not because they are personal cowards, but because it is their set policy—be it the Right C.P.I. or the Marxists—not to challenge Mrs. Gandhi and her policies directly. They would prefer to wage limited wars with the shadows, with her lieutenants in the government.

Take for instance the Presidential election. In view of the uncertainty about the exercise by the President of his powers in certain circumstances, one can understand the communist anxiety about the democratic credentials of a presidential candidate, a candidate who would act with rectitude and in accordance with the accepted democratic norms; but the communists ran away from the contest and totally surrendered themselves to the Prime Minister. They decided to support the candidate of Mrs. Gandhi's choice, no matter who

he was! This was a shameful position for radical opposition parties to be in.

Advocates of the Left front refuse to answer several pertinent questions and clear up certain doubts. One such is the implication of the communist obsession with the danger of 'Right reaction' and their refusal to have 'anything to do' with the Right parties. How does this square with communist practice?

In a situation such as the one that the people of Bihar are facing, how are we to work out and apply the line of a Left alliance? Logically speaking, the leftist parties supporting this C.P.I. policy should have offered to cooperate with the 'secular' and 'progressive' Congress Government or enter into coalition with it or at least should have desisted from toppling it. For this toppling could be done in that State only in cooperation with the Jana Sangh and an alternative government formed only with the participation or support of that Rightist party.

The C.P.I., if it had been honest, logical and consistent, should have taken the first course: support to the Congress Government or coalition with it. However, it knew that such a line would be extremely unpopular with Bihar's anti-Congress masses. In Bihar, Congress vote in the mid-term poll was only 30 per cent as against 42 per cent in Leftist West Bengal.

So, in practice they toed the S.S.P.'s anti-Congress line and joined hands with other non-Congress parties in toppling the government. Now if Bihar is not to suffer Congress rule some working arrangement among non-Congress parties on the basis of a common programme is absolutely necessary. This is the stark reality, the basic requirement of the situation even if does not suit the Right Communist book.

In Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, a Leftist

front provides no real alternative to the Congress. Non-Congressism with insistence on programme implementation coupled with the efforts to build mass strength alone can be the proper policy for the Left. It is not at all necessary to participate in the non-Congress Governments nor to support them unconditionally. The Leftist parties cannot build up their own strength or project their independent image if they adopt a soft line towards the Congress.

What is true of Bihar is true of the Centre also. There the alternatives are either to support the Congress and help perpetuate present economic stagnation or to seek to introduce change, dynamism, movement into the fossilised political set-up by adopting the policy of a radical programme-based non-Congressism.

If this can be combined with joint mass action on specific issues, better results will be produced.

If possibilities of cooperation with Right parties on specific issues for the good of the people are to be shunned, may we ask as to why the Danges and Ramamurthis agreed to speak from the same platform with the Thengadis and Kanwarlal Guptas during the Central Government Employees' strike?

I would also like to know from these people as to what are the criteria of progressivism, and how the Congress 'leftists' who voted for the repressive Railway and Essential Services Bills are more progressive than the Jana Sangh members who opposed and voted against them!

The British Labour Party is by no means a radical party. But Labour Party dissidents show far greater courage in voting against their party than these Congress Leftists against theirs!

So it is not a question of being soft to the Rightist parties or giving up the struggle against communalism or against their reactionary activities. The main question is: what should be our

attitude to the Congress Party and its government at the Centre and in the States?

The Left parties, I think, should not extend support to the Congress: they should not do anything that will help it to keep itself in power anywhere. It is only by removing the Congress and by rebuilding the mass fronts and joint action that anti-Congressism will come to assume increasingly radical content. Mere ideological similarities do not necessarily lead to radical achievements, unless they are backed by time-bound programmes and the determination to implement them.

This should be tested in practice, in action, not on the basis of *a priori* reasoning. Where the Left parties articulate, in the main, the anti-Congress trend, I am not suggesting that Right parties should be invented to give the alliance the character of an all-in anti-Congress front!

And how is the slogan on a Left democratic front to be reconciled with the CPI's actual practice of cooperation with a communal, Right-wing party like the Muslim League in Kerala?

At the earlier stage, the CPI was opposed to cooperation with the Muslim League, but it later on gave up its 'moral stand' for more mundane reasons: The CPM also evolved a peculiar justification for this alliance, namely that while majority communalism was dangerous, minority communalism was not so dangerous!

This shows that the two communist parties are not motivated by any all-India perspective or consistent all-India line but are reflecting their parochial outlook, interests and needs or rationalising their politics of expediency into high-sounding political slogans.

So, whatever is necessary to keep Congress out of power in the States where they are strong, they do readily or willy-nilly; however, in areas where they are weak and the SSP is strong they prescribe their own unrealistic and irrelevant standards or tests in respect

of alliances and adjustments! Where do principles come in all this, one fails to understand.

Every political party functions in certain objective conditions and its politics is naturally coloured by regional peculiarities and regional needs. But should not an all-India party try to rise above these considerations and evolve a national line? This the two communist parties are unable to do because the middle premise of the nation, India, does not exist for them. Their playing up of the regional themes and their foreign affiliations and tradition of subordinating national interests to 'international' ones are largely responsible for this.

These realities of the Indian political situation and differences arising therefrom apart, people like us who regard some policies such as people's languages, preferential treatment for backward people, freedom of the socialist movement from interference from outside, etc., as fundamental, as justifying our separate existence, would not agree to sacrifice any of them for achieving a Left front which in any case cannot provide an alternative to the Congress in the largest States of India like the U.P. and Bihar or at the Centre. On the question of national interests and national borders we would not compromise our position just as we would not water down our struggle against feudalism and capitalism for achieving a 'durable alliance' of the so-called democratic and nationalist forces.

My disagreement with the CPI and CPM on this point does not mean that joint action should be ruled out on issues on which agreement is possible. If there cannot be an immediate agreement on the general line, nobody can impose one's own line on others.

The CPI will have to adjust its policies and change its orientation if it wants the cooperation between the SSP and itself to be strengthened and developed into a 'durable alliance'.

The Indian Communists would do well to remember this basic

fact and take a fresh look at the question on autonomous development. Were not the pretensions of the Soviet Union and its Communist Party to sole leadership of the world communist movement, its doctrine of limited sovereignty of other non-Soviet parties and States, and the right of the CPSU to a kind of overlordship over the rest challenged in clear and ringing terms by the Italian Communists at the Moscow Conference of world communists?

Said their spokesman, Mr. Berlinguer: 'Our opinion has always been and remains this: that at the present stage of maturity and expansion of our movement there can exist no directing centre, no guiding party and no guiding State... The independence of each party must be fully recognised and respected... Basically it is a question of suppressing any tendency towards a monolithic conception of any movement, such tendencies being not only erroneous but also utopian.'

He further said that, 'Even in the socialist camp national conditions, sentiments and interests cannot be ignored. There can be no real unity if no account is taken of national sentiment or if it is violated!'

*Mainstream, Link, Patriot* and other similar journals which regard all manifestations of national sentiment and national interests as a deplorable lapse into 'narrow-mindedness' and 'nationalism' would, of course, not agree with this formulation of the Italian Communist Party. For they have been viciously attacking the SSP and me for our advocacy of the nationalist cause in respect of Kutch and Kachchhathivu. But when the geographically largest State in the world comes to blows with a communist brother State over the possession of the icy wastes of Damansky Island in Ussuri and describes this island as the 'sacred and inviolable' soil of the Soviet Fatherland, these

fashionable leftists do not show the guts to tell the Soviets to settle the dispute by transferring the disputed bit of this territory to their Chinese communist comrades!

**A**t the Moscow Conference, S.A. Dange joined the 'anti-China chorus', defended Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and was the enthusiastic supporter of the discredited idea of a revived Cominform—an 'international' directing centre. His anti-China tirade was not a result of his defence of Indian national interests. In the fifties Dange dismissed all criticism of Chinese actions in relation to India as reactionary. He said China being a communist country it could never commit any aggression! It was only after China challenged the Soviet leadership of the world communist movement that Dange turned a 'patriot'.

This veneer of patriotism can be very deceptive. The young Turks who are advocating the cause of leftist unity—not outside and without the Congress but with the Congress and around Mrs. Gandhi's leadership—are also taken in by this. They propose to keep the Naxalites and Marxist Communists out of their leftist front, perhaps on the ground that their inclusion would give the front an anti-patriotic slant. But a little analysis would show that the nationalism of the Right CPI, which to them is acceptable, is also only skin deep. They are nationalists in a very limited sense, that is in so far as their basic loyalty to the Soviet Union permits them to defend Indian national interests. In case the two come into conflict, as was exemplified by Kutch and Russian Arms Supply to Pakistan, they do not hesitate to sacrifice India, for, to the Right Communists loyalty to the Soviet Union comes above everything else.

Czechoslovakia has shown that the CPI majority fully endorses the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty of Socialist States and communist parties, the Soviet right

of interference in the internal affairs of these States and parties, and the USSR's and CPSU's position as the sole and final arbiter in the matter of defining the limits of this sovereignty, as also the conditions which would warrant the exercise of the right of intervention in others' internal affairs.

And what about the Congress leftists themselves? Some of them at least take their cue from the Russians. For them, Czechoslovakia and the vicious doctrine of limited sovereignty and the Soviet right of intervention simply do not exist!

It is not surprising that the Congress leftists have no opinion on a vital matter like this? They are just not interested in this. They either do not have a conscience or if they have one it is so dead that it does not appear to trouble them in the least.

**T**his then is the condition of what is conventionally styled as the Left. How do we take this Left out of the present morass? How do we reconstruct it? Such a reconstruction must be based on the following major premises.

1. That the future of the country does not lie with the Congress or any Congress group or leader;
2. That the leftist parties must emerge as the leaders of the anti-Congress movement at the national as well as State levels and they should articulate the mass dissatisfaction with the Congress;
3. Throughout the country a common front be forged on issues affecting the common people, the adibasis, the harijans, the landless, the agricultural proletariat, the industrial workers, the urban poor, the students and unemployed youth. Let a beginning be made at the grass roots level;
4. They should give up the habit of pathetic ideological

and material dependence on outside 'directing centres, guiding parties and guiding States', and build up an autonomous, leftist movement;

5. That they should give up the obsession with 'dark reaction' and should not play the role of gallant heroes rescuing the Congress damsel in distress. This obsession strengthens the Congress and reaction;
6. That while waging an uncompromising struggle against reaction and communalism of some non-Congress parties, opportunities of fruitful cooperation on issues and programmes should not be shunned altogether. There is no need for the Left to be afraid of association with other non-Congress parties be they the DMK, Akalis, BKD, Jana Sangh or even the Swatantra, on specific issues and agreed programmes. If the Right parties keep away out of fear that is another matter!
7. Since the motivation of Naxalite youths is not ignoble, a dialogue should be maintained with them also. They should be drawn into the mainstream of the mass movement.
8. A serious debate should be started among Left-wing parties on all issues of Indian politics, /as also foreign policy, not in a polemical spirit but with a view to arriving at a deeper understanding and, if possible, agreement;
9. Joint action should not be spurned by any leftist party with others on specific issues simply because their general lines do not coincide.

**O**nly in this way can the present pitiable plight of the Left be

overcome and a new start made.  
July, 1969

Postscript:

The above was written before the Bangalore Meeting of the AICC and the decision of the Parliamentary Board to sponsor the candidature of Sanjiva Reddy. On the basis of its policy of anti-Congressism, the SSP supported the candidature of V.V. Giri. The slogan which it gave at that time was 'Vote Giri and split the Congress'. It cannot be denied that the Presidential Election aggravated group rivalries within the Congress and, although no action was taken by the Nijalingappa group against the Prime Minister before the Presidential Election or in the Working Committee Meeting held on August 25, 1969, it was this controversy that finally led to the split within the Congress.

I never regarded the split within the Congress as being ideologically motivated. Thereafter, the two sections of the rival Congresses which met separately at the end of the year reaffirmed their faith in the so-called 10-point programme (passed by the undivided AICC in 1967). Neither of these parties has formulated a concrete and time-bound programme for bringing about basic social changes.

The Ruling Party has been making a series of unprincipled compromises, thereby exposing its reactionary character. Within 24 hours of the passing of the high-sounding resolution at Bombay, Mrs. Gandhi made three New Year presents to the big monopoly houses of this country. She conceded a price rise to the monopoly manufacturers of Vanaspati Ghee (dalda) led by Hindustan Levers who alone produce 30% of the total production of this commodity. She also accepted the demand for a steep rise in steel prices in order to appease the Tatas and their steel associates, Biren Mukherji and Goenka. She also finalised the Goa Fertiliser licence for the Birlas about which

a reference has been made in the above article in July, 1969 itself. The information, which I then had, has since been confirmed finally and formally by the Prime Minister.

After the striking down of the Bank Nationalisation Act, the new Ordinance issued by the government provided for enormous sums as compensation to the bankers.

And the new Railway Budget has imposed additional burdens on the third class passengers and has also increased freight charges whose ultimate incidence will fall on the ordinary consumer. The new General Budget is also likely to impose additional taxes on the common man.

For fear of being defeated in the House, Mrs. Gandhi allowed the Preventive Detention Act to lapse. However, the State Governments were told that they could proceed with their own enactments at the State level. Significantly, the so-called progressive 'indicate' governments of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Assam passed the reactionary and repressive Preventive Detention Legislation. The Andhra Bill is supposed to be even more draconian than other similar State enactments. Curiously enough, the reactionary 'syndicate' governments in Uttar Pradesh (which has since resigned) and in Gujarat and Mysore have not so far passed this kind of legislation.

Similarly, in Uttar Pradesh the 'new' Congress has agreed to support unconditionally the government headed by Charan Singh. Charan Singh's policy is inimical to the poor farmers and the landless kisans and he made it clear in no uncertain terms that he would not agree to abolish the land tax on uneconomic holdings. When C. B. Gupta's Government passed the Ordinance, Mrs. Gandhi claimed that this was as a matter of fact his father's programme and that it was Gupta who had been coming in the way of its imple-

mentation. And yet the new Congress has agreed to support Charan Singh who is dead-set against this abolition!

It is well known that the alternative 'mini front' government in Kerala was installed by the Governor with not only the connivance, but active encouragement from the Centre. The Marxist party is torn by two conflicting desires, one to avenge its defeat in Kerala and the other to remain in power in West Bengal somehow. In Parliament they are still continuing their policy of offering general support to Mrs. Gandhi's Government. As to the CPI and the PSP, they are now the most ardent supporters of Mrs. Gandhi not only in Parliament, but also in Bihar. The PSP which sided with the opposition on the Rabat and Jagjivan Ram's tax affairs issues in the Winter Session of Parliament in 1969 has changed its policy and has decided to start 'meaningful dialogues' with Mrs. Gandhi's party and Government. What shape these 'meaningful dialogues' will take will become clear in the course of time!

So far as I am concerned I have no manner of doubt that the future development will increasingly bear out the correctness of our analysis of Mrs. Gandhi and her policy and compel the C.P.M. and the SSP and ultimately the CPI to put themselves in opposition to this government of reaction and the *status quo*. The SSP's analysis will ultimately be vindicated as events unfold themselves; meanwhile I would suggest co-operation on as many specific issues as possible among the parties of the Left, both in the legislatures as well as outside, especially in the arena of mass struggles. I would also suggest that the differences that undoubtedly exist between some of these parties of the Left and the SSP should not be unnecessarily accentuated. A time may soon come when our view-points will begin to converge again.)

# **T**he contemporary role

N. K. KRISHNAN

THE split in the National Congress has opened up immense possibilities of advance for the Left forces in India, possibilities of a nature that never came up during the last 22 years of independent India. But, in order that these possibilities may be most fruitfully utilised, it is incumbent on the Left to make a sober objective analysis of this split, freed from all preconceived political obsession and prejudices, and devise a correct strategy of united action to meet the challenge posed. For, this split is indeed both a challenge and an opportunity for them.

Those who argue that this split is purely due to the power conflict between rival groups inside the ruling party are guilty of superficial oversimplification.

Everybody knows that there have always been power conflicts inside the National Congress both at Central and State levels, but they never led to such a split. This time the split came in such a cataclysmic manner precisely because there were deeper driving forces operating, mass driving forces. These driving forces have been the rapidly accelerated popular discontent in the country against Congress policies during the last few years, the mounting curve of mass struggles spreading to ever-widening sections of the people and the defeats sustained by the Congress Party in the general elections of 1967 and more particularly in the mid-term elections of 1969.

Indeed it is this latter defeat—the defeat in the mid-term elec-

tions of 1969—that triggered off the mounting crisis inside the ruling party and led, step by step, to the final split.

**T**he split inside the National Congress indeed bears the impress of these driving forces of mass revolt and mass movement against Congress policies. It is because of this that the split has generated an unprecedented wave of mass awakening, political radicalisation and mass expectation of radical change among all sections of the common people. This became manifest at the time of Giri's election victory and the nationalisation of the 14 major banks.

Seen in the context of this background alone does the character of the two sides that have emerged as a result of the split become clear.

None—excepting those blinded by non-class obsessions about the theory of 'non-Congressism' can fail to see that the Syndicate-Jana Sangh-Swatantra combination is based on the forces of obscurantism and resistance to radical change and to the rising tide of the mass movements. Indeed, the core of this combination is linked with aggressive defence of monopoly and feudal interests in home policy and pro-imperialist reaction in foreign policy.

On the other side, it is true that the Prime Minister's group is still quite heterogeneous—and as one goes down from the Centre to the States its heterogeneous character becomes still more pronounced. Indeed, it would be fatuous and futile on the part of the serious Left to expect the National Congress to split into two factions on 'pure' ideological lines—one 'socialist' and the other 'anti-socialist'. Obviously, no bourgeois party splits on such a basis. The point for the Indian Left, however, is to make up its mind as to which side will be more helpful in the realisation of Left objectives, which side will be more responsive to the pressures of mass sanc-

tions and the mass movement, which side is more responsive to the wave of political radicalisation sweeping across the country.

From this point of view, events have already proved that the Prime Minister's Congress is undoubtedly more amenable to mass pressure and the mass popular awakening for radical change and therefore, the Left must marshal their forces in such a manner as will compel Indira Gandhi to translate her professions into practice. At the same time, it is essential that the Left forces outside the Congress should take urgent steps to forge unity among themselves as well as more coordinated activity with the really radical forces inside the Indira Gandhi Congress and its mass following, so as to make themselves more effective on the national scene.

At the same time, the Left must firmly fight, politically and ideologically, the Syndicate-Jana Sangh-Swatantra combine and allow it no quarter to come to power at the Centre.

**T**his does not, of course, mean that the Left give blanket support to Indira Gandhi's Government or form a united front with it. Indeed, the dynamics of the Indian situation, as it has developed during the last 22 years and culminated in the split of the ruling party, has proceeded in such a manner that the conflict between the forces of monopoly, engendered by capitalist development, on the one hand and all other sections of the Indian people, has progressively been sharpening and coming to a head.

It is this conflict and the mass discontent and mass movement arising out of it which has led to growing political differentiation within the Indian bourgeoisie and its party, the National Congress. The Indian Left, therefore, has to hinge its strategy on formulating a concrete programme of urgently-needed radical measures to curb and break the power of Indian monopoly and of foreign private capital linked with it and

to eliminate landlordism and advance the interests of the toiling peasantry and agricultural workers. The Left must take steps to unleash a united mass movement for implementation of such a programme.

**T**he new possibilities opened up for the Left by the split in the National Congress consists precisely in the fact that in the struggle for implementation of such a radical programme the forces of the Left can secure an immensely wider base than ever before. The bulk of the sections following the Indira Gandhi Congress can become allies of the Left in this struggle.

In the course of such a mass movement and such mass struggles, the Left can simultaneously perform the three-fold objectives of isolating and defeating the Syndicate-Jana Sangh-Swatantra combine, shifting the Indira Gandhi Government further to the Left and bringing about the needed further political differentiation inside the Indira Gandhi Congress.

History has placed the Indian Left in a position to discharge these three objectives in one process—provided it discards petty prejudices and partisan considerations, gets its political perspectives correct and marshals its forces for unleashing a mass movement in this direction.

It is failure to see this that leads sections of the Left to confused theories of 'equi-distance' from both the Congress groups, of forming 'a third force' and so on—theories which in the developing complicated Indian situation today would only land them in practice as camp-followers of reaction, as in the case of certain sections of the SSP leadership.

The Left and democratic parties in the country must immediately open up a dialogue among themselves, as well as with the radical forces inside the Congress, on the imperatives of such a concrete platform of urgently needed measures and on unleashing a united

mass political campaign for its effective implementation. A vast body of scientists and technicians, economists and radical intellectuals are already there in the country today thinking along these lines, who could participate most fruitfully in such a dialogue.

Our party, the Communist Party of India, is of the opinion that the fourth five-year plan must be replaced by a new plan based on radical structural and policy changes to give effect to the expectations and urges of the people. In order to make India advance along the path of economic development and self-reliance, the following measures are urgently needed.

Nationalisation of foreign oil companies, export-import trade, foreign banks, drugs and pharmaceutical companies and tea plantations, has become a national necessity if our economy is to make a radical break from the past.

Moratorium on debt repayments involving expenditure of foreign exchange, ban on repatriation of profits of foreign companies and ban on further collaboration agreements except where indigenous technology is not available—these steps are indispensable if our economy is to disentangle itself progressively from the shackles of 'foreign aid'.

In order to remove the road-blocks to radical reforms, right of property as a Fundamental Right must be removed from Part III of the Constitution. In order to curb the monopolies, the recommendations of the Dutt Committee for conversion of the loans advanced to the public sector by financial institutions and the government into equity and other effective anti-monopoly measures must be implemented. Nationalisation of sugar mills and of wholesale trade in foodgrains is urgently needed in order to tone up the national economy.

Monopoly power cannot be effectively controlled and living standards of the working people

raised without other measures such as the following:

—Ceiling on acquisition of urban property in land and buildings; nationalisation of all vacant lands in and around cities with a population of over two lakhs or around industrial centres; steeply graded wealth tax on existing urban property in land and buildings with family as unit subject to the present exemption limit.

—Ban on acquisition of agricultural property by industrial houses and requisitioning by the State of such existing holdings.

—Ending bureaucratic grip over public sector and establishing workers' effective participation in management at all levels.

—Commandeering by the State of a certain proportion of such commodities as enter into the cost of living indices for the working class and the middle-class, for the purpose of their distribution through government shops at controlled prices to the poorer sections of the people.

—Rapid expansion of employment opportunities, specially through a well-planned rural working class and the middle-of irrigation, rural electrification and extensive credit facilities for the running of small and medium scale engineering and other industries as well as for their expansion, rural workshops and urban housing.

The Left will probably have to fight their crucial main battles in the coming period on the agrarian front, where social tensions and conflicts are rapidly getting aggravated. Here, a concrete effective programme will have to be put forward and mass struggles organised on its basis.

In order to put an end to landlordism, lock, stock and barrel, the

remaining old feudal intermediary tenures must be abolished, evictions banned and rents reduced to one-fifth or one-fourth of the produce. Tenants and sharecroppers must be brought into direct contact with the State and given full ownership of land as soon as possible, except in case of lands belonging to disabled persons, minors, army personnel and industrial workers.

Ceiling limits must be lowered and all loopholes in the ceiling laws plugged. All banjar lands must be distributed to the agricultural workers and other sections of the rural poor. Illegal grabbing of tribal people's lands by others must be stopped and such lands already gathered by Mahajans and landlords must be restored to the tribal people.

Adequate funds should be provided from the nationalised banks and other financial institutions for irrigation facilities to at least half the land under cultivation.

Separate cooperatives of the toiling peasants and agricultural workers should be organised so as to give them cheap credit, electricity, fertilisers, new seeds and other facilities for efficient farming.

New trade union laws must be passed in all States for ensuring a living wage, adequate bonus, gratuity and for the recognition of trade unions on the basis of secret ballot.

None of these urgent and minimum measures can be properly implemented without a radical overhaul of the corrupt bureaucratic administrative structure. As a first step in such a direction and in order effectively to combat bureaucratic sabotage, professional experts with a record of commitment to democratic ideals of social progress should be inducted into the Planning Commission and in the ministries. Pro-monopoly and anti-democratic officers must be removed from key posts. The 'guaranteed' position of the ICS,

a heritage left by the British rulers, must be sharply attacked.

**T**hese are only some of the proposals which our party is placing before the country, as essential ingredients of a radical democratic platform around which the Left and radical democratic forces in the country can purposefully unite for mass struggles and mass action in the present situation. Through such a united mass movement and mass action alone can the Indian Left play its effective role in the present national situation and bring about necessary shifts in the political balance of forces to take the country towards socialism.

Such a course necessarily means a correct understanding of the character of the split in the National Congress and a correct broad non-sectarian perspective of uniting all the Left and radical democratic forces in the country in one common stream and isolating the combine of reaction. Mutual relationship among the Left parties and forces must, therefore, correspond to, and rest upon, such a broad political perspective and understanding.

Finally, the Indian Left must realise that the combined forces of rightist reaction have already opened an offensive in the field of foreign policy against the well-established principles of anti-imperialism and friendship and cooperation with the socialist world which are the best traditions and heritage of our national movement. In the name of 'correcting imbalances' in the policy of non-alignment, a line of disrupting our friendly relations and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, a line of aligning India with the American camp and with satellite powers of Yankee imperialism, is being pushed forward and propagated. The Jana Sangh, with its poisonous slogan of 'Indianisation of Muslims' is stoking the fires of Indo-Pakistan conflict, besides buttressing Hindu communalism.

The Indian Left has to fight these trends uncompromisingly if

it is to further the cause of socialism in India. Our allies are the heroic fighting people of Vietnam, bearing the torch of national freedom and anti-imperialism against the American aggressors. Our allies are the socialist countries, not those who are working to destroy socialism and prop up capitalism throughout the world. Friendship and cooperation between India and Pakistan is indispensable not only to solve the complicated economic problems facing the peoples of this sub-continent but also to fight the evil forces of reactionary communalism in our country.

**R**eaction today is posing a challenge to the Left forces in our country—not merely by its direct bid for power at the Centre, but also by its indirect and diversionary attacks in multifarious forms to disrupt the unity and integrity of the democratic and working class movement. They are rousing communal, chauvinist and separatist passions on a wide front, exploiting border problems, exploiting the burning problem of unemployment, exploiting every issue left unsolved and festering by the present rulers, appealing to backwardness and obscurantism. The Indian Left has to come out openly against every such attempt and take up its position on a principled basis, standing up for the rights of the Muslims and other minorities, fighting against every manifestation of social and caste oppression, fighting to preserve the unity and integrity of the working class and democratic movement.

Short of the hard and arduous path of mobilising and organising the masses at field level, giving a correct political orientation and perspective to the mass movement and giving relentless battle to reactionary and obscurantist ideologies, there can be no shortcut to social revolution in India. Those who attempt to short-circuit this path by dogmatic formulae and cliches or by unprincipled parliamentary manoeuvres will come to grief and will have to learn things the hard way.

# **The centrist pull**

SUMANTA BANERJEE

THE stubborn resilience of Centrism in Indian politics has always been the despair of the Left. The middle-of-the-road policy seems to have gained another spurt of life with Mrs Gandhi's success in remaining in power. 'Some people say that I

am a Communist and that I want to lead the country to an ultra Left path. There are others who think that I am not sufficiently inclined to the Left. Both are wrong. I am following the middle path.' (Mrs Gandhi's speech at a meeting of Congress workers in

Calcutta; *Statesman*, Calcutta edition, February 6, 1970).

The announcement of some long over-due measures like bank nationalization, abolition of privy purses and land reforms has encouraged fond hopes about the socialist potential of Mrs Gandhi's government.

But, for the Leftists the Prime Minister's Centrist policies have had a disastrously emollient and soporific effect. While some have decided to throw in their lot with Mrs Gandhi, others are still pathetically torn between the contradictory demands of the situation.

Before examining the response of the Leftist parties to the latest challenge posed by Centrism, it would be interesting to note the tradition of Centrism in the Congress.

The Congress has always been able to accommodate heterogeneous class interests. During the national movement, this was possible partly because of common opposition to alien rule and partly due to Gandhi's notion of trusteeship and belief in class harmony combined with a tapping of traditional currents of thought in India.

In the post-independence era also, none of the interests whom Nehru belaboured were driven completely to the wall. The princes for instance, received a wide array of *quid pro quo*, the annual tax-free privy purse being only one of them, in return for their accession to the Union. The same attitude of moderation was evident in his treatment of business communities, who were granted the private sector, but faced restricted legislation, State sector encroachment and numerous kinds of taxes.

The refusal of the Congress to identify itself purely with the Right thus failed to bring forth into existence a potent, coherent Leftist opposition. The Congress moderation accounts for today's immature opposition. For, so long as the rule of a single class is not

organized completely, so long as it does not acquire its pure political expression, the antagonism of the opponent classes cannot appear in its pure form and it cannot ripen into a consistent adversary.

The Centrist tradition is carried out successfully by Mrs Gandhi in her present policies and pronouncements. Soon after bank nationalization, she was prompt in assuring relevant interests that there should not be any fear of further nationalization. 'We have first to consolidate the first step (bank nationalization) and its gains and study the overall impact of it. It will not be good to be hasty.' (Her speech at a rally before her house on August 26, 1969).

**T**he new year, 1970, began with further retreats. The government cleared the licence for the \$ 75 million fertilizer project of the Birlas and sanctioned an average increase of Rs 75 per tonne in the price of steel.

But driven by the pressure of mass demands generated by her promises, and being at the same time, like a conjurer, under the necessity of keeping the public gaze fixed on herself, as Nehru's substitute—(since in an underdeveloped country like India, a charismatic image is a necessity)—she has to spring constant surpluses. So she may execute a coup d'état in miniature now and then, by dropping some minister or other. Or she may strike a radical posture by welcoming the National Liberation Front delegation from South Vietnam.

Thus, Mrs Gandhi has demonstrated the Centrist principle that it is easy to contrive a policy of compromise on the basis of an extremely broad and ambiguous 'socialism.'

The Leftist response to her challenge would indicate the state of dislocation of the Left parties. Antagonisms that seemed to work themselves up to a climax before July this year, (like a possible

showdown between the Centre on the one hand and Kerala and West Bengal on the other) have lost their sharpness and fallen away without being able to resolve themselves. The blaring overture that announced immediately after the 1967 elections that the Leftists would soon capture power in the Centre, has died away in a pusillanimous snarl.

**L**et us take the two Communist parties first. The CPI sees in the current developments the vindication of their programme, the emergence of a clear cut rift between the monopolist section of the bourgeoisie, whose spokesman is the Syndicate, and the national bourgeoisie, whom Indira Gandhi represents. It feels that more and more Congressmen will move in the direction of the National Democratic Front. To accelerate this process, the party has urged the Opposition to 'develop closer contacts and cooperation with the active progressive elements among the supporters of the Indira Gandhi Government.' (Re: CPI National Council Resolution on the political developments, November 26, 1969).

According to the party's General Secretary, C. Rajeshwara Rao, 'although the CPI does not expect Mrs Gandhi's Government to implement all the economic reforms proposed by the party, it hopes that pressure on the government by the united progressive sections could bring about the reforms.' (*Statesman*, December 31).

Thus, the CPI seems to feel that the present government at the Centre will be as radical in its programme and policies as the Left can persuade or compel it to be. For the time being, therefore, its role will be reduced to a pressure group. Its aim is to put Mrs Gandhi on the road to socialism; to see its aims become the aims of Mrs Gandhi.

The CPI (M) is in a dilemma. Even since its formation in 1964, it has been rearing up its rank and file on the belief that the Congress as a whole was a reactionary

mass and should not be touched with a pair of tongs. This was its position till as late as April 19 last year, when its Central Committee asserted that none of the groups and factions within the Congress squarely stood for the reversal of the pro-landlord, pro-big bourgeois policies and for the adoption of alternative democratic principles.

**B**ut after the July-August developments, the party's General Secretary, P. Sundarayya, had to acknowledge policy differences within the ruling group. He said that his party would support progressive measures taken by Mrs Gandhi and appealed to Congress members and groups to join hands with democratic forces to build up pressure for the adoption of more radical measures. He added that his party would oppose any Rightist conspiracy to topple Mrs Gandhi's government. (*Statesman*, August 23).

The later developments suggest the confusion and division among the leaders of the CPI (M) and the consequent vacillating policy. After the ousting of the Marxist Communists from the Kerala Government, E.M.S. Namboodiripad threatened to woo the Syndicate to spite Mrs Gandhi for having allowed the CPI to form a ministry in Kerala. He said in Madras that his party would not hesitate to vote 'even with the Syndicate against the government on specific policy issues even if it meant the fall of Mrs Gandhi's Ministry and a mid-term election to Parliament.' He added that his party would adopt the same policy in the Kerala Assembly. (*Statesman*, December 1, 1969.)

But soon after this, events in West Bengal took a serious turn with the threat of a mini-front Ministry backed by Mrs Gandhi's group. S. D. Sharma, General Secretary of the ruling Congress party, said in Delhi that his party would not mind Ajoy Mukherjee heading a government in West

Bengal in 'changed circumstances.' (*Statesman*, January 25, 1970.)

This prompted the CPI (M) to change its position. Sundarayya and Jyoti Basu rushed to Delhi on January 27 to hand over to Mrs Gandhi a letter assuring her of their support to her against the Syndicate-Jana Sangh-Swatantra axis. They at the same time warned Mrs Gandhi that if there were attempts to oust the Marxists from the West Bengal Government and form a mini-front government on the Kerala pattern, 'the support your party and government are seeking in their struggle to fight the threat of the conservative alliance, from the democratic and advanced sections of the people, will surely be vitiated.'

The party's Central Committee which met in Calcutta on February 6, sanctioned the policy outlined in the letter to Mrs Gandhi.

**T**hus, while the CPI has already reconciled itself to a policy of general support with a moderate doze of pressure on the ruling party, the CPI (M) is still hesitating between the choice of developing an alternative array of forces in opposition to Mrs Gandhi and that of alternately cajoling and threatening Mrs Gandhi, to have their way. The main consideration preventing the Marxists from adopting a more ruthless policy against Mrs Gandhi is the fear of a combined Rightist coup in which event the first victims will be the communists.

The responses of the two communist parties reflect the old conflict in their parent body—the united CPI. The CPI had always veered between what are known in party parlance as 'Left sectarianism' and 'Right opportunism', between the phase of insurrectionary attempts in 1948-49 and of pro-Nehru policies in the fifties. Of the two parties, the one which has taken over the name of the parent body, is more and more leaning towards the ruling party and in the near future may be the closest partner in any coalition

with Mrs Gandhi's Congress at the Centre.

The CPI (M) on the other hand has inherited the ambivalence of the parent body. Ever since its formation in 1964, the party has been wavering between faith and doubt in parliamentarism. Is it desirable to try to bring changes in the present framework of the Constitution or is it necessary first to wreck the framework? Should the party utilize it or should it expose it? A few excerpts from the controversial statement issued by E.M.S. Namboodiripad and A.K. Gopalan in Trivandrum on July 7, 1969, would help illustrate the dilemma: Among the aims, they list: '...to expose bourgeois parliamentary democratic system, to develop discontentment against it among the people and to raise that discontentment to an organized revolutionary movement.' In another part of the same statement they say: '...the legislative assembly and ministry can be used as a forum for working for the urgent and partial needs of toiling masses and peasantry.'

When the CPI (M) joined the Kerala and West Bengal Ministries, they were therefore left with two alternatives—a showdown with the Centre to expose the futility of the Constitution or a compromise with it. The problems of both the States would suggest why they had to waver between threatening a showdown and offering a compromise. For one thing, both the State Governments could hardly hope to be able to feed their citizens adequately out of their own products. They had to depend for their very existence on Central recognition and Central help in the reconstruction needed to put the States on their feet.

**M**oreover, the Marxist ministers slipped into seats vacated by their Congress predecessors and were served by the same IAS or IPS officers whose social background was attuned to Congress traditions. They were not in a position to change either the traditional

institutional framework in which political decisions were taken or the bureaucratic machinery which was meant to carry out the decisions. This explains why even after the unprecedented police outrage in the West Bengal Assembly, in which the instigation and involvement of high officials were proved, the government had to remain a helpless spectator as it could not remove the officials without the permission of the Centre.

In such a situation, the CPI (M) preferred to build up its image by extending the party base instead of depending solely on legislative reforms. Reforms like the distribution of vested land among the landless or achievements like solving disputes in tea, jute and textile industries in West Bengal also help to boost up the party's prestige, as both the Land Revenue and Labour portfolios in this State were held by a CPI (M) Minister.

But the urge to extend the party base soon led to the inevitable clashes with other contenders. In Kerala, the situation reached such an extent that the CPI (M) stood finally isolated and had to leave the United Front. The failure of the Marxists there to put up successfully the threatened fight against the mini-front ministry could suggest two things. Either, there has been an erosion in the support of the CPI (M) with the latter's departure from power, or the Marxists are reserving their strength to fight the next elections hoping to emerge with a more comfortable majority.

In West Bengal, the CPI (M) is facing a similar fate. Inter-party clashes have reached a stage where governmental working has come to a standstill. In the rural areas, the clashes are between land hungry peasants and landowners who are taking refuge with one constituent party or another of the United Front. In the urban areas, the lumpen proletariat have swelled the ranks of almost every party and are on the usual rampage. Gang warfares, an

old feature of Calcutta's social life are, therefore, taking on political colour. The extent of the problem can be gauged by the admission made by CPI (M) leaders that 'anti-social elements' have infiltrated into their party.

The CPI (M) being the most powerful party in West Bengal and occupying key posts in the government, naturally stands to gain in such a situation. Quite understandably, it has become the target of attack by its rivals, particularly the CPI and Bangla Congress. Gradually it is becoming isolated in the Front and may soon share the fate of its comrades in Kerala.

Although the Marxists have warned that there would be a mass upsurge if there were any attempt to oust them from power, the experience in Kerala has shown how empty such threats can be. Besides, there are always practical difficulties in sustaining mass movements. One remembers what happened in West Bengal after the dismissal of the first U.F. Government in 1967. The civil disobedience movement against P. C. Ghosh's rump-Ministry reached a blind alley after some time. It was not the mass movement, but Ashu Ghosh's defection from the ruling coalition, that rung the knell of the P.C. Ghosh Ministry.

In Kerala also, if the mini-front ministry faces any danger, it is not from the CPI (M) led hunger strike or satyagraha, but from the possibilities of inter-party disputes in the shaky coalition. The demand made by P. K. Kunju to be taken back in the ministry has already created tensions in the mini-front, as the constituents feel that his inclusion would hit the balance in favour of the ISP in the front.

Taking advantage of the discomfiture of the Marxists, the CPI is gradually consolidating its base. Although its all-India policy is to concentrate attack on the Rightists, it has no compunction in forming a government in Kerala with the Kerala

Congress, some members of which party voted for the Rightist candidate, Sanjiva Reddy, in the Presidential contest. Nor has it any scruple in utilizing the Central Reserve Police in Kerala to put down the CPI (M) movement.

Judging by the trend of events, one would not be surprised if the CPI agrees to participate in a government in West Bengal with the passive support of the Indira-Congress in the State. This would be in keeping with its National Council resolution of November 26 urging 'closer contacts' and cooperation with the active progressive elements among the supporters of the Indira Gandhi Government. What is probably preventing it from adopting such a course is the public hatred against the present stalwarts of Mrs Gandhi's Congress in West Bengal, against people like Siddhartha Ray and Bijoy Singh Nahar. But then, again, political memories are a curious mixture of elephantine persistence and almost total oblivion.

What is the future of the communists, who are strong in West Bengal and Kerala? In both these States, they were carried to power on a wave of mass unrest and frustration with the corruption and inefficiency of the old order. But the conditions under which they agreed to share power with the other parties, precluded any drastic legislation of a socialist kind and limited their achievement to wage increase of white collar workers, restoration of trade union rights to certain category of workers, and provision of free education at some stages, among other things. Although some land could be distributed among the landless, there were obstructions from the big landowners who were successful in misusing the legal process to scuttle implementation of the reforms.

Quite obviously, in an economy of limited resources, such plans to distribute concessions are bound to reach a saturation point.

Further progress is bound up with the need for changing the entire economic structure and the administrative framework at the Centre. The CPI hopes to work its way up through United Fronts at the State level and finally share power at the Centre with Leftist and Centrist elements. The CPI (M) is not prepared to discard parliamentarianism or United Fronts, even after the fiasco in Kerala and West Bengal. The party wants to streamline future United Fronts by avoiding Centrist parties. But then, again, the anti-CPI fanaticism of some of its leaders often gets the better of the ideological policies, as evident from E.M.S. Namboodiripad's insistence on enlisting the support of the Syndicate to topple the CPI-led Ministry in Kerala.

If the present ambivalence is allowed to drift further within the CPI (M) it is bound to affect seriously its rank and file. Brought up on the belief that the Congress and the CPI were their main enemies, the ranks would find it difficult to change overnight to a pro-Indira stance. It would not be possible for them too to accept half-heartedly parliamentarianism and work enthusiastically in election campaigns, for long. Another split in the party ranks is inevitable. While some might opt for a Centrist policy and soon shade off into the ranks of the CPI, others might merge with the Naxalites.

The antagonisms which are still slumbering undeveloped in the CPI (M) have broken out in a rabid form in the policies of those Leftist parties which claim to be democratic socialists—the SSP and the PSP.

The SSP, since its formation, has shown a bewildering propensity to factional disputes. The need for formulating a policy towards Mrs Gandhi's government, has thrown the party completely out of gear, and it is facing a split.

Although the recently held Sonepur convention of the party managed to avert a split, the differences could not lie harmoniously side by side for long. This

became evident in less than two weeks after the end of the convention.

The main two alternatives proposed at the Sonepur convention were whether the SSP should join hands even with the Rightist parties to bring down Mrs Gandhi's government, or whether they should take a more conciliatory attitude towards Mrs Gandhi in view of the split in the Congress.

While the former line was spearheaded by Raj Narain and supported with minor reservations by Madhu Limaye, the latter found a weak defender in S. M. Joshi. The anti-Indira Gandhi group won the day, and the so-called compromise resolution gave a mandate to the party to seek the support of any party in its effort to topple the government at the Centre headed by Mrs Gandhi.

Soon after this, the party was faced with the choice of forming a government in Bihar. Ramanand Tiwari, leader of the SSP Legislative party was nominated by the Central leadership to head the newly formed SVD comprising the Syndicate, the Swatantra and the Jana Sangh besides the SSP. This was the interpretation of the compromise resolution, according to the Raj Narain group.

But the party in Bihar soon ran into difficulties. The decision to side with the Rightists was resented by a section of the party workers. The Bihar SSP deputy leader, Inder Kumar, resigned in protest. Presumably under pressure from this section, Tiwari also resigned from the SVD on February 7 and announced his eagerness to form a bloc comprising his party, the PSP, the CPI and the Loktantrik Congress among others. Significantly, the announcement was made in Patna in the presence of the PSP Chairman, Karpoori Thakur.

The party is thus on the brink of a split, with the Chairman and the General Secretary working at loggerheads. The much heralded policy of 'non-Congressism' is

passing through a severe test. With the split in the Congress, the leaders of the SSP are being compelled to identify their main enemies. They are yet to find out whether they should fight both the Congress groups or choose only the ruling group.

Much of the present crisis of the SSP is rooted in its past. A representative of the democratic socialist strain of our Leftist movement, the SSP inherited the anti-communist tradition of that strain. In its desire to retain its nationalistic image and emerge as a challenge to the communist movement, it often digressed from the Leftist path, as evident from its organization of satyagraha on the Kutch issue or agitation on Kacchatiyu, even at the risk of provoking wars with neighbouring countries. In the course of these agitations, often the SSP pronouncements could hardly be distinguished from Jana Sangh policies on such issues.

The legacy left by Dr Lohia also has much to do with the present attitude of the SSP leadership. Dr Lohia's antipathy to Nehru assumed a sort of anti-modern bias in his followers' hands. Anything in the tradition of Nehru, became suspect in the SSP eyes. In reaction to the westernized trend of the Nehru tradition, the SSP harped back to Hindi, which more than often dragged it back to the obscurantist trends of the Hindi-speaking belt. The anti-Nehru policy assumed distressing proportions particularly in the SSP's attitude towards Indian foreign policy, leading it to refuse to condemn U.S. intervention in Viet Nam or Israeli aggression in the Middle East.

As a result, a negative, destructive attitude came to be crystallized in the thinking process of the SSP leadership. The slogan of non-Congressism was the inevitable result. The strong traditional bias against scientific reasoning has drawn them today into the fold of Right reaction.

It seems that while one section in the party, under the leadership

of S. M. Joshi, may join the Centrist stream of Indian politics along with the CPI, the other section may be led to align itself with the Syndicate-Jana Sangh-Swatantra axis. The polarization within the party has already become evident in Bihar and U.P.—the two SSP strongholds. The Raj Narain group is bent on having an alliance with the Rightists in Bihar and on supporting C. B. Gupta in U.P. In both these States, his line is being opposed by a small but vociferous section in the party.

The bitter anti-communist record of the PSP should have drawn it closer to the SSP. Frequent attempts have been made in the past to merge the two parties. But every amalgamation supplied the occasion for a fresh split. Personal rivalry could have been one of the factors standing in the way of a merger. The latest move indicated by the exchange of views between the SSP Chairman, Karpouri Thakur, and the PSP Chairman, Goray, may also be doomed to a similar fate.

The PSP meanwhile, under the impact of Mrs Gandhi's policies, is vertically divided between the two trends of support and opposition to the ruling party. The National Executive's proposal to commit the party to open dialogue with Mrs Gandhi's Congress, came in for sharp criticism from H. V. Kamath, a member of the National Executive. Finally, a compromise was struck by including other parties, besides the Indira Gandhi Congress, for opening the dialogue.

But since the anti-Indira trend in the PSP has not yet been able to consolidate itself, unlike the SSP the party has managed to keep itself away from a direct alignment with the Rightist forces. Besides, the PSP has little influence in any of the major States. If there is a polarization in the party, it will follow the same pattern as evident in the SSP.

As for the other minor Leftist parties, their influence is restricted to certain States only. Most

of them have come out with policy announcements supporting Mrs Gandhi against the Syndicate. But their loyalties sway with the regional politics of their respective States. The RSP, for instance, is with the CPI (M) against the Bangla Congress and the CPI in West Bengal, but is supporting the CPI in the Kerala mini-front. The Forward Bloc in West Bengal is divided between the need to maintain the U.F. and fight against the CPI (M). The SSP—a minor force in both Kerala and West Bengal—is with the CPI (M) in Kerala, but is one of the bitterest enemies of the Marxists in West Bengal.

In any future realignment of forces, these small parties will be divided according to the demands of State politics and the sway of the major Leftist parties.

There is however one belief held in common by the entire heterogeneous Left-nationalization is the minimum condition for creating a socialist society. But it appears that the Left will soon come to the end of its traditional list of nationalization proposals. Mrs. Gandhi's government is thinking in relation to economic life in strongly interventionist terms. This is not unusual as all governments in advanced capitalist societies today, whatever their political complexion, help to shore up their private enterprise economies.

There is also an inhibiting factor on the part of the Leftists regarding measures like bank nationalization. Experience of the public sector is not calculated to arouse boundless socialist enthusiasm. The unsocialist approach dominating the establishment and management of the public sector, the inefficiency and corruption of the high officials, the callous attitude of the employees to the needs of the common man, go to prove that in a predominantly capitalist economy, there are definite limits to what can be done to socialize public ownership.

Thus, on the all-India level, none of the Leftist parties seem to

be prepared with any real idea about the process of the socialist movement in the country. There is an air of improvisation in their actions for meeting an immediate emergency.

While legacies of Nehru's foreign and defence policy even today draw both the communist parties nearer the ruling Congress, the rest of the Leftist Opposition, particularly the SSP and PSP, take a completely opposite stand. On the questions of improving ties with Pakistan, developing friendship with the Soviet bloc, easing tension on the Sino-Indian front, opposing American intervention in South East Asia, Mrs Gandhi's party in Parliament can only bank on the support of the two communist parties and a few Independents.

In these circumstances, even if there arises a chance in the near future of a Leftist coalition at the Centre, the Communists would never be able to come to terms with the SSP and other Leftist elements on a minimum programme, particularly on matters like defence and foreign policy.

What then is the prospect of the Left movement beyond the immediate policies of a power struggle? Even if the Leftists are able to form homogeneous governments of like-minded elements in the States, how will they evade the growing economic crisis? How can they change a warped and poisoned public mind, a society where there is not a soul down to the policeman or the customs officer who does not join in the great procession of corruption? And how can they purge their party organization of the lumpen proletariat—the apolitical dregs of society, now being utilized to extend their bases? Attempts are never made to answer these questions involved in any effort to establish a socialist society.

Perhaps a cultural revolution is necessary to create the objective conditions for a stable socialist society. But the assiduous cultivation of all the obnoxious fea-

tures of the 'Chinese' cultural revolution by the Naxalites—the other embryonic strand of the Indian Leftist movement—is leading to a tragicomic situation. A handful of sincere young people, roused by idealism, are going to the villages with messages of armed revolution. But the situation is far from revolutionary. The people are prepared to vote for the communists, but are not yet willing to defend them with arms. For them, parliamentary democracy has not yet exhausted itself. A series of failures is necessary to lure them of their illusions and hopes.

Besides, the Naxalites are themselves divided. The CPI (M-L) sets little store by trade unions or mass fronts. Their main aim is to mobilize the landless and the small peasantry and organize guerrilla warfare to seize power. The stress for the time being is on underground preparations. The other wing of the Naxalites, asserting the need for armed revolution, attaches importance to legal activities like trade unionism and organization of mass fronts.

The Naxalites agree that the uneven political nature of India precludes the possibility of a uniform revolutionary situation in the near future. While the heartland is still dominated by obscurantist forces like the Jana Sangh, the communists are strong only in Kerala, West Bengal, Andhra and parts of Bihar and U.P. The Naxalites are therefore concentrating on the tribal belt running across these States. The tribals being the most oppressed and dispossessed in modern Indian society, are more susceptible to the call for militancy.

What sets apart the Naxalites from the other Leftist parties is their firm rejection of any hope to bring about changes in society within the present parliamentary framework. Their basic premise is an extra-parliamentary platform. Their non-allegiance to the Indian Constitution frees them from the inhibitions which scuttle at every stage the efforts made by

the CPI (M) to strike a radical pose.

Although their strategy is yet to yield results, the Naxalites at least are the only politically consistent elements in an age of the most motley mixture of crying contradictions. Constitutionalists like Congressmen conspire openly against the Constitution. Revolutionists like communists are confessedly constitutional. Alliances are made whose first proviso is separation. Struggles are launched whose first law is indecision. The Leftists win elections in States with socialist phrases on their lips and proceed to administer a capitalist society which they have previously denounced, in as efficient a way as possible.

**T**he prospects beyond the immediate policies of the government are, from a socialist point of view, by no means hopeful. As evident from Mrs Gandhi's speeches and policy announcements, there is no attempt for a change of a fundamental kind involving an attack upon existing property relationships. There is only a sense of the need to cast away much of the old lumber and refurbish some part at least of the structure of Indian society.

Such a policy is no more than a hot compress on an ailing body politic. After some time a crisis is inevitable. In face of widespread bankruptcies and mounting unemployment, the Naxalites would gain ground rapidly at the expense of the Centrists.

In these circumstances, the Left's present attitudes and reactions to government policy can only have coherence and vigour if they are part of a broader perspective. Such a perspective is important not only in terms of the government's present actions, but even more in terms of its tendencies for the future. These tendencies make it essential for the Left to work out a clear set of policies and alternatives, with proper allowance for the widely different situations varying from one State to another.

# Confrontation with democracy

D. R. GOYAL

THE Indian communists officially adopted parliamentary democracy as a means to achieve socialism at the Amritsar Congress of the Communist Party in 1957. Before that they did participate in elections and legislatures but they remained ideologically committed to the position that an insurrectionary action alone would give State power in the hands of those who were genuinely interested in a basic and radical change in society. They had differed with Gandhiji himself during the freedom struggle on the question of violence and non-violence. In the post-independence period this was said to be the main fault of communists on account of which other socialists considered them untouchable.

The declaration in the Preamble of the Constitution adopted at Amritsar that 'the Communist Party strives to achieve Socialism by peaceful means' and that 'in Socialist India the right of political organisation will be enjoyed even by those who are opposed to the Government so long as they abide by the Constitution of the country' came as a surprise to many. It was a radical departure from the earlier known position in as much as the idea of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' also seemed to have been given up.

The scepticism was taken note of by the Party's General Secre-

tary in a *New Age* article in which he wrote: 'A question which has been posed by many is: Have you, Communists, adopted peaceful means as a creed or as a tactic, i.e., a manoeuvre?' His reply was that it was neither. He stated that '...peaceful methods for us are neither a creed nor a tactic. It is a policy—a seriously meant policy.'

The questions that Ajoy Ghosh faced thirteen years ago are still being asked by many people. They acquire a renewed edge and validity by the statements occasionally made by leaders like Gopalan and Jyoti Basu asserting their intentions to wreck the bourgeois constitution. The Indian Constitution has been amended more than 20 times since its adoption and there is no party, including the Congress, which would hesitate from introducing further amendments if it is felt that the interests of the nation or the people warrant it. But the use of an expression like 'wrecking the Constitution' creates doubts about the seriousness with which the peaceful or constitutional means are taken by communists. Such postures may satisfy the extremists within the communist movement but they make the rest of society sit up and watch whe-

ther a threat is being posed to the stability of the system.

Statements of this character come only from the leaders of the CPI(M). But they were also party to the adoption of the Amritsar thesis and Constitution. And this gives rise to the question: if one set of communists have already drifted away from that position, what is the guarantee that others also will not do the same?

To find an answer we have to go back to the circumstances and reasons which brought about the change in communist attitude to democracy in 1957. Ajoy Ghosh had given the following explanation at that time: 'We consider that in the present historical condition, the possibility exists in many countries of achieving socialism peacefully and of defeating attempts of the ruling classes to force civil war on the people. The possibility exists of parties and elements who stand for socialism securing a majority in Parliament and overcoming the resistance of reaction by means of mass action. And we shall try our utmost to make this possibility a reality in our country.'

According to him it was the result of the historical situation probably as it had been assessed in the Moscow Declaration of 12 ruling communist parties. One may not be wrong in saying that the experience of the communists in India had also something to do with it. There have been certain unique features of the practice of parliamentary democracy in India which the communists would have continued to ignore only at their own peril.

First among them was the fact that the Indian Constitution gave the right to vote to every adult. It meant the mass of Indian people, the majority of whom comprised the workers and peasants, had the right and the possibility to vote into power those who they thought could represent and safeguard their interests. They being the majority could

mould the policies of the State in their interests. The franchise was not confined to what are called the bourgeoisie and the feudal classes as was the case in many of the western democracies on the basis of whose experience the earlier communist theoreticians had expressed doubts about the system ever becoming an instrument of socialism.

Secondly, those who were supposed to be the representatives of the bourgeoisie and the big landlords in India had seen to it that the communists were given facilities to participate in the very first general elections even though the party was hostile to the Constitution and the system as a whole. Even if it be considered an action dictated by historical compulsion, the communists should have recognised that the processes of history were better understood by the ruling Congress under Nehru than by themselves.

Non-participation in democratic elections would have put them outside the national mainstream even as their attitude in 1942 had isolated them. Through participation they came into the eyes of the people as equally good or bad democrats as others, their own theoretical hostility to democracy notwithstanding. They also found that by voicing the demands of the people they sought to represent they were able to get several vital concessions for them. It is true that the labour welfare measures adopted by the government helped create a climate from which the industrialists greatly benefited but none can deny the great advantages that accrued to the working class.

The high watermark of this experience was that after the 1957 general elections the Communist Party emerged as the majority party in Kerala. They even formed the government in that State and the ruling party at the Centre consciously chose not to obstruct them. Very strong apprehensions about the wisdom of allowing them to come into the government were expressed in

fairly influential quarters. The Nehru government disregarded all these voices. It was as bold an experiment as the earlier one of introducing adult franchise on the morrow of freedom.

The way that government was brought to an end evoked adverse and sharp criticism not only in communist or pro-communist circles but also in what is described by them as the monopoly press. The whole nation as if stood by the right of communists to rule so long as they enjoyed majority support in the legislature. It must have been a major factor in helping the Communist Party to absorb this shock immediately after its declaration of faith in parliamentary democracy. There was a section in the party which then wanted to take recourse to extra-parliamentary methods to defend the Kerala ministry but the leadership effectively withstood the pressure.

Do the political developments during the last decade warrant a change of policy? The wheel of history which had come to the point where communist countries were able to play an effective, almost decisive, role in world affairs has not turned back in spite of the schism in the socialist bloc. The freedom movement in colonial countries continues to advance despite set-backs here and there. The imperialist countries are not able to impose their will on others—at least not in most cases.

Within the country the communists have been allowed more or less a free hand to work and propagate their creed and ideas. The edge of anti-communist hostility has been blunted. Communist-led governments have been allowed to be formed and what in communist parlance is called the monopoly sections of the bourgeoisie have made earnest attempts to come to terms with them rather than adopting a posture of unmitigated hostility.

This has revealed another feature of the Indian situation. What are called the Indian mono-

polists are not in a position decisively to control and direct the democratic process. They have not been able either to prevent the communists from coming up or to force on the organs of democracy their own hand-picked men. Rather than pushing up or pulling down a certain group or party they seem to be keen on being on the right side of those who enjoy popular support and are better capable of ensuring peace and stability in the country. The interests of the rich and the poor may not be identical but they have not reached the stage of sharp conflict. Pressure of democracy is, therefore, not resisted but respected by the bourgeoisie and the landlords. At worst they are able to dodge or thwart a popular measure for a certain period. But ultimately they submit as is witnessed in the case of the princes.

Participation in the democratic process has also helped the communists to adjust themselves better with the popular sentiment. In this regard a comparison of the 1942 situation with 1962 would be rewarding for them. In the earlier period they failed to have a measure of the anti-British sentiment of the Indian people and had to be content with the glory of splendid isolation. But when China attacked India it was possible for a significantly large section among them to understand on which side they should stand.

**N**ot all those who came out in spontaneous condemnation of the Chinese action even knew much about the Sino-Soviet dispute because till then the leadership had kept it away from the party rank and file for various reasons of its own. Many were even admirers of China's achievements and yet they did not take time to decide that they should side with their own country against the model they would like their people to emulate for their national progress and prosperity.

All these factors point to the conclusion that there are no

reasons why the communists should waver in their commitment to democracy. Yet one cannot be too sure. There are certain aspects of communist experience and practice which raise serious misgivings.

**O**ne of them, of course, is common to other parties of the Right and Left. Parliamentary democracy is not by itself a desirable end for them. The communists would not care for it unless it could be an instrument for achieving socialism. There is greater stress on ends than on means. This attitude is shared by the Samyukta Socialists also, at least in practice. The Jana Sangh and the Swatantra do not swear by socialism but they do not mind taking recourse to non-parliamentary or extra-parliamentary means if the onrush of communism can be thwarted that way. And there is no party in India which can honestly say that it has never gone outside the parliamentary arena to achieve its ends.

More important than this is the historical experience of communists. Nowhere in the world has a communist regime been ushered in without recourse to arms. The only such instance, that of the Paris Commune, weakens their faith in democracy rather than strengthening it. There are obvious differences in the Indian situation but the communists have not so far given sufficient evidence of adequately appreciating them. They are still, for example, bogged down in the differentiation between what they describe as the monopoly and non-monopoly sections of the Indian bourgeoisie and have not picked up sufficient courage to undertake a reappraisal of the character and context of the Indian monopolists vis-a-vis Indian politics.

This inbred distrust of democracy has come in the way of presenting it as a commitment. In spite of its being 'a seriously meant policy' the leadership of the Communist Party has not been able to rid the rank and file of the tendency to look upon it as a mere

tactic or manoeuvre. Unless a policy becomes an integral part of the thinking of the entire party, continued adherence to it is difficult to ensure. That is why the phenomenon of the CPI adopting postures of CP(M) and both vying with each other to win favour with the Naxalites. In their competition for supremacy the two communist parties are more keen to win over the old committed faithfuls than to attract new adherents. New people do not come in because the parties work within old grooves and any change in their style and methods of work is hampered by lack of fresh blood. It is a vicious circle because of which the communists fail to take long strides towards democracy.

**T**he organisational structure of the communist parties is also not very helpful in their efforts at adjustment with the democratic process. They are modelled on those parties which had to function under tyrannical regimes and were perforce secretive and conspiratorial. In an open society like India's this kind of behaviour creates unnecessary suspicions and alienates people. The romance of working in isolation is not everybody's cup of tea. A party in a democracy has to be a public affair, an open phenomenon susceptible and responsive to the needs, aspirations and sentiments of the widest commonality. The variety of opinions within also should be public property so that the supporters of the party may have the sense of participation in political discussion and decision-making which is a pre-requisite to commitment.

Unless modes are evolved by the communists to establish such a rapport of confidence with the people the chances of their retreat from parliamentary democracy cannot be rated very low. If they take the peaceful path seriously they have to think of overcoming these hurdles. It may be an epoch-making contribution to the science of Marxism.

# Books

**PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO COMMUNISM IN INDIA** By Victor M. Fic, Nachiketa Publications, Bombay, 1969.

As indicated by the author, Victor Fic, in the brief preface, the major part of the material comes from his doctoral dissertation presented to the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi. The extensive bibliographical references clearly show the seriousness with which Fic has pursued his studies and come out with a commendable document for the benefit of general readers and specialists alike. The presentation is lucid besides being interpenetrating from chapter to chapter with regard to the treatment of the subject, and full of relevant quotations from source materials. The notes and references also throw additional light on important aspects of the theme.

The book provides a fascinating account of the global communist movement with special reference to India. The major portions deal with the efforts of peaceful transition of India into communism as envisaged by the communist leaders and the contributions of the Kremlin bosses towards this hitherto unsuccessful effort.

The active participation of the Indian Communists in the national political life goes back to the fifties. One of the early exponents of peaceful transition to communism in India was P.C. Joshi. This was borne out of his experiences during the second world war when violent clashes, extensive strikes in the navy and the army, and communal riots had brought misery to the common man. Joshi thought that the time was not ripe for revolutionary activities and class conflicts. On the other hand, Ranadive wanted the CPI to follow the Yugoslav method of intertwined revolution by combining the upsurge among the peasants and the working class—which in reality had not fully emerged. The author of the Telengana revolt, Rajeshwar Rao, however, sought the extreme China tactic of winning over the lower urban and upper

rural bourgeois classes and getting quick revolutionary results.

After the failure of the Korean war, spurred by the Moscow-Peking Axis and the failure brought by the sixteen-nation coalition under the leadership of the United States, Joshi accused Ranadive and Rao, the then Secretary-General of the CPI, for untimely guerrilla warfare waged in limited areas which had brought a bad name to the party in the country. This new policy sought to support nationalistic bourgeois elites who had then started taking an anti-American stand in foreign policy in many Asian countries, and to encourage the progressive trend in Nehru's foreign policy towards the communist bloc. The leaders also recognised the freedoms and liberties guaranteed under the Indian Constitution and decided to embark upon a course of action to harness the communist movement.

A strategy for adopting peaceful methods of change was launched by the formation of a Preparatory Peace Committee in Bombay. The strategy was outlined in three documents published by the party in 1951. The idea was to establish a National Democratic Front which could be a four-class alliance of the workers, peasants, the middle class and the national bourgeoisie. It was also planned to reinforce the peace movement through all-India institutions such as the Trade Unions, Kisan Sabhas, Student Federation and the National Federation of Indian Women.

The CPI had succeeded during 1950-55 in evolving the theories as well as operational techniques relating to the formation of the United Front of Leftists. The elections of 1952 had been an important test. It clearly showed that communism in India could make significant advance through the strategy of the united front of the Leftist parties.

When the Congress Party made the declaration of a socialist pattern of society in 1954, India had executed a Leftward turn both in her foreign and domestic policies. It amended the Preamble of the Constitution of India and the Directive Principle of State Policy for establishing socialism in the coun-

try. This utterly confused the CPI which generated within itself 'factional interpretations of events, and widely divergent policies proposed by the opposing groups in the Central Executive Committee which soon ceased to function as the policy making body' (96). In order, however, to come out of the situation, the CPI decided to exploit anti-American trends in the bourgeois class, which supported Nehru's neutral policies while fearing that if these were not accepted America might interfere in her domestic problems.

The period between 1954 and 1955 was really trying for the CPI, as it had to line up behind the Indian Government, with a view to support the global strategy of Moscow, in spite of the conservative home policies of Nehru. This contradiction was apparently removed when the government started drafting the second five-year plan with the desire to lay the foundation of socialism in the country. But, the CPI leadership found it difficult to 'forget hundreds of comrades rotting in jails in India from the days of Ranadive and Rao.' and openly criticized the Congress Party for repressive home policies. The Congress hit the CPI in the mid-term elections in Andhra Pradesh by capturing power on the basis of *Pravda*'s editorial praising India's foreign policy.

The Conference of Asian Countries in New Delhi in March, and the Bandung Conference in April 1955, respectively, created a mixed climate in the West and in the communist world. This was followed by Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union in June 1955. Following these historic events, the Central Executive Committee quickly evolved a new policy line to extricate itself from the narrow and dogmatic attitude towards the government's home policies. In one of the resolutions in relation to the second five-year plan, the party said that it should be supported by every Indian, no matter to which party he owes allegiance. The plan was considered to be a patriotic national plan for creating mass action to fight reactionary features of the policies on one side, and to defend the immediate interests of the masses.

The CPI had evidently undergone definite changes in its outlook on the strategy of revolutionary war. 'The magnitude and significance of this metamorphosis can best be gauged from the Election Manifesto, published in January 1957, which presented the Indian people with a programme broadly identical with the aims of the government and the Congress Party' (231). The peaceful growth of capitalism into socialism as enunciated and practiced by Nehru was endorsed by the party which aimed at using parliamentary methods in capturing seats of power. It was considered essential that wherever possible the CPI enter into coalition governments with parties of the national bourgeoisie or their Left wings.

In the electoral campaign of the party, adverse references were made to the dictum of Nehru

saying that Marxism was outdated and that there was no scope for international communism. Nehru retaliated by a counter election campaign and reiterated that Marxism was not only outdated but was wholly inapplicable in India. He went still further and remarked, the Russians 'made Stalin their god and then, after his death, called him a tyrant. This was the result of choosing the wrong path' (213).

This was too much for the CPI to swallow and there came a counter attack. The party regretted that Nehru was 'hitting them below the belt', and indicated that whether socialism in India would be attained peacefully or by violence depended much on the Congress government and not on the CPI who was least inclined to repeat the painful results of revolutions in Russia and China. Nehru did not take these attitudes calmly and stated at a Calcutta meeting in January 1957 that 'I challenge the Communists that they cannot have the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is not possible anywhere in the world today and in the existing circumstances' (282). Nevertheless, the CPI enormously improved its position and doubled the number of votes from 6.2 million in 1952 to 12 million in 1957.

The decade 1957-67 has proved to be the most crucial decade for the CPI due to various reasons including the Sino-Soviet doctrinal conflict. It involved the Indian government also in conflict situations. Peking abhorred Moscow's optimism about the influence of the Peace Zone and the Soviet aid programme. Particularly, Nehru was said to have exhausted the revolutionary potential and begun to pursue vacillating and unstable policies. The Sino-Indian frontier demarcation and Tibetan independence were the bones of contention.

The Sino-Soviet schism finally reached its height when the Kremlin succeeded in initiating a détente with Washington which Peking failed to do on account of lack of reconciliation over the Formosa question. Although the leaders of both the communist countries attained a compromise at the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, it did not last longer. To control Peking's independent political posture *vis à vis* Moscow, the latter proposed a joint defence programme in 1958 and thereby sought ground to cancel the agreement of 1957 to advance military and atomic technology to China.

The CPI had no alternative but to review its internal policies. Peking had already assaulted its method of peaceful and democratic constitutional means to capture power. Simultaneously, there occurred a split in the Congress Party which was to result in the formation of its Left wing, the starting of the polarization process which had been eagerly awaited for by the CPI.

In brief, it was agreed that the international and internal prerequisites of peaceful transition to com-

munism in India remained operative. It also reiterated the Kremlin's original position on the question of peaceful transition and rejected Peking's methods regarding non-parliamentary struggle in preference to winning the majority in Parliament as the first step forward.

Two significant disabilities of the CPI revealed in the discussions at the Amritsar Congress pertain to its inability to build the mass base and attain the unity of Leftist forces. The leaders of the PSP and the Socialist Party were not in favour of cooperating with the CPI and kept their membership away from participating in united mass activities with it. The resolution decided to overcome this by 'combining a firm ideological-political struggle against these parties with an effort at common actions with their leaders as well as the rank and file members' (352).

Secondly, the participants criticized the party for the lopsided class composition of its organization members occupying higher positions. Even though the activity of the CPI had considerably increased among the working class, the number of workers within its rank, was relatively small. The resolution frankly admitted that 'the composition of our higher Party Committees remains essentially non-proletarian, which has intensified many of our weaknesses' (360).

The subsequent events in national and international relations posed serious threats to the ideological and organizational unity of the party. The massive American aid to India in various forms and the composition of the Aid to India Club created sharp differences in the party regarding their strategy of operations for developing a united front for action. The party was particularly alarmed to notice that in comparison to aid from the United States and the countries of the West, the Soviet aid was considerably smaller and it could not therefore maintain the necessary balance for influencing the mass of the people. The situation demanded a re-appraisal of the policies and need for suitable changes in the Political Resolution of the Amritsar Congress.

With regard to the Kerala crisis, the party noted that after its formation of the government there, the ruling class would tolerate the government and would not adopt a discriminatory attitude towards it. The smooth change-over, free from conflict and crisis, as visualized for peaceful transition was shattered to pieces. In view of all these happenings, the strategy in Kerala was enlarged but the party apparatus there was not permitted to jeopardise its existence by the continuation of its own militant defensive mass operations. By these directives, the National Council sounded a retreat in Kerala and eventual resignation or dismissal of the troubled regime in order to sacrifice its national interest for the sake of the requirements of the Kremlin.

The international activities followed by the Chinese leaders led to further differences between

Moscow and Peking and the former started to look upon India as a potential ally against China. The CPI here, faced a real contradiction between its attitude towards external aid from the capitalist countries and the expediency of defending the unity of the Indian sub-continent. The party had no alternative but to modify its Amritsar thesis to the effect that 'it would not be propelled to power in the central government through the non-capitalist path of development, which implied cooperation with the Left wing of the Congress Party, but rather through the united front strategy with all anti-Congress forces' (414).

All these dramatic happenings created rifts in the CPI. The three groups with different policies and programmes which had existed underground came to life. Within a short span of time after the Sino-Soviet schism followed by the Chinese border conflict, the CPI initially got split into two wings in 1964, the second Communist Party being CPI (Marxist). This new wing also suffered from contradictions. Its advocacy of the Chinese pattern of revolution dependent on the bourgeoisie gave it an unpatriotic role due to the anti-national posture it involved. As a result, the radical wing of this party and other elements fomented agrarian uprising in the Naxalbari area in the Darjeeling district in 1967. This gave rise to the third Communist Party of India: Marxist-Leninist led by Kanu Sanyal.

The CPI and CPI (M) are, however, the two major parties impinging on the Right and Left wings of the Congress Party and thus attaining considerable operational effectiveness. Eventually, the co-operation between the two communist parties have succeeded in forging united fronts and forming State governments in Kerala and West Bengal after the general elections of 1967. In both coalitions the dominant factor, however, is the Leftist party.

While making a global survey of the communist movement in India, the author states in the introduction to the book that communism is generally associated with violence. This strategy has considerably changed, and contemporary communism has developed new theoretical formulas as well as organizational techniques to harness and exploit peace, democratic processes, parliamentary institutions, constitutional usage and other non-violent means to the promotion of its objectives. The entire process involves interacting patterns whereby the diplomatic relations, friendship, trade and economic aid are broadly based so as to become protracted, peaceful and irreversible, lasting perhaps several decades. The author warns that the cardinal problem of India's security is posed by the rivalry of the two communist giants, Russia and China. India should leave her options open by cooperation with countervailing forces which could guarantee her protection against the possibility of the two communist powers coming together again and endangering her freedom. The author further states, 'Even

the present conflict of Moscow with Peking, in which the former needs India as an ally, does not appreciably affect Kremlin's goal and drive to communize her, (12).

Taking an over-all view of the situation in India, it appears that we are far removed from the formation of any class structure worth its name based on economic considerations. Caste, religion, regionalism and ethnicity are four major factors interfering with the formation of a unified working class. When in this new atomic age, dominated by scientific explosion, the members of newly developing societies are looking forward to higher levels of permissive social behaviour in all walks of life, it is regrettable that so much emphasis is laid on economic class-structure, ignoring psychological and other motivational factors as real driving forces of human conduct. It is also doubtful whether communism is the end product in the evolution of human society leaving no scope for the growth of other forms of socialism as envisaged by Nehru, which could come into purposeful play, at least in culturally rich and traditionally sound societies like India.

It seems that the agrarian-class revolution is not feasible in large parts of India, barring some tribal tracts, because moneyed persons have increasingly started investing their own skills and money on mechanized agriculture precisely due to the freedom from taxation on agricultural income. Similarly, the industrial class which continues to remain somewhat stable merely with regard to marginal collective bargaining with the management, takes little time in becoming unstable when communalism or sectarian forces are aroused to cut at its very foundation, as demonstrated in the recent Ahmedabad disturbances.

And, again, these anti-class-formative conditions and infrastructures will continue to persist so long as we have within the macro-social frame of our society, the newer structural forms such as the semi-urban-pockets interpenetrating both in the so-called rural hinterland and the urban centres of trade and political power. In brief, it is a variety of small towns in rural areas on one hand, and different kinds of labour colonies, mohallas, urban villages in the cities, on the other hand, which are the breeding grounds of communalism, ethnicity or regionalism, which strongly prohibit the formation of any class that is more conscious of economic equality in preference to a host of social factors working for divergent but interdependent micro-structures.

It is necessary, therefore, that we in India give serious thought to developing our society either on communist or capitalistic models as these do not seem to suit our culture and indigenous genius. A society with a socialistic pattern based on 'trusteeship' of national wealth for equitable distribution to the extent possible, is probably the best answer for times to come. 'Nehru and his colleagues primarily thought in terms traditional to the oriental

heritage of political, religious and cultural tolerance and accommodation; and in terms of Gandhi's philosophy and technique of a non-violent political action which could attain truly revolutionary social changes in a peaceful manner' (170).

Whatever may be the ramifications of the world communist movements today, the book is an important contribution to understanding our internal political problems in significant ways. The seventies may rightly be called India's most dangerous decade.

Harshad Trivedi

#### INDIAN COMMUNISM—Split within a Split, By Mohan Ram, Vikas Publications, 1969

Mohan Ram is already known for his challenging earlier book, *Hindi against India: The Meaning of D.M.K.*, which was a not unimportant contribution to a controversy that is likely to occupy the Indian political scene for many years to come.

In his present work, Mohan Ram has considered the past twenty one years of the Indian Communist movement in order to assess the emergence, recession, re-emergence and prospects, on the Indian political scene, of what he calls 'Maoism'.

This is an important study of what is perhaps the most arresting trend in current Indian politics.

Political science, according to Marxists, is the science of the conduct of class struggle by the proletariat through constitutional or other means. Armed revolution is the continuation of politics by other means. Just as the science of war is subdivided into *War Theory, Strategy and Tactics* there are the corresponding divisions into *Political Theory, Strategy and Tactics*, which together add up to political science.

The present work is not so much a study in political theory as in political strategy and tactics. The author has thus not dwelt on general economic and political developments in India. Economic regression and the State of Emergency declared in October 1962 and continued until 1968, is hardly referred to and the long continued regime of the Defence of India Rules finds but passing notice. For persons acquainted with Indian events perhaps such an omission is not important.

The importance of the book is the light it throws on trends on the extreme Left of the Communist Party, in particular the so-called 'Maoist Formations'. Of these the author selects two groupings for detailed and comparative study, the 'Naxalites' and the Andhra Pradesh Formation. According to him the differences among the numerous Maoist formations in India relate mainly to their tactical line.

The political theory of the 'Maoists' ascribes a pre-eminent role to the organisation of the poor and

landless peasants of the countryside as the nucleus of a revolutionary force that must surround and ultimately subdue the towns.

In the application of this theory the strategy no less than the tactics of different groupings appears to differ.

Thus, as the author states, the 'Naxalites' ascribe a minimal rôle to the workers in the towns. As against this the Andhra Group takes the view that, '... to liberate first villages and then towns is our path of People's War. ... We have to work in towns towards this goal even from now on, and we have to thwart in every detail plans of our enemy to suppress the present armed struggle. We also have to prepare the party and people to capture political power by the time the towns are liberated. With this view, we have to plan our work in towns.' (p. 266).

This would appear to be a strategic and not mere tactical difference of the two groups. The author has dealt in detail with the growing trends as he finds them, towards constitutionalism in the CPI (Marxist). According to him, a rapprochement between the two non-Maoist parties, as he terms the CPI and the CPI (Marxist), (if not their outright merger into a single party) cannot be ruled out because the contradictions between the two is, according to him, non-antagonistic. (p. 271.)

The author has not examined the possible implications of the identification of the 'Maoists' with a person holding a position of responsibility for the conduct of affairs in a foreign State. A question that must cross the reader's mind is whether the 'Maoists' would maintain their revolutionary fervour even in the event of a new rapprochement between the Indian and Chinese Governments—for which there are today in India powerful trends working. It may not be entirely accidental that the period of recession of 'Maoism', during the years studied by the author, was precisely the period of official, 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai', and the period of the re-emergence of 'Maoism' was that of armed clash between India and China and its aftermath.

A serious revolutionary movement, if it is to arise and grow strong in India, must retain its independence of any foreign person or group, particularly of persons or groups exercising State power. This is perhaps one of the best lessons to be drawn from the history of Mao himself, not less from that of Ho Chi Minh and Castro. The calamitous effects of the main body of the Indian Communist's subservience to the Soviet leadership have been plain for all to see.

's book is well written, well produced. Dealing as it does with questions of importance for the future of this country, I have no doubt that it will be closely

studied and widely read by all students of the Indian scene both in India and abroad.

Danial Latifi

#### COLONIALISM IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS : A

Study of Soviet Policy towards India and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1947, By Zafar Imam, Eastman Publications, 1969.

Unlike a number of recent publications concerning the role of the Soviet Union in influencing the anti-imperialist, nationalist movement in India, the present volume has adopted the method of historically tracing actual events and developments before and since the establishment of the USSR which contributed largely to the disintegration of the world colonial system. Naturally, Britain having been the most outstanding of the colonial powers, currents and cross-currents of Anglo-Soviet relations since the end of the first world war and up to the transfer of power in India, have significance for us here.

However, a useful tool can also be wrongly used and the product disfigured. Zafar Imam, depending too much on pre-conceived notions, gave up historical objectivity and busied himself in locating 'suitable' quotes to justify his thesis. It would seem, the author first consulted material available from British sources, imbibing all its imperialist justification of a particular course of action, and thereafter searched for corresponding 'quotes' in the Soviet archives to complete what might have appeared to him as a jigsaw puzzle.

That would perhaps explain why he started with Lenin's views on colonialism and laboured to prove that later the Soviet Union only made use of its profession about anti-colonialism as 'pressure tactics' for securing closer political and economic relations with Britain, while the British imperialist governments, particularly those headed by the Conservatives, misunderstood its implications and unnecessarily developed a fear of 'Bolshevism' spreading to its colonies when there was no objective basis.

The contradiction inherent in such a judgement is apparent in every section which deals with British colonialist interests in India, and thus in his conclusions which he calls 'Reckoning', Imam writes that 'in the case of Soviet policy towards India, no efforts were made to look at the situation in the colonial countries as it really (author's emphasis) was, and the dynamic and progressive role of nationalism was totally rejected. The whole idea of a future set-up for the colonies became more and more marked with contradiction, confusion and vagueness'.

But, in the very next paragraph, he writes: 'Yet, in the ultimate analysis, Soviet interests in colonial affairs did exercise a remarkable influence on the whole process of the beginning of the break-up of the colonial system.'

This is further reinforced by: '...the Bolshevik Revolution, and later the various phases of Soviet

policy towards India, created a new situation in Indian politics in which they acted as a catalyst in raising the tempo of the Indian Nationalist Movement; they also posed a new problem for the Government (British—SP) which widened the gulf between the nationalists and the British Government in India and stimulated the interest of the nationalists in the Soviet Union.'

In the concluding paragraph Imam writes: 'Thus the beginning of the break-up of the colonial system and the long-term effects of Soviet interest in India were without doubt a gain for the objectives with which Soviet Power was declared to have been established in Russia in 1917.' Compare it with the author's assertion that 'After Stalin's ascendancy, the ideological interest in India completely degenerated into an extra hand of Soviet diplomacy in Anglo-Soviet relations', a view quite in keeping with those of Sir Austen Chamberlain and Lord Curzon.

The author has provided quite a bit of information regarding the close interest that the Soviet journals and writers and Government leaders had been taking about the rising nationalist movement in India, but his bias forces him to dismiss all this as of no consequence.

Imam admits the pre-eminent position of the Soviet Union as the only world power between the two world wars which consistently stood for the end to colonialism and also records how this very fact had greatly influenced the nationalist movement in its struggle against British rule in this country.

Yet, with a vehemence he set about to marshal arguments to prove that the Soviet Union did not 'concretely' assist it by, for example, organising an armed invasion of India through Afghanistan.

But, then, one would only feel that the author just could not comprehend the significance of the very existence of the first socialist country in the world which breached the world capitalist system and opened up the era of the disintegration of the colonies, providing a powerful inspiration to the anti-imperialist, nationalist movements the world over.

#### Saral Patra

#### ELITE CONFLICT IN A PLURAL SOCIETY :

Twentieth Century Bengal, By J. H. Broomfield,  
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1968.

As the sub-title suggests, this book is a study of the politics of a British Indian Province, namely Bengal. The author starts with a penetrating analysis of the emergence at the beginning of the twentieth century of the *bhadralok*, a group of Bengalis who claimed and were recognized as superior in social status to the masses of the other people. It is this *bhadralok* class which constituted the elite of Bengal. Broomfield discusses the origins and objectives of this elite as well as its

role in the national struggle for independence. His analysis suggests that it had an important part to play in the partition of Bengal in 1905, its reunification in 1912, and its second partition in 1947.

Broomfield points out that although the *bhadralok* achieved their main purpose of the reunification of Bengal in 1912, they could not prevent the emergence of the Bengal Muslim leadership as an independent political elite. During the period 1913-20, the Hindu *bhadralok* and the Muslim elite earned experience of the functioning of the legislative system. Their expectations of a greater share in power also rose high. Gradually there grew a divergence of interests between the Hindu and the Muslim elites. With the beginning of the 1930s the Hindu *bhadralok* began to lose control of many local bodies and the provincial legislature. One of the reasons of the Hindu-Muslim elite conflict, according to the author, was the encouragement given to the Muslim elite by the British Government and the national-secular policy of the Indian National Congress. But there were other reasons too and the author discusses them all with a penetrating insight.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the one dealing with the internal weaknesses of both the Hindu and the Muslim elites. The author points out that both the elites suffered from certain attitudes that were responsible for the various problems of communal accommodation and institutional development.

Broomfield's conclusion is that the Hindu elite of Bengal—the *bhadralok*—enjoyed the social and political dominance in Bengal for several decades and they could not preserve it after the reunification of Bengal in 1912. Why it was so is the main concern of the author. But in trying to answer this question he also makes some profound statements about the development of parliamentary democracy in Bengal in particular and in India in general.


The book is indeed a welcome publication not only for the quality of its analysis but also for the authenticity of its conclusions because the analysis is based on and the conclusions are derived from a careful study of Bengal political papers and government records and extensive interviews.

Mahendra Kumar

MANKIND—Lohia Special Number, Vol. XII, No. 2,  
March-April, 1968

Throughout the two decades after independence, Dr Rammanohar Lohia's voice had constantly broken the stillness of India's political firmament which earned him a reputation of being a 'born-rebel' a 'Gandhian heretic' and so on. No other political leader, outside the ruling party has attracted divergent opinions about himself from the community of this country down the street. *Mankind's* special number

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bring out the salient features of Dr Rammanohar Lohia's philosophy and ideas through excerpts from his writings, press interviews and contributions by the people who had an opportunity to see and work with him. A reviewer's task in such a case is primarily to highlight the main trends of the philosophy and ideas of Dr Lohia as gathered from the special number, meaning thereby that individual contributions lose their identity in the exposition.

The two major problems faced by humanity, according to Dr Lohia, are that of injustice and inequality both in their national and international aspects. In the Indian context, they appear in the form of exploitation by the rich, the bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy and political leaders, all in league with one another, of the poor unquestioning masses who live in mortal fear of punishment from them. In the international field, they are the root cause of imperialism which, according to him, is mainly of five types, namely, productivity imperialism, space imperialism, price imperialism, weapon and skill imperialisms.

The two problems have to be fought, at the national level, through the restructuring of the State into a 'four-pillared' pattern diffusing political power not only at the central and provincial levels but also at the district and village levels, by demolishing the hegemony of monopoly capital along with its allies, namely, the bureaucracy, the English speaking elite and corrupt political leadership. This is to be accomplished by educating the masses and training them in the art of fighting for their rights through peaceful civil disobedience.

At the international level this fight against exploitation has to take the form of building a third camp which is 'creatively independent' and an active participant in international events. It is far from being non-aligned or neutral vis-a-vis two power blocs. It could immediately undertake work in the fields of world-unity movements and anti-imperialist movements which are not attached to either of these two blocs. It could also sponsor such international projects like world development cooperation, international projects of reconstruction and peace and a world food pool.

The other main aspects of his views in the field of foreign policy are his active Himalayan policy and Confederation of India and Pakistan. In the latter case, the Kashmir problem could be mutually solved between the two countries without much difficulty.

Dr Lohia's other contribution relevant to the Indian situation is his theory of 'will to power'. In India, the will to power on the part of a political party or a political leader has an ugly connotation. It is considered somewhat unholy and sinful to strive for it. It is often forgotten that politics is not an art of renouncing power but actively striving for it through policies and programmes. In this

respect Dr Lohia tried to attack the hypocrisy which permeates political activity in India.

In the field of economics, he has tried to evolve a system through which private property could be abolished except for that which does not employ labour. Mass producing units can be retained wherever necessary and a 'small unit machine' wherever possible. His 'small machine' is not the same as the Gandhian 'Charkha' but something which could be driven by electricity or some such power. Small units of production can be jointly owned by village cooperatives like un-worked excess of land in the village. All major units of mass production have to be nationalized for which no compensation need be given to the owners. An immediate curb on the consumption habits of the elite through fixing a ceiling on the earnings of this class is advocated. The motive behind these measures is not State ownership of the means of production and a distribution of wealth among the poorer sections but to facilitate the capital formation to be reinvested in productive activities like agriculture and industry.

On the social plane, the demolition of the English speaking elite is to be effected through the development of a national language which to him logically could only be Hindi. Dr. Lohia's emphasis on language is also due to his insistence on developing India strictly in accordance with the Indian spirit. He has no faith in western culture in which man is gradually becoming the slave of the machine. His man is to be the master of his machine. Women have also to be emancipated by assigning them an equal role in the programme of social reconstruction.

To this end of social, economic and political rebuilding of India, it is imperative to break the Congress monolith. Hence his anti-Congress stance and eagerness to cooperate with parties of the Right like the Jana Sangh.

Dr Lohia was no conscious system builder. His musings on national problems from time to time are the only clue to his thought which when put together reveal something of his philosophy. A student of modern Indian political thought would hardly fail to note that emphasis on the 'Indian spirit' as distinct from the western or any other way of life, and the concept of an ideal State based on some sort of autonomous villages have been the hallmark of Indian thinking between the two world wars. Dr Lohia was no exception to this attitude which idealized the small machine and diffusion of political and economic power among the villages.

Dr Lohia's passion to end political corruption and social stratification could hardly be matched. He did look like an unconventional leader who was out to mobilise the masses against internal exploitation. That he did not leave a strong cadre behind to translate his dreams into reality is clear from the confusion prevailing in his party ranks today.

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# Communication

The valuable contributions on *Secularism in Crisis* (January 1970) are enlightening indeed. These can be grouped in broad categories, viz. (i) problem-specific, (ii) historical-cum-political, (iii) ethical-cum-ideological, and (iv) scientific-cum-rational. Firstly, the discussions by Bhargava and Roy Burman are directly focused on what happened in the recent communal riots in Ahmedabad. Naturally, they do not deal adequately with secularism in broad perspective. However, Bhargava is more pointed in mentioning that Muslims chose to isolate themselves from the mainstream of popular movements in the State and thereby gave a sense of suspicion about their motives. The system of block votes in the hands of a few Muslim leaders, and the influence of anti-social goonda and feudal elements in both major communities misled the ignorant poor masses of the people. This menacing problem is admirably articulated by Khan Abdul

Gaffar Khan during his countrywide tours.

Besides, organised labour is not immune to communalism when *mohalla* identity harbouring religiosity and communalism come into operation. Some of these *mohallas* in Indian cities could be identified with Negro and Jewish ghettos fortified by ethnocentric walls. Although Bhargava and Roy Burman have not gone into details of these dingy living conditions, Ahmad has made candid reference to these. The ghetto situation is confined not only to Muslims but also to Hindus and other communities in Indian towns. I call these type of areas, *semi-urban pockets*, to which Roy Burman cold have paid some attention.

As a third emerging social reality of great magnitude, the concept of *semi-urban pockets* if given due recognition by the Census, would help considerably in explaining current social explosions in the form of communal riots, troubles by non-student and unemployed youths, etc. Incidentally, Roy Burman makes reference

\* "Semi-urban Pocket as Concept and Reality in India," Harshad R. Trivedi, *Human Organization*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1969. Kentucky, U.S.A.

to high density areas of Kharia and Jamalpur in Ahmedabad, but to be able to spell out fully the diagnosis of the disease, more meticulous screening of the social reality is essential. There are three wards of Karia and two of Jamalpur areas respectively, which totally comprise 46 circles, and 76 blocks as per the Census of 1961. We can be nearer the truth if we make our judgements on social behaviour of the people inhabiting these blocks separately.

Secondly, we come to Baig, Imam, Jain and Siddiqi. The first two writers deal with the subject in a comparatively dispassionate manner. Both Baig and Imam give high emphasis on breaking the 'shell' of Muslim orthodoxy prevalent not only among the masses but also among the religious and political leaders. In the opinion of Imam, however, the first pre-requisite to modernising Muslims is by means of politicization of the community with regard to socially viable objectives. But politicization of an enlightened nature may not be feasible without imparting liberal education to the masses of the people. After partition, Muslim leadership is said to have left a vacuum. As Baig puts it, 'The vacuum, as already brought out, has been filled by traditionalists and revivalists who keep the Muslim masses in mental mohallas in what is virtually the mediaeval age'. This statement of Baig's is applicable to Hindu traditionalists as well, and they also need to imbibe essential elements of modernity for the good of the common man.

The papers of Jain and Siddiqi are ubiquitous leading to circular thinking. It is strange to read Jain saying that modernization, education and industrialization will not corrode the traditional way of life, and in the present context, communalism. The only relevant example he gives to support his view however is Northern Ireland with recurring instances of riots between Catholics and Protestants. What is delightfully common between him and Siddiqi is that both put the responsibility of the state of affairs on the intelligentsia. However, it is gratifying to note that both these writers are hopeful of India achieving some measure of communal harmony in the future.

Thirdly, Karan Singh calls attention to three roles of religion, viz., consolidation of stray groups, war-like opposition between religious communities, and spiritual quest. He rightly commands the third role as the best. One may not agree with his mathematical dictum that 'fanaticism

varies in inverse proportion to the degree of spiritual realization'. Nevertheless, his thesis that acceptance of all religions as different paths to the same goal, though not original in itself, is refreshing in the midst of muddled thinking on the subject.


Fourthly, we have the highly valuable, rationality oriented and scientific approach to this problem in Ahmad's paper. He has taken up, so to say, the problem of all minorities anywhere in the developing countries of the world. This is amply clear from the six premises he ably outlines and proves the importance of economic participation by the minorities to be able to get into the mainstream. Ahmad, however, has not lost sight of the historical point of view when he mentions, 'Very often the root cause of conflict is economic disparity but the surface motivations appear to be different'. Suggesting remedies for fighting economic backwardness, he has urged that the Muslims must adopt diversified occupational pattern with adequate skills and knowledge and get into a meaningful role in India's economic development. They should further sharpen their tools by adopting entrepreneurship, modern management techniques, joint cooperative ventures, education and training, and research in the community's economic problems.

Finally, let us see what David Martin has to say in 'Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularization'. \*\* 'Secularization', he says, 'is less a scientific concept than a tool of counter-religious ideologies'. Some of the generalizations and propositions made by him in candid terms strongly support Ahmad's premises. These are (i) Where religion is weak one has a sure indicator of a developed society firmly oriented towards the future, (ii) Once educate people properly, in the neutral scientific atmosphere congenial to rational values, and religion will steadily lose its grip and mankind no longer be troubled by bad dreams, (iii) The troubles of religious institutions are an inevitable prelude to the triumph of truth. Truth is not only truth but it will be manifest in the demise of religion. (iv) Faith provides relatively little information about the world, and such as it does provide is incidental.

New Delhi

HARSHAD TRIVEDI

\*\* 'Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularization'. David Martin (London School of Economics and Political Science), *Penguin Survey of Social Sciences* 1965. Ed. Julius Gaud, London.



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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**— X T M O N T H : T H E R U R A L B A S I**

# 128

## MODERNIZATION

a symposium on the  
forces operating the  
processes of change

### symposium participants

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Designed by Shantanu Bhattacharyya

# The problem

THE present decade has seen an increased interest in the study of modernization and allied processes, especially in the developing countries. There is already a considerable body of literature on the subject, and it is not easy to say anything new without undertaking intelligent empirical studies.

My aim in this brief essay is therefore a limited one, viz, to raise a few queries for general discussion. The term 'modernization' has come to stay in sociology as also the division of societies/cultures into the traditional and the modern. In raising some questions about the concept and the dichotomy I am only seeking greater clarity in discussions of the modernization process, and also entering, incidentally, a plea for a clearer recognition of the assumptions involved. Otherwise there is a danger of over-simplification, and of a mechanical use of the concept and dichotomy.

The first point I would like to make, and it is an old one, is that the use of the concept of modernization involves a value judgement. There is not sufficient recognition of this fact, and at least one well-known sociologist has argued with me that the use of the term 'modernization' does not involve any value-judgement. According to him, it is value-free unlike westernization which is not. I shall not try to argue this point here as I have done it at some length in my book, *Social Change in Modern India*.<sup>1</sup> Westernization, as I understand it, is a process which the observer is free to approve, disapprove or remain neutral to. For

instance, western medicine may be welcomed as a boon while horror comics are loathed. But modernization, at least as I understand it, carries with it the idea that it is something good or desirable. When political, social or religious institutions are said to be 'modernized' there is the implication that the changes referred to are something which the speaker does not disapprove of.<sup>2</sup>

The obstacles to modernization come from people who are conservative and wish to preserve the old order in a world which is changing rapidly under the influence of modern technology and communications, and the advancement of knowledge. Excepting for the conservative, and a few who are ideologically opposed to modern technology, modernization is generally regarded with approval while 'traditional' carries with it a pejorative meaning. Other assumptions, unstated but real, are that traditionalism and modernity are incompatible and, since knowledge and communications are for ever developing and at a continually faster rate, the world is shrinking under their combined impact.

In other words, modernization is inevitable, and those who resist it are pitiable Canutes. If I am right so far, then, the idea of the inevitability of modernization is only the new *avatar* of the idea of progress which was also considered inevitable by nineteenth century thinkers. Inevitability also appeared elsewhere in nineteenth century thought, viz, in the Marxist prediction of the decay of capitalism followed by the transitional phase of the dictatorship of the proletariat which eventually yielded place to a classless society.

Since modernization is a good thing and traditionalism is a bad thing, and further, since modernization is inevitable, it is perhaps thought that it is in the interests of sociologists to get on the bandwagon. This is putting things too crudely but it may help to explain the sudden spurge of interest in the phenomenon. My own idea is that sociologists should be for modernization but for a different reason. The science of sociology needs, for its fullest development, to investigate into every aspect and

1. University of California Press, 1969, pp. 50-52.

2. 'It (modernization) stems initially from an attitude, a belief that society can and should be transformed, that change is desirable. If a definition is necessary, "modernization" may be defined as the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution. This process of adaptation had its origins and initial influence in the societies of Western Europe, but in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries these changes have been extended to all other societies and have resulted in a world-wide transformation affecting all human relationships.' (Emphasis mine) *The Dynamics of Modernization*, C.E. Black, New York, 1066, p. 7

area of social life. There cannot be any corners of the society hidden from the sociologist. This freedom should not only be ideal but existential, and the continual exercise of the freedom is the only guarantor of its existence. The wider social framework as well as the intellectual climate prevailing in a country should be such as to enable sociologists to exercise their right—'divine right' if I may say so—to investigate into social situations and publish the results of their research. Information about the functioning of the various institutions of the society should be available to all those interested, and the press and the public should discuss freely matters of general concern.

In other words, it is only in an open society that sociology can flourish. And an open society is necessarily a modernized society or, to put it differently, modernization is impossible without 'openness'. A sociologist has therefore a vested interest in an open society; it is a precondition of his efficient and full functioning. In this connection, I would suggest that comparative studies of the development of sociology in countries with different political and economic systems would be an important area of research in the sociology of knowledge.

A word is necessary here by way of caution. There may be vested interests even in a politically open society and these interests may prevent the unfettered conduct as well as the publication of sociological research. Even more important, control over research funds may determine the general direction of research with the result that vital and sensitive areas may suffer grievous neglect. The kind of talent that gets attracted to sociology, the state of development of professional bodies, and the quality of leadership that is available in the discipline are all additional factors in research. In other words, sociologists have to be continually alert to see that research into all aspects of the society exists as a reality and not merely as a possibility. There is a danger, and this is particularly likely in developing countries, of sociologists becoming the instruments of the government and losing one of their most important assets—the objectivity that comes from long professional training.

I shall now consider briefly the heuristic utility of dichotomizing entire societies and cultures into traditional/modern. Such a dichotomy also carries with it the assumption that modernized societies are without traditions. This view is so absurd that I shall not spend any time exposing its absurdity. On the other side there hardly exists today any society which is still purely 'traditional'. Western civilization is so ubiquitous that communities which enjoyed considerable isolation even as

recently as thirty years ago, have now come under its influence.

In discussing the distinction between traditional and modern societies, western countries become inevitably models of modernization while non-western countries become models of traditionalism. In this connection, it would be worth while to ask whether the equation of western with modern is a satisfactory one, and whether 'western' is a unitary category. It includes a whole range of countries from Great Britain and U.S.A. at one end, to Portugal or Albania at the other. Are all these countries equally modernized? Are there no traces of traditionalism in their attitude to women, and to ethnic minorities such as Jews, Blacks, Browns and Yellows? Is the ascriptive principle totally absent in these societies? The attitude towards birth control in many western Catholic countries is far less 'modern' than in India today.

Further, what are the implications for understanding the process of modernization, of the recent violent outbursts of racial violence in the United States and Britain? What is the significance of the sudden and surprising popularity in the West of such non-'modern' phenomena as Yoga, the cult of the hippies, and arranged marriages? In asking these questions I am only attempting to stress the need to view the modernization process in a time perspective. Single points or ahistorical studies of modernization are likely to result in a distorted view. Besides, it is not safe to assume that modernization is a cumulative process—there may be setbacks.

For analytical purposes, modernization may be divided into sub-areas, the kind of division adopted in each case being dependent on the problem with which the scholar is concerned. With this prefatory remark, I would like to divide modernization into the following areas: (a) material culture, including technology; (b) social institutions; and (c) knowledge, values and attitudes. It is necessary to remember that while these three areas are linked with each other they also enjoy a certain amount of mutual autonomy or discreteness. I am aware that this sounds contradictory but in discussing highly complex phenomena the co-existence of linkage as well as autonomy is not unusual. It is only in societies where technology is primitive, communications are under-developed, and the degree of the monetization of the economy is minimal, that social relationships are so closely intermeshed with each other that changes in one area may be followed by changes everywhere else though even here the linkage may be weaker in some areas than in others. In such societies face-to-face relationships tend to predominate and a small number of people are linked to each other by a variety of bonds

which Gluckman has called 'multiplex' in contrast to modern societies where relationships tend to be uniplex.

In discussing the process of modernization one is struck by the relative ease with which material culture from outside is borrowed. Thus, western dress is much easier to borrow than parliamentary democracy or the scientific method. The lag between technology and social institutions and values is a commonplace of sociology, and is universal. It may be noted here that the consumption of the products of modern technology does not only have a utilitarian significance but also confers prestige on the consumer. This is a factor in the spread of western or western-type consumer goods in Indian villages. But it is necessary to remember that rural youths who use these goods are more exposed to the forces of the outside world than the others. That is, the use of the objects of western material culture might pave the way to westernization in a more intangible and fundamental sense.

In order to illustrate the complexity of the process subsumed under modernization and their mutual linkage I would like to consider briefly nationalism, a phenomenon that is generally considered to be an integral part of modernization. Nationalism is a relatively new phenomenon in world history, and it presupposes an infrastructure of developed communications and an army, bureaucracy and other agencies of modern government. And it generally provides the impetus to the introduction of radical changes in the customs and institutions of the country concerned. But nationalism may also subject the country in question to all kinds of hazards. Patriotism for the country can turn into jingoism, and the urge to be free from alien domination may soon give way to an urge to dominate over other countries. Mass media of communication may become instruments for whipping up national hysteria, and for propagating ideas about racial superiority and national destiny. This type of phenomenon is believed to be peculiar to totalitarian countries. Such a view, however, turns a blind eye to the distortions that may occur in democracies.

There is yet another kind of hazard to which nationalism exposes a country. It brings in its train heightened awareness of group identities at all levels. It is necessary to stress this because there is a tendency on the part of the educated in the developing countries to identify nationalism with loyalty to the highest political entity and regard lesser loyalties as less than legitimate. Such a tendency represents a failure to recognise the fact that when self-consciousness comes to a people it effects them at every nodal point in the social structure. In the case of India, this means that nationalism brings about loyalty not only to the country as a whole

but also to caste, sect, religion, region and language. And in the context of mass illiteracy, adult suffrage may result in lesser loyalties proving to be more powerful. That is, sub-national loyalties may become powerful enough to destroy nationalism.

Self-consciousness inevitably results in the reinterpretation of traditional institutions and ideas giving rise to a complex amalgam in which the traditional and modern are mixed together in a new synthesis. There is a tendency on the part of the educated to ignore the 'modern' component in such syntheses and to describe the reformulation as only 'revivalistic'. For instance, the Arya Samaj movement represents an attempt to 'modernise' nineteenth century Hinduism in parts of north India and the fact that the reformulation was expressed in the pseudo-traditionalistic terms of a return to the *Vedas* ought not to be allowed to mislead students as to the true nature of the phenomenon.

It is a commonplace that nationalism results in the reinterpretation of history and mythology and other elements of traditional culture. In the case of ancient civilizations such as India it gives birth to a collective preoccupation with the past, and antiquarian pursuits come to have a political significance in that they contribute to national pride and self-respect. But this can degenerate into national indulgence in fantasy or collective megalomania resulting in war against neighbouring countries.

I would like to refer here briefly to an obscurantism which seems to be a carry over of nationalism to sociology in India. Indian society, it is argued, is unique and Indians have spiritual and moral ideas such as *karma*, *dharma*, and *moksha* which other peoples do not. Therefore, only Indians can understand their society.

Indian society is indeed unique in the sense that it is the product of an unrepeatable series of historical events occurring in a particular part of the world. In this sense, however, every society on the surface of this earth is unique, and uniqueness is not peculiar to India. I have a certain amount of sympathy with the point of view that no outsider can understand a society as completely as an able, sensitive and well-trained indigenous sociologist. But I am also aware that an outsider enjoys advantages in observation which are denied to natives. In brief, outsider and insider enjoy different kinds of advantages and disadvantages, and in the study of vast and ancient societies such as India this question may have implications and consequences that, to me at any rate, are not fully clear. Finally, all societies have their own moral and religious ideas, and it is stretching credibility too far to believe that Indian moral

and religious ideas are superior to those of the other countries. The claim does indeed appear pathetic were it not for the fact that it is fraught with dangerous consequences for the future of the country.

I have spent a little time on the appearance of obscurantism in Indian sociology for the reason that xenophobia is a disease to which new nations are particularly prone, and it can come from a variety of sources, Right, Left or centre. And since I believe that an open society is essential to sociology and since I am against obscurantism of all sorts and from all quarters I thought I should not miss an opportunity to express my sense of unease at some of the tendencies which I see around me.

Indian society has been undergoing far-reaching changes over the last two hundred years. The nature of the changes and their implications vary from one region to another, one section to another, and one set of institutions to another. Assuming that some or all of these changes can be subsumed under modernization, India today provides a vast and fascinating laboratory for research into modernization. The differential level of modernization of institutions and individuals, and the kinds of linkage which modernization in one area has with other areas needs to be studied carefully, and it is not unlikely that a picture of the general drift of the changes may be teased out from a number of such studies. Better insights into the modernization process can be obtained if a comparative approach is brought to bear on the above studies, especially comparison with neighbouring countries.

I would now like to dwell a little on the oft-heard comment that Indians do not have a sense of contradiction, or that it does not have the same emotional and other implications for them as it has for westerners. I shall give below a few examples of such contradiction.

Scientists from Kerala and Tamilnadu employed in a meteorological institution are known scrupulously to avoid doing anything important or auspicious during that part of the day which is believed to be presided over by the inauspicious Rahu, one of the nine planets of Indian astrology. A chart showing the period of each day of the week presided over by Rahu, is frequently hung on a domestic wall. South Indian calendars and diaries generally show Rahukala. According to Hindu mythology, Rahu is a demon whose head was cut off by Vishnu after he had attempted to drink the nectar obtained at the churning of the ocean, but, having become immortal, periodically revenged himself on his betrayers, the sun and moon, by swallowing them at the time of eclipse. The interesting point in the above example is that people who have been trained to study

weather phenomena in terms of the operation of impersonal forces perceive no contradiction between their professional activity and their astrological beliefs. It is likely that these scientists also observe the food and other taboos which orthodox Hindus observe during an eclipse.

Belief in astrology is wide-spread though politicians and businessmen are generally singled out for ribald comment in this context. When the Communists first came to power in Kerala in 1957 they took care to see that the ministers were sworn in during an auspicious time. There was indeed some discussion about the propriety of the Communist Party of India, committed to secularism and rationalism, conforming to outdated superstitions, but it was pointed out by some that since most people in Kerala believed in astrology, Communists had to be sworn in at an auspicious time, otherwise the people would conclude that the Communists would be thrown out of power prematurely.

Jawaharlal Nehru claimed all his life to be a rationalist and socialist though somewhat different to other rationalists in his articulated sensitivity to spiritual values. During the post-independence years he made it a point to criticise faith in astrology, whenever he could. Perhaps he found the tendency of his colleagues in cabinet to go to astrologers at the slightest provocation highly irritating. It therefore comes as a surprise to find him writing, in 1944, to his daughter asking her 'to get a proper horoscope by a competent person'<sup>3</sup> for his newly-born grandson. He adds that 'Such permanent records of the date and time of birth are desirable. As for the time, I suppose the proper time should be mentioned and not the artificial time which is being used outside now. War time is at least an hour ahead of normal time'.<sup>4</sup> If he only wanted an accurate record of the date and time of birth would not a birth certificate have been enough?

Jawaharlal Nehru also desired that his ashes should be immersed in the river Ganga at Allahabad. He made it clear, however, that he wanted this done not because of the usual Hindu idea that such immersion was religiously meritorious but because of his sentimental regard for the river of his childhood flowing in his natal city of Allahabad. He also wanted his ashes to be sprayed from a plane on Indian soil.

The Indian Communist, Brajesh Singh, Prince of Kalakankar, who married Svetlana Ali-

3. Letter No. 74 in *Nehru's Letters*, Edited by Krishna Hutheesing, London, 1960.

4. *Ibid.*

luyeva, daughter of Stalin, also wanted his ashes to be immersed in the bosom of mother Ganga at Allahabad, and Svetlana undertook a pious journey to India out of regard for her dead husband's wishes. There is a curiously apposite irony in this journey which the daughter of the most powerful atheist in history undertook to respect an ancient superstition of the Hindus.

My aim in narrating the above incidents is to make the point that even western-educated Indians, self-declared rationalists and Communists, behave in a manner that seems to ignore seeming contradictions. I shall now briefly explore the sources of these contradictions but before I do so I should make the point that perhaps such contradictions occur in other cultures also, including western cultures, though they may not be as egregious as in Indian culture.

A source of contradiction in behaviour which is universal stems from role conflict. Behaviour in roles such as citizen, official, legislator, may conflict with familial and kinship roles such as father, mother, son, daughter, brother, etc. In his role as official or legislator a man may do one thing which he may totally disregard in his role as father or uncle. A Member of Parliament may have voted enthusiastically for the abolition of the dowry but when it comes to the marriage of his daughter, he may pay it like other people. A politician may strongly advocate teaching through Indian languages but may send his own children to English-medium schools.

It is not unlikely that developing societies which are not only trying to modernize but are also under a compulsion to appear modernized pass legislation without a serious intent to implement it. This may itself be a source of contradiction or inconsistency in the behaviour of individuals. In addition, it is likely that there is more contradiction in behaviour in developing countries because of the pace of social change and the extent of the break with traditional culture. It is perhaps only a transient phenomenon, and the compulsion to be consistent might increase as the modernization process gathers momentum.]

However, contradiction may not always be due to role conflict. A man's own interest or inclination may run counter to his proposed principles thus a man may be aware of the danger of eating exposed food but may not be able to resist the temptation when he actually confronts such food. Habits formed early in life may prevail over knowledge. That this occurs all over the world would be readily conceded but the type of contradictions which

I am concerned with are institutionalised contradictions.

I shall now consider the possibility that there is something in Indian society and culture which makes Indians, including the educated, less sensitive to contradiction than members of other societies. I have deliberately listed this explanation last as I am not quite certain about its validity and I offer it as a purely tentative one.

<sup>7</sup> Caste is fundamental to Indian society, and it necessarily implies acceptance of pluralism in culture. People get used to cultural and ethical relativism though such relativism is qualified by an attempt, not always successful, to subsume the various systems in a hierarchy. This relativism is at the basis of Indian 'tolerance' while the hierarchy explains indifference if not arrogance on the part of the higher groups to the cultures or life-styles of the lower. Indian theological thinking is also characterised by relativism-cum-hierarchy. Indian thinkers are able to accept the propitiation of a village goddess with buffalo sacrifice while at the same time asserting that the highest form of worship is offering a fruit or flower to a single god, if not contemplation on an attributeless Brahman.

Diverse styles of life, codes of conduct and belief systems can coexist in a caste society. It is true that all the styles of life do not have the same validity and one is extolled above the others. That is, the idea of hierarchy is the price paid for the acceptance of cultural pluralism. There is no idea that one's style of life should be imposed on others—in fact, the opposite idea prevails that different castes have different styles of life. Though in Sanskritic Hinduism one style of life is rated above all the others, at the existential level it is seen that there was rivalry between different styles of life, between that of the Brahmin and Kshatriya or of the Brahmin and Vaishya.

The idea of hierarchy as well as theological concepts such as *samsara*, *karma* and *dharma* helped in building bridges between diverse and conflicting ways of life. A pantheistic philosophy which saw God in everything and the same God in the buffalo-consuming Kali as well as the attributeless Brahmin also ignored differences and contradictions.

Indian society is changing rapidly and it is possible that the urge to consistency may become stronger. It is not unlikely that this may be accompanied by increased mental illness. I am assuming here that the way a culture regards contradictions in behaviour has consequences for the mental health of its population.

# Political aspects

YOGENDRA SINGH

MODERNIZATION is a much used and widely operationalized conceptual category, and yet controversies continue to persist with regard to its objectivity, value-neutrality and operational feasibility. This arises because of historical discontinuities in its formulation and application by social scientists in the western and Asiatic regions where not only the autochthonous traditions differ but, owing to emergent forces of nationalism released by the end of the colonial era, the search for identity often outruns that for assimilation and synthesis. Moreover, most formulations of the concept of modernity do embody cultural presuppositions derived from the traditions to which the scientist formulating the concept belongs, and, incidentally, most such scientists come from the western nations so well identified with an ambivalent form of political and cultural relationship in regard to the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thus, Asian social scientists' evaluative frame of reference for modernization tends to be caught in peculiar emotional and intellectual conflict common to a host of other levels of relationships between the elites of the rich nations and the poor.

Against this background, Professor Srinivas' contention that modernization involves value judgment and is a 'new *avatar* of the idea of progress' which was also considered to be inevitable by nineteenth century thinkers' assumes significance and merits analysis. The progress ideology of the nineteenth century was a product of the philosophy of

rationalism and utilitarianism which assumed universality in the nature of man so that teleologically social systems would work out an evolutionary course leading societies from progress to progress; this ideology was, therefore, nominalistic and laisse faire in orientation.

Some recent formulations of modernization no doubt suffer from this same ideological bias (I have particularly in my mind Talcott Parsons' thesis on 'Evolutionary Universals'; of *American Sociological Review*) yet, it would be a mistake to assume that all formulations of modernization models tend to be rational-nominalistic and liberal. The Marxist and neo-Marxist formulations are an obvious exception. Empirically, too, many social scientists have now begun to suspect the established view that in the process of modernization all structures would evolve from lower to progressively higher degrees of differentiation; the observations indicate that with progressive differentiation or specialization there also takes place a higher form of structural fusion or de-differentiation of roles (Cf. Nettie and Robertson: *International System and the Modernization of Societies*, pp. 42-46). Thus, differentiation proceeds alongwith the emergence of new communal bonds and primary networks of relationships.

This renders the process of modernization, whether political or social, very complex. The neat contrariety between modern and traditional not only in terms of social structure but also values and norms is lost and is replaced

by a picture of evolutionary multiple transformations. In such a process of development it is not impossible, nor should it surprise us, if glaring role inconsistencies and cognitive dissociations are evident in the behaviour of modernized persons, for instance, if a person is an eminent scientist and yet believes in omens and astrology. To my mind such a 'modern' society is impossible to emerge and does not so far exist, where there is no inconsistency in thinking and behaviour. As Professor Srinivas says, probably consistency did exist more in the traditional society, and modern societies are those where dissociation between roles and levels of thinking become imperative and are sought to be institutionalized.

**W**hy should a modern society necessitate dissociation or autonomy between substructures and systems of values? An answer to this could be given both in logical as well as sociological terms. Logically, all roles in sets of combinations form social substructures or structures and are based upon 'operational' or 'instrumental' values (statement that 'if we wish to achieve A then the best method is to do B') as well as 'fundamental' or 'categorical' values (statement that 'A is good') along with the types of activities to which the role is oriented.

Now, whereas the operational values can be proved true or false by rational methods of science and technology, the fundamental values are logically beyond such tests. Assuming that a modern role like that of a surgeon or an engineer or a bureaucrat implies clearly laid out operational values for role performance, the contingency of incumbents' simultaneous commitment to some fundamental values cannot be ruled out. It is not necessary, however, that these values too should be rational. Rationality can only be judged when fundamental values are transformed into operational ones and enter into our role performance.

/ A traditional society differs from

a modern society in the sense that in the former there are relatively fewer roles which are predominantly governed by operational values, and it is the fundamental values which govern the operational ones. The situation is reversed in a modern society, whereas science and technology advance, more and more categorical values are formulated in operational terms. Such increased operationalisation leads to the growth of specialised structures which in course of time begin to operate as self-generating autonomous units, and this is the second cause of dissociation of substructures in a modern society.

Referring to the power system in an industrial or modern society, Raymond Aron draws our attention to this fact saying: 'The originality of industrial societies does not reside in the permanence of a political sub-system, but in the differentiation of ruling hierarchies. In the western system, the same men do not control public administration and private enterprise; legislators and public officials are for the most part professional politicians. Scholars, artists, writers, professors are all christened intellectuals and consider themselves dependent in their own activities solely upon the judgment of their peers; priests neither command nor obey the scholars or the political rulers. In short, apparently characteristic order of Western industrial society consists of dissociation of power'. (*Progress and Disillusion*, p. 52.)

**T**he integration in the modern social system thus proceeds through continual segmentation of social structures with increasing overall organic growth. The main problem of political modernization of India could be seen in the contradictions of the 'organic' and 'segmental' principles of growth in the framework of the micro and macro structural forces. The equivalent of the organic process of growth in the political idiom is consolidation of nationhood or national solidarity. It involves a federal macrostructure; parliaments and assemblies, judiciary,

bureaucracy, army, political parties and the national elites.

**A**t all these levels, the process of political modernization refers to questions connected with institutionalization of operational values and their legitimization in culture. It also involves institutionalization of the fundamental value of the political system, such as that parliamentary form of 'democracy is good.' The question whether the Indian social system in the process of modernization throws up adequate responses for institutionalization of these values in political role structures is the problem of political modernization. These two value counterparts should thus be analysed in the background of the structural processes of the Indian society, that of segmentation versus organic growth.

The single most important 'operational value' of the Indian polity is the Constitution which also enshrines some fundamental values of this system. Within its framework political modernization in India means growth, legitimization, and institutionalization of the political role structures concomitant with the above set form. The form that is set whether through one or the other operational or fundamental values and corresponding structures is not inelastic but constitutes what is known as the 'boundary condition' for performance of the system. Other boundary conditions of the determined by history, natural resources and conditions of the social and cultural system of the society concerned. The political modernization proceeds only as a sub-culture and substructure of the general processes of modernization in the social system as a whole.

When we consider this, the relevant issues in the process of Indian political modernization at the macro-structural level are regarding the nature of formation of political parties, emergence of political leadership, the role of bureaucracy (administrative, managerial and military) in the political processes and the func-

tioning of the federal politics and finally its cultural integration through communication media (linguistic media), value systems and ideologies. At the micro-structural level the aspects of political modernization involve problems of caste and ethnic politics, patterns of voting behaviour, and the role of regionalism and sub-regionalism in politics. It may not be possible for us to deal with all these aspects of political modernization in India in this short space, but it is necessary to keep all these dimensions in mind in a systematic analysis of the problem.

The process of political party formation within the operative norms of democracy is itself an indicator of modernization. Parties are otherwise groups that are societalized, that is they are oriented to a goal (acquisition of power) in a planned manner and based on a rational order (distribution of administrative offices, rights and responsibilities among the staff and the functionaries etc.), and in this sense parties involve communal action which they can mobilize either on a class basis or on the basis of status groups like castes and tribes and religious communities. Parties based entirely on communal or status group structure were always there in the eastern and the western societies, but these did not contribute to political modernization as in terms of their operation they soon degenerated either into pressure groups, private armies or factions. The modern political parties only emerged with the inception of the industrial society and its rational equalitarian order; in Europe their fuller growth coincided with the breakdown in the 'estates' which were status groups; it also coincided with the process which removed the hierarchical and closed system of stratification.

In the political modernization of India through the growth of political parties, the relevant question is of the extent to which parties cut across status group

loyalties, and the extent to which they are ideologically committed, that is whether 'principled interests' or the 'expediency interests' are dominant. This phenomenon is indeed very complex in the party formation in India. The basic dilemma this process faces in India is that due to a differential rate of growth or modernization in different social substructures (social life, culture and beliefs and above all economy) the response of the hierarchical system of social stratification to political modernization in the early phases has not been proportionate or even balanced.

Hierarchy, thus, constrains the emergence of the 'rational order' of the party, and status groups in the forms of dominant castes and communities monopolized the major party roles and its decision making processes. Upper and middle castes and classes formed the largest and most influential part of the party organism. The party movement was governed more by historicity of stratification than by articulation of varied interest groups. This was true not only for the Congress but also the Communist and other parties. The result is that as political modernization now enters into its second phase of development, that is of the politics of interest groups, not only the Congress but all other parties tend to issue forth new political parties.

The main reason for these changes is the change and challenge experienced by parties through the restructuring of status group alliances owing to the clash of interests in the sharing of power. But the role of the status groups, particularly of caste, in party formation has not disappeared but only changed. This can be explained through the operation of the 'organic' and the 'segmental' principles. The modernization of social structure implies the mobilization of segments within an organic system both on the vertical and horizontal lines. In early political modernization (roughly until Independence) political parties in

India represented mobilization of caste segments only at the top of the social pyramid; it had a mainly horizontal character.

After Independence, when the role of parties in the power behaviour or their command over the distribution of rewards, was understood and realized by other segments, the pressure for new alliances increased. This resulted in the coming into prominence of the D.M.K. in the South, and parties like the Shoshit Dal, Akali Dal, B.K.D. and Jharkhand, etc., in other parts of India. All these parties reflect the merging of segmental identities into a new organic-corporate solidarity by which the status principle is metamorphosed into a political party. To a lay man the process seems irksome, to vested interests it might smack of danger, but to a social scientist it only reflects the essentials of our structural dynamics; one might go one step further and say that the emerging trends of party formation through horizontal and vertical mobilization of social segments do in a real sense usher in the forces of political modernization.

It is only at this stage that party formation shows signs of necessary dissociation or substructural autonomy of the political organism. When parties emerge through segmentary mobilization of the status groups like castes, communities and tribes or even linguistic affinities, it is reflective of the fact that forces of political modernization have now become diffuse from their earlier specific or purely segmentary existence. It also shows that the realities of the existing social structure rather than mere historicity now increasingly govern the process of political operations and movements.

It is, however, also true that as realities impinge upon political processes more acutely, the awareness of economic, social and cultural deprivations among people is enhanced and if the system does not respond to these demands beyond a point there may even be a

breakdown in the operative values of the polity (by calls for revolution, violent movements for capturing power, formation of 'private' armies or Senas). Here the viability of political modernization is lined with economic modernization and fair distributive justice.

**O**ne test for the success of political modernization is easily the extent to which social justice is realized through the political mechanism emerging in the process of modernization. In our view, the new trends in party behaviour and its structure guarantee it more than in the past, simply because parties now represent varied interest groups rather than a traditionally dominant status group bearing the label of a party. This renders the political system more responsive, consensual, reconciliatory and adaptive.

The issues concerning political elites, bureaucracy, and the politics of the Indian federation are also connected with forces of party formation and their fission and fusion. Some outstanding features of the elite structure as well as bureaucracy in India coincided with the early party structure: both reflected the dominant status groups, were involved in political ideals rather than realities, and both manifested commitment to values foreign to the Indian tradition (with the exception of Gandhi) and showed an elitist bias.

Consequently, we observe that among the political elites, bureaucrats and business elites there existed a high degree of cultural and status homogeneity before Independence; all of them came from upper castes, had an urban, middle class background of an English education, the top group in all the segments was exposed to foreign culture contacts and was educated there; hence their self-image in terms of expected roles was also that of a generalist rather than specialist. For instance, political elites were literary writers and intellectuals, the ICS tended to be ethnographers

and cultural historians and were supposed to perform successfully any responsibility irrespective of the nature of skill involved.

The business elites, too, professed varied cultural interests in education and social reforms. The cultural idiom and style of these early elites in India was western but their social structure, like those of parties, merely reflected an extension of the old status group principle. The structural dissociation among segments necessary for evolving a higher organic solidarity called modernization did not exist. They symbolised cultural not structural modernization in India.

**F**ollowing Independence, this pattern of elite composition has considerably changed. The monopoly of a few top status group segments on the political elite positions, and other elite positions is breaking down. This generated the needed dissociation among elite segments, but it also brings into its wake some difficult problems. A major difficulty emerges from cultural distanciation between the political and non-political (bureaucratic and managerial) elites. As interest group mobilization in-party politics increases, the political elite has to project itself increasingly as representative of regional and local cultures and its identities tend to incorporate different shades of traditionalisms and ethnocentrism, but the bureaucratic elite has to function within a rationally defined order of operational values with laid down criteria of training and efficiency. In other words, it is systematically enculturated.

The conflict might emerge through the political elites' insistence of reconciliation or accommodation of interest group demands in his role performance which might be resisted by bureaucrats on grounds that such insistence violates the principles laid down in the rational order of bureaucracy. The slogan for the need of a 'committed' bureaucracy by political elites now only reflects this historical phase of con-

tradiction. Irony is that commitment to any rational order generates built-in constraints against arbitrary reconciliations which political processes in an open society often demand. The alternative, therefore, does not logically lie in politicalization of the bureaucracy but suitable transformation in the rational order of the bureaucracy itself.

Another difficulty arising from the changing structure of elites in India is that the need for over-localisation of identities might threaten the federal or national identity. The manner in which some radical tendencies are emerging in some States, and the extent to which the State political leadership tries to reconcile with local forces (West Bengal may be cited as a case in point, but the difference with other States is that of degree and not of direction or form) a serious or even dangerous strain might be exerted on the operational norms of the democratic systems to which India's model of political modernization aspires. If reconciliation extends far enough to offer tacit if not clear recognition and legitimization to political movements employing private armies or Senas and protests involving organized violence, the political game of democracy would have broken, because democracy too like bureaucracy is based on a rational order irrespective of its ideology, whether Marxist or western-liberal.

**H**ow to reconcile these forces released by political modernization? The answer only lies in the planned reinforcement of political segments through the policy of the States and the central regime so that dissociation of each elite segment from others does not deteriorate into centrifugal disorder but might be integrated into one organic structure of purposeful national identity. A policy of reconciliation is necessary for this, but the limits of reconciliation must be realised. Reconciliation would involve not only pursuing of a socialistic policy or a policy of rational distributive justice, but also constant and suitable modi-

fication of the operational values of our democracy laid down in the Constitution.

**S**ocial transformation is an organic or vital process, especially modernization, and it would be a purely anti-historical approach to assume that the Constitution which a nation gives to itself through social consensus at a period of history should be treated as the last word, especially in respect of the operational values (means to an end). The fundamental values of the Constitution may, however, need more careful review or probably little alteration.

As we pass from macro-structures to micro-structures involved in political modernization, caste assumes a very significant place. Caste is a status group; so are the tribes and communities. Does caste retard political modernization? Would the emergence of class accelerate this process? These questions have been frequently posed and answered by social scientists and its literature now is legion. Apparently, caste as a system of local primary relationships, kinship bonds and loyalties does get deeply involved in political processes: it is politically exploited being the only available social group to begin with. But the relationship between caste and politics is not simple or symmetrical. Caste too is caught in the segmental-organic dilemmas of social transformation. It does not have a unified form, it is constantly subdivided and suffers from internal fission and fusion. We may of course speak of the dominant castes: of Bhumihars, Kayasthas and Rajputs in Bihar, of Jats, Rajputs, Bhumihars in Uttar Pradesh, of Pattidars in Gujarat, Marathas and Mahars in Maharashtra, Kamaas and Reddis in Andhra, Lingayats and Okkaligas in Mysore and Nadars and Vanniyars in Madras, etc., but dominant castes reflect only one phase of the political process.

The emergence of such castes as political groups follows associative or corporate principles; the

consistency of their interest for political mobilisation is necessary. But there are many factors which render interests of segments within a dominant caste inconsistent with that of the whole; this happens when class-like rivalries for control over resources and power emerge, or when factional groupings begin to compete for power or also when other caste segments within the horizontal status line offer temptations of a new alliance and better prospect for the share in power. The political behaviour of caste thus does not remain rooted in the structure of caste per se, but constantly shifts alliances and loyalties. When caste segments strike alliances for political bargains with other caste segments on either horizontal or vertical level, they are transformed into a new 'organic' structure, a political group and caste ceases to be a relevant frame of reference.

**E**ven otherwise the political behaviour of castes is not unimodal but differs from level to level of political participation. At the village level the segmental tensions of castes and subcastes may be most articulate; at the regional level, depending upon caste demography, dominant castes or caste alliances might be effective political units, but at the national level castes might be replaced by a more complex ethnic cum universalistic principle of alliances. As modernization increases, the ramifications of interest groups cutting across caste loyalties also increase and these might introduce the needed dissociation of structures and substructures in the forms of political groups, associations and parties whereby the pull and push factors of caste in politics may be rationally balanced. The studies of voting behaviour in India by political scientists do confirm that such trends are already emerging, although caste has not ceased to be an influential structural phenomenon in Indian politics.

Political modernization has many aspects through which its

problems can be located. Primarily, its problems are rooted in the process whereby a society predominantly governed by status groups takes one long and sudden jump to introduce party system of democracy and rejects the non-party model of political modernization offered by Gandhi, who essentially symbolised a reawakening of the Indian and Asian consciousness. In this choice lies our historic problem for modernization, social, cultural as well as political. We have preferred the elitist system of political modernization over the mass mobilization system of Gandhi.

**W**hether the Gandhian model too was elitist is a question we would not like to raise here; but the differences in the two models are obvious. The elitist system of democratic politics prefers to modify and not alter the system of stratification in a fundamental manner. It prefers a gradualist approach through reconciliation with emerging contradictions of interest groups in society at each period of transition, and seeks to introduce such changes in the social structure in a planned manner that minimise inter-segmental incompatibilities and contradictions so that, on the one hand, needed structural autonomy between substructures, such as polity, economy, culture, technology, etc., which are necessary attributes of a modern social system could be realized and on the other the tensions and anomalies of growth are also controlled. For nations with poor resources both natural and human such a task is indeed formidable. But when one observes the processes of political modernization in India, the structural response has kept pace fairly with this challenging goal. It happened because reconciliations were made when it became absolutely necessary; what we need in future is to sustain this far-sightedness. Secularism and socialism are nothing if not rational forms of cultural and social reconciliation respectively.

# National integration

RASHEEDUDDIN KHAN

INDIA, a classic traditional society in the process of modernization, is also the most authentic and complex federal polity in the world. No other territorial sovereignty, with a continental dimension, at any point of human history and anywhere else is or has been so distinctly and positively federal in its socio-cultural ecology as the India of today. This is observable along the multiple lines of ethnodemography, culture-patterns and social mores, no less than in terms of religious beliefs, languages and dialects, regional pulls and sub-

regional allegiances. Similarly, the variations in region-bound historical myths and legends, group symbols and identities, as indeed in occupational structures and sociological determinants of traditional economy and in the entire process of political socialization of the mass and the elite, reveal a most complicated mosaic of diversities. While, there is nevertheless an indelible impress of a pervasive sense of unity, yet the congruence of these diversities into a viable federal national

identity is the main quest of contemporary Indian politics.

In this paper attention is focused on some of the inter-related problems of national integration as a basic process of modernization of the Indian polity.

**S**een from the angle of political development, that is, to be more specific, in terms of modern nation-building, the broader phenomenon of modernization of society involves for its fuller realization the synchronization and convergence of at least those five major processes on which a considerable consensus of social scientists is available. These may be itemized as: (i) mass mobilization and political participation (based on equality of status and opportunity of the citizenry); (ii) democratization of political structures (involving pluralism, competitiveness and distribution of power); (iii) secularization of politics (based on differentiated institutions and stability of the political system); (iv) rationalization (achieved through functional differentiation and achievement criteria); and (v) national integration (of discrete segments of the polity).

The process of national integration is vital to the modernization of a society because the concept of a nation is the *only* universally recognizable and internationally valid concept for the sovereign aggregation of human beings in a modern State. If modern States are nation-States or multi-nationality States, then the territorial integrity, political stability and legitimacy of the States (that is, the three pre-requisites of what Karl Deutsch prefers to call a 'security-community') is predicated upon the political, if not also emotional, integration of its citizens.

This serves simultaneously two levels of modernization—national and international, because a politically integrated national community alone can provide the firm bases for mutuality relationship among sovereign people by promoting multiple transactions like

communications, trade and mobility of persons; technological sharing and congruent functional interests.

National integration is the *sine qua non* of modernization for, in its very process, it involves a radical shift in the focus and the consequential readjustment of loyalties of the people. The values of a tribal, a feudal and a parochial ethos give way to the ideals and ends of a democratic, egalitarian and an evolving national society. National integration is the breakdown of fragmented group-existence based on particularistic loyalties, and its supercession by generalist loyalties to the total aggregation of the political community—a nation. Integration is thus a movement away from traditionalist allegiances and for modernist allegiances—a movement towards the establishment of a new national identity.

In this sense, national integration is both a horizontal and a vertical movement: simultaneously a quantitative and a qualitative process. This is a logical corollary of the proposition that the bonds of cohesion in a given society ought to be in consonance both with the temper of the age and the basic character of the polity. A democratic age and a national polity require a democratic-cum-national bond of cohesion. Democracy is an expanding and an enabling process. For an equalized democracy, fuller political participation and mass mobilization that would generate in turn a unified political culture is necessary and desirable.

**I**n this context, three factors are to be noted. Firstly, the felt need for national integration obviously arises when the totality of the political community in a sovereign State is not homogeneous but heterogenous in its composition. Secondly, the existence of a real or an imaginary fear of disintegration of the political community due to the presence of mutually hostile and conflicting segments of people accentuate further the necessity of national

integration. And, thirdly, the felt need for integration becomes all the more urgent in those plural societies (like India), whose structure of State is federal and whose functions of government are democratic, since both federation and democracy have an in-built propensity for permitting, if not also promoting, dissent, whose articulation in politics often acquires aspects of separatism and *fissiparism*—one in the name of greater regional autonomy and the other on the plea of more explicit right of self-determination.

In the semantics of functional politics, the term national integration means, and ought to mean, cohesion but not fusion, unity but not uniformity, reconciliation but not merger, agglomeration but not assimilation, solidarity but not regimentation of the discrete segments of the people constituting a political community/State.

**N**ational integration may be summed up to signify a condition of *unity in diversity* in which both the components are equally valid and mutually inter-dependent. National integration presumes the existence both of unity and of diversity: for if there is only unity then integration is not necessary, and if there is only diversity then integration is not possible. Obviously, then, integration is not a process of conversion of diversities into a uniformity but a congruence of diversities leading to a unity in which both the varieties and similarities are maintained. It may also be remembered that all diversities are not, and need not be construed as, divisive in their operation. Viable plural societies anyhow presume that diversities are reconcilable.

Presuming that national sovereignty cannot be fragmented, and further presuming that the unified allegiance of all the citizens irrespective of any divisions in the society is to be obtained for the legitimacy and stability of the political system, then, in a situation of *unity in diversity*, national integration serves such major purposes like: (i) providing the psy-

chological basis for the smooth functioning of national sovereignty; (ii) giving cohesion at the political level to a culturally plural society; (iii) checking and weakening, if not eradicating forces of disruption, disunity and disintegration; and (iv) attempting to secure a consensual basis for a unified political growth for the many sub-units of national sovereignty.

**L**et us examine the plurality of Indian society. The ramifications of its plurality extend to so many sectors of collective life that one might as well make a distinction and say that India is plural in the most comprehensive sense of the word. Sociologically it comprises different stratas of people living as contemporaries a pattern of life which is so widely different in its value-structure, norms and behaviour that one wonders how social entities belonging intrinsically to different milieu co-exist temporarily in the same political community. Ethnically, India is a laboratory of many races and their inter-mixing. Culturally and linguistically there are well-marked and almost defined regions and sub-regions where people speaking a developed and alive language cherish memories of their past grandeur and distinctive heritage with the twin sentiments of alliance and discord with other contiguous regions in India. In terms of religious communities it includes seven major segments: Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jainists, Buddhists and Parsees.

In its occupation-structure and economy, India reflects in human terms all the worst features of a society fragmented at its base by antagonistic class division maintained by abominable disparities in income levels. The syndrome of political ideology in India includes all the major contemporary schools of political 'isms' and their variants of the extreme Right and extreme Left.

All this however is plurality on the horizontal plane, the like of which in lesser degree and with

fewer diversities is nevertheless found in quite so many countries, even if in India due to a variety of reasons certain divergences and discords (like communal, regional and linguistic animosities) often tend seriously to impair the peaceful growth of the polity. But it is plurality on the vertical level in the form of castes and sub-castes and kinship linkages, that is not only typical of the hierarchical and segmented traditional polity of India, but also the real bane in the promotion of national integration at the more basic sociological plane. This equally fundamental aspect of integration is normally overlooked in India. There is more than necessary emphasis on the horizontal, that is, inter-regional, inter-communal or inter-linguistic integration; and less than essential attention is given to vertical integration, that is intra-regional integration within homogeneous culture and language zones, between communities and castes. This integration in depth is a pre-condition for the stabilization of a democratic political system.

**O**bviously, compartmentalization of population at the vertical level based on ascription becomes worse by its inter-mixing with the ascriptive cleavages at the horizontal level. This 'two level of traditional plurality' impedes the process of modernization more than is normally experienced by other societies. It is therefore true that since no country faces internally such a baffling problem of national cohesion as India does, precisely for this reason few political communities in the world are in greater need of concerted and many-pronged effort for modernization than India is.

Therefore, the problem of national integration in India stems generally from a combination of four determining factors: (i) continental dimension of Indian polity which by its size and complexity is heterogeneous, and basically different from an 'insular' homogeneous polity; (ii) existence for centuries of a plural society in terms of culture, language, reli-

gion, region, economy and urban-rural dichotomy; (iii) federal structure of government and administration that has an in-built checks-and-balances system between localism/regionalism and federalism/nationalism; and (iv) democratic-decentralization (*Panchayati raj*) of participatory functional politics.

The Constitution of India has wisely recognised the diversities in its basic assumptions of law and except for the bold assertion to eradicate social inequality, abolish caste distinctions, provide economic justice and promote a uniform civil code, there is nothing on the statute book, and correctly so, to hinder the existence of reconcilable diversities like those based on culture, language, region, and religious-community. Actually, if the chapters on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy are to be read with deeper meaning, they would reveal the tacit, and in parts explicit, consent of the founding fathers for the co-operative growth of a plural society and a federal polity. Yet, precisely for this very reason of constitutional impartiality, there is more than ordinary concern for the political, that is, extra-constitutional effort for integrating the people for the harmonious and manifold growth of a genuinely plural but politically integrated society in this country.

**W**hen we talk of the need for national integration in India, we essentially refer to four basic aspects of the problem: (i) cultural (regional and linguistic variations); (ii) social (differentiation of caste, communities and tribes); (iii) economic (rural-urban divergences and disparate income-groups among them); and (iv) political (cumulative articulation of exclusivist demands reflecting the conflicts of interest projected by the structured cleavages based on the above-mentioned segments).

At this point we may ask the question: 'Does the process of national integration refer to the integration of culture, society, economy and politics or does it

refer mainly to political integration with consequential impact on other sectors of life? If the objective of 'integration' is the creation of territorial nationality in order to subordinate parochial loyalties by the effective working of a national central authority that maintains and works a unified political system, then the process of national integration refers mainly to political integration. The qualifying word *mainly* and the qualifying clause 'with consequential impact on other sectors of life', have been deliberately inserted to underline the complex reality that anyhow the process of national integration, particularly as an extension of the broader process of modernization, cannot but have repercussions on the totality of social life.

But in order to extricate the process of national integration from over-tones of authoritarian styles, fascistic ends and coercive methods, that is, from non- or rather anti-democratic strategies, it is necessary to juxtapose the imperative need for political integration as different from, and co-existent with, cultural and social pluralism. Dialectically, the unity of India in terms of its culture (covering languages, regions, communities, etc.), is essentially a federal concept entailing the dichotomous existence of sub-national autonomies with national identity. The argument that the unity of India rests exclusively and only on steam-rolling the diversities out of existence is not merely naive and mechanistic but also repugnant of the rich historical heritage and distinctive ethos of this many-splendoured land. Only the conceited, the bigoted, the illiterate and in a sense the less-than-patriotic can refuse to see, or cannot see, the distinctive federal hall-mark of Indian polity, or having seen it would like to wish it out of existence.

A very great part of such a response for 'elimination of diversities for the maintenance of unity' rests on the sense of disquiet and annoyance and occasional guilt for the incapacity of the national

leadership to maintain the territorial integrity of the country when power was finally transferred in 1947 by the retreating British imperial authority. Escape from guilt and rationalization of the situation is variously sought by those ever-prepared to soothe their conveniently gullible conscience by either over-playing the 'role' particularly of British Imperialism and generally of patent colonial politics of divide-and-rule and divide-and-quit; or by accusing (what appears to their mind) the 'inherent treachery' of the 'congenitally separatist' Muslims, whose faith anyhow gives them an 'extra-territorial' focus and whose doctrine of the 'brotherhood of the faithful' runs counter to the very grain of territorial nationality!

guage, one State have to be fair to them, an idealistic and abstract theoretical proto type of a completely integrated political community in their minds, which could be coerced into existence by a politically dominant elite. Longings for such a 'homogeneity-under-duress' is reflected in the writings of Mazzini, in the speeches of Mussolini, in the politics of Hitler or in the imaginative formulations of well-meaning un-realists in India.

In this context it is not surprising that the three most commonly reiterated factors that are mentioned as impediments to national integration are popularly called 'communalism', 'regionalism' and 'linguism'.

The term national integration in India is used essentially to signify the cohesion, or at least reconciliation of religious communities in a pattern of emotional harmony. It will be germane to remember, in this context, the sociological nature and political role of communalism in India and its relationship to the process of modernization.

**T**heoretically, in the ascending spiral of pre-modernized group-cohesions in India, communalism follows tribalism and casteism but it has neither the primitive roots like the tribal order nor the traditional sanction of the caste system. It is not primordial in its origin. Although like the other two it is ascriptive in its character, unlike them it is not anachronistic in social terms, except in a relative sense. In fact, if secularization of politics is taken restrictively as a phenomenon only of the separation of Church from State, that is, the differentiation of belief-pattern from the political processes, then communalism may not appear totally irreconcilable even with secular politics, since the latter can also be articulated, though abnormally, through communal identities.

Further, some who plead for 'one nation, one culture, one lan-

The process of nationalism also involves cohesion of all the major

communities first around a community base. In India, where the majority community itself is a heterogeneous congregation, fragmented by caste and sub-castes, divided further by regional variations intersected by language-dialect, urban-rural and locality distinctions, community-orientation serves the immediate purpose of first level integration. But precisely because of such an integration around a religious base, the projection of communal integration into national politics accentuates further the communal consciousness of the minorities, who due to their smaller proportion in the population complex feel greatly alarmed by such a development. Worse still is the identification of majority communalism as the norm and the pattern of nationalism. But this is an unavoidable world-wide phenomenon.

**M**uch against the common impression, communalism is responsive to modernity inasmuch as it seeks to appropriate the benefits of modernization although exclusively for its own community, and does not repudiate it like tribalism does, nor resist it like the caste system. This is evident from the history of communalism in India. And now with the functioning of a participatory democracy based on universal franchise, freedom of expression and faith and of organization, communalism has grown as the natural beneficiary of a political revolution that has outpaced the long overdue radical social change and the growth of industrial economy. In the transition to an authentic modern polity, the last to yield to a rational pattern of human relations will be not tribalism or casteism but communalism.

Apropos communalism, one might briefly refer to the country's biggest religious minority, the Muslims. The 'Muslim problem' socially and culturally, and in a very specific sense politically, is not so much a vertical phenomenon as it is a horizontal one;

not really a monolithic all-India problem as it is made out to be, but a genuine regional—and therefore a fragmented—problem. By perceiving it the other way (i.e., as essentially a vertical, monolithic and basically an all-India phenomenon) one tends to have both exaggerated (and imaginary) fears and despair. This way of looking at it is heavily conditioned by the pre-independence politics of agitation of the immediate past. The point to remember is that both the *context* and the *style* and *idiom* of the politics of sovereign democratic India, is basically different and (one might add for emphasis and to invoke the *norm*) ought to be different.

The Muslims—like the Hindus but unlike the Sikhs and the Parsees—are a fragmented community—fragmented regionally, linguistically, culturally and ethnically. The manipulative strategy of the British imperial rule had politicized communities by attributing to them an exclusive juristic-cum-political identity that was sought to be juxtaposed for obvious reasons of colonial administration against the latent and emerging composite national identity. The irrational, but logical, birth of Pakistan was the one major consequence of communal polarization of politics under the auspices of the benign British Raj. However, the continuing adherence to that polarization maintained by certain interest-groups and power-elites, is a conversely illogical but politically a rational development. One dimension of the competing politics of bargaining at the local, State and central level is the transformation of communities, or parts thereof into pressure-groups.

**R**egionalism, conceived in any form, is unavoidable in a country so vast and expansive like India. Existence of regional consciousness is not only a prelude and a pre-requisite of genuine national sentiments, but logically is also generated by the euphoria created by the establishment of a Nation-State. Nothing is more basic to the very concept of federalism

than regionalism. And in India there are many reasons not only for the existence but also for the growth and, one might add, desirability of regionalism perceived from a democratic perspective and political functionalism. The chequered history of India provides the background for kinship and fellow-feeling in defined viable regions whose culture and language(s) have evolved for centuries.

In the British and the medieval times, regional personality though latent, remained nevertheless tangible on measurable counts. The process of national integration itself involves the previous integration of these viable regions prior to and as a precondition of the development of national identity. For instance, 'to be Indian' is not necessarily 'not to be a Maharashtrian'; on the contrary, ironic as it might superficially appear, only an integrated Maharashtrian has the propensity to become an integrated Indian. National unity can genuinely flower out of a healthy reconciliation between regionalism and nationalism. However, like national chauvinism, unhealthy regional patriotism is equally cancerous and disruptive both of creative regionalism as also of syncretic nationalism.

**S**imilarly, in a country of many equally developed languages spoken for centuries by people more numerous than those constituting many sovereign States of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, a demand for the unfettered growth, and political and administrative conditions conducive for such a growth, is not surprising. The pejorative term 'linguism' (almost made to sound as 'jingism') is used partly by those self-righteous 'imposers' of one language over all the others who conceive their design as a great patriotic duty and partly by those who in the simpleness of their minds cannot conceive of national unity without a national language. These are the imitators of western models, who pawn the creativity of their minds in exchange for

ready-made analogies of national integration. It may be noted that the process of modernization would increase rather than decrease the magnitude of demands by language communities.

With reference to the recent movement for sub-regional autonomy or Statehood the implications of Telengana, as a case study, may be noted. The Telengana agitation for a separate State has at least demonstrated for purposes of theorization the inadequacy of the language factor as the primary bond of political cohesion and has brought into sharper relief the necessity of taking into account for purposes of political stability and national growth, such critical factors like varied patterns of economy, demographic and socio-logical differentiation, political traditions and sub-cultural divergences, which cannot be taken for granted, if a viable identity is to be maintained.

The collapse of the national sentimental unity, based on common language, under the strain of interacting group interests and 'caste-class-and-mass' conflict, has also revealed how sub-regional rivalries generated by economic imbalances and genuine accumulated grievances can succeed in fragmenting political loyalties (notwithstanding allegiance to the same political party). The situation acquires alarming proportions if the 'elitist' ambitions of adventurist leaders remain unchecked by the corrective that enlightened public opinion alone can provide.

Democracy generates articulation of demands; the greater the range and depth of enabling rights, the wider and keener the corporate urge for demand fulfilment. Economic development unleashes political forces by the very fact of development that tends to wreck the political system if the system is not resilient enough to respond to the challenge. Political demands of viable sub-regions for new administrative arrangements are not necessarily antithetical to the territorial integrity of the country.

Every urge for autonomy may not be a divisive but probably a complementary force; it may not lead to balkanisation but to the re-structuring of the national unity; it need not be taken as a call for disintegration of the national sovereignty, but its recomposition. In other words, the quest for federal identity in India is still not over, and this is quite legitimate historical development.

In the present stage of the nation's socio-technological growth, an average Indian has two sets of distinct and often conflicting loyalty-foci—the pre-democratic or primordial sociological components of allegiance based on ascription and the democratic-modernist components of allegiance based on achievement and volition. In the first category may be mentioned: i) family/kinship; ii) caste/sub-caste/Tribe; iii) community (in the Indian sense of the word)/religion; iv) language/dialect; v) region/sub-region/locality. In the second category are included: i) profession/interest; ii) ideology/party; and iii) nation/country. Notionally the two sets may be assumed in the shape of concentric circles around an individual, in which the modernist concentrics intersect the primordial concentrics.

For a typical average Indian, the five primordial concentrics of allegiance have an unequal pull dependent on his individual choices, volitions and situational-conditioning, though he has inherited them by the fact of his birth, since indeed they are antecedent to his birth. For instance, some may develop greater attachment to one or few primordial concentrics like caste or region, or community, or distribute their allegiance proportionately to all. The intersecting modernist concentrics may either supersede or get subordinated to the primordial concentrics, again however dependent on an individual situation. It may be therefore hypothesized that there is a greater probability of modernization when the intersect-

ing modernist concentrics converge on the primordial concentrics and in the process not only overlap but also envelop them, thus presumably restricting and inhibiting and thereby operationally eliminating their impact over a period of time.

Basic assumptions are: i) modernization does not obliterate primordial allegiances but only weakens them; ii) modernization does not replace or supplant all the primordial concentrics of allegiance by modernist concentrics but merely introduces other concentrics of allegiance which, due to their relevance and contemporaneity have greater in-built attraction; iii) national integration as a factor in modernization of society and secularization of politics will be dependent on the proper adjustment of loyalties between the primordial and the modernist concentrics.

The Indian society, diverse and segmented as it is today would by steady evolution get more cohesive in the very process of balanced inter-regional growth. Social integration is a product of history. An artificial stimulation or executive pressure would only create tensions and lead to conflicts, open or hidden. It is on the economic front, that is in the production and distribution of industrial and commercial goods that there is a need for giving a planned and policy direction for developing an integrated all-India economic unit, an all-India market system. The flow of goods from one to the other region would promote multiple transactions and increase communication and mobility of people. The political system, bureaucracy and the legal framework is already all-India in character and functioning. Economic integration after reaching the nodal point of change, would create propitious objective conditions for closer collaboration between diverse culture-zones and the many strands of society, thereby facilitating not only the general process of modernization but also the deeper and more viable prospects of national integration.

# A myth

SURINDAR SURI

THE concept of modernization has fallen into discredit. It is a legacy of the age of imperialism; currently it is used to perpetuate neo-colonialism. India is one of the few great civilizations to fall under colonial domination; its political and intellectual leaders have become self-alienated. The homage paid to modernization, whether in the guise of Sanskritisation, as with Srinivas, or westernisation, as with his critics, is the major obstacle in the way of rejuvenation of India as a great civilised society. Some aspects of this argument are examined briefly in this article.

Industrial societies grew rapidly in the past few centuries but have now reached a dead end. They may perish in a nuclear holocaust,

be strangled by the ecological imbalance they have brought about unless they are saved by a revolutionary transformation. The last development begins with the realisation that the growth of material affluence beyond a certain point becomes humanly and socially destructive. Looked at from a global perspective, if all of mankind took to the level of consumption of the U.S.A. or Western Europe, there would not be enough natural resources, nor sufficient air, water or space for all of us.

In short, the advanced industrial societies can enjoy affluence only so long as three-fourths of the human race remains poor. The prosperity of the rich nations is

built upon the poverty and exploitation of the poor nations. Either the societies that are at present economically developed must prevent others from attaining wealth (whether this is done by outright obstruction or not) or a way must be found for the fair sharing of the world's resources and wealth among all the people of the globe. This will mean, if not a reduction in the standard of living of the affluent sections of humanity, at least a halt in its increase.

What concerns us in the growth of these trends is that the concept of modernization of societies is related to technological expansion and growth of affluence and has come under critical scrutiny, even in the industrialized and affluent societies. To put it bluntly, England, the U.S.A., Germany or France are no longer held as models of what societies of the third world must emulate. Nations are no longer considered modern in so far as they approximate to the political or social structures of West Europe or North America. The questioning of these models is well advanced in the industrialized and affluent societies, where the search for alternative directions is carried on in earnest.

Whereas some Afro-Asian societies have rejected the western model, e.g., Tanzania, Cuba, etc., others are still enthralled by the web of ideas spun by the erstwhile imperialists and their intellectual apologists. Thus, social and political scientists from the U.S.A. who have been discredited in their own country, and would not be permitted to speak by their own young students or scholars, nevertheless parade as specialists in India.

Conversely, whereas young scholars seek answers to their searching queries about social organization and purpose in societies such as Indian, Chinese, or other long-enduring civilization, Indian scholars and public leaders are unaware of their own cultural treasure and fawn upon the 'western' concepts in a servile and self-

destructive manner. Thus, if a bibliography of 'science of science' is published in Britain (itself slavishly copied from elsewhere) it will be copied in New Delhi. The main operating tool of intellectual colonialism is the concept of 'modernization'. So long as we accept this concept we'll not gain political or social independence nor, ironically, will we be able to cope with the challenges and opportunities of the coming years and decades.

kind into master nations and slave nations, into imperial powers and their colonies. This differentiation on the global scale overlaid the division inside the societies, particularly the imperialist and predatory ones. Social inequality was related to, justified by, and partly moderated and made acceptable through the dominance of the society as a whole, acting as an imperialist power, over colonized societies.

A major point here is that societies which launched on a career of conquest were sick, indeed were themselves colonies that had developed a colonial mentality. England and Holland, to take only two, were both former colonies. Holland was a colony of Spain. England was once a colony of Rome but subsequently and more profoundly a colony of the Normans.

**H**ow did the so-called modern societies arise? Claude Levy-Strauss, the French anthropologist, argues that a fundamental transformation in social organization took place in the neolithic period. At this time, 'the great city States of the Mediterranean Basin and of the Far East imposed slavery, they constructed a type of society in which the differential statuses of men—some dominant, others dominated—could be used to produce culture at a rate until then inconceivable and unthought of. By the same logic, the mechanistic revolution of the 19th century represents less an evolution oriented in the same direction than a rough sketch of a different solution: though for a long time it remained based on the same abuses and injustices, yet it made possible the transfer to culture of that dynamic function which the protohistoric revolution had assigned to society.'

Levy-Strauss argues that what we call cultural progress ensued because the division of society into classes or castes permitted the subordinate groups to be used like natural resources. Progress of society was brought about by the enslavement and degradation of a large part of it. The result was that, as Rousseau puts it, as civilization advances, man decays.

We shall return to the concept of social differentiation as the basic factor in modernization. Here I would like to enlarge this concept into relations between nations. If the neolithic period saw the division of society into masters and slaves, the modern period was marked by the division of man-

**T**he impact of colonization is well-described by Aldous Huxley. 'The English are Germans who have partially "gone Latin". But for William the Conqueror and the Angevins we should be just another nation of Teutons, speaking some uninteresting dialect of Dutch or Danish. The Normans gave us the English language, that beautifully compounded mixture of French and Saxon; and the English language moulded the English mind. By Latin out of German: that is our pedigree. We are essentially mongrels: that is the whole point of us. To be mongrels is our mission. If we would fulfil this mission adequately we must take pains to cultivate our mongrelism. Our Saxon and Celtic flesh requires to be constantly rewedded to the Latin spirit.'

For the most part the English have always realized this truth and acted upon it. From the time of Chaucer onwards almost all of our writers have turned, by a kind of infallible instinct, like swallows, toward the South—towards the phantoms of Greece and Rome, toward the living realities of France and Italy. On the rare occasions when, losing their orientation, they

have turned eastward and northward, the results have been deplorable. The works of Carlyle are there, an awful warning, to remind us of what happens when the English forget that their duty is to be mongrels and go whoring, within the bounds of consanguinity, after German gods.'

The conclusion I wish to draw is different from the aesthetic self-adulation of Aldous Huxley. It is that this mongrel nation, the English, lacking in its own civilization and cultural roots, spread like some cancerous parasite across the face of the globe. The cancer was British imperialism. Political imperialism is practically ended so far as British power is concerned. But the concept of mongrelization, of cultural rootlessness, and social differentiation, combined into the theory of modernization, remains implanted. The concept of modernization is a legacy of imperialism that, far from shaking off, we hold ever closer to our hearts and thus perpetuate and deepen self-enslavement.

The U.S.A. has replaced Britain and other European powers as the supreme imperial power: a brief glance into its social origins is in order. Our best guide is the late Negro social historian, W.E.B. DuBois, who wrote: (The U.S.A.) 'was a rich new land, the wealth of which was to be had in return for ordinary manual labour. Had the country been conceived of as existing primarily for the benefit of its inhabitants, it might have waited for natural increase or immigration to supply the needed hands; but both Europe and the earlier colonists themselves regarded this land as existing chiefly to be exploited, as rapidly and ruthlessly as possible, of the boundless wealth of its resources. This was the primary excuse for the rise of the African slave trade to America.'

'Every experiment of such a kind, however, where the moral standard of a people is lowered for the sake of a material advantage, is dangerous in just such proportion as that advantage is great.'

In this case it was great. For at least a century, in the West Indies and the southern United States, agriculture flourished, trade increased, and English manufactures were nourished, in just such proportion as Americans stole Negroes and worked them to death. This advantage, to be sure, became much smaller in later times, and at one critical period was, at least in the Southern States, almost nil; but energetic efforts were wanting, and, before the nation was aware, slavery had seized a new and well-nigh immovable footing in the Cotton Kingdom.'

The reason for quoting this statement is not to excoriate America for the entrenchment of slavery in its social system but to point out that the premier imperial power today is itself a colony. It is a colony that seeks now to colonise other nations because it has not emancipated itself from its own colonial heritage. The theory of modernization is a major ideological weapon of the new empire and its camp followers. Indian sociologists, political scientists, and scholars generally have fallen prey to it.

Let us summarize our argument. Certain societies were colonised in the past and lost their cultural integrity: they were uprooted and became 'mongrelized', to use Aldous Huxley's term. They were colonised by societies that became 'hot', in the language of Levy-Strauss, because they had introduced inequality in their own structure. The uprooted, imperialist nations launched upon a career of conquering and uprooting others, at that time defenceless or vulnerable, societies. Some of the latter were wiped out, such as many Red Indian societies in America and tribes in Africa. Others were cut off forcibly from their culture and reduced to savages. Some civilizations survived relatively intact. China is one example. India was a great civilization but fully colonised. In the first place, the British or European conquests were not the triumphs of a 'lion rampant', as an English historian

refers to them, but the pickings of a jackal.'

Empire builders were people who could not resist trampling upon and enslaving the societies that were defenceless at the time. More importantly, and in the second place, they were messengers of cultural rootlessness. Wherever imperialism succeeded, it destroyed the cultural integrity of subjugated people. It did so by implanting the idea that the latter were old-fashioned, superstitious, unmodern. That the word 'traditional' should come to be a pejorative whereas 'modern' implied good has been the crowning achievement of imperialism. That scholars and political leaders should accept as their aim the 'modernization' of Indian society is a measure of their alienation from Indian society.

The characteristics of modernization, commonly held out for emulation, include mobility and social dynamism, growth of individualism and proliferation of 'interest groups', a 'pragmatic outlook', social differentiation and specialization. In India it includes the disappearance of castes and their replacement by classes. In so far as class differences arise, it is claimed that India is making progress towards social modernization. In his writings, Srinivas bemoans that caste loyalties are becoming stronger; in his more sanguine moods he equates modernization with the decline of caste ties. At other times he poses Sanskritization as a counter-pole to 'Westernization'. Implicit in his writings is the western model of a modern society. This western model, we have argued, postulates cultural rootlessness. It means, on the one hand, inability to define the cultural heritage of one's society. The vacuum is filled by ad hoc terms such as 'dynamism', 'changeability', and others that in fact signify rootlessness.

On the other hand, the society has no values, whether beliefs, social bonds or relations between man and nature, that would enable it to assess and control natural or social forces to its common ends.

and values. In western industrial societies, for instance, technological development and material wealth have become ends in themselves. Although they pay homage to certain beliefs, there are no values alive enough to assess and control these 'material' social forces.

The results are 'runaway technology' and 'consumerism'. These dehumanize man. As Alberto Moravia defined it: 'The consumer is a gut not so much because he consumes as because he is convinced like those simple organisms (worms), that his function is to consume. In short, the consumer is ready for any kind of consumption in the same way that the earthworm is ready for any kind of earth to pass through his intestinal tube.'

As against consumerism, it is proposed that 'mankind is not bound either to produce or to consume limitlessly but rather to express itself within limits, limits established by itself, of space and time.' I would like to go somewhat further and argue that what one needs is an ecological lodging, such as the Hindu-Muslim tradition, in all its developments, richly provides.

China's is the only civilization that in its vastness and richness compares with that of India. It is worth our while to note how China is rejuvenating herself to cope with imperialism as well as challenges and opportunities provided by industrial technology. One does not have to accept Alberto Moravia's diagnosis to realise it as a significant hypothesis: 'I believe that the Cultural Revolution is aimed chiefly at restoring a "natural" conservatism in China, a conservatism suited to modern times and capable of enduring for thousands of years like that of the empire. The Chinese hatred for the past, then, is the hatred of an emerging conservatism (in the end all revolutions are conservative for they must preserve the conquests of the revolution) for a dying conservatism. The former is taking the place of the latter. But since

the latter is slow in dying, it must be hated.'

At this short range, Moravia's remains a highly speculative interpretation, even though other reports from China tend to confirm it to some extent. But the cultural revolution in China makes sense as a determined effort to restore the integrity and autonomy of the cultural community. This is the only way in which a vast and rich civilization such as China can survive.

It is also the only way in which the ancient, rich, and vastly creative community of Indian people can endure and prosper. No amount of economic development, technological advancement or other material development will by itself move India off dead center, for the cultural and ecological roots of Indian society were damaged by imperialist domination; but not destroyed. A society less richly endowed and less complex may lose its roots and exist or prosper, even though often as a parasite, as imperial power or colony; but this mode of existence is denied to India. In short, India cannot be modernised. It can only rejuvenate itself.

Modernization necessarily implies an outside model; for India to adopt such a model is impracticable or self-destructive. The rejuvenation of India requires, in the first place, that she must establish her cultural autonomy, her self-dependence. The highest value for a community is its awareness of itself. In other words, the values or beliefs that motivate it are not abstractions. The fundamental belief is the community itself; principles, beliefs are abstractions used to explain its various aspects. Faith is life, action. It is not a set of abstract principles or doctrines. The concept of modernization postulates that a society follow an abstract model or guideline. This may be necessary for societies that lack a rich cultural heritage. For India, as also for China, such a path would perpetuate colonial dependence; ultimately it would be suicidal.

# Behaviour patterns

SIDDHESHWAR PRASAD

I AGREE with M. N. Srinivas that modernization is a value judgment. By implication it means that traditionalism is also a value judgment. Therefore, dialectically, traditionalism is the antithesis to modernization.

Modernization, as is well known, is a complicated and painful process. But what is the fundamental concept of modernization? Bertrand Russell was of the view that 'Almost everything that distinguishes the modern world from the earlier centuries is attributable to science, which achieved its most spectacular triumphs in the seventeenth century.'

What is the behaviour pattern in modernization in relation to the behaviour pattern in a traditional society? As both are value concepts the basic difference lies in their attitude towards life. Traditionalism accepts tradition not simply as a part of habit, as many seem to think, but by choice because it believes that religion being revealed truth is superior to scientific truth and it is tradition which symbolises revealed truth and embodies age-old wisdom and not science. Naturally, in the beginning, there were violent clashes between the men of tradition and men of science and the pioneers in the world of science like Copernicus (1473-1543), Kepler (1571-1610) Galileo (1564-1642) and Newton (1642-1727) had to suffer for their scientific discoveries at the hands of the traditionalists.

The clashes between the forces of tradition and modernization

may not be as sharp today but are still there. It may not be the whole truth, but in a way tradition stands for the status quo and modernization for change. Nature is changing constantly; change may be somewhere perceptible, somewhere imperceptible, somewhere fast and somewhere slow, but there can be no doubt that change is the nature of Nature. Since time immemorial, man has been trying to know the secret of this change. Therefore, it is not correct to say that science is against the pursuit of truth. Science being the pursuit of truth, a modern society means a scientific society.

While discussing the relation of science and values, Bertrand Russell observed that 'The scientific society in its pure form, which is what we have been trying to depict, is incompatible with the pursuit of truth, with love, with art, with spontaneous delight, with every ideal that men have hitherto cherished, with the sole exception of ascetic renunciation.'<sup>1</sup> Nobody will deny that man has not been able to establish a perfect scientific society anywhere in the world and hence, no society can be called completely modern in this sense. But there cannot be any doubt that man cannot march forward in this direction without science, rather, it is by developing science more and more, and making its use in the proper manner, that human

1. *A History of Western Philosophy*  
— p. 547

2. *The Scientific Outlook* — p. 274

society can be transformed into a scientific society.

Bertrand Russell further observed that 'The sphere of values lies outside science, except in so far as science consists in the pursuit of knowledge. Science as the pursuit of power must not obtrude upon the sphere of values, and scientific technique, if it is to enrich human life, must not outweigh the ends which it should serve.'<sup>3</sup> Granting that the sphere of values and the sphere of science are different or separate, is it because of difference on this point that the traditionalists opposed science or oppose modernization?

The various studies of traditionalist societies being transformed into modern ones no doubt show signs of stresses and strains of various types but have proved two very significant facts—(1) traditionalists, that is the forces of the status quo, oppose modernization because of their vested interest in the status quo; (2) opposition is not generally due to awareness of any particular type of sense of values but mostly due to ignorance, laziness, fear complex, false sense of vanity and blind faith in dogmas of different types. All these or some of them, if they be very strong, combine to foster such an attitude towards life which kills the very initiative to act and work hard for the transformation of society.

Therefore, what Russell has said about the sphere of values does not apply at all to a traditionalist society but is really a warning to the scientific society for which he has said that only science is not enough and for that the sphere of values has also got to be equally nurtured. About the sphere of values, C.E.M. Zoad is of the view; 'The awareness of values cannot at our present stage of evolution be more than a fleeting and uncertain experience, like thinking in a dog, it is a mode of apprehension to which the species has only just attained. It is still an abnormal capacity, exercised not continuously at the level of everyday experi-

ence, but enjoyed in fleeting and tantalizing glimpses of a world not normally accessible to consciousness.'<sup>4</sup> Therefore, the sphere of values being different (Russell), or the awareness of values being of a higher stage of evolution (Zoad), it is obvious that traditionalism, although a value concept is an expression of an earlier stage of social evolution, and so it is bound to be transformed into a modern, that is, scientific attitude towards life.

It is obvious by now that anti-modernization forces are the forces of the status quo. As pointed out earlier, the forces of tradition have their vested interest in the status quo. What science and technology do by the modernization process begins to disturb the very delicate balance of a traditionalist society by bringing various changes and those whose interests are affected by those changes, naturally oppose the process of modernization, which ultimately comes to opposing science, as power gained through the knowledge of science seems to be the root of all change. Therefore, science is attacked as being against God, being anti-religion, being anti-spiritual, being anti-moral and being against the truth, that is the ultimate value.

If we look back and try to understand the Industrial Revolution, we will find that the process of industrialization meant disintegration, decay and, ultimately, the death of the feudal system; it meant an end of serfdom and slavery and freedom for the working classes; it also meant the growth of a middle class and the advent of capitalism. Naturally, the feudal lords, and those who were dependent on the feudal system, could not keep silent and either some of them transformed themselves according to the requirements of the new forces, or those who did not accept it fought against it to the bitter end. There is no doubt that this transformation was a painful process. Not only Gautam Buddha, Socrates,

Christ, Mohammad and Gandhi—those who come in the category of sages, saints and prophets—had to suffer and sacrifice for the pursuit of truth as they perceived it but Copernicus and Galileo—who were men of science—had also to suffer and sacrifice alike.

Here I would like to mention that modernization is not westernization, nor do the interests of the West lie in the full industrialization of all nations or societies. Western nations may be mostly Christian but for being modern it is not at all necessary to be a Christian; western nations may mostly comprise of white races but modernization is not a monopoly of the white races; western nations may be direct inheritors of the Greek tradition but inheritors of any other tradition also can be equally modern; western nations may be having a particular dress design or food habit but that has really nothing to do with modernization. I am mentioning all these because there seems to be a lot of misconception going on in the name of modernization and science and it is often forgotten that western imperialism was born and flourished under the canopy of industrialization, modernization and science. Even today there are persons who in the name of 'Challenge of White Man's New Burden' are scheming to revive their imperialist interests.<sup>5</sup>

If in the name of modernization and science any of the western powers dream of reviving a neo-colonial policy, or want to treat other than the white races as inferior, or try to obstruct industrialization of the developing nations, it is because western society is only industrialized, partially modern but, by and large, without a scientific attitude towards life, that is, socio-economic and politico-

5. The Sunday Telegraph, 4-1-1970. See Peregrine Worsthorne's article where he ends by saying — 'For a decade Britain has been looking for a new role. The 1970s will show that the old one, far from being finished, has scarcely yet begun.'

4. *Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science* : C.E.M. Zoad — p. 30.

cultural relations are not governed by objective considerations.

Talking on 'Social change not science will shape the future' Paul Johnson has expressed that 'Racial, cultural, regional and class differences will have merged, (by 2070)'<sup>6</sup>. So far as the caption of the address is concerned, Johnson is correct but he has failed to analyse the real dangers in the way to desired social changes. On the one hand, there is a growing demand for the elimination of racial, cultural, regional and class differences and, on the other hand, those who have vested interests in racial, cultural, regional and class differences are trying their utmost to retain them. We are living in a world of double standards, living with people who profess one thing but do something else.

This is surely an anti-modernization behaviour. It is just like professing Vedanta and practising caste. But why this split personality? David E. Apter, who has studied the politics of modernization, is of the view that 'Only recently have social scientists, and more particularly students of politics, diverted their attention to similar problems in modernizing societies'. Why could not the politics of modernization be studied earlier? Because there was politics in not studying it and there is politics in taking up its study.

**I**t is unfortunate that the social sciences could not keep pace with the physical sciences. This has resulted in a lot of confusion and set-back for the forces of modernization. Modernization is not an ally of imperialism, exploitation and colonialism but imperialists and colonialists think that if the developing nations really get modernized they will not only lose their market and political hold but the developing nations, in due course, may wield far more political powers which not only they do not like but cannot tolerate. This is a most anti-modernization attitude and leads us to the con-

clusion that the modernization of the tools of production or technological change do not necessarily mean the modernization of socio-economic or politico-cultural behaviour. Had it been so there would not have been any discrimination on grounds of race or colour in modernized societies like the U.S.A., U.K., Germany and in many others.

**T**his state of affairs leads us to think about the motivation behind modernization. Like science, modernization or technology is not the pursuit of truth. In a sense technology, which helps and accelerates the process of modernization, is neutral, the powers—political, economic, social or otherwise—which technology generates can be used either for the pursuit of truth or for its suppression, can be used for the welfare of man or for his total annihilation. Therefore, motivation is as important as anything else. The history of modernization shows that the motivation behind modernization has been mixed, it has been used for the concentration of economic and political power and it has been also used for decentralization of economic and political power on an unprecedentedly large scale. A few might be more prosperous than the rest but human society has never witnessed mass prosperity on this scale.

Could we not do still better? Is it not that the anti-modernization forces have succeeded to a certain extent in blocking the pipe line which pumps fuel for the modernization of socio-economic and politico-cultural relations and pave the way for what Russell has called 'Sphere of Values'? I think everyone of us has come across such persons who look modern in their dress or food but are an embodiment of the *status quo* in their thinking and approach. This has been an obvious contradiction in the process of modernization.

Writing on social change in India and some of its contradictions, Sri-

nivas has said that 'This (Revivalist Movement) has produced in the course of time a body of men with western knowledge but who also emphasize the distinctness and superiority of their particular sect or religion.' The result, naturally, has been fatal—'Between them and the nationalists there was an irrevocable conflict which has resulted not only in the creation of India and Pakistan, but also provided each country with certain built-in threats to its own survival and development.'<sup>8</sup> Jadunath Sarkar has gone a step further and said—'If India is ever to be the hope of a nation able to keep peace within and guard the frontiers, develop the economic resources of the country and promote art and science, then both Hinduism and Islam must die and be born again. Each of these creeds must pass through a vigorous vigil and penance, each must be purified and rejuvenated under the sway of reasons and science.'

**B**ut such vigorous vigil, penance, purification and rejuvenation are as much necessary for other religions, like Buddhism, Christianity, etc., as for Hinduism and Islam. Why do missionaries from modern European nations or modern America waste their energy in conversion at all? Why do they not take up the modernization of the whole human society with the same missionary zeal instead of talking about the 'White Man's New Burden'?

Such contradictions in modern society are bound to confuse the issues of modernization, westernization and Christianity with the concept of values. Neither modernization nor westernization are inter-related or inter-dependent nor are they dependent on Christianity. But intentionally or unintentionally an impression has been created by the West that modernization is a special feature of the West and it can flourish most under Christianity. But this is far from being true. 'A value is an objective

6. 'The New Statesman,' 28th March, 1969.

7. *The Politics of Modernization* : p. 2

8. *Social Change in India* : p. 80

9. *India Through the Ages* : Sir Jadunath Sarkar.

element in the universe, a factor in world or order of reality to which goodness, truth, and it may be, deity also belong.<sup>10</sup>

Secularity and competition are two important criterions of the behaviour pattern in modernization. Therefore, anti-secular and anti-competitive behaviours are also anti-modern to that extent. James S. Coleman has suggested: 'Competitiveness is an essential aspect of political modernity, but not all competitive systems are modern.'<sup>11</sup> Edward Shills has described modernization as a progressive sharing by the public in an understanding of modern life in such a way that no longer massive agents acted upon by outside forces, they can utilize their potentialities and their creativity.<sup>12</sup> But no modern society is fully secular and competitive in this sense.

**S**o far as India is concerned we are faced with a peculiar situation. Here religious fanaticism, feudalism, capitalism and modernization, all flourished side by side under the care of imperialism which has resulted in the development of various contradictory trends. It is not only the Revivalist Movement which protected dogmas and strengthened forces of fanaticism but adult franchise and democratization of political and social institutions also strengthened forces of local patriotism, linguism, regionalism and casteism. These divisive forces are not being exploited by the un-educated mass but by the educated modernized elite.

A study of anti-modernization behaviour patterns shows that modernization is not complete by simply industrializing the society or modernizing tools of production or accelerating the pace of technological changes but has got to be accompanied by such basic changes in an attitude towards life which

can ultimately lead to the transformation of life.

**R**eligion aimed at perfection of the individual, while industrialization and modernization aim at perfection of society. But no individuals can attain perfection in an imperfect society and no society can be perfect unless individuals are perfect. Unfortunately, either we have cared for the individual or for the society; but for the attainment of perfection a proper balance has to be maintained. Human life is both like a transmitting and a receiving set. If it transmits or gives something, it also receives or gets something. Therefore, both the transmitting and receiving ends have to be equally perfect. This is not possible unless a scientific attitude is developed. A scientific attitude means objectivity in matters of socio-economic and politico-cultural relations. It may seem a dream today but is bound to be a reality tomorrow. For the creation of such a modern society many dogmas will have to die, even dogmas which are current in the name of science and modernization.

To sum up, the anti-modernization behaviour is not restricted only to opposing science, technology, industrialization and democratization but is also equally active in opposing the acceptance of modern values and a scientific attitude towards life. Man cannot be really modern unless he accepts modern values along with the tools of modernization. Discussing about the meeting of East and West, Heinrich Zimmer has said—'We of the Occident are about to arrive at the crossroads that was reached by the thinkers of India some seven hundred years before Christ.'<sup>13</sup> I do not know whether this will ultimately lead to the Sanskritization of the whole human society or will be termed post-modernization evolution. It is just the beginning of the Technetronic Age, an age 'Beyond the New Class', where streams of science and values may find a point of confluence.

10. *Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science* — C.E.M. Zoad — p. 313

11. *The Politics of the Developing Areas* — Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman — p. 533

12. *Political Development in the New States* — Edward Shills.

13. *Philosophies of India* — Heinrich Zimmer — p. 1

# **R**ole of religion

A. N. PANDEYA

AN analysis of the relationship between religion and modernization in India faces several difficulties — conceptual, theoretical, methodological and empirical. Neither of the two crucial concepts, for instance, have been rigorously analysed as to their logical structure, despite their vogue in social science literature as well as everyday parlance.

Let us take up 'modernization', to begin with. The effort to develop an adequate conceptualization of the process of 'modernization' extends to over a century. Karl Marx was probably one of the first to note this process as activated by inter-social communication, when in the preface to *Das Kapital* he observed: 'The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future'. This 'showing', one may argue, includes not only the 'images' transmitted to the elites and masses of the less developed countries through the normal channels of international communication and dissemination, but also the relatively

sophisticated conceptualizations of 'modernization', developed by the social scientists of the 'modernized' nations, which have been transmitted to their counterparts in the developing nations.

Consequently, conceptualizations of the process which are valid with reference to a specific sequence of historical developments in the West, are uncritically assumed to have universal applicability and significance. Professor S. N. Eisenstadt (1966) provides a good example, when he observes: 'Historically, modernization is the process of change towards those types of social, economic, and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and have then spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth, and twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian, and African continents.' (p. 1.)

Even when it is noted that the different starting points of the processes of modernization of these

diverse societies have greatly influenced the specific contours of their development and the problems encountered in the course of it, it is claimed that beyond these variations there have developed many 'common' characteristics which constitute perhaps the major core of 'modernization' of a modern society. It would be worth while to analyze these characteristics, for not only do they reveal the implicit value-judgments hidden in the concept of 'modernization', as Professor Srinivas has noted in his essay, but also what is worse, some kind of a disguised ethno-centrism in definition.

Of the numerous summaries of these core-characteristics of 'modernization', the following may be cited as an interesting illustration: (1) 'A degree of self-sustaining growth in the economy—or at least growth sufficient to increase both production and consumption regularly; (2) a measure of public participation in the polity—or at least democratic representation in defining and choosing policy alternatives; (3) a diffusion of secular-rational norms in the culture—understood approximately in Weberian—Parsonian terms; (4) an increment of mobility in society—understood as personal freedom of physical, social, and psychic movement; and (5) a corresponding transformation in the modal personality that equips individuals to function effectively in a social order that operates according to the foregoing characteristics—the personality transformation involving as a minimum an increment of self-things seeking, termed 'striving' by Cantril, and 'need-achievement' by McClelland, and an increment of self-others seeking, termed 'other-direction' by Riesman and 'empathy' by Lerner' (Daniel Lerner, 1968).

It is noteworthy how by the trick of utilizing the objective mode of statement, a whole series of value-judgments, specific to the socio-cultural system of the theorist, is transformed into a set of 'indicators' or 'characteristics' in

terms of which a universally valid model of 'modernization' has been erected. Systematic scepticism, supported by unrelenting inquiry, based on self-awareness and environmental context, is probably the only appropriate response, when confronted by such conceptual confusions.

The situation is no better when we turn to the concept of 'religion'. The anthropological study of religion, for instance, has been highly sensitive to changes in the general intellectual and moral climate of the day. Very often the questions that anthropologists have pursued among exotic religions have arisen from the workings—or mis-working—of modern western society, and particularly from its restless quest for 'self-discovery', as Clifford Geertz has aptly noted. The thin disguise of the comparative method adopted in most of these religious studies (from Edward Tylor to Claude Levi-Strauss, on the one hand; and Karl Marx to Max Weber, on the other) should not blind us to the far-reaching conditioning to which the supposedly 'neutral' scientific enquiry regarding religion has been invariably subjected. This has serious implications for any appraisal of the 'religious situation' in India, either in its earlier historical phases, or the contemporary setting. Our primary task here is to shed the myths that have been acquired over the last fifty years about the characteristics of our religious tradition and situation, largely as a by-product of the comparative studies undertaken by western sociologists, specifically in the area of the Indian cultural tradition.

The dominant note in this doubtful legacy is the proposition that Asian religion is a major obstacle to modernization, because it is a bulwark of traditionalism and a repository of beliefs and values incompatible with modern science, technology, and the ideology of progress. The most famous exponent of this view is undoubtedly the German sociologist, Max Weber, who concluded from his learned application of the compa-

rative method to the sociology of world religions that:

'for the various popular religions of Asia, in contrast to ascetic Protestantism, the world remained a great enchanted garden in which the practical way to orient oneself, or to find security in this world or the next, was to revere or coerce spirits and seek salvation through ritualistic, idolatrous, or sacramental procedures. No path led from the magical religiosity of the non-intellectual classes of Asia to a rational methodical control of life. Nor did any path lead to that methodical control from the world-accommodation of Confucianism, from the world-rejection of Buddhism, from the world-conquest of Islam, or from the messianic expectations and economic pariah law of Judaism'. (1964).

This sweeping conclusion is frequently echoed and elaborated in current discussions, without the benefit of his vast erudition or of contemporary empirical studies of the relation of religious beliefs and practices to modernization. India, one could say, offers a particularly rich field for the study of these interactions and adaptations because of the strength, variety, and long history of its religiosity and because of the intimate and free-flowing connections between the popular religion of the masses and the esoteric religion of the virtuosos.

It also happens to be an area where social anthropologists, sociologists and social and cultural historians have begun to identify the underlying processes involved in the 'modernization of religious beliefs', to use an expression borrowed from Milton Singer. This essay is a modest prolegomena to any attempt to clear the ground of the 'Weberian' myths, in so far as they relate to the Indian context today. Inevitably, it confines itself to identifying the relevant questions, rather than providing answers. The more important task is to define the pre-requisites of any adequate answer, and sug-

gest some of the more promising leads.

The first steps in this task have already been taken by Professor Srinivas himself. If Weber's primary interest is in religion as a source of the dynamics of social change, and not religion as a reinforcement of the stability of societies (as claimed by one of his most clear-headed interpreters—Talcot Parsons) it is appropriate that one begins a counter-response with Professor Srinivas, who has provided one of the most perceptive interpretations of religion 'as a source of the dynamics of social change' so far as India is concerned. It may be useful, for instance, to begin by tracing the relationship between 'Sanskritization' and 'modernization'. Sanskritization, as he sees it, is a process by which the so-called low castes take over from those of the upper class, the beliefs, ritual, styles of life and certain other cultural items, especially the Brahmins.

**H**ow does this process relate to modernization? Generally what happens is that when the desire to move up comes to a caste, especially a low caste, it initially takes the form of changing its ritual, style of life, and so forth in the manner of the upper castes, of local upper castes, which may be regarded as a prelude to 'westernization', however one may interpret this latter phrase. The two are linked processes, and in the situation as it is in India today, you cannot understand one without the other.

Dr. Gould in a very interesting paper demonstrated that for the Brahman and other higher castes, Sanskritization was an attempt to maintain the distance between them and the lower castes who are Sanskritizing; so the Brahmins are, in a sense, running away from the lower groups who are trying to catch up with them. Dr. Milton Singer's studies of leading industrialists in Madras City provides another interesting example of both of these processes occurring in a very large city. These Indians whom he studied might well be described as culturally and socially 'amphibian'.

The process itself could be called 'compartmentalization'.

**T**here are, of course, certain limitations to this 'compartmentalization', since there is a limit to which any personality can divide itself up into all those different compartmentalized roles. There are 'leakages' as a result. Moreover, it is in juxtaposition to a continuity, which is more than a kind of conservative persistence of tradition. As Dr. Singer has noted, it is 'an active, dynamic continuity that consists of people reacting to new conditions and trying to adapt to them. For example, most of these industrialists have tried to reinterpret such basic Hindu doctrines as the belief in rebirth, the belief in *dharma* or moral duty, the belief in personal fate or *karma*, in such a way, that it applies to their industrial careers. To cite one or two examples, one of them said that when he is going to be reborn he would prefer to be an industrialist again, except that instead of taking a B.S. in geology he would prefer to have a B.A. in economics!'

Professor Srinivas has convincingly argued that this process of re-interpretation of Hinduism has been going on ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century. He has identified two trends in the nineteenth century Hinduism. On the one hand, there is increasing secularization, illustrated by contracting ritual, of leaving out some and emphasizing others, and what may be called 'vicarious ritualization'—somebody else substituting for me in certain ritual activities. On the other hand, there has been an attempt on the part of the Indian elite to acknowledge some institutions such as *suttee* and human sacrifice as evil and to put down these activities, and in doing this they have changed Hinduism in the process of re-interpreting it. What has happened today is that we have a purified and reinterpreted form of Hinduism, and this re-interpretation has not come to an end. It is going on.

I should like to dwell on this aspect a little, since it provides the clue to any satisfactory inter-

pretation of the religious situations in India, in the context of modernization. Perhaps, the most suggestive summary of the situation, is provided by Dr. Singer's concluding observations at the end of a panel discussion on the theme, wherein he outlined six propositions:

1. Continuous exposure to European ideas and criticism from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries stimulated a number of reform movements within Hinduism, such as Arya Samaj and the Ramakrishna missions.

2. Partly in reaction to these European influences and partly deriving from indigenous sources, particular individuals and groups increased their conformity to Hindu beliefs and ritual practices, that is, "Sanskritized" their styles of life. In some cases, this Sanskritization was a prelude to westernization and modernization; in others, it followed upon entry into modern occupations and the acquisition of wealth, political power, and social status as an effort to close the gap between ritual and secular status.

3. European and modern models and influences have not been immediately fused with traditional models. They have rather been incorporated into Indian life and thought in separate spheres—for example, office and factory—where they have been permitted to develop as "foreign" innovations. Traditional Hinduism, on the other hand, has been maintained in the sphere of the home and social relations. This compartmentalization has minimized direct conflict between tradition and modernity.

4. The conflicts that have emerged from the coexistence of traditional and modern life styles tend to be resolved by abbreviating the time given to ritual observances, by delegating more of the responsibility for ritual observations to those who have the time (for example, women and professional priests), and by reinterpreting tradi-

tional religious beliefs such as the doctrines of *karma*, *dharma*, *ahimsa* and *moksha* to apply to the problems and conditions of modern life. Gandhi's use of these doctrines in the struggle for political independence, the abolition of untouchability and the amelioration of poverty is a familiar recent example of this process of re-interpretation of Hindu beliefs. Less dramatic examples can be found among many Hindus engaged in modern occupations and professions.

5. The net result of these processes of re-interpretations, vicarious ritualization, Sanskritization, and compartmentalization is not yet a secularization of Hinduism, although the secular ideologies of socialism, communism, and rationalism are also found in India. The net result of these processes of interaction and adaptation is more accurately described as an ecumenical sort of Hinduism that is blurring sect and caste lines.

6. While these conclusions do not add up to a proof that Hinduism has caused modernization, they do reveal a capacity of Hinduism to adapt to changing conditions that casts serious doubt on the wide-spread belief that Hindu beliefs and practices are a major obstacle to modernization.

Another sort of evidence, largely empirical, is provided by a number of studies that have been specifically inspired by the Weberian hypothesis. It was probably Robert N. Bellah who first tried to suggest an extended interpretation of the Weberian position when applied to Asia, in his *Reflections on the Protestant Ethic Analogy in Asia* (1963). The first serious attempt to test the hypothesis in the field is represented by Joseph W. Elder's dissertation on *Hinduism and Industrialization and Brahmins in the Industrial Setting* (1964-1966), which leads one to cast serious doubts on the validity of Weber's position. Dr. Surjit Sinha's studies in the area,

currently under progress, should provide further reinforcing evidence questioning the adequacy of Weber's formulations (1969).

**E**mpirical refutation of Weber, however, is a blind game, unless it is supported by an adequate theoretical and analytical frame, as I have argued elsewhere (1967). This task has implications which overflow purely academic interests, since it ultimately transforms the prevalent set of cognitive orientations in the elite-groups of our community. I have a feeling that the heart of the matter, so far as the Indian religious traditions are concerned, remains untouched, unless one pays careful attention to the 'invisible dimensions' of the religious experience and expression. It is here that analytical energies would be most fruitfully absorbed. Let me elaborate.

In contrast to prevalent approaches—evolutionary, psychological and sociological—the newly emerging analysis, which may be loosely called 'semantic studies' of religion seems to be about the most promising beginning for the future, if a more reliable understanding of the religious factor in modernization is to be achieved. Levy-Strauss has opened up a vast territory for research, with his preliminary explorations characterised by theoretical brilliance and profound scholarship. In fact, he is not alone. Recent works by Evans Pritchard, R. G. Lienhardt, W. E. H. Stanner, Victor W. Turner, Meyer Fortes, Edmund R. Leach, Rodney Needham and Susanne K. Langer tend to show that the analysis of symbolic forms is becoming a major tradition today in the study of religion.

Whatever else religion does, it does relate 'a view of the ultimate nature of reality to a set of ideas of how man is well advised, ever obligated, to live. Religion tunes human actions to a view of the cosmic order and projects images of cosmic order out to the plane of human existence. In religious belief and practice a people's style of life is rendered intellectually reasonable; it is shown to represent

a way of life ideally adapted to the world as it "really" (fundamentally, "ultimately") is'. (Clifford Geertz, 1968). It is in this context that one should link the religious frame with the identity questions. Religion emerges in action systems with respect to two main problems.

In order to function effectively, it is essential that a person or group have a relatively condensed and, therefore, highly general definition of its environment and itself. Such a definition of the system and the world to which it is related (in more than a transient sense) is a conception of identity. Such a conception is particularly necessary in situations of stress and disturbance, because it can provide the most general set of instructions as to how the system is to maintain itself and repair any damage sustained.

**I**n addition to the identity problem, there is the problem of motivation. The problem of identity and of unconscious motivation are closely related, for it is just those situations of threat, uncertainty, and breakdown, which raise the identity issue, that also rouse deep unconscious feelings of anxiety, hope, and fear. An identity conception capable of dealing with such a situation must not only be cognitively adequate but must also be motivationally meaningful. It is precisely the role of religion in action systems to provide such a cognitively and motivationally meaningful identity conception or set of identity symbols.

It is our concluding hypothesis that the Indian religious tradition is a vast reservoir providing the members of a modernizing society a wide choice of 'such a cognitively and motivationally meaningful identity conception or set of identity symbols'. This neglected dimension needs to be put in the focal area of future analysis, if the role of religion in modernization is to be grasped in its psychic dynamics, and the distinctive nature of India's modernity is to be intelligently anticipated.

# B Books

## **MODERNIZATION: The Dynamics of Growth,**

Edited by Myron Weiner, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1966, pp. 355.

Perhaps never before in history have social scientists been so much engaged in conceptualization and conceptual analysis as they are today. Although conceptualization and conceptual analysis cannot be completely isolated from each other, the former is often a more difficult task than the latter. Conceptualization means framing concepts in order to describe the objective reality, whereas conceptual analysis means explaining the implications of the concepts already framed either by the one who indulges in conceptual analysis or by someone else.

The term 'modernization' belongs to the post-conceptualization stage because it was framed quite some time ago as a concept to describe a particular kind of development in the social, economic and political affairs of a society. Having been developed once, the concept of modernization has been open to a variety of interpretations and a number of theories of modernization have been built on the basis of those interpretations.

Myron Weiner's edited volume belongs to the category of conceptual analysis rather than to that

of conceptualization. Included in it are twenty five essays which were originally prepared as lectures. Since these essays are an attempt at an analysis of the concept of modernization and not at the conceptualization of the reality that is supposed to have been already described by that concept, their authors can only be expected to explain what they understand by modernization.

Thus, every contribution adopts its own definition of modernization. Yet, it would be wrong to suppose that all the contributors differ from each other in all respects and that there is no consensus among them on any point. They all, in fact, view modernization as a process. But how does this process operate? To what spheres of life does it apply or is relevant? What factors determine the nature of the process of modernization? What is the relationship between the attitudes and values of a people on the one hand and modernization on the other?

It is in their attempt to answer these and similar questions that the contributors to this book reflect a diversity of the definition of modernization. This diversity is mainly due to the fact that the contributors, some of whom are political scientists, some sociologists, and some economists, have tried to define modernization in the perspective of their own discipline of academic training. Thus, writers like

Edward Shils, Norton Ginsburg, and Milton Singer emphasize the modernization of society and culture, others like Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara are concerned with an analysis of the modernization of politics and government. On the other hand, the modernization of the economy is the theme to which attention is paid by Alexander Gerschenkron, Eugene Staley, and several others.

In his Introduction, Myron Weiner provides a framework of analysis which has been followed in the subsequent chapters. He draws attention to the relevant questions that must be discussed under the theme of modernization.

The definition of modernization adopted in most of the essays is such that it emphasizes new ways of thinking which could be helpful in creating a modern industry, modern society, and modern government. Some writers have also turned to the writings of Max Weber in their attempt to find answers to the various vexed question relating to modernization. Weber's suggestion that certain traditional societies have seeds of modernity within themselves has been examined by them in the context of certain specific cases of traditional societies. It is revealed from a panel discussion among Milton Singer, M. N. Srinivas, and Bernard Cohen that Hinduism is not a real impediment in India's modernization.

However, the most provocative article is 'The Modernization of Man' by Alex Inkeles. There can be no denying the fact that modernization of education, economy, industry, and politics and government depends upon the modernization of men's attitudes. Inkeles, therefore, has addressed himself to the question of what is a modern man.

The characteristic mark of a modern man, according to him, has two parts: the internal and the external. The external part deals with man's environment and the internal part with his attitudes, values, and feelings. It is the internal part with which Inkeles is mainly concerned. A modern man is one who is ready for new experiments, whose opinions are not related to the immediate present alone, who is oriented towards the present and the future rather than to the past, who believes in planning, who is convinced that this environment can be controlled, who has confidence in others, who has respect for the dignity of other people, who has faith in science and technology, and who believes in distributive justice. This nine-point definition of a man with a modern attitude provides a good deal of scope for further discussion and analysis of modernization.

Mahendra Kumar

#### TRADITION AND MODERNITY IN INDIA:

Edited by A.B. Shah and C.R.M. Rao, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1965, pp. 223.

This book is the record of the deliberations of a Seminar held at New Delhi in November 1961, under

the auspices of the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom. Apart from the editors of this volume, some twenty other participants—university teachers, journalists and others—constituted the Seminar.

As the title of this work indicates, the principal object of the Seminar was to explore the scope and means for a possible synthesis between modernity and the Indian tradition. And to this end, the first problem to which the Seminar addressed itself was—and rightly so—to find out what modernity and tradition meant. However, one searches in vain through these pages for any systematic inquiry into this initial and basic problem. And A. B. Shah's plea, (in the editorial Introduction) that systematic definition and terminological clarity were not necessary in the context of this Seminar, apparently presumes mere credulity than commonsense among the readers. For when it is a 'free for all' as regards basic concepts, the discussion is apt to degenerate—as indeed is evident at several places in these pages—into pointless declamation or worse.

The most glaring example of confusion arising from terminological vagueness is the participants' tendency to identify modernity and modernization with the latest technological and socio-economic developments in some countries in the West. Accordingly, the latest and the most recent should always be identical to the 'modern'. Hence (whether these exponents of modernity like it or not) *Amber Charkha* is more modern than the power loom, and Pakistan more modern than the United States! Again, several participants—notably A. B. Shah, Raj Krishna and Yogendra Singh—mention rationality as a leading characteristic of modernity: and rationality is further defined—quite rightly—as 'the use of means consistent with the demands of goal-realisation'.

In this context, it would be well to recall that one of the foremost goals of the so-called modern societies is to work for the increasing freedom and happiness of the individual and democratization of the political order. But the latest methods of political indoctrination and means of mass communication, always under the control of government or powerful vested interests otherwise, invariably make for conditions of minority rule and virtual regimentation everywhere. As for the individual, even in America and the United Kingdom, whatever the formal position, he finds himself increasingly helpless and frustrated in the face of the overpowering mechanical civilization. Hence the evergrowing population of the Hippies and the like, desperately seeking the assertion of their individuality through such anti-social and suicidal practices as unbridled alcoholism, drug-addiction and sexual promiscuity and perversion.

A similar contradiction between means and ends manifests itself in the western obsession of seek-

ing peace through the multiplication and increasing sophistication of armaments. Thus, in several respects, the allegedly modern societies are very unmodern, indeed. On the other hand, the traditional order, with its transcendental and metaphysical basis, is an internally consistent system. Hence, it is apparently more rational and modern.

Moreover, several participants, especially M. K. Haldar and R. L. Nigam, have tended to mix up isolated, vestigial rituals and superstitions among some sections of the people in present-day India with tradition as such. This is both puerile and misleading. At the end, C. D. Deshmukh, who presided over the Seminar, draws his conclusions in characteristic civil-service fashion, which adds to the confusion. Thus, on the whole it is a somewhat disappointing work, except for some flashes of vision or insight here and there—as for example, in Raj Krishna's contribution. Maybe, this was due largely to the Seminar's reluctance to grapple fully with basic concepts and the precise scope of its subject at the outset. But, also it has flowed partly from the composition of the Seminar: while there was a disproportionate preponderance of economists and journalists among the participants, basic and highly relevant disciplines like sociology, philosophy and ancient Indian history were poorly represented both in quality and numbers.

S. C. Gangal

**THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION : By Lloyd I.  
Rudolph & Susanne Hoeber Rudolph; The University  
of Chicago Press.**

The title *The Modernity of Tradition* is intriguing; it almost seems a contradiction in terms. The authors, therefore, explain in the Introduction that their purpose is to accord a higher priority to tradition in the study of modernization, especially as the two seem to be in radical contradiction. Nevertheless, the title does seem somewhat misleading. It is almost like saying 'the blackness of white'; whereas the purpose of the authors is really to show the inter-play of the two forces, and to show how traditional concepts and styles can also be made the vehicles for change. To that extent the book serves a useful purpose in the context of Indian conditions.

The book is in three parts. Part I deals with traditional structures and modern politics in the framework of caste. Part II is the main arch of the work, and deals with the traditional roots of charisma around a study of Gandhi. In Gandhi one sees personified and real the interaction of tradition and modernity in India in the first half of this century. One sees in the reflection of his charismatic figure the clarity of the issues thrown

up by the book in a way in which it is not seen in the other two parts. Part III deals with legal cultures and social change.

There is no new thesis in the first part of the book dealing with traditional structures and modern politics, even though the part on horizontal mobilisation dealing with the Nadars and Vanniyars of Tamil Nadu make interesting reading. Most of the time secular Indians tend to treat all local groupings as being equally divisive; no distinctions are drawn. It was, therefore, thoughtful of the authors to point out that 'castes do not pose the same kind of potential threat to the nation State that tribes, religions, communities and linguistic groups do.' Most will probably agree with this conclusion. It is also interesting to examine the authors' four processes 'making Indians more alike and in doing so, are laying the necessary but not sufficient conditions for national integration: ascriptive boundaries are expanding; the culture and status of the twice-born *varnas* are spreading to the Sudra castes; westernisation is affecting the ideas and occupations of broader sections of society; and secularisation is dismantling ritual barriers and disarming sacred sanctions.'

Of these four, the last two—westernisation and secularization—are quite clearly modernising factors in favour of change. It may be that the second factor, Sanskritisation has been a long process going back to earlier centuries and, therefore, it is something which is outside more recent modernising influences, a part of a centuries-old traditional process. However, it is equally likely that the equality theme in modernization is speeding up the process of Sanskritisation in more recent decades. The first process, namely, the expanding of ascriptive boundaries surely flows from a widening of the modern political process, and an appreciation of growing political power based on similar groups of the same caste, both in the local village community and in the wider para-communities of the same caste, e.g., Yadavs and Nadars.

If this is so, then the conclusion from the first part of the book is that traditional processes of change towards integration are playing a relatively minor role, compared with modernising processes. An apparent clear-cut dichotomy between modernity and tradition should, surely, not be taken too seriously by any sociologist. These are only broad stereotypes and, as was said earlier, the play of one affects the other in the process of change. Traditional structures like caste, either in the village or in the para-community, and the linguistic groups only respond to the forces of change. They remain old vessels with new wine. In the political sphere they become the vehicles of modern urges, toward equality, education, a higher standard of living social and economic power. One sometimes gets

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
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the impression that the authors of this book have tended to confuse the container and the contents.

Part III is, perhaps, the least satisfying part of the book in so far as this is more historical, dealing largely with the imposition of the Anglo-Saxon legal system in the late 18th and 19th centuries upon the two indigenous systems of law—the Brahmanic Law and customary laws. Both the Brahmanic Law and the British Law, imposed on a heterogeneous system of customary laws, were significant unifying factors. Strangely, it was the alien British Law which, on the one hand, seemed remote from the understanding of the people and rootless in its traditions; and yet it was the major change force among the three systems of law. To that extent, the thesis of the book is not sustained in Part III. So far as the legal process went, change was brought about by the imposition of Anglo-Saxon Law and its concepts, and not by traditional law. This was all the way from the abolition of Sati to the Sarda Act and the Hindu Code Bill. It is a pity that, in a country with such impressive legal traditions, there has been virtually no sociological research into the traditional law and the para community's larger caste associations; nor into the impact of the dual system, namely, the imposition of the Anglo-Saxon Law on the indigenous Brahmanic and customary laws. Lawyers and sociologists have lived severely apart.

But it is in the study of Gandhi, the centre-piece of the book, that the reader is presented with the most vivid inter-play of these two major forces. Gandhi's style and idiom were characteristically Indian and traditional. There was the dominant Indian urge from the days of the *Upanishads* for moral aspiration; for him in the shape of 'Ahimsa' and 'Satyagraha'. He was the political fount of vernacularisation. The tongue was traditional; the purpose, mass-communication, was modern. The authors juxtapose Gandhi's and Franklin's daily schedules to show a common desire for order and punctuality. In fact, Gandhi, they say, would have been enthusiastic about Franklin's 'Protestant Ethic' habits, 'silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, cleanliness, and chastity.' Yet, what they do not bring out is the significant lesson in the tradition-modernity study, that the vital difference lies in objectives, even when attributes are shared.

So, the real difference between Gandhi, a traditional Hindu, and Franklin, a believer in the 'Protestant' virtues which Weber thought were at the root of capitalist industry, lay in the fact that Franklin liked life enough to enjoy all things moderately, including a good dinner, music, and diversion. Gandhi turned the same qualities to a stern asceticism, with body labour, education, sanitation and common worship in his day's plan. Even the traditional Chinese were able to grasp the compass and gun-powder before the modern West, but the objectives of the two cultures produced quite different results even with the same discoveries.

These were the essentially traditional motors in Gandhi. What were the essentially modern ones,

even, perhaps, un-Indian ones?

The first of these was a certain emancipation from cultural bonds which gave Gandhi the freedom to choose new ways, new concepts, whilst millions of his countrymen and their other leaders could only think of doing what was done before. Second, Gandhi showed a meticulousness and a capacity for organisation, which was unlike that of traditional Indians. 'Gandhi', write the Rudolphs, 'approached his public work with the frame of mind of those modernising men who confront all tasks with the calculation of the metronome and the balance-sheet.' His big watch was one of the four major symbols of his life. His punctuality and punctiliousness were as far removed from the Kumbh mela ways of the Congress party as Teutonic character is from Indian.

His management of the Congress parties both in S. Africa and in India showed a third mark of modernity, result-mindedness. He deplored the amateur ways of earlier Congresses, which collected for three days and went to sleep for the rest of the year. He introduced professional cadres and programmes, filling Kipling's 'unforgiving minute with sixty seconds' worth of labour run'. And here is a commentary on those who followed Gandhi and claim to be working for modern ends: 'There is little regard for economy of energy. More than one did the work of one, and many an important thing was no one's business at all.'

But, perhaps, the most signal departure from tradition in Gandhi's make-up was his choice of the public ethic for the familial one. He was stung into this choice when he returned ashamed from the Political Agent, Kathiawar, after pleading for his brother, Lakshmidas, in somewhat dubious circumstances. He dismissed Manilal from the ashram for misappropriating money to help his brother. Kasurba's relations were billed when they stayed at the ashram. In these ways, he burst through 'the Indian dilemma, the contradiction between public ideology and private commitment', in a manner which makes him stand almost alone in Indian public life. The Rudolphs remind Indians: 'The supersession of private and familial obligations by a public ethic in the conduct of government remains an unfinished item on the agenda of political modernization in India.'

Lastly, Gandhi's greatest departure from the traditional ways of a thousand years was to display an herculean will, capacity and courage to overcome his environment, whether it was an unchallenged alien imperialism, an amateur debating society called the Indian National Congress, or the hitherto accepted tyranny of untouchability. In this tremendous capacity to move mountains in his environment lay his greatest contribution to political modernisation, 'helping India to acquire national coherence and identity, to become a nation.'

In the balance between his traditional and modern motors, even in a figure so apparently traditional

as Gandhi, the modern ones seem to provide the greater power which made Gandhi different to all others in his time. His was not just new wine in an old bottle.

The Rudolphs have given us an opportunity of weighing the scales of tradition and modernity in India, and that is a unique opportunity to probe beyond jargon and stereotype. The modernity of tradition is too literal a claim for easy acceptance.

A. D. Moddie

### **THE BRAHMANICAL CULTURE & MODERNITY:**

by A.D. Moddie, Asia Publishing House, London, 1968, pp. 143.

Recent years have witnessed the unprecedented proliferation of studies on the various aspects of modernization, a contemporary term which seeks to take into account the socio-political change which is taking place particularly in the new nations which found themselves in the post-second world war years. This is not to suggest that this change is a peculiarity of these years or that it is confined to the new nations. It has been in existence practically in every phase of history, although of course its pace has by no means been uniform. Modernization began attracting special attention of scholars since the middle of the last century when European systems underwent a social transformation on account of the industrial revolution. For about a century, the focus of attention was Europe, but the subsequent quarter of the century saw a shift from Europe to the new nations.

For obvious reasons, studies in modernization relating to India have been many and the book under review is an instance in point. Its argument is that there are elements in the traditional Hindu value-system (the book uses the term Brahmanical in the sense of a wider social culture of Hindus and not just the culture of Brahmins as a caste stratification) which are not helpful to the accelerated economic development which India urgently needs at the moment. Hence the book is critical of those elements which, according to it, are stultifying the process of modernization and pleads for their rejection. It argues in favour of setting in motion a zest for better and tasteful living, which alone will provide both incentive for growth and intellectual and aesthetic standards to accompany it.

It is accepted on all hands that traditional institutions and values are an important variable in the process of modernization. In fact, the content and level of modernization is dependent upon the result of interaction between traditions and modern values. Hence, a study on modernization requires a clearer understanding of these two terminal points of a continuum, a task which is by no means easy.

The tradition of Hindus comprises all kinds of elements, it admits of different interpretations and

inferences, some of which may be even diametrically opposite. It is here that the author, who is an executive, lands himself in a dubious position. He thinks that our attitudes towards time, work, and wealth 'are those of a static and stratified peasant society, a society which has relegated these low down on its value system, where status and authority are dominant' (p. 39). He points out that Gandhi's concept of Daridranarayan represents a thinking according to which material values—profit motive and others—are not adequately cared for.

Aside from using the western rationalistic tools of analysis, which are not always illuminating and helpful in reaching balanced conclusions, one is not sure if these conclusions are not the result of fatal oversimplification. It may, for instance, be pointed out that Hindus have not lacked economic interests. Max Weber has clearly emphasised this point while discussing the general character of the religions of Asia. In fact he talks of 'unrestricted lust for gain among the people in this region.'

The main burden of the author's argument, which is in accord with the theory of modernization, is that while not rejecting the traditional values, we must be cognizant of the available alternatives and choices. To be modern is to be aware of them. He points out that India has chosen the path of rapid economic and social development. To the extent our tradition does not enable us to help in this commonly agreed objective, it must be given up.

India is in the midst of a kind of crisis of values. The kind of wholesale cultural uprooting that one sees around is unfortunate and perhaps unparalleled elsewhere; it cannot be explained simply in terms of the problems of growth and modernization. We need our tradition to give us strength and to harmonise it with the needs of today. We need discussions which would help us enshrine in our society all that is best in the two value-systems. This book neither advocates complete rejection of our tradition nor the wholesale adoption of the western value-system. It is a provocative study and hence a welcome contribution to a theme of topical interest.

K. P. Misra

### **ISLAMIC MODERNISM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN**

1857-1964 By Aziz Ahmad, Oxford University Press.

### **ISLAM IN INDIA'S TRANSITION TO MODERNISM**

by M.A. Karandikar, Orient Longmans.

Although the Muslim masses chose to follow knight of the British knight (Sir Sayyid in the 19th century and Sir Mohammad Iqbal in the twentieth) they remain less changed (especially in their laws) than the Hindus. Some of the causes may be studied in the two volumes before us.

In *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964*, Aziz Ahmad concentrates on the Muslim per-

sonalities who dominated Muslim political ideology from 1857 to 1964. Well written and, in the main, objective, it outlines the struggle between the forces of change and the traditionalists and demonstrates how reinterpretation and apologetics prevented the violence of a bloody confrontation and soothed the masses into accepting the traumatic experience of change. This activity also slowed down the pace of change.

The major instrument of change was the British association and the most potent cause the disaster of 1857-58 when defeat forced the erstwhile ruling community into an anguished reappraisal of their traditions and values. The British position during the early period can best be summoned up by a quotation from Macaulay: 'We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions we govern; a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste and opinion, in morals and intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population.'

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan appears, in retrospect, an answer to Macaulay's prayer and his unswerving loyalism shows the powerful hold those who opened his mind to the West had on him.

Aziz Ahmad tends to identify modernism with European influences so totally as to include in his study art forms like painting and architecture. He quotes Lubor Majek, 'Jehangir albums were not infrequently adorned with European paintings presented to the Emperor by the Jesuit missionaries of Goa. Most of these engravings are copies of the Dutch mannerists after Durer Rottenhommer and Behan. The Mughal painters often copied these engravings as well as pictures brought as gifts to Jehangir by the British Ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe,' and concludes the discussions by stating that '... Renaissance influence on Mughal painting remains an occasional foreign gesture of aesthetic eclecticism.' While the contribution of Europe to Indian modernisation is obvious, manifest and undeniable, it is perhaps excessive to include the sixteenth century in the period when Europe was more 'modern' than India.

To revert to Sir Sayyid, the difficulties facing the reformer or educator are those caused by inflexible attitudes of mind in their subjects and where these are buttressed by the sanction of religion, the reformer's task becomes doubly difficult.

It is stated in the chapter on Islam in the *Sources of Indian Tradition* that 'The ideal Muslim social order is essentially a religious order. Society is not a venue for individual self-realisation, a contrivance for the satisfaction of human wants, the only kind of human happiness which it should make possible

is the happiness that comes from obedience to God. Since obedience to God meant obedience to a revealed Holy Law, the Sharia, Muslim social ideals envisage a conservative order in which repetition and submission are reckoned more worthy than innovation and enterprise. The good society was the old society—that which existed during the lifetime of the Prophet. The modern American hopes and intends change to be for the better; the medieval Muslim believed it for the worse.'

Sir Sayyid operated against the above background and was himself part of it. Thus he included the compulsory theological studies in the curriculum of Aligarh although the University College of London had by then established the viability of a more denominational or secular educational institution. This and his bigoted loyalism are as much part of his personality, as the brilliant articles in *Tahzil ul Akhlaq* which opened the modern world of public hygiene and speculation on religious dogma to its readers. From 1887 to 1898 Sir Sayyid's loyalism was employed to emphasize Muslim political separation and this activity had far reaching consequences.

Aziz Ahmad is able to delineate clearly the intellectual background to the constitutional crises in Pakistan. However liberal or radical the modernist interpretation of the basic classical sources of law may be, as long as the divine word rather than human reason, experience and requirement is regarded as the ultimate source of law, an Islamic State cannot be sovereign in the modern sense of the word.'

Although other thinkers are also mentioned, the poet philosopher Sir Muhammad Iqbal and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad get more detailed notices. Iqbal's significant contribution to political thought was an attempt at enlarging the *ijma* to include the masses although they are unschooled in Islamic canon law. This view was naturally welcomed by the westernized. The fears of the traditionalists were set at rest by providing special representation for the Ulema in these bodies. The impact of Iqbal's poetry, and a very powerful one at that, is inadequately covered although it aroused in the Muslim breast, nostalgia for a golden past and encouraged a belief in its repetition. This last was a powerful factor in the growth of the Pakistan movement.

M. A. Karandikar's book is well documented and detailed. He himself calls it 'a presumption of little known facts against the background of which alone one would be able to better understand the Muslim attitude and mores in India'. It lacks the quality of stimulation.

The depression caused by reading these two volumes can only be relieved by the thought that the practice of caste and religious exclusivity is bound to decrease with the growth of industry and mass media communication. The Arab Israeli confrontation might also help reappraisal in both Islam

and Judaism. As a result of all this, Muslim personal law may be reformed to relieve the distress of the underprivileged Muslim woman.

Akhilesh Mithal

**BRITISH ORIENTALISM AND THE BENGAL RENAISSANCE: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization 1773-1835;** By David Kopf, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969.


To the extent that modernization can be defined as a process of social change under the impact of new environment—social, cultural, political or technological, Bengal led the rest of the country in this process in the past, and can be said to be doing so even at present. Bengal witnessed agrarian, technical, educational, and intellectual changes long before any other considerable part of India, for Bengal had a clear half century of British rule before that spread over other areas.

During the second half of the eighteenth century and the first of the nineteenth, Bengal therefore played a dominant role in British Indian life. Looking at the sub-continent today, Bengal again is found to be at the cross-roads of revolutionary change. The Indian Bengal as well as the Pakistani Bengal are showing impatience at the pace of change set

in by the existing social order and are anxious to 'modernize' it for the benefit of millions. David Kopf's study in the Bengal renaissance under the impact of British orientalism, therefore, acquires special relevance.

The choice of Calcutta as the capital of British India was accidental but Bengal, thereby, became the spearhead of the Indian revolution. India discovered itself through Bengal. The efforts of the British Orientalists, whatever may have been their motives, brought about a literary revival which led to a cultural reconstruction of India. Indians having identified themselves, even if through British eyes, reacted against the injustices of an alien rule. This gave birth to Indian nationalism in which Bengal played the leading role. David Kopf's book offers a penetrating insight into this process. There was no dearth of existing literature on the subject. What was wanting, however, was examination of the subject as a case study of encounters between civilisations. This has been admirably attempted in this book.

It starts with a delineation of the cultural policy of Warren Hastings, and establishment by Wellesley of 'Oxford of the East', i.e., the College of Fort William at Calcutta. The East India Company's purpose initially was to train a cadre of civil servants proficient in Indian languages to be able to administer India effectively. The imminent task



first was to systematize the languages. In the process were born Orientalist luminaries like Henry Colebrook, Jonathan Duncan, Henry Forster, John Gilchrist, William Hunter, William Jones and Charles Wilkins who wrote grammars and dictionaries of Sanskrit, Persian, Bengali and Urdu.

Next, it was necessary to disseminate knowledge in these languages. This led to the establishment of printing presses, books and libraries. Simultaneously, there was a growth of colleges, schools and research institutes. The Asiatic Society, the Calcutta Madrassa, the Sanskrit College, the School Book Societies, the Calcutta Schools, and the Serampore College and Baptist Mission, these and others made pioneering contribution to the spread of knowledge among Indians. They brought face to face men of the 'Orient' and men of the West.


In the course of a few generations, there arose a Bengali intelligentsia who (represented by Raja Rammohan Roy), steeped in western liberalism, began to question the validity of out-worn native institutions. The forces of renaissance which were thus unleashed found positive concretization in the revival of national pride when Anglicists (James Mill, Macaulay) began running down Indian culture and imposing on India the English language and way of life.

In fact, in the light of the over-all problem of western intrusion, cultural encounter and moderni-

zation, the Bengal experience seems to point to one generalization: the receptiveness to change on the part of the indigenous intelligentsia in Calcutta largely depended on its evaluation of the colonialist agent introducing phenomena from abroad. The Bengalis responded well to foreign ideas and customs when introduced by sympathetic Europeans (Orientalists) who were themselves highly responsive to the Hindu way of life. 'So long as the European masters viewed modernization as cosmopolitan rather than parochial in nature', concludes the author, 'the Bengalis offered little resistance to cultural change. When modernization took on the guise of Macaulayism, the older response pattern collapsed and the cultural barricades of nationalism were rapidly erected.'

The author successfully explodes the myth that modernization is synonymous with westernization. The use of 'psycho-cultural' dimension of analysis has enabled the author to expose another kind of incompleteness or distortion, i.e., too much emphasis on 'the grim record of economic exploitation in India and economic drain to England', or too much importance to the contribution of the so-called historical forces represented by the Babu, the I.C.S. official, or the missionary. The book is extremely well documented, and should be found very useful by students of South Asia as well as general readers.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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#### COVER

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# The problem

AFTER an interregnum of years, politicians and policy-makers alike are back at discussing the problem of rural inequalities, and particularly of land reforms. This return to the old theme in a sense signifies a defeat for the philosophy which came to determine the New Agricultural Strategy in the mid-1960's. In retrospect, the Strategy seems to have consisted of part romanticism, part prayer to God, and part cutting-of-awkward-logical-corners. The Strategy had concentrated the supply of inputs, in effect, to the relatively affluent, land-owning strata in rural society. The overt objective was to improve, at one hefty effort, the productivity of land belonging to these strata. The problem of income distribution, it was hoped, could be secondarily tackled: as production and incomes soar at the top, those lower down the ladder would be beneficiaries of the 'trickling-down' effect.

This bit of the Strategy has misfired. The rate of increase of output, even for superior land with assured water supply, has not been altogether significant, especially in most of the districts in the south-eastern parts of the country. Even where it has been impressive, the result has not been a quietening of rural tension. Quite the contrary has taken place. The cost-benefit aspects of resource-use having been so spectacularly laid bare by the application of the Strategy, there is a scramble for the limited supply of resources; the bureaucrats, ever wont to follow the flag, have sided with the powerful landlords where issues concerning the allocation of inputs has arisen; the fantastic increase in the profitability of agricultural operations has led to widespread resumption of tenures—or to rackrenting. The second-order inequalities which the Strategy has occasioned

has now rendered the countryside dangerously susceptible to violent emotions.

Admittedly, this tension is more visible in the South and in the East than in the North and the West; the ingredients are however common. If prices could have been kept in leash, the system of distribution of essential commodities improved upon, inputs distributed somewhat less unevenly between the big and the small holders and, in addition, wages pushed up significantly for the landless labour, the discontent would perhaps have expressed itself on a somewhat lower key. None of this has happened, or happened to the extent necessary. In some parts of the country, there are attempts to maintain the perversity in input distribution, and not to spoil the labour market by purposively hastening with the mechanisation of agriculture.

Adult suffrage is a great civiliser, and it is debatable whether it is the prick of social conscience or the possible repercussion of widening rural inequalities on the voting pattern which has once more lent respectability to the cry of land reforms. Those who are looking for *simpliste* solutions are however bound to be disappointed. Unlike in industry, where once you have capital, you can hire the rest of the factors of production, agriculture is exclusively dependent on the specific factor of land. This specificity cannot be broken by any expenditure of capital, nor are there any substitutes available: if you are shut out of land, you are shut out of agriculture.

This explains the intense land hunger, but at the same time it also indicates the near-intractability of the problem in the short period. With 360 million people crowding just about

360 million acres of net arable land, per capita availability of land in Indian agriculture is barely one acre today; if the typical household has a membership of five, the average size of a family holding cannot be more than five acres. This limit too is bound to shrink with the years as population keeps growing but net arable area remains rigidly inelastic. In other words, while even the most egalitarian of land reforms would not today provide more than one acre of cultivable land per capita, the position will be worse with the years. And, yet, until as long as alternative outlets are not available, the pressure for land reforms will be there, and the country will continue to be at the flash point of crisis.

Certain superstitions deserve to be demolished nonetheless. It must not be taken for granted that taking land away from the relatively big holders invariably militates against efficiency in output. For example, one can do with holdings of much lower size for paddy cultivation than in the case of wheat; it might even be suggested that, for supervisory skill to be at its optimum, the size of paddy holdings need not really exceed five acres. In certain areas, therefore, there need be no conflict between the goal of economies of scale and that of progressive income equalisation. Where absence of security of tenure stands in the way of the grant of credit and inputs to tenants and small farmers, the necessary reforms, if enforced, could certainly promote growth.

There are other glaring anomalies which can be put down without harming the cause of growth. The major difficulties do not lie with the old-type intermediaries, who are more or less on their way out, but with the vested

interests which keep bobbing up afresh. Tenants are often forced to pay as rent as much as one-third of the gross produce, as in Punjab and Haryana; sharecroppers have to part with 50 per cent or more of output in West Bengal and parts of Andhra Pradesh.

Such predatory forms of extraction leave the actual tillers of land with little resources with which either to replenish the quality of the land or to augment their physical effort. A major part of the rent which the landlords collect either leaks out to other sectors, or is invested in types of outlay scarcely optimum from the point of view of the economy; for example, it is open to question whether large-scale investments in harvester combines should be permitted in any part of the country in the immediate period.

Four short-term prescriptions touching on land reforms appear obvious: (a) the rigid enforcement of a uniform code of land ceilings after plugging the loopholes; even granted that such enforcement cannot release any substantial quantum of land for re-distribution amongst the landless, a move in this direction could go a long way to contain the overt tensions in the countryside; (b) a uniform ceiling on the rent realised from tenants and sharecroppers; in no case should rent be allowed to exceed one-fifth of the gross produce; (c) a blanket ban on the resumption of tenures and on the hoax of 'voluntary' surrenders; and finally, (d) an administrative programme for drawing up detailed land records on a systematic basis in all States and Union Territories.

This is a limited agenda, but, if past experience is any guide, resistance to its implementation will be fierce from the inte-

rests likely to be affected. Some of these interests are prominent in the seats of power in the States, but, even where the State governments do not themselves drag their feet, those who intend to thwart the social process can still do so by taking recourse to umpteen devices. Till so long as Articles 14, 19, 26, 31 and 226 are enshrined in the Constitution, and lawyers are not deprived of their ingenuity, neither legislative measures nor administrative stirrings would deter people from running to the courts to slow down the course of land reforms. It is little use blaming the courts at the lower echelons for this kind of development. Where tenets of law clash with broader social values, jurisprudence—the interpretation of the legal frame in the light of the living reality—can come to the rescue; but the tradition for jurisprudence is itself a product of the social milieu.

It is therefore on the impact of social forces that the successful carrying out of land reforms will ultimately depend. Occasional congregations of Chief Ministers for discussing the basic issues may be an indirect tribute to the cruciality of the problem. For the plans for necessary reforms to be translated into action, however, pressures have to be generated all along the line. Invoking the bureaucracy to do the job will be mostly counter-productive, for bureaucracy cannot be out of step with the dominant political realities.

In the ultimate analysis, it is through changing the political and social institutions in rural India that the prime motive force for land reforms can be released. A great deal can thus be said in favour of the creative role of rural discontent. Just as tensions in different parts of the country have made the authorities aware of the limits of the new Agricultural Strategy, similarly land reforms too would be hastened only when those entrenched in power in the different States come face to face with the nature of the calamity that is to overtake them in case reforms are held back.

If law is slow moving, jurisprudence bereft of contemporary ideas, and the administrative machinery inept; sooner or later the people left out in the cold in the countryside will be on the move everywhere, as they already have been in some areas. An aggravating factor will be the gradual spread of literacy among the children of the landless agricultural workers and small peasants. Primary education will stoke the fire of discontent, enabling the deprived peasantry to learn the necessary skills for organising themselves for the final confrontation with those whom they consider as their exploiters.

In all societies, it is greed which foments revolution. True, even with drastic land re-

forms, there will not be much land to go round for all; still, a measure of self-abnegation at the top of the rural hierarchy could stave off disaster. A short-sighted policy of cornering the land and the associated inputs could lead to a blow-up which may leave no survivors. The plea for land reforms is in this sense a plea for survival.

It is nonetheless necessary to leave the blinkers behind. Land reforms—and of the kind described above—can only buy time. As population continues to expand, over-crowding in the countryside is bound to get more and more aggravated: if today per capita availability of arable land is one acre, it would be progressively less with the years. Diseconomies of scale could then be no longer staved off. The current level of agricultural technology would then be barely able to sustain the population; to think of waxing a larger surplus from the rural areas would be increasingly far-fetched. What is done with the time gained through land reforms, and through a more equitable distribution of agricultural inputs, is thus the crux of the matter.

If the polity is to survive, two processes will have to set at work simultaneously during this borrowed time: (a) wide-scale induction of new technology for raising the level of per acre productivity for all lands and for all crops, and (b), a progressive reduction in the number of dependents on agriculture and the absorption, in a synchronised fashion, of those released from land in the industrial and commercial sectors.

Obviously, the new phase in agriculture will have to be accompanied by sustained industrial investments. If productivity per acre cannot be raised to a rate much faster than what obtained in the 1960s, despite all the land reforms, we will soon be back at the phenomenon of acute rural tension. But since a technological breakthrough in agriculture would, at a certain stage, start releasing surplus labour, agrarian unrest would in any case continue to haunt us unless industry and commerce are in a position to take up the slack.

Even though a cliche, the point therefore still needs to be stressed: the problems of land and agriculture are, in the final analysis, very much a part of the wider problem of economic growth. The final key to the solution of the problem of land hunger is in rapid industrialisation. When the nation's budget is being drawn up, it may therefore sound neither absurd nor over-bearing to suggest that enlarged investments in the industrial sector are to be heavily protected, if only to lick the problem of land and agriculture in this heavily populated, woefully retarded country.

# No generalizations

M. Y. GHORPADE

WE are on the threshold of a new decade. Whether dangerous or not, the next decade is bound to be more challenging. The tempo of events will increase and the pattern of change will become more intricate and involved, demanding clearer thought and finer balance in the formulation of political, economic and social

values. The temptation to force facts into the straight jacket of pet theories and wishful models will have to be avoided. It will not do to oversimplify the process of change. Correct conclusions will depend on a deep and detailed awareness of the inter-relationship between different factors and forces and a feel for changing

human motivation. Especially with regard to the rural scene, it is important not to overlook the crucial diversities, in our impatience to arrive at some sort of superficial conceptual unity.

The baffling contradictions will have to be unravelled and resolved in order to arrive at the truth. What is the connection between the new agricultural strategy, land reforms and the increasing rural tension in different parts of the country is a question which cannot be answered without reference to the experience in the last two decades and the various seemingly unconnected factors which go to make up the social milieu. The subtle play of innumerable natural forces behind the changing colours and contours of the social horizon will have to be seen with a deep and discerning eye, free of political myopia. Rural India is changing but changing unevenly. And, sometimes, what appears to be a change is a change from tweedle-dum to tweedle-dee.

**F**ood production has no doubt increased but not faster than the growth in population. According to the Government of India's Economic Survey for 1968-69, the all-India food output in 1967-68 was 95.5 million tons, i.e., 7.4 per cent higher than the output of 88.9 million tons in 1964-65 when weather conditions were equally favourable. On this basis, the compound annual growth rate works out to 2.4 per cent as compared to the population growth rate of 2.5 per cent. During the bad seasons of 1965-66 and 1966-67 the all-India output was as low as 72 and 74 million tons respectively. In Mysore State, food production was 4.5 million tons in both the years 1964-65 and 1967-68 as compared to 4.1 million tons in 1960-61 and 1966-67 and 3.1 million tons in 1965-66.

Obviously, per capita food production has suffered. There is not much scope now for bringing more land under cultivation, and the increase in production will

have to come largely from increases in productivity. It is significant to note that during the period 1952-62, while the all-India agricultural production increased by 2.9 per cent, productivity increased by only 1.6 per cent, the difference being the result of more land brought under cultivation. It is equally significant to note the wide variations in the development from State to State. In Tamil Nadu, for instance, agricultural production and productivity increased by 4.2 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively, due to widespread rural electrification, irrigation and chemicalisation of agriculture. About 50 per cent of the irrigation pumpsets in the country are in this one State.

**T**he wide difference between average yields and high yields attained by many progressive farmers indicate the scope for further increasing production by better land and water management and more sophisticated use of fertilisers and other inputs. At present the average yield of rice or wheat varies from one third to half a ton per acre depending on the percentage of rice or wheat area under irrigation, which varies considerably in different States and regions. The same is the case with millets which are the staple food of the poorer sections in many States and deserve far greater attention. Yields of three to five tons of wheat or paddy per acre are attained by many farmers. Still higher yields are achieved by quite a few, clearly demonstrating the technological scope for doubling and trebling our present per acre average. But the point at issue is the slowness and unevenness of this development. While Kerala, Andhra and Madras have about 40 to 50 per cent of their cultivable land under irrigation, Mysore, Maharashtra and Gujarat have less than 10 per cent of land under irrigation.

Irrigation greatly facilitates the use of fertilisers and other inputs. It means higher yields, employment and general prosperity, as a result of which the landless labour-

er gets higher wages and enjoys much greater mobility and relative freedom from the fear of unemployment and starvation. In short, the landless labourer no longer remains so helpless. He can afford to argue, agitate and organise. Literacy, education and politicalisation also add to his equipment. Is it not significant that the areas of rural tension are largely co-terminus with areas of irrigation and education? At any rate, visible rural tension is not co-terminus with arid poverty stricken areas where the human being is too depressed by his condition to express dissatisfaction.

The philosophy of dissatisfaction and contentment also undergoes a qualitative change with modernity. Pockets of rural tension are more in Kerala, Andhra and Tamil Nadu compared to Mysore and Maharashtra.

At one time it was estimated, on an ad hoc basis, that against Andhra's rice surplus of 8 lakh tons, Kerala had a deficit of 6 lakh tons, and Madras and Mysore had a deficit of 1 lakh tons each. A single food zone for this area should help to equalise these surpluses and deficits. But, can we assume that our egalitarian States will sincerely subscribe to a policy of distributive justice and equality in food?

**T**he other basic question is whether the price mechanism will take food to where it is needed most. How to avoid an imbalance in the availability of food between the high and low purchasing power areas? In Madhya Pradesh, the per acre production is the lowest in the country but the per capita production is one of the highest. A few years ago, when the price of jowar was Rs. 70 to Rs. 80 per quintal in Mysore State, farmers in Madhya Pradesh were finding it difficult to sell jowar at Rs. 40 per quintal. Last year, a lot of wheat in Punjab could not be lifted in time by the Food Corporation of India. The result was that the Punjab farmers could not be effectively assured a minimum remunerative price for their produce, and the wheat prices in the scarcity re-

gions could not be brought down to a reasonable level.

There was a time when the per acre yields in our country were much lower than what they are today, but India could export foodgrains. The bulk of the people were living at subsistence level and there were famines and deaths because help could not be rushed in time. There are no such famines today but tension is mounting and erupts, not in arid areas of utter poverty, but in regions of relative prosperity. Sociological studies indicate that social responsibility and discipline suffer in areas of plentiful irrigation, monetisation and urbanisation. The old social order breaks down and the new struggles to emerge and find its feet. Political consciousness and education go together. That also partly explains why there is greater tension in Bengal, Kerala and certain parts of the South compared to the West and the North.

The principle of equality of status and opportunity is steadily but surely upsetting the applecart of caste strength and stability. Devolution of real power to the people will undoubtedly accelerate this process although, in the short run, certain conflicts and contradictions might come to the surface. This is inevitable. There is also an element of revolt against a social hierarchy which has ceased to be functional. There is the vague desire politically to correct what is socially unjust, arising out of a feeling to be treated like a human being and not like an inferior animal. All this arises out of a sense of insecurity and lack of faith in the justice of the top dog. But the fever of casteism must work itself out of our body politic before a new and more equitable social equilibrium is reached.

However, much of what is called casteism is nothing but individual opportunism which exploits the caste sentiment, such as it is, at the grass roots level. At higher levels of power, we have an amorphous, horse-trading kind of politics based on personal power

and prestige. It is faction politics based on the interests of individual members. It is not predictable in terms of any recognisable principle. The coalitions in our country, for instance, are very often multi-caste, unstable groups. Even within a single political party there is not much of ideological clarity or consistency. Other forces and sentiments such as language, religion and region also come into play, but the dominant motive seems to be political opportunism. And even when we talk of the sentiment of caste, it is more relevant to talk of the innumerable sub-castes and family relations than of caste in its broad classification.

This is briefly the sociology and politics of tension. It is therefore misleading to suggest that the agricultural strategy of the 1960s has misfired and caused rural tension. The new agricultural strategy has shown the way to increase productivity. The increase in agricultural prices in the sixties (as a result of inflation combined with a sharp fall in production due to the unprecedented drought) made it possible for farmers to make economic use of fertilisers and other inputs in spite of their costs. (Prices of fertilisers in our country are more than twice as high as those in U.K. and U.S.A. It is estimated that the per acre consumption of fertiliser nutrients in India is only 1/90th of Japan, 1/150th of Netherlands and 1/7th of the world average).

The cost-return ratios of following the new agricultural package of practices became suddenly workable especially in certain irrigated tracts. However, in the rainfed areas, which constitute the bulk of our agriculture, the cost-return ratios are not so favourable, making the use of costly modern inputs risky. Naturally, the progressive and economically stronger farmer of irrigated lands took the lead in following these practices and improving yields. But what he did had a significant demonstrative value and helped the movement to spread. In the case of irrigated paddy and sugar-

cane, where intensive cultivation counts, the size of the farm did not make a difference to the use of inputs.

Here, it was not as though only the big farmers got the inputs or used it. Often the highest yields were attained by those who had a limited acreage to take care of. In the rainfed areas, of course, the poorer farmers could not afford to take the risk of a failure of rains. Why blame the bureaucrat for these farmers not using much fertilisers and other costly inputs. Any stick ought not be good enough to beat the bureaucrat with. After all, no system can work without a bureaucracy. And bureaucracy cannot be out of step with the dominant social and economic realities. In a democracy, the people and their elected representatives are the masters who take the credit and the blame.

Rural discontent is more a symptom than a cause of all these developments. Whether discontent is creative or not, it is not the same thing as the capacity to forge effective and purposive political, economic and social institutions that function efficiently and deliver the goods. It is stated that 'greed foments revolution'. But one must be reasonably strong, even to be noticeably greedy, and only reasonably greedy to move ahead without breaking down. Under rainfed conditions, the bulk of small holdings represent subsistence farming.

A new integrated technology for dry regions with cost-return ratios which are feasible even for the small farmer is yet to be developed. When this happens it will be a very major break-through in Indian farming. In Mysore State, an average increase of 1/8th to 1/4th ton per acre in rainfed lands will add 3 to 6 million tons to food production while ½ to 1 ton increase in the average production of irrigated lands will add only 1 to 3 million tons to production. If dry farming becomes remunerative, it will radically change the social climate and, perhaps, indirectly develop tensions. But

this cannot be attributed automatically to the failure of any strategy. To some extent the process of change is inevitably uneven and the change itself creates other problems.

**W**herever labour is scarce and costly and the size of the unit permits mechanisation, farmers will try to use it in order to lower the cost of production. In Japan, where the average holding is very small, farmers use small power driven implements. Is this not inevitable? Ultimately, depending on our capacity to absorb people in other fields of activity, is it not necessary to step up the average productivity of the farmer in order to increase his standard of living? In India, 70 per cent of the people living on land produce only 50 per cent of the national income and grow the food for the rest, whereas in the developed countries of the world, less than 10 per cent of the population is engaged in growing food for the entire population.

In India, the bulk of farmers are at the subsistence level. Therefore, it would be very misleading to generalise about the profitability of Indian agriculture. Variations in cost-return ratios of different crops in different regions and types of soil and seasonal conditions will be a fascinating study in contrast and range of fluctuations. Has our agricultural policy devised tools fine enough to take this variegated and varying picture into account? Crop insurance and an assured floor price will give the much needed security to the Indian farmer and enable him to use modern inputs without undue risk of failure or loss.

A massive programme of purchase and storage of foodgrains at harvest time, for distribution to the vulnerable sections of society during the lean periods, at reasonable prices within the purchasing capacity of the salaried groups and agricultural labour, is absolutely essential to maintain peace and stability.

To keep the pressure of increasing population on land within

bearable limits, it is undoubtedly necessary to develop alternative employment opportunities in industry and trade. But the recent industrial recession has shown that in a country like India, heavily dependent on agriculture, the pace of industrialisation itself is dependent on the rate of increase in agriculture. As a rough approximation, a 10 per cent growth rate in industry requires at least a 5 per cent growth rate in agriculture. Otherwise, the demand for industrial goods falls short of the required level. This is what happened during the recession. This is particularly so in a country which depends mainly on internal demand and only marginally on competitive exports, unlike Japan.

Infra-structure is very essential for sustained growth. But in a poor country the scope for taxation and savings is limited and deficit financing beyond a certain limit becomes the worst form of taxation by causing inflation and eroding the value of money and the real income of the poor. As we have seen, the per capita production of food has not increased but decreased in varying degrees in many States, but the prices of food stuffs have increased beyond the reach of many. During the drought years, when procured and imported grain was distributed by government, many did not have the purchasing capacity to buy even at controlled prices.

**I**n the ultimate analysis, if agricultural production cannot be increased at a faster rate than population, and if industry and trade cannot absorb more people and reduce the pressure on land, mere redistribution of land cannot solve the problem. It is well known that the per capita availability of land is at present hardly one acre. But vigorous and imaginative administrative action to implement the essentials of land reforms is necessary. Much may have been stated in the law. Let us see what is happening in practice. In law, a tenant is supposed to have security and become an

owner by paying compensation in instalments.

In practice, informal tenancy by oral leases and high rents continues untouched by law. Not many legal tenants have become owners by paying compensation as prescribed by law even in Maharashtra which is supposed to be in the forefront of land legislation. In certain areas, where the tenants are socially not so weak, they have been able to take advantage of the law regarding security of tenant and fair rent. But in other areas this has not happened. The law is too expensive and tricky for the really weak.

**T**o the poor it is a major hardship to forego the day's wages and even to pay the bus fare to attend the law court, apart from the lawyer's fees, to defend himself and his rights. There is no provision for free legal advice and assistance. Land records may state the legal ownership of land. But how can they be made to reflect the reality or the actual cultivating conditions of each piece of land? Poor farmers in times of need and hardship will sign almost any paper for a little money and suffer a whole life time for it. Under these circumstances, how can all be equal in the eyes of the law. The law is blind they say.

Some provisions of land reforms are too complicated. Take for instance the provisions regarding resumption of land from tenants for personal cultivation. This is bound to lead to a lot of litigation. Where is the need to allow any further resumption of land? Resumption should be stopped. At the same time, the definition of personal cultivation should not be too rigid or narrow. It should take into account management and investment in land. Even small cultivators hire labour in order to complete certain agricultural operations in time. The concept of ceiling is the outcome of the pressure of population on land. But there should be some finality to it. Otherwise it will

result in a different order of insecurity and inaction affecting production. Farming must be viable and attract adequate investment. It must be treated as an industry sensitive to costs and returns.

A simple law which is effectively implemented is better than a theoretically perfect law which inevitably leaves loopholes in actual implementation. Apart from the ceiling, it is important to concentrate on security of tenure and fixation of fair rent. Would this object not have been better served if the tenant had not been left to the mercy of the landlord but had been brought face to face with the State? The government could have acted as the intermediary and collected the fair rent and such other dues payable by the tenant. Rent should be fixed as a multiple of assessment and be about one sixth of the gross produce.

**T**he important thing is to express rent in terms of fixed money amount. In an inflationary situation it becomes, in due course, a small item of expenditure from the tenants point of view. The bonafide land owner who is satisfied with fair rent and is not interested in unfair evictions would have also been satisfied with this arrangement. This would have improved the status of tenants and they could have been given development loans more easily and enable to make investments more confidently.

Survey and settlement, land records corrective drive and consolidation of holdings should have been vigorously pursued and completed before a target date in all States. At the time of consolidation, a portion of the land should be set aside for village community purposes such as extension of house sites, proper village planning with roads, compost pits, school play ground, space for housing cattle, etc. The corrected village land records should always be available at the panchayat office so that there is no difficulty for any person to look into them and bring any errors to the notice

of government either directly or through the panchayati raj bodies.

**I**f 'law is slow moving, jurisprudence bereft of contemporary ideas and the administrative machinery inept', only the disciplined and organised will of the people must ensure that things move faster and become more relevant. But for that, the will of the people must crystallise and focus clearly on desired goals. It is not so much law, but the interpretation and implementation of law and the rules that counts. The International Commission of Jurists, in their publication on the Rule of Law and Human Rights, have stated that 'Law, as all other human institutions is never static. Within the changing pattern of human relations resulting from progressive social and economic advancement, the concept of the Rule of Law undergoes such adaptation and expansion as is necessary to meet new and challenging circumstances'. It also emphasizes the 'lawyers social responsibility' to contribute to the promotion and understanding of the Rule of Law. Social responsibility implies a progressive social philosophy.

'Rights that do not flow directly from duty well performed are not worth having' said Gandhiji. He also said; 'If, instead of insisting on rights, everyone does his duty there will immediately be the rule of order established among mankind'. But, in practice, everybody does not do his duty and sometimes duty is interpreted to suit ones own ends. Assuming that everybody is prepared to do his duty, it will result in a stable social order only if all people defined and determined duty in the same way as Gandhiji who said 'Whenever you are in doubt recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you have seen and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him; will he gain anything by it?' It is obvious that there will always be the need for Gandhian action to rouse the conscience of mankind.

# **Locating the causes**

T. K. OOMEN

PEASANT revolts and agrarian tensions were certainly not unknown in India. However, unrest in the agrarian sector has been widespread in the last few years. Politicians, social scientists and agricultural experts are all concerned about the problem and they have expressed their opinions. The prevalent argument can be summarized as follows: thanks to the developmental measures initiated in India since Independence, the productivity of the rural sector has registered an upward trend. However, since the strategy of development has been mainly production-oriented, the problem of distributive justice remains unattended to. The fruits of

the green revolution are pocketed mainly by the rich and prosperous farmers and the disparity between them and the have-nots, particularly landless agricultural labourers, has increased. The increased disparity leads to a sense of deprivation on the part of the weaker and poorer agrarian classes and their frustrations are manifest in agrarian tension. The formula advanced is as follows: The green revolution—Deprivation—Agrarian Unrest.

I suggest that the prevalent notions in regard to agrarian tensions in India, as stated above, are naive and simple and that the problem is much more enormous.

and complex. Of the several theoretical deficiencies in the argument, a few may be mentioned here. First, the argument seems to accept deprivation as a sufficient cause for unrest. We will try to show that it is not so. Second, it falls back on a single factor theory of agrarian tension. Though the role of political parties to foment tensions is recognized, it is not viewed as an independent variable. Third, the argument implicitly recognizes a certain sequence of events. We will argue that this sequence is a misconceived one.

If there is an unmistakable association between the current wave of agrarian unrest and the sense of deprivation, believed to be caused by the green revolution, it is safe to put forward the following proposition: the greater the impact of the green revolution in an area, the more is the disparity between the rich and the poor and the greater is the prevalence of agrarian tensions. I am sure that even the supporters of the viewpoint stated above will hesitate to endorse the above proposition, although, of course, the position is implicit in their argument. While the theoretical proposition stated above seems to be untenable, the fallacy can be demonstrated only through empirical evidence. Unfortunately, we have hardly any codified data on the problem at hand from the perspective of a casual analysis. In such a situation, we are compelled to press into service the scanty and indirect data available on the problem.

Let us begin by looking at the achievements in the agrarian sector, both at the production and at the distribution side. Increase in agricultural produce has been nearly one hundred per cent between 1946-47 and 1968-69. Total agricultural income has increased from Rs. 5,200 crores in 1953-54 to Rs. 9,080 crores in 1965-66. Thanks to the application of science and technology, even a three acre farm can be a surplus unit today. Agriculture is no more simply a way of life for the Indian farmer, but it is fast becoming a business pro-

position. Production is not geared only or entirely for consumption; market-orientation is gaining ground day by day.

On the distribution side, goals are kept high, but achievements are modest. So far as agrarian legislations are concerned, India has the largest number of them in the shortest span of its existence as an independent nation. The maxim, land for the tiller, is accepted in principle and attempts to realize it have been made. So far, three million tenants and share-croppers have acquired ownership in more than seven million acres through land distribution and ownership-transference programmes of the State. Over a million acres of land have been distributed to the landless through the effort of the Bhoojan movement and there are nearly 50,000 Gramdan villages, wherein land is said to be either communally owned or collectively cultivated, or an attempt to distribute land to the landless is made.

**T**hus, both on the side of production and that of distribution, the achievements are impressive, if not spectacular. And yet, the agrarian tensions have increased and their nature changed in recent years. After the Telengana peasant riots on the eve of Independence, violent agrarian riots resurrected with added vigour in 1967, in the Naxalbari area of West Bengal. Ever since that, forcible occupation of land and armed attacks on landlords have been frequently reported in the Indian press. Both in the case of the Telengana peasant riot and the Naxalbari revolts, the role played by political parties and ideologies is too well-known to be re-called here. It seems, therefore, that the most crucial variable in the current agrarian unrest is political ideology and not the presumed relationship between the green revolution and the problem of distributive justice.

In order to demonstrate the validity of our argument we need to examine the causes of agrarian tensions in detail with reference to the crisis pockets. Agitations

in the agrarian sector may be initiated either by the landed for protecting their interests or by the landless to pursue their betterment.

**I**n the two years 1967 and 1968, 62 cases of agrarian tensions were reported; 19 in the first and 43 in the second year.\* Of these 51 (nearly 82%) agitations were directed against the landed to press the demands of the landless. The leading themes of these agitations and tensions were: the demand of land for the landless, increase in wages of agricultural workers and forcible occupation of land and seizure of crops. Only 11 agitations were led by the landed (peasants) pressing for demands such as rehabilitation of displaced persons due to construction of dams, decrease in levy and land revenue, added irrigation facilities, lowering of price for evictee land, increase in price for agricultural products, etc. For the present purpose, the agitations led by the rural proletariat or their agents against the landed are only relevant, an analysis of which follows.

The State-wise break-up of these agitations (during 1967-68) reveals very interesting facts. While no State is exempt from the phenomenon of agrarian unrest, the two States with the largest number of these agitations (against the landed) are Bihar (8) and Madhya Pradesh (7). If the prevalent argument (that the present wave of agrarian tensions have an unmistakable association with the green revolution) is true, neither Bihar nor Madhya Pradesh would have topped the list with the largest number of agrarian agitations against the landed, for these States are certainly not in the vanguard of agrarian prosperity caused by the recent break-throughs.

By the same logic, Punjab and Maharashtra, the two States in the fore-front of the green revolution, should have witnessed a

\* The data on agrarian agitations is taken from a recent report of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

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large number of agrarian agitations. However, in the years 1967-68, there were only three agitations in the Punjab and two in Maharashtra and none of these agitations were particularly widespread or violent as compared with similar agitations elsewhere. This being so, there is a strong case for re-examining the prevalent hypothesis in regard to the cause of agrarian unrest in contemporary India.

Another method for analyzing this issue is by examining whether or not the crisis-pockets have registered any substantial agrarian prosperity in recent years, as compared with relatively peaceful areas. It is well known that agrarian unrest is more widespread in certain areas such as the Naxalbari area in West Bengal, Alleppey and Kottayam districts in Kerala, Lakhimpur district in Assam, the districts of Guntur, Nellore, East Godavari, Khammam, Krishna and Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh, the Koraput area in Orissa, Broach district in Gujarat, the Tanjore area in Tamil Nadu, to mention a few. We have no evidence to suggest that these areas in these States have registered a greater amount of agrarian prosperity as compared with other areas. And, if it is so, the presumed causal link between the green revolution, the feeling of deprivation by the poor and agrarian tensions does not hold true.

**T**he feeling of deprivation is relative and is a widely accepted notion. One may not feel deprived when all are in poverty and squalor. But class polarisation will not in itself lead to deprivation and even if one feels deprived one may not feel aggrieved or wronged. This is the reason why poverty stricken masses tolerated the wealthy and powerful in traditional societies. But as the values of a system change and promises and hopes are given to the weak and the poor, they start comparing their lot with others and start searching for the 'why' of their pitiable predicament.

Even then, available empirical evidence suggests that those who

are at the lowest level of a society are likely to feel less deprived as compared with those who are in the middle level. That is to say, existential conditions in themselves are not a sufficient reason for giving birth to the sense of deprivation. One should have the ability to perceive deprivation and this normally is not present in the lowest stratum in a static society.

**O**n the other hand, in a changing society wherein the revolution of rising expectations is given a boost, the sense of deprivation may be intense and the quest for distributive justice is likely to be widespread. The point I am making is this: even if the problem of distributive justice is adequately attended to, the sense of deprivation is unlikely to disappear from a modern or modernising society. On the other hand, the problems of production and productivity and the related issues of incentives to individuals and groups cannot be lost sight of in a society which is wedded to the goal of rapid economic development through democratic means. One has to be very careful in keeping the balance between the problems of production and the need for distributive justice. The problem of agrarian unrest, therefore, needs to be viewed in a wider perspective.

As I have pointed out earlier, the data on agrarian tensions are too scanty to provide any definitive conclusion. However, our analysis of the available evidence is suggestive enough to cast serious doubt on the prevalent argument regarding the genesis of agrarian tensions. Therefore, what we need at the present juncture is an adequate theoretical framework and the bringing together of relevant empirical data on the subject. While the latter aim cannot be pursued here, the former objective can be attended to, at least in a partial manner. What follows in this article is an endeavour in that direction.

To start with, we should be clear about the nature of the phe-

nomenon characterised as agrarian tensions. In the final analysis, it is nothing but an inter-group confrontation, or a class conflict to employ Marxian terminology. What are the conditions which facilitate the cleavage between the two groups, the landed and the landless? Deprivation, whatever may be its source, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for inter-group conflicts to erupt. European feudalism and the Indian caste system did exist for centuries, despite the fact that men and groups felt deprivations of various kinds under these social-economic arrangements.

**P**erhaps, it is true that the perception on the part of the deprived was not very sharp or pointed, as the social forces which shaped them did not facilitate the same. What is more important to note is that even when they felt deprived they were helpless (powerless) to mobilize themselves into action against their oppressors. The powerlessness on the part of the weaker sections was rooted in the system of stratification according to which wealth, privileges and power were the monopoly of the haves, and the have-nots were deprived on all these counts. In such a situation it was impossible for the poor to protest against the rich. What is happening today is a progressive dissociation between wealth, power and privileges.

The rich in rural India may be getting richer thanks to the green revolution but they are not necessarily becoming powerful too. The introduction of adult suffrage and the principle of one-man-one-vote are revolutionary instruments of change when introduced into a closed society. The significance of numbers, in a democratic political set up, is tremendous. The introduction of organizations such as the statutory panchayats, the cooperatives, etc., at the grass-roots level has offered an opportunity for the economically poor and socially underprivileged, yet numerically superior and therefore politically

significant groups, to assert themselves in several contexts. This situation inevitably throws up a number of conflicts. The point to be stressed here is this: certain social situations permit or encourage, more than others, inter-group conflicts. Agrarian unrest in contemporary India is made possible due to certain changes in the social structure which are conducive to generating conflicts.

A number of stresses and strains should be at work in order that the tensions may be pursued purposefully. Admittedly, real or anticipated economic deprivations play an important role in this context. However, structural conduciveness coupled with stresses and strains will not in themselves result in these tensions. Growth and spread of an organization or political party which champions the ideology of conflict is another pre-requisite for inter-group conflicts to erupt. It can be said with considerable confidence that Communists in general and Naxalbaris (CPML) in particular lead most of the agrarian agitations in India, today.

In all inter-group conflicts certain precipitating factors are utilized by those who lead agitations, to mobilize the participants into action. In most cases the hard core of committed agitators are very small in number and no serious targets can be achieved by them alone. Therefore, the leaders of agitations invariably employ certain precipitating factors to mobilize a large number of less committed, none-the-less sympathetic, on-lookers to press their demands.

**F**inally, the role of social control agencies is very crucial in the context of inter-group conflicts. In so far as the agitators have open or silent support of the police, the press, the courts etc., in all probability the frequency of crises will increase. The present wave of crises in West Bengal and the recent agrarian unrest in Kerala when the Namboodiripad Government was in power are illustrative of this. The Land Grab Movement initiated by the

C.P.M. in Kerala in January 1970, failed, to a large extent, due to the effective operation of social control agencies. Therefore, in the final analysis, the operation of social control agencies, over-arches all the preceding conditions which generate inter-group conflicts.

We have started the present analysis by noting that the prevalent explanation in regard to agrarian unrest in contemporary India is too simplistic, nay, fallacious. We have highlighted the need for collecting relevant empirical data on the problem and made a plea for an adequate theoretical framework. It is our hope that the theoretical framework suggested here will yield rich dividends if applied carefully to an understanding of agrarian tensions in India.

**I**n charting out the major elements which would explain agrarian tensions in India we have listed the following determinants.

1. Structural conduciveness (democratic polity, changes in the nature of stratification);
2. Stress and strains in the system (economic deprivation being a leading one in the present context);
3. Emergence and spread of an organization or party which attests the ideology of conflict (mainly C.P.M. and C.P.M.L. at present in India);
4. Precipitating factors (these may be trivial, imaginary and or remote from the real issue);
5. Mobilization of participants (The character and role of leadership is very crucial here);
6. The functioning of social control agencies (the police, the press, the courts etc.)

A scientific understanding of agrarian tensions in India is possible only when we analyze the situation in its manifold ramifications. Until this is achieved, let us guard ourselves from falling an easy prey to political slogans or simplistic arguments.

# Vitalizing the village

J. S. YADAVA

INDIAN villages are not any more, if they ever were, isolated and timeless independent republics. They are fast undergoing social and cultural transformation. Various forces of modernization such as improved means of both personal and impersonal communication, increase in the scale of economic and political activities, and other forces largely ideological in nature are reaching to the villages, even to the remote ones, are bringing them out into the main stream of national life. As such, the social and cultural life of the people living in villages is being affected all over India.

Modernization, which was initiated with the advent of British rule and western technology in India, has gained momentum with the achievement of Indian independence. The process of modernization is complex and multifaceted; it is activated by a variety of socio-economic and political forces. Here we will discuss only some of the major features of the changing rural scene and the factors which have led to the emergence of tensions in rural areas. We will make an attempt to put the processes involved in proper perspective and suggest some corrective measures.

With industrialization and other changes in the wider economy there has been a decrease in the opportunities of earning one's livelihood by following the traditional caste callings, while there has been an increase in occupational opportunities of a new kind in the market economy. In the

changed circumstances the traditional caste callings are not very profitable to progress. Further, the lower castes may not like to follow their caste callings because of the social stigma attached to them. As such, there is a greater dissociation between caste and the occupation its members follow.

The services of certain castes are either not required at all or only partly required. For instance, the weavers have been almost thrown out of operation with the availability of mill-made cloth at a cheaper price. Similarly, shoe-making is not a very profitable occupation now in villages. The villagers prefer to buy ready-made shoes available in the markets. Further, even if the services of certain castes are needed the terms of employment and interaction have changed considerably. For example, the services of a barber, blacksmith, or a carpenter may still be required locally but the terms of payment have changed. Instead of paying these artisan castes in kind at the time of harvest the villagers prefer to pay them in cash. Some of these lower caste persons whose specialized services are not required have become floating labourers locally or drifted to neighbouring towns and cities.

There have been significant alterations in the value system of the rural people. The equality of all men irrespective of caste, creed, and religion, as preached by Gandhiji and other leaders and given statutory validity in our

Constitution, has gone a long way to change the outlook of people. The lower castes have been given a respectable name, 'Harijans'; and special provisions have been made in our Constitution to improve the lot of this lower strata of Indian society. As a result, the Harijans no more accept their position as given; on the contrary they are clamouring for equality in practice and substantial improvement in their economic conditions.

These economic and ideological changes have affected the traditional inter-caste relationship in rural areas, the lower castes do not accept the higher castes as their benevolent protectors and the higher castes find it difficult to treat the lower castes as their 'servants', or call them *Kamins*. As a consequence of such economic and ideological changes, broadly speaking, the inter-caste relations tend to be contractual, and there has been a lesser emphasis on the notion of purity and pollution in inter-caste relationship.

**L**and reforms further affected the inter-caste relations and village economy. These reforms, aimed at benefiting the non-landowner cultivators, (unfortunately) misfired as the tenant cultivators surrendered voluntarily their claims. Instead of deriving any benefits the tenants became victims of the distrust which the landowners had towards them. Now the tenants find it difficult to obtain land for cultivation from the landowners.

The population explosion in rural areas has intensified the demand for cultivable land. Due to repeated fragmentation, the majority of the landowners have small holdings, sometimes not even economical enough to cultivate independently. Generally, land holdings are so small as to be manageable by the owner himself and not leaving scope for leasing or employing hired labourers. These developments (population growth and fragmentation of lands) pose the problem

of earning a livelihood for non-landowning castes.

**F**urther, the land holdings are usually not large enough to support all the members of a family. The family income needs to be augmented from non-agricultural sources. This necessitates the movement of certain adult members (mainly males) in search of economic opportunities outside the village. Obviously, this 'push' factor is strengthened, or may be initiated also, by the 'pull' of the urban areas. For example, the rikshaw-puller and other labourers we come across in Patiala are mainly from the eastern districts of U.P. On a casual inquiry it was found that the majority of them were agricultural but their land holdings were very small, and as such they come mainly in the off season from agricultural work to various cities in the Punjab (of course, they must be going to other places also) to earn extra cash.

The new agricultural strategy of the mid-1960's, as argued out in the poser article, has not brought the desired results. In Punjab, where the new strategy is most successful and the phrase 'green revolution' conveys the prosperity and affluence of agriculturists, the large section of the village population has not been benefited in any substantial measure. During the course of a study in Ludhiana District of Punjab, it was noticed that it was mainly the influential landowners who derived the maximum advantages of the new strategy.

Further, though the demand for agricultural labour in Punjab has considerably increased in recent years and the labourers are paid almost double the amount they received five years ago, the inequalities between landowners and non-landowners have widened instead of narrowing down as a result of the so-called green revolution.

The authority pattern in the villages has also changed considerably. In the past, certain castes having high position in the ritual caste hierarchy and enjoy-

ing economic and numerical preponderance over other castes functioned as the dominant caste in the villages. The *Lambardar* and other officials at village level usually belonged to the dominant caste. They were intermediaries between the village and the government. Such positions were usually hereditary. But the introduction of the statutory panchayat system and parliamentary democracy together with other socio-economic and educational factors have brought about significant alterations in the pattern of influence and authority in rural areas.

The villages have become highly politicized. Village politics has become factional politics. The claimants for leadership exploit all the resources at their disposal to reach the power positions such as the *Sarpanch* and *Panch*. The statutory panchayats seem to have become new arenas in the game of village politics. In the process the unity of the caste as a political group, particularly of the dominant caste, has been cracked and new alliances across kin and caste ties are formed. Whatever may be the dysfunctions of factional politics, in the struggle for leadership between members of higher castes, the lower castes stand to gain in some ways. The leaders of higher castes approach the lower caste members for votes and in the process the lower castes do gain in status terms and sometimes monetarily also.

The local-level politics is intimately linked up with regional, State and national politics, through the offices of political 'brokers'. Now the villagers are becoming more articulate and as such social issues influence increasingly the political activities and processes as is evident from the recent political developments in the country.

**A**s a result of these developments, rural India has been witnessing a massive social and cultural transformation during the last few decades particularly since Indian Independence. But

the process of social and cultural change has not been very smooth and uniform. The new opportunities hold different potentialities for different sections of the rural population. For instance, the land reforms promised a better deal for landless cultivators but in reality only a few were benefited. The new agricultural strategy of the mid-1960's benefited only the big land holders.

**S**imilarly, the opportunity of education and outside employment was not exploited equally by all. Much depended upon the resources at hand and the perception of new forces and opportunities. As such, the picture of differential change and 'progress' emerges very boldly and the different forms of inequalities—some old but many new—remain the important feature of contemporary rural India.

The cumulative effect of the developments in different aspects of rural life has been extremely complex. The uprooted surplus manpower has been drifting to the urban areas in the form of floating labour and threatening to create the worst kind of slum in the cities. It is still nostalgic about the land and attributes its plight (chiefly) to the non-availability of cultivable land. Obviously, the land reform thus far carried out has failed to deliver the goods.

The new agricultural strategy or so-called green revolution has also widened instead of narrowed down the inequalities between landowners and non-landowners. These developments together with rising levels of expectations of the rural people, particularly of the younger generation of literates, have given rise to tensions in rural areas.

While this may speak for the success of our efforts to develop empathy through education and the mass media of communication, the charge levelled by George Fernandes nevertheless remains, i.e., for long the Indian leaders have been issuing post dated cheques. As such, the present

situation in rural India is full of tension ripe for bursting into violent form. And these 'cheques' have now begun to bounce. In certain areas the rural tensions have already been precipitated in the form of a violent Naxalite phenomenon.

The situation demands some fresh thinking on the question of rural development.

The new land reform and other patchy measures may prove useful in postponing the immediate confrontation with the rural tensions, and may help us in gaining time for drawing a long-term and comprehensive plan to ease the tensions in rural areas and develop them into viable progressive village communities and to encash their long back-dated cheques. Lately, much thinking has been going on at various levels to draw plans for comprehensive development of rural areas under such concepts as 'Growth Centres', 'Integrated Area Development' and 'Market Towns and Spatial Development'.

**B**riefly, the plans visualise the development of certain selected places as growth centres which will stimulate in turn the integrated development of the surrounding village. The growth centres will primarily serve as markets for a two-way flow of agricultural produce and implements and other machines and electrical goods, and as centres for educational and medical facilities. These growth centres are also projected to serve as entertainment and cultural centres. Besides vitalizing the village economy the proposed growth centres will provide employment opportunities to the 'surplus' population released from the agricultural sector and other sections of the village. These measures will go a long way to ease the pressure of migration on big cities and will help in avoiding the creation of slums of the type we find in metropolitan cities like Calcutta and Bombay.

To achieve these laudable objectives much spade work needs to be done. As a tentative out-

line it may be suggested that the proposed growth centres of three 'categories' should be planned. I would call these three categories of growth centres, (i) Locality Growth Centres (ii) Area Growth Centres (iii) District Growth Centres. I would put greater emphasis here on locality growth centres only. Such a growth centre should be able to serve about 10-25 villages and should have facilities like an intermediary market, high school, health clinic, post and telegraph office, entertainment and other amenities of modern life like electricity, 'safe' drinking water, good housing and parks etc.

**T**he life in these growth centres should be made 'comfortable' enough to attract trained personnel to man the various positions. This measure will go a long way to ease the ever haunting scarcity of trained teachers, doctors and other personnel for staffing school and health clinics in rural areas. Thus, instead of spreading our limited butter too thinly over a wide area we should concentrate on these selected villages to develop into viable growth centres.

Roads and other forms of communication links will play a very important role in the whole scheme. The locality growth centres should be well linked with the area and with the district growth centres.

The whole scheme will require collaboration in different capacities of a large number of government and private, industrial and commercial agencies, farmers, leaders and social scientists.

To evolve such a policy based on rational considerations and on the existing infrastructure and available resources is a much desired objective. But, sometimes 'irrational' factors in policy and decision making will have to be taken note of. In the world of pressure politics it will be naive not to take due note of the leaders and their roles in influencing the location and development of such growth centres.

# Winds of change

PRODIPTO ROY

THERE are several myths about the agrarian base which need to be broken before the vicious poverty circle—of poor land, poor farmers with a traditional and ignorant attitude—can be transformed to a beneficent green revolution with rich farmers and labourers on rich irrigated lands with innovative craftsmanship of agriculture, and our food deficits changed to abundant surpluses. The irony of the situation is that this green revolution and the surpluses are almost at hand even before our economists, politicians and bureaucrats have discovered it. It is the ignorant peasant who is also demanding a better agricultural service, more power in politics, more education, health, communication and consumer goods.

In this context, the poser which returns to the old saw of land reforms sounds so antiquated that one wonders where the scholar has been: buried in Myrdal's *Asian Drama*, Wolf Ladejinsky or the reports of the Agricultural Prices Commission. Let the facts be reported that after 23 years of pious land legislation and dedicated Bhoojan, Gramdan and Sarvodaya, only about 1 per cent of India's land has in total changed hands from rich owners to the poor. As

Khusro pointed out over a decade ago, in a study on Telengana, by the time the laws were passed the birds had flown. Most MLAs in all the States of the Union own land and a substantial proportion of them (or their relations) own over the ceiling limit. Hence, loopholes have been left in the laws through which one can drive a Tata-Mercedes truck.

Another unfortunate part of the logic of the old saw is that in the last analysis, 'land reforms...can only buy time'. Worse, this 'leftist socialistic' frame of mind stops short of socialism. All these champions of the small farmer and the landless labourers are really dishonest time-serving politicians, playing on land hunger for their own political aggrandisement or, to put it in proper communist jargon, the peasants must be 'slowly educated' to socialism. What these men never preach is that socialism is *not* the taking of land from the rich and giving it to the poor but the taking away of all land by the State and that landless labourers will still be landless labourers, only serving another master.

As agriculture modernizes, that is, as the new seeds, fertilizers,

insecticides, machinery and irrigation are invested in larger and larger per acre doses, the technical management of agriculture becomes more complex. Whether this happens in the East under socialism or the West under capitalism, there has been a rise in the size of the farm unit. In the Indian context it is the larger farmer, the farmer who knows about the outside world and has contacts, who is likely to modernize. In a study conducted by this author the farmers operating over 1 hectare constituted perhaps only 30-40 per cent of the village population and cultivated about 70-80 per cent of the land and used 95-98 per cent of the agricultural innovations. In this nation of agricultural poverty side by side with agricultural excellence, where so much of our agricultural resources have been inefficiently invested (a polite understatement of government efforts hitherto), it is high time we stopped scattering our scarce fertilizers like moon dust. We have to stop socialist politicians measuring development by welfare yardsticks.

**T**he poser claims the 'defeat' of the new agricultural strategy. The grain of truth is that other comparable areas have also shown equally great increases. I would recommend a visit to the Samarala Block in Andhra Pradesh where an estimated 97 per cent of the land—mostly 2-10 acre holdings—is under HYV of wheat. The poser also implies a failure of the 'trickle-down' effect. Wages in Samarala in peak seasons were around 10 rupees plus what looked like a very square meal. This was also true of West Godavari and Tanjore. Labourers were demanding higher proportions of the crop. The areca plantation workers demanded and won a five nuts per bunch cut, even if the bunch only had 3 areca nuts. Once there is a higher pie the labourers will demand and get a bigger cut and there will be even some left-overs for the socialist politician.

In fact, one redeeming feature of socialist agricultural innovation

has been that it has been labour intensive. The green revolution areas can compete effectively with industry in wages and labour demand. Ultimately, the salvation of the rural base will be the demand for education, health and roads and all social infrastructure will create sufficient jobs to take care of all the agricultural occupational mobility.

**L**et me now return to the three poverty myths perpetuated by our colonial forebears and used by our politicians to obtain all manner of foreign handouts.

*Firstly*, the agricultural resources of India are not poor but rich and varied. Of its 360 million acres of cultivated land, about 1/3rd is irrigated and perhaps 100 million acres can be brought under perennial irrigation. Once this is done, although the acreage of land may be limited, with double or triple cropping, this is equivalent to 200-300 million acres. With the new strategy of high-yielding varieties which in crops like wheat changes yields from 10-20 maunds to 20-30 quintals per acre, each acre may be viewed as 2 or 3 acres transforming the 200-300 million acres to 400-900 million acres. Like the alchemist the HYV have transmuted these base metals to gold. When the better lands more than supply the food needs of 500 or 800 million mouths, we can turn our attention to managing the 260 acres of remaining dry land and perhaps return to forest, horticulture or other uses for the marginal land.

*Secondly*, the farmers of this country are not poor, lazy and undernourished. In a nutrition study being done in one of our reportedly poorer States, a farmer to whom I was explaining the study, disarmingly said, 'you know our trouble in Orissa is that we eat too much'. I have interviewed farmers in nearly every State of the Union in nearly all seasons and I have never found them idle or

having enough time to talk to me. In the prime of my life (21-25 years of age) after representing my college in Allahabad University in every sport, I took a hand at farming. I could never plough as long, never dig as much earth or cut as many trees as the common tribal labourer with his technology and tools in my native Ranchi area.

*Thirdly*, the technological education imparted by our caste system has yet to be understood, before our eager bureaucratic and egalitarian politicians destroy it. A Nai boy of 10 can ply a pair of scissors or a razor better than any barber's school could teach. Recently at Konarak we watched three somewhat drunk Nulia fishermen start out at 10 p.m. on a stormy sea to take their catch of fish to Puri 10-15 miles down the coast in a catamaran. Not one of the 50 M.As. we had hired could even take a catamaran across the breakers on a calm day. The shining dark torso of the Nulia fisherman, his intimate knowledge of the sea, his deft weaving of nets and catching of fish, bespeaks a wide technological mastery of nature and an organic and natural balance between man and his resources. So often do the wheels of 'civilisation' or progress crush this craftsmanship like a Jagannath. How can any one who has seen our craftsmen at work, call our weavers, who amaze the tourists at Expo 70, or our potters or fishermen, ignorant just because they were spared going to one of our lower primary schools.

**I**n short, this is a country richly endowed with land and nature, a warm climate, with a 12-month growing season, with millions of people who would be considered craftsmen in their occupation. A necessary but not sufficient condition for our agricultural take-off, is the psychological feeling that our land, our people, our villages have the know-how and the resources to take-off. This feeling is abundantly manifest in the green revolution areas. There,

farmers are no longer waiting for government handouts by the VLW of the BDO; they demand and invigilate the agricultural services. Any lapses are fed into the Panchayat and MLA system and 'action' is taken. The articulation between the present and the outside world and the rural representation in all political bodies is complete. The sleeping peasant giant of India is politically and economically awake.

To return to agrarian reforms and agricultural polarization. There is no question that India, in this second development decade, is going to see some economic and political revolution in our rural base. Whereas I may not entirely disagree with the poser's 4-point prescription, I would categorise it as wishful pious legislation which is not likely to come into the law books nor be executed by the government machinery.

The two trends I would predict on the rural scene are based on two very different premises. The first trend is a technological and economic break-through on the agricultural front. The high yielding varieties produced of the four or five major cereals are nothing short of fantastic and the end is not yet in sight. The pace of innovation that these varieties will set in motion is going to be very difficult to conceive for the average government official. When the Punjab farmer produced 15 maunds he sold 3—5 maunds and left 10—12 for home consumption. When he produces 60-75 maunds (25 quintals) he keeps perhaps 15 but sells 45-60 maunds or ten times as much. In one block the sales may be of the order of 1,000,000 quintals and purchase of fertilizers above 2,00,000 quintals, or 12,000 ten-ton truck loads of transportation in and out of the block. The BDO could keep 30-40 trucks occupied the year round.

Unfortunately, the crops do not come the year round but in short harvest peaks and plantation demands. This is only an elementary illustration of part of the physical transport repercussion of

the HYV break-through. The fall-out in road construction, schools, consumer goods (60-70 radios per village)—and the entire gamut of social, economic and political life will be quite disturbing. Let it be said that the problems of surplus are no less formidable than the problems of deficiency.

The other trend I see is manifest in such activities as the Naxalite movement. Jyoti Basu now claims an agricultural labour organization of 1,000,000 members out of the approximately 3,000,000 landless labourers of West Bengal. He does not need the other 2,000,000 to set the countryside on fire. While social justice may be done, the economic clock in the tea gardens and later in rice and jute will be set back. Like the Chinese who learned that you do not make blast furnaces in backyards, Jyoti Basu will learn that an equal distribution of land produces small farmers who cannot modernize. He either has to go the whole hog and socialize land into organized communes, collectives, or cooperatives or he will find that the pace of agricultural innovation will slow down. Not all agricultural labour organizations need be dysfunctional. As mentioned earlier, the Tanjore labourer or the areca nut plucker is getting a bigger share of a bigger pie.

The 1970s will see some revolutionary changes on the rural face of India. As a social scientist, changing times are always a fascinating period in which to measure and predict. The instruments employed by social scientists today are both precise and comprehensive, thanks to the fall-out from the space race of 2nd, 3rd and 4th generation computers and 2nd, 3rd and 4th generation programmers and social scientists. If we can bridge the generation gaps, social scientists may be able to put at the disposal of planners, politicians and administrators, the data necessary for scientific planning and execution. These facts will be necessary to keep us abreast of the economic and political changes in our rural base.

# Missing: a strategy

SARWAR LATEEF

NEARLY a decade after the initiation of the new agricultural strategy, we seem to be preoccupied with finding suitable graves to bury it in. The strategy we are told by SEMINAR's poser consisted of 'part romanticism, part prayer to God and part cutting of awkward logical corners...' The 'overt objective', one learns from the author who clearly subscribes to a conspiracy theory of politics, was to improve at one hefty effort, the productivity of land belonging to a (relatively affluent landowning) strata in rural society'. This strategy 'misfired' because the rate of increase of output 'has not been altogether significant, especially in most of the districts in the south-east parts of the country'. In fact, where the results were impressive, the second order inequalities triggered by the strategy have rendered the countryside dangerously susceptible to 'violent emotions'.

Several questions arise from this analysis of the agricultural strategy. Is it really fair to argue that the strategy had a deliberate class bias? Is it correct to say that the rate of increase in output has not been 'significant', and if this is so, to what extent should this be attributed to any inadequacy in the strategy? Has the application of the strategy resulted in agrarian tensions and if it has, what is the answer? Do we scrap the 'New Strategy' altogether? Or can the strategy be worked in a way that does not aggravate rural tensions? If the strategy is scrapped are we left with any alternative coherent plan for an increase in agricultural production? 'Wide scale induction of new technology for raising the level of per acre productivity for all lands and for all crops' is more a statement of hope than a basis for a viable strategy.

At the risk of covering well worn ground, it would be worth

recapitulating the origins of the New Strategy. The strategy owes its origin to a report prepared by a team of Ford Foundation consultants in 1959 entitled, 'India's food crisis and how to meet it'. The recommendations were accepted by the Government of India and formed the core of a new agricultural strategy. In very broad terms, it was argued that the quickest solution to India's food problems—and in 1959 our food problems appeared impossibly difficult—lay in providing a complete package of inputs (fertilisers, improved seeds, pesticides, credit, etc.) and improved practices through a unified extension service in areas carefully chosen for their response to the package of inputs and practices, i.e., areas with assured water supply, minimum natural hazards, developed village institutions and a tradition of progressive farming. In theory, at least, the strategy was a geographical one rather than a 'class strategy'. The idea was not to help just the big farmer across the country, as the 'poser' seems to imply, but to develop the potential of the whole district which came to be called the 'package programme districts'.

Seven districts were chosen first. (Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu, West Godavari in Andhra Pradesh, Shahabad in Bihar, Raipur in Madhya Pradesh, Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh, Ludhiana in Punjab and Pali in Rajasthan. Subsequently, eight other districts were added to this list. (Alleppy and Palghat in Kerala, Bhandara in Maharashtra, Burdwan in West Bengal, Cachar in Assam, Mandya in Mysore, Sambalpur in Orissa, Surat—Bulsar in Gujarat and Jammu and Anantnag in J & K). To quote the third plan, 'the intensive agricultural district programme has been taken up to begin with in one district in each

State. The programme is intended to contribute both to rapid increase in agricultural production in selected areas and to suggest new innovations and combinations of practices which may be of value elsewhere'. The districts were, therefore, intended to be both 'pace-setters' and 'pathfinders'. Once these areas began to show results, the programme would be enlarged through the Intensive Agricultural Area Programme.

**L**ooking back over the last decade at the record of the package programme districts, it is true the results have by no means been uniformly spectacular. There has been remarkable progress in the wheat growing districts, while in rice the progress has been uneven and less impressive. In six<sup>1</sup> of the districts of the Intensive Agriculture Districts Programme, rice production has risen by 38 per cent between 1958-61 (base period) and 1967-68; wheat production by 260 per cent and maize by 100 per cent. There were proportionate increases in inputs.

In all IADP districts, the average yield for rice went up during the same period from 1168 kg. per hectare to 1248 kg. per hectare. For adjoining non-IADP districts, the yield per hectare rose from 1032 kg. to 1041 kg. in 1967-68. In both cases, 1964-65 was the peak year with a yield of 1399 kg. per hectare in IADP districts and 1137 kg. per hectare in adjoining districts. In wheat the results have been more impressive. The average yield per hectare in all IADP districts went up from 1016 kg. in the base period years of 1958-61 to 1858 kg. in 1967-68. For adjoining non-IADP districts, the performance is not so good, average yields rising from 1023 kg. per hectare to 1509 kg. per hectare.

That the 15 IADP districts (out of 322 districts in the country) were pace-setters in the process of agricultural development can

be easily seen from their importance in the high yielding varieties programme. The IADP districts account for 10.6 per cent of the area under rice in the entire country, but they accounted for as much as 22.2 per cent of the area under HYV of rice in 1967-68. The package districts account for 3.6 per cent of the area under wheat but 11.2 per cent of the total acreage under HYV of wheat in 1967-68. Taking the data on a State-wide basis, 53 per cent of the total acreage under HYV rice in Tamil Nadu in 1967-68 was located in Thanjavur district, 40 per cent of Bihar's HYV wheat and 21 per cent of its high yielding rice acreage was located in Shahabad. In Madhya Pradesh, 56 per cent of the acreage under HYV rice was located in Raipur. In Punjab, 16.5 per cent of the HYV wheat acreage and 32.2 per cent of the HYV maize acreage was located in Ludhiana. In UP, 16.4 per cent of the acreage under HYV bajra was located in Aligarh. West Godavari was a notable failure in this respect with only 4.87 per cent of the area under HYV rice in Andhra Pradesh located in that district.

While these districts have made considerable progress, and many have performed the role of pace-setters, there is no doubt that the performance has been rather uneven, varying enormously from district to district, and, even within districts, the performance has not been uniform for all taluks. What has gone wrong?

**S**everal factors are responsible for this uneven performance. Firstly, the districts were not as carefully chosen as was intended. Political pressures and the haste in which the programmes were pushed through meant that most districts did not meet the criteria for selection. According to the Fourth Evaluation Report of the Intensive Agricultural District Programme, the area classified as irrigated included 'a wide range of conditions from year-round irrigation capable of supporting multiple cropping to just one or two supplemental irrigations in the rainy season itself'. Only 50

per cent of the rice area in the 15 districts is irrigated, 80 per cent of the wheat area and 20 per cent of other cereal crop areas. Most districts are subject to natural hazards such as drainage problems, drought, and floods. Furthermore, 'the cooperatives in the districts did not have sufficient capabilities to give the needed support to intensive agricultural programmes', and the panchayati raj institutions too were not developed enough to undertake a programme of this nature.

**S**econdly, the logic of the package approach has never been fully accepted at central, State or district levels. The districts have not been accorded the necessary priority in terms of fund, staff, or inputs. Frequent transfers of development staff, poor quality of personnel, inflexible budgetary procedures, little linkage between research and extension, and poor credit facilities are some of the typical problems the IADP districts have had to face. In other words, on most matters, the IADP districts have been treated like any other districts. The package has also been inadequately conceived, excluding from the powers of the Project Officer and the D.C. such essentials as power, irrigation, communications. Thus, wherever the State Government has realised the significance of the programme and accepted its logic, as in Punjab, the progress has been remarkable.

Last, but not least, the single most important factor that has retarded growth is the absence of a suitable high yielding variety of rice which not only is resistant to disease, but is acceptable to consumers and fetches a good price on the market. The fact that there has so far been no equivalent in rice to the Mexican Dwarf wheat varieties accounts for the failure of the bulk of the IADP rice growing districts to show a substantial improvement in output.

Given all these inhibiting factors, it is creditable that merely with the provision of some inputs, fertilisers, pesticides and improv-

<sup>1</sup> The average of Ludhiana, Shahabad, Aligarh for wheat; the average of Thanjavur, West Godavari, Shahabad and Raipur for rice and of Ludhiana and Aligarh for maize.

ed seeds, along with some supporting facilities the IADP districts have been able to do slightly better than comparable neighbouring districts, and at the same time constitute a significant part of the few hopeful signs that have been a little prematurely labelled the 'green revolution'.

**B**ut, instead of concluding from this experience that the package districts might have performed so much better had they been more carefully chosen and provided all the necessary supporting facilities, our policy makers seem to have decided that the experience with IADP has not been sufficiently rewarding to justify continuing with and extending the experiment.

Thus, in the Draft Fourth Plan, while it is admitted that the IAD Programme 'brought into focus two elements of the strategy, namely, the efficacy of the interaction of various improved agricultural practices conceived as a package and the advantage accruing from concentrated and coordinated effort in areas with significant potential', there is virtually no mention of the future role of the programme. Furthermore, the inter-ministerial working group at the Centre to coordinate the activities of the organisations responsible for agricultural development and to provide leadership and guidance to the programme has become defunct, and there is now virtually no coordination. Central funds for the programme have also been stopped, and now it is entirely up to State Governments in their financially parlous condition, to continue the experiment. Maharashtra and Rajasthan have already scaled down the IADP in Bhandara and Pali to the level of intensive area programmes, and Andhra is likely to do the same with West Godavari.

There appear to be two reasons for this change in approach. The first is a certain sense of complacency about our agricultural performance and an implicit assumption that it has acquired a certain autonomous momentum that can be helped along by a

provision of inputs without any concentrated application of these inputs in selected districts. The second is the belief that the agricultural strategy is aggravating rural tensions. Hence the renewed interest in land reform, the emphasis on the small farmer and on dry farming and the decisions to set up the small farmer development agencies and experiment in dry farming in selected districts. But, in our legitimate concern for equity, we seem to be talking ourselves out of an effective strategy for agriculture.

There is little doubt that the new agricultural strategy has largely benefited the well-to-do farmers. Although, as we have seen, this was never an intention of policy, the bureaucracy and the politicians at the district level have been all too eager to help the large farmer, at the expense of the small farmer, tenant and sharecropper. It is also true that in some areas there has been over-mechanisation induced by high wages during the time of sowing and harvesting. It may also be true that rural unemployment is rising and tensions are growing, though evidence on this is as yet not sufficiently adequate to reach any definite conclusion, or make any correlations.

**B**ut these aren't the only lessons to be learnt from the New Strategy. Where the small farmer has adopted the new technology, as, say in Raipur, it has been shown that he is just as, if not more, efficient in the use of inputs as the large farmer. Within limits, the new technology appears to be blind to scale, implying that redistribution of land through effective ceilings legislation will not adversely affect output. Another equally important lesson is that the absence of land reforms, through insecurity of tenure and high rents has been an obstacle to the spread of the green revolution.

Furthermore, while cooperative credit in West Godavari discriminates in favour of the landed interests by demanding proof of ownership, tenants face no such

problem in Ludhiana where the societies insist only on proof of cultivation. What I am trying to get at is that many of these 'failings' are remediable within the framework of a strategy that concentrates in areas with a significant growth potential. Land reforms are an essential step in this process. But even assuming they are slow in coming, other measures can be taken in advance. All the IADP districts can be asked to move on to Stage II level (as is already happening in Raipur) which is the involvement of all cultivating families in the programme. This will mean the provision of adequate inputs, sufficient extension staff to cope with small farmers and draw up their production plans, and adequate credit to meet requirements of tenants, small and large farmers.

**I**n the meantime, and in keeping with the need to spread the new technology as widely as possible, IADP programmes should be taken up in new areas. The Prime Minister has already indicated in the budget the need to develop the command areas of major irrigation projects. Similarly, certain rain-fed areas that offer the greatest scope for a dry-farming package programme should be carefully selected. This enlarged IADP programme could then be the nucleus of further agricultural development.

In a country such as this, selectivity is the key to rapid growth. The new technology is highly complex. It assumes a certain critical minimum of investment in terms of district and extension staff, in terms of inputs, and in terms of infrastructure without which the results are likely to be disappointing. It is obvious to the meanest intelligence that we do not have sufficient resources to cover all areas of the country simultaneously. By concentrating on areas that are likely to yield the highest response both in dry and wet farming, we can insure both adequate marketable surplus as well as the resources to finance the spread of the new technology to the rest of the country.

# Books

A REVIEW ARTICLE by P. C. Joshi

Rene Dumont, a member of the United Nations mission on Community Development to India (November 1958—April 1959), has observed: 'Is the Indian peasant really deeply, passionately decided to shake away his agony? Are surging forces really living in him, only restrained, crushed down by exploiters, sterilised by an incompetent administration or is there perhaps a tendency ingrained over thousands of years, to accept, to become resigned? The crisis in Indian agriculture is rapidly heading towards tragedy; is it the result of historical and social processes, devoid of any mystery which explain it and at the same time throw light on the perspectives and conditions of development? Or is it rather the outcome of less tangible factors, of an immutable "indianity", of special, disconcerting traits of national character only tenuously related to any concrete data?' (*Lands Alive*, New York, 1965, p. 137).

Dumont was appalled not only by the intolerable conditions of the rural masses; he was also shocked by the lack of any protest against deprivation and injustice by the sufferers. Would the Indian peasant remain eternally resigned to his lot as he had been all through Indian history? Or would he begin to act, shaking off the fatalism ingrained in him for

thousands of years? Indeed, Dumont was not alone in asking this question. Numerous observers of the Indian scene have asked the same question time and again.

It now seems that this picture of the Indian country-side was more mythical than real; that the calm of village India was like the proverbial lull before the storm. In December, 1969 the ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India released its report on 'The Causes and Nature of the Current Agrarian Tension.' The report descended like a thunderbolt on the complacent members of the Indian elite. Indeed, many ruling politicians and economists were having visions of a 'green revolution' spreading prosperity in the country-side when the Ministry of Home Affairs exploded the myth of a peaceful transformation of Indian agriculture. The Ministry took official cognizance of the widespread unrest which is smouldering in the countryside and leading to agrarian tension. It made a frank admission that 'it was unrealistic to seek lasting solution to a socio-economic problem of this magnitude through coercive measures alone.'

It must be appreciated that the Home Ministry has done what any distinguished group of policy-

makers and social scientists associated with the government failed to do in this period.

It has boldly recognised the facts of the rural social situation and raised fundamental questions regarding the consequences of development policies on the welfare of the rural masses. The report has in fact a much broader significance. It has thrown into prominence the study of social unrest in a developmental perspective as a major branch of social science research in India. It is the duty of social scientists to pick up the thread and to carry on deeper studies and investigations on the vital issues raised by this important report. The present article deals with some of these issues and examines specially the diagnosis of agrarian tensions offered by the report.

The Home Ministry report makes two important contributions. In the first place, it provides a wealth of information on agrarian tension during 1968-69. It also tries to identify the issues which have led to agitations during this period. In the second place, the report offers some tentative hypotheses on the causes of agrarian tension. More specially, it tries to relate agrarian unrest to the socio-economic impact of land reform and the 'new agricultural strategy' in the current period. The report explains that four types of issues have led to agrarian violence and tensions since 1966.

(1) Tenant demands for tenurial security and fair share in the produce which have led to agitations in States like Bihar, Kerala, Tripura and West Bengal.

(2) Demands of agricultural labourers for increase of wages which have led to labour agitations and strikes in States like Kerala (Alleppey districts), Tamil Nadu (Tanjore district) and Andhra Pradesh (East and West Godavari, Nellore and Guntur districts).

(3) Demands of landless workers and poor peasants for distribution of surplus land which gave rise to regular movements in the form of satyagraha and forcible occupation of land in the States of Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.

(4) Demands of tribal people against exploitation by outside landlords and money-lenders which have led to agrarian violence in the Srirakulam area of Andhra Pradesh and to growing agitation in Chhotanagpur area of Bihar and in Korapur district in Orissa.

The report expresses this view that 'so far there have not been many sustained agitations of tenants and, provided a satisfactory solution of the bataidari issue is reached, the unrest among the tenants can be contained'. One of the most important findings of the report is that it is 'the agitations for distribution of land to the landless which have eli-

cited the maximum response and have also had a wide geographical spread.' The report is of the view that 'these agitations on the issue of distribution of land to the landless and the poor peasants are expected to be continued in the coming years'.

This is because 'the mobilisation of the peasantry on this issue is a major plank of policy of some political parties'. Further, 'the extremists are committed to a policy of "liberation" struggle in the rural areas'.

Presenting an over-all view, the authors of the report indicate that 'the tensions resulting from the widening gap between the relatively few affluent farmers and the large body of small landholders and landless agricultural workers may increase in the coming months and years'. In their judgement, 'a bad agricultural season could lead to an explosive situation in the rural areas'.

The above prognosis is derived from an analysis of the causes of agrarian tension. And it is to the main points of this analysis that we should now turn our attention.

Among what may be called the 'pre-disposing' causes of agrarian tension, the Home Ministry study seems to regard the 'outmoded agrarian social structure' as of fundamental importance. A short but telling survey of the land reform and its implementation provided by the report makes it clear that land laws have failed to remove the basic defects and injustices of the old agrarian structure. That 'about 82 per cent of the total number of tenants in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Punjab, Haryana and West Bengal are either tenants-at-will or subject to landlord's right of resumption' is a highly eloquent piece of information which typifies the failure of land reform. Similarly, 'inequalities in landholdings have persisted because of the failure to implement ceiling laws'. In a nutshell, 'the programmes so far implemented are more favourable to the larger owner-farmer than to the smaller tenant farmer. As for the share-cropper and the landless labourer they have been, more often than not, left out in the cold.'

Conflict and discontent are thus inherent in such an agrarian situation. But while the agrarian structure provides the basic cause, the 'proximate' causes which have led to the eruption of 'latent' discontent into 'manifest' tension are located by the authors of the report in the 'new agricultural strategy' and the 'green revolution'. The latter has 'vastly increased agricultural production and has made land more valuable.' It has rendered agriculture even on a small-scale a profitable proposition or at least capable of supporting a family.' Further, 'the rise in agricultural prices that have occurred in the past year has contributed to the impatience of the cultivating classes, particularly the weaker sections, to have their legitimate share'. Similarly, 'high agricultural prices and increases in production have heightened social and political consciousness

and led to a much more insistent demand for better and increased farm wages'. This, in a nutshell, is the explanation of agrarian unrest put forward by the report.

The argument can be re-stated so as to spell out more explicitly the causal nexus between the land system, the 'green revolution' and agrarian tension. The basic thesis of the report implies that the injustices of the agrarian structure may have been tolerated by the poorer classes in the past when there did not exist any promise of spectacular gain through technological change. The attitude of the rural masses towards these very injustices has been undergoing a sea-change in view of the prospects of vast economic improvement opened up by the 'green revolution'.

The handicaps imposed by the land system in the form of burdens of rent, high interest rates, denial of credit, deprivation of land or higher wages appear to the masses now as intolerable burdens since they stand in the way of material improvement through exploiting new opportunities. For, it is no more a question now of a *low* share in the total product the size of which remains static or increases very slowly. The rural masses are now faced with the prospect of a perpetually low or even declining share in the total product, the size of which is fast increasing as a result of technological change.

Thus, the 'green revolution' occurring within the framework of an outmoded agrarian structure not only perpetuates the poverty of the rural masses. It enables the top few to gain at the expense of the many who are condemned to remain poor; it thus widens the economic disparity between the upper and the lower strata to an extent unknown in the past. It is not surprising that this trend of development should have created widespread resentment and frustration among the rural masses and, consequently, given rise to a disturbing situation in the rural areas. No wonder, as the report points out, that it should also have 'provided a breeding ground for various political movements.'

The report concludes that 'the problem of agrarian tension' cannot be tackled by piecemeal measures and that 'it has to be tackled on a wide front in the Home Ministry study.'

The authors of the report also draw the inescapable conclusion that: 'Failure to do so may lead to a situation where the discontented elements are compelled to organise themselves and the extreme tensions building up within 'the complex molecule' that is the Indian village may end in an explosion'.

In the remaining part of this paper an attempt has been made to examine this view of the agrarian situation which is partly explicit and partly implicit in the Home Ministry study.

In our view the Home Ministry report seems to explain growing agrarian tension in terms of the

frustration of the urge of the rural poor for improvement in their levels of living. There are three basic elements in this view of the rural social situation; and agrarian tension is the consequence of the contradictions among these elements. The first is the political system which promotes the ideology of equality of opportunity and rising levels of living. Forces emanating from the political system are bringing about a qualitative change in the belief-system of the masses. Thus, poverty and inequality are not accepted any more as God-given.

As a consequence, the old spirit of contentment begins to give way slowly to a torment of desires for worldly goods; and fatalism gives way to a sense of grievance against the social system which is responsible for the maldistribution of worldly goods as between the rich and the poor. A redefinition of rights and obligations leads to a heightened sensitivity to injustice and deprivation. A growing assertiveness for claiming what is now perceived as one's legitimate share—this is the inevitable direction of change in the beliefs and attitudes of the masses in a political system which is based on adult franchise and which propagates the idea of equality of opportunity.

The second crucial element is the 'new technology' which makes an equally powerful impact on the minds of the common people. One of the most significant developments in the contemporary rural situation is the growth of technology-awareness among the illiterate rural masses. Indeed, sensitivity to the importance of new technology has emerged as a force to reckon with in so short a time. Technological change appears to hold the promise of translating the dream of prosperity into a reality for those who have adequate command over resources for exploiting its benefits. The sense of deprivation is enhanced a thousandfold for those who lack resources for exploiting these opportunities. The attention of the deprived, therefore, turns naturally towards locating the factors in the social system which are responsible for keeping them away from their legitimate share in the economic resources.

The next logical step is the identification of those who have resources far in excess of their legitimate share. The conflict between the many who have little or no control over land and capital and the few who monopolise them is therefore inherent in this social system. In other words, the egalitarian urges of the masses and the demands of modern technology both come into sharp conflict with an exploitative agrarian system. A change in the agrarian system is one of the essential requirements for resolving this conflict.

Here is an explanatory framework which no doubt provides an insight into some aspects of social unrest and tension in rural India. At the same time it leaves out of account certain fundamental aspects of the current social situation. In our view many

factors both institutional and technological have been causing a profound disturbance in the old equilibrium of the rural economy and society and, consequently, in the traditional livelihood pattern of the rural poor. One should not overlook that poverty and inequality have been the fate of the lower classes even in the past. But within the structure obtaining in the rural areas before the introduction of institutional and technological changes, poverty and exploitation coexisted with a certain framework of security for the masses.

Thus, no doubt the tenant or the share-cropper had to pay exorbitant rent and the agricultural labourer was a semi-serf, both being subject to exploitation and surviving at a low level of subsistence. But the fact remains that the tenant was assured of a piece of land for his livelihood and the agricultural labourer of some employment and protection by the employers. There existed numerous customary ties and bonds between the landowning 'patrons' and landless 'clients' which enabled the rural poor to tide over times of distress caused by natural and social calamities.

Profound disturbance has been caused in this low-level equilibrium mainly by two major events, viz., (1) piece-meal land reform and (2) the 'new technology'.

Half-hearted land reform failed to convert the majority of insecure tenants into secure tenants and secure tenants into owners. On the contrary, it had the very opposite effect. The fear of permanent rights on land accruing to tenants drove the majority of landlords to transform tenants having de-facto security into tenants-at-will. The same situation motivated many other landlords to effect eviction of tenants from land on a large-scale in the name of resumption of land for 'self-cultivation'. The transformation of secure into insecure, open into disguised and long-term into short term tenancy followed the half-hearted implementation of land reform. And then came the benefits of new technology which pushed up the rate of returns from agriculture as never before.

As a consequence, the erstwhile rent-receiving landlords have again been motivated to throwing out even the tenants-at-will and bringing their lands under some form of 'self-management' or 'self-cultivation'. Large-scale eviction of tenants from leased out lands and their conversion into hired farm servants is an inevitable outcome when the landed class turns from 'feudal' to 'commercial' or 'capitalist' methods of exploitation.

It may not be unsafe to see in this trend an Indian variant of the classical 'enclosure movement' which was a concomitant of transition from feudal to capitalist agriculture in England. Whether this development assumes the form of change from secure to insecure, feudal to commercial tenancy or from tenancy to farm labour, the consequences for the former tenants are the same—a breakdown of

the traditional framework of security and an unprecedented aggravation of economic *insecurity*. Indeed, the process of economic change has meant for the tenants not an advance from bondage to freedom or from poverty towards plenty but an agonising change from *security* in the midst of poverty to growing *insecurity* along with poverty. It is against this background that the land hunger of the rural poor assumes a new and, indeed, menacing dimension.

Considered from this perspective, it is not surprising that peasant agitations for land should have acquired such a sweep and geographical coverage as have been brought to light by the Home Ministry report. By fighting for land the peasants are not just registering their protest against the growing disparity between the rich and the poor as implied by the authors of the report. Indeed, the fight for land symbolises here the fight for the peasants' very survival. The peasant whether he is a tenant or a small owner is being driven to the point of revolt by the forces of predatory commercialism which are tending to snatch away from him his traditional means of livelihood, viz., a small piece of land cultivated for generations.

In short, the explanation of agrarian tension in terms of 'growing disparity' between the rich and the poor or in terms of the frustration of the urge of the poor for higher levels of living does not take into cognizance the structural disequilibrium and imbalance occurring in the wake of technological change. Our hypothesis is that these structural changes lead to 'growing insecurity' for the rural masses. In our opinion, therefore, a more satisfactory explanation of agrarian tensions has to take an integrated view of the twin phenomena of 'growing disparity' and 'growing insecurity' which are forcing the peasantry to shake off its attitude of resignation and to adopt the path of resistance.

Below we quote a few extracts from recent studies on agricultural transformation in India to indicate that the thesis of 'growing insecurity' in the countryside is not without empirical support and that 'growing disparity' and 'growing insecurity' together constitute two important dimensions of agrarian change in contemporary India.

The following extract from Francine Frankel's work on *Agricultural Modernisation and Social Change* brings to light the insecurity to which the tenants and small owner farmers are exposed as a result of the green revolution in an area of dynamic agriculture, viz., the I.A.D.P. district of Ludhiana in Punjab:

'There is little doubt that the position of tenants has become more difficult as a result of the green revolution. With profits from direct cultivation rising, there are now more farmers who want to lease in land than lease out. Moreover, large farmers now find a positive advantage in larger units of management, with new possibilities for more efficient agriculture with mechanisation. Those

large farmers who still give out some land on lease usually demand a premium in higher rents. Compared to five years ago, cash rent on leased in land have increased from about Rs. 300—350 to Rs. 500 per acre. More commonly share-cropping arrangements are made.

In some cases, the traditional rate of 50:50 division of gross output between the owner and the tenant is maintained; and the owner may also pay half the cost of fertilisers and diesel for irrigation. But in many instances, tenants are not so fortunate; landowners may ask for 70 per cent of the crop as their share arguing that with new methods, the tenant still receives a larger absolute portion from 30 per cent of a higher output than 50 per cent of a lower out-turn. But since most small owner-cum-tenant cultivators cannot afford to invest in optimum production practices, they find the new rentals uneconomic and generally are forced to give up as a cultivator.

'One solution has been to "rent" out small holdings of two to four acres to large farmers, who supply the actual owners with modern inputs for cultivation and take fifty per cent of the crop as their share. Some small owners have also decided to take advantage of rising land values and sell their small holdings, either to liquidate debts or to start a new enterprise such as poultry farming. Pure tenants, those with no land or bullocks to sell are in the worst position. They may be taken on as a share-cropper by a large farmer who supplies all the inputs, and pays the tenants 20 per cent of the crop as his share.' (Francine Frankel: Agricultural Modernisation and Social Change).

Frankel's study also throws light on the plight of the agricultural labourers as the landowners begin to retaliate against the demand for increased wages by denying labourers traditional rights of taking fodder from the fields for their animals, or additional payments in kind of fuel and vegetables. A greater hardship to many labourers is caused by the landowner's refusal to advance interest-free loans. Equally serious is the determination of the landlords to convert all kind payments into cash. But the greatest threat to their livelihood arises from the landowner's resolve to mechanise harvesting operations 'in order to be rid entirely of their dependence on agricultural labourers.'

From her analysis of economic change in rural Ludhiana, Frankel concludes: 'Occurring as these changes are, in a social context characterised by an erosion in traditional ties and an incipient polarisation on the basis of class, it would not be surprising if efforts by political parties to mobilise social discontent for power purposes would lead to increasing instances of class confrontation in rural areas.'

We now turn to the very illuminating account of economic change in the Kosi area of Bihar by

Wolf Ladejinsky. He draws pointed attention to 'the growing insecurity of the share-croppers as the potential of the Kosi irrigation scheme rises'. Already under the threat of land reform measures, Ladejinsky reveals, 'owners have managed to "convert" tenants through a variety of questionable methods into insecure share-croppers.' What exactly are the implications of being an insecure tenant?

Ladejinsky throws light on this by quoting from an official report: 'The landowners do not allow the share-croppers to cultivate the same land from year to year for the fear that they may lay claim over the land. In irrigated areas the landowner generally gets the irrigated land cultivated by his own men or hired labour and settles less irrigated or unfertile lands with the share-croppers. Big cultivators who have large areas of irrigated land have no option but to get part of the irrigated land cultivated by share-croppers. In such cases also the landowners generally change the share-croppers every year. The harvested crop is mostly kept in the *Khalihan* of the landowner till the division of the produce. Though according to law the landowner is entitled to 1/4th of the produce only, in actual practice the produce is divided half and half between the landowner and the share-cropper. . . All the share-croppers who have been investigated have invariably stated that the insecurity of their tenure is the biggest handicap barring them from adopting the new technology.' ('The Economic and Political Weekly', September 27, 1969.)

The share-croppers are exposed to a new insecurity as the benefits of the new technology have begun to flow into this erstwhile backward district of Purnea. To quote Ladejinsky again: 'It is not unique that with Kosi irrigation scheme and technological changes under way, the once unproductive and neglected land is becoming a prized asset. Not unlike the bigger owner-cultivators of Punjab, their counterparts of Purnea are eager to make the most of the changed situation induced by rising land values and production. One way of achieving it, they contend, is few entanglements with share-croppers and more hired labour.'

Ladejinsky, however, is of the view that, 'there has already been much bad blood spilt in the process of downgrading tenants into unprotected share-croppers. . . Any attempt of yet another round to augment still further the ranks of farm hands carries no promise of success but much turmoil that might set Purnea on its ear.'

The small owner farmers constituting numerically the largest section of the rural population, are also exposed to new stresses and strains by the forces of technological change. For as Ladejinsky points out, the Kosi irrigation scheme and the package of new practices it is giving rise to are 'watering down tradition and turning the mind of the big and the small farmers towards change'. At the same time 'the rigidities of the socio-economic system and other inhibiting factors' deny the small

farmer the wherewithal to enlarge a holding, to dig a well, to hire on occasion a tract or for ploughing, to buy fertiliser or to be judged credit-worthy.'

The new-technology-oriented and competitive agriculture, thus brings into sharp focus the resource disabilities of small peasant economy as never before. If the trend of technological progress continues unabated, the new uncertainties and risks beyond the enduring capacity of the small peasant may condemn him either to the fate of a debt-ridden and pauperised peasant or that of an unemployed or underemployed landless labourer. Ladejinsky is not oblivious of the explosive possibilities of this emerging situation.

He observes: 'If left alone with desires thwarted and growing disparities much in evidence, and considering the multitude of farmers on the outside looking in, a setting will eventually emerge where existing restraints may prove a very thin reed to lean on. India is not without a few cases where restraints all but melted away under violent agrarian outbreaks.'


In short, whether it is the areas of progressive agriculture like Ludhiana or backward areas being drawn into the vortex of growth only recently like districts *Saharsa* and *Purnea*, it is the same story of 'growing disparity' along with 'growing insecurity'. It is our hunch that the unrest in the tribal areas is also a reflection of the insecurity caused

by the disintegration of the traditional economy without adequate compensation in new economic opportunities.

The interplay of structural factors and technological forces is bound to throw up diverse patterns of change. It is the task of social scientists to identify them and to analyse the common as well as the specific features of change through field-studies in different parts of the country.

**AGRARIAN RELATIONS AND EARLY BRITISH RULE IN INDIA : A CASE STUDY OF CEDED AND CONQUERED PROVINCES (UTTAR PRADESH) 1801-1833:** By Sulekh Chandra Gupta, 1963, pp 338 Asia Publishing House.

The period under consideration is well documented, the bibliography being extensive and impressive. But the danger of not being sufficiently ruthless with one's sources can mean instead of a compact and succinct study, a rambling narrative that reads occasionally like a series of lecture notes. If the author is aiming for the library shelf, then a great deal can be excused him; but if he is interested in making a contribution to knowledge then Chapter II on Land Revenue System and Administration on the Eve of British Rule which is based heavily on Moreland and Irfan Habib should either be condensed or taken as read, while Chapter III, which is largely



irrelevant, should be shorn of such observations as Thomas Fortescue's 'curiously enough the economic unity of the village community was not undermined by conflicts resulting from differences of caste, race or religion' or Mackenzie on 'Chamar' families in the Ceded Provinces. Instead, the author should get to the point without fuss especially in a study that he is not the first to approach.

The arrangement of settlement of land revenue was of prime importance; the question arose whenever a province came under British administration. Land revenue was the heart of the administrative system and brought the government into intimate contact with the peasantry. The government had to place responsibility of tax collection on someone and therefore define rights in the land of various classes of society. This process, known as the land revenue settlement, had a profound effect on the distribution of power within Indian society. Whichever class obtained the settlement was, in effect, master of the land, able to reduce all others to virtual dependence upon its generosity.

When the liberal reformers arrived on the scene, they found two contrasting land systems already in operation. Gupta's treatment of the permanent settlement in Bengal is thorough. Cornwallis awarded proprietary rights in the soil to the 'Zamindars' who, by the time the British arrived, possessed many of the attributes of an established aristocracy. But they were not proprietors in the English sense, the concept of unfettered private ownership was alien.

In Madras, Munro was developing the system where government dealt directly with the ryots, which system came under fire from Wellesley who advocated the Bengal pattern.

In the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, there existed an indigenous pattern of landholdings different from the others, the land being in possession of unified groups of cultivators bound by ties of common ancestry under the direction of the headman who paid the land revenue to whoever was entitled to receive it. No member could claim his fields as of right as under the 'ryotwari' system. Above these village communities was a class of revenue collecting intermediaries, the talukdars who like the zamindars had vastly enhanced their powers during the 18th century. Gupta does not make enough of the fact that during the early years, for mainly political reasons, the government settled with taluqdars wherever they could be found; after 1822, when the Maratha danger had receded, conciliation of the talukdars became less necessary. Holt Mackenzie's Famous Minute of July 1819 recognizing corporate village communities as proprietors of the soil is adequately treated, as is the Regulation VII of 1822 by which the former policy of talukdari settlement was abandoned and a field by field survey instituted as a preliminary to the introduction of a new settlement with village communities.

The dialogue of Mackenzie and Bird with the Board of Revenue leading to Bentinck's decision is



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fascinating. In the complexity of the Indian land revenue it was easy for men like Mackenzie to find justification for tenant rights in Ricardo's theory of rent, while Bentinck was led to consider ways and means of deviating from the strict line of proceedings laid down under Regulation VII by pressure of fiscal needs and exigencies of practical administration. In a word, Metcalfe felt the government 'was out to invent a class of individuals in order to allow them to benefit by the management of what were mistakenly called estates instead of villages' but Bentinck's was the final word that 'all existing institutions be maintained'.

Enough is made of the climate of change, the era of reform and innovation spurred on by the liberal and reforming enthusiasm of early Victorian England, that coincided with deliberation on the land revenue system and administration of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. The result, in 1833, was a system hitherto unique. Although, after 1833, the Ricardian theory was to triumph in the setting aside of the taluqdars, the impact of economic policies on the relative rights, interests and privileges of the various classes in the agricultural community upto 1833 has been thoroughly treated and what comes across clearly is the contradiction between the needs of revenue and the need to make India serve as the ever increasing market for British manufactures.

Navin Chawla

#### ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPED AGRICULTURE:

Edited by Tara Shukla, Vora & Co.  
Publishers, Bombay (1969).

#### ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF INDIAN AGRICULTURE:

by G. D. Agrawal and P. C. Bansil,  
Vikas Publications, Delhi (1969).

*Economics of Underdeveloped Agriculture* is a selection of the previously published works of some 16 economists. The readings included in this volume are grouped under two parts. Part I deals with the problems of agricultural growth in less developed countries. Of the writings on agricultural economics included in this part, the contributions by Schultz, Mellor, and Hopper bring out the problems and the prospects of agricultural modernisation in less developed economies; the works by Dantwala, Snyder, and Onoue cover discussions on the experiences in planning for agricultural development in India, Pakistan and China; and the paper by Santi Priya Bose deals with the diffusion of a farm practice in Indian villages. An article, of wider significance, on Investment in Human Capital, by Schultz, has also been included in this part.

Part II is captioned: Functioning of Traditional Agriculture. The articles by Raj Krishna, Azizur

Rahman Khan and Nuruddin Chowdury, and Vinod Dubey, question the conventional belief about the lack of economic rationality in the behaviour of farmers in underdeveloped countries. They help to understand the nature of farmers' response to price changes as well as the forces that govern the marketing decisions of farmers in less developed countries. The paper by Long gives the economic basis for land reforms in these countries. Panikar's work, included in this part, shows the nature of savings by rural families in India. The remaining articles by Gale Johnson, Leibenstein, and Georgescue Roegen are concerned with the theoretical aspects of agricultural tenancy, underemployment and agrarian economics. The book includes, besides the editor's introduction, a select bibliography of suggested readings.

This volume, like most other books of collections, serves a useful purpose by bringing together the contributions scattered in various publications. But it suffers from several shortcomings. The book is devoid of any selection from the works based on 'Studies in the Economics of Farm Management, (India)'. Also, no mention has been made about the existence of such work either in the long list of omissions included in the editor's introduction or in the bibliography appended. Representation has not been given to the writings on the agricultural situation in the underdeveloped world outside South Asia. Contrary to the editor's claim, certain articles included in earlier collections on agricultural economics published in India, have been repeated in this book. The bibliography included in the book is far too inadequate to serve as a comprehensive list of reading on the subject.

The authors of the book *Economic Problems of Indian Agriculture* hold that it 'has been mainly prepared for the use of students at the agricultural colleges in India'. They have attempted to explain some of the economic aspects of Indian agriculture in its historical perspective. The topics covered in this volume, as in most numerous works of this type, range from the evolution of agricultural policy, size of holdings, cooperative farming, irrigation, livestock, etc., to agricultural credit, marketing, taxation, agriculture under five-year plans, and so on. The authors have rightly pointed out that the study of Indian agricultural economics has suffered for want of suitable text books. However, the book under review does little to improve matters in this respect. The economics underlying the issues dealt with has not been clearly brought out. The stress is mostly on the historical aspects of the topics covered. Besides, the language and presentation leave much to be desired. An introductory text intended for students of agricultural colleges would be expected to provide vivid and accurate description of the economic problems of Indian agriculture with succinct explanations of the economics underlying them. The book does not come up to these expectations.

N. D. Abdul Hameed

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
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# Communication

PLEASE permit me to make a few comments on the symposium on 'Modernization' in the April issue of the SEMINAR. On the whole it is disappointing.

Professor Srinivas who was invited to state the problem has not cared to define 'modernization'. He should have defined the term as there is as yet no agreed definition of it. In a footnote he quotes the definition given by C. E. Black but he doesn't say whether he agrees with it. As he has made no comment on it, we have to assume that he agrees with Black in defining modernization as the process by which human institutions are adapted to the knowledge which scientific revolution makes available. If so, what are the problems which this process creates. Srinivas has not listed these problems but from the statements which

he has made in the course of his article, we have to make a list ourselves. It would certainly have been better—and this is what the readers expect the poser of the probem to do—if he himself had listed them.

The following seem to be the problems which need discussion. (1) Is modernization good or desirable? (2) Is it inevitable? (3) Is modernization a complex process producing as in the case of 'nationalism' both good and harmful results? (4) Is modernization the same as westernization? Srinivas doesn't think so; (5) Can any society became wholly modern? Is it not the case that every society has both modern and traditional features in it, whether we take the beliefs among its members

or their behaviour? Srinivas is of the view that contradictions exist in every society. (6) Is it the case that there are more such contradictions in Indian society than in western societies? Srinivas thinks so and explains the sources of such contradictions.

The point however is whether it is only in modernised societies that we find such contradictions. We find them in traditional societies also. There is always a gap between man's thinking and his behaviour. It is a part of human nature. We can't conceive of any time when man will become wholly rational. There is also a large sector of man's life—the sector of religion and of art, the whole sector of fundamental values—where science and rationality have no relevance. Srinivas does not recognise this and he has consequently taken the trouble—unnecessarily as it appears—to point out they are especially characteristic of modern societies. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that contradictions are more numerous in India than elsewhere. Astrology thrives as much in New York and Paris as in New Delhi.

You have invited Yogendra Singh who belongs to the Department of Sociology to write on political aspects of modernization. His article suffers from two serious defects. One is the excessive use of unintelligible jargon which is now a feature of most books—especially American—on sociology and politics. He has forgotten that he is not writing for the enlightenment of other sociologists who are familiar with the jargon but for those who though educated are not specialists in any branch of knowledge. Readers of SEMINAR belong to the latter category. Srinivas and Pandeya are, I believe, as good specialists in sociology as Yogendra Singh but they have taken care to convey their ideas in a language which can be understood by ordinary mortals like myself. Why should one use 'cultural distanciation' instead of 'cultural distance'? Why speak of 'bureaucracy as systematically enculturated' when their work is explained in a previous sentence in simpler language?

The second defect with Yogendra Singh is that he has no clear ideas about the political implications of modernization. Some of his ideas are also mistaken. He speaks of political parties not based on status groups as a characteristic of modernization and draws a contrast between parties in India before independence and after independence. The Indian National Congress to which he makes no reference was a non-status group party throughout


all its career from 1885 while the D.M.K., the Akali Dal, the Shoshit Dal and Jarkhand have always been status-group and communal parties. Leaving aside details like these, one does not get a clear conception from his article of what political modernization means. Nor does he take up for consideration all the problems posed by Srinivas.

As usual with him, Surindar Suri does not write on the subject under discussion but on something else. This was what he did when you invited him to write on Gandhiji in your October 1969 issue. He wrote more on guerilla warfare in Vietnam than on Mahatma's non-violence. Now he writes on imperialism and colonialism instead of on modernization. He assumes that modernization is imperialism. But there was imperialism from the earliest days of human history. Even according to him, England was a Roman Colony and it is to this that he attributes modern British imperialism. All this is highly original but not to the point. He refers to American imperialism but not to Soviet expansionism.

There is a similar confusion in the article of Siddheshwar Prasad. He starts well by defining modernization as resulting from the pursuit of scientific truth, by stating on the basis of a quotation from Bertrand Russell that the sphere of values is outside science and that modernization is not westernization. But most of his article is devoted to an attack on the West. He also speaks of modern values which is inconsistent with his assumption that the sphere of values is outside science. None of these contributors comment upon the statement of Srinivas that modernization goes with an open society. Does this imply that a society like the Soviet is incapable of modernization or that it has not become modernized? What then about Soviet industrialization, urbanization, growth of literacy, of mass media of communication, etc., which are accepted by everyone as the indicators of modernization?

Pandeya is the only contributor who does full justice to the subject. He points out the characteristics of modernization and his discussion of the relation of religion to it is original and enlightening. Along with several other mature thinkers on the subject, he demonstrates that there is no conflict between the two. If Rasheeduddin Khan had been less pedantic—he also is fond of jargon—his article would have been equally good.


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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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(In Millions)

|                            | 1968         | 2000         |              |
|----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|                            |              | Low          | High         |
| <b>Industrialized Area</b> | <b>1,040</b> | <b>1,250</b> | <b>1,400</b> |
| Europe                     | 460          | 490          | 530          |
| Soviet Union               | 240          | 320          | 350          |
| North America              | 220          | 290          | 350          |
| Others                     | 120          | 150          | 170          |
| <b>Developing Areas</b>    | <b>2,340</b> | <b>4,720</b> | <b>5,560</b> |
| China (Mainland)           | 730          | 1,000        | 1,400        |
| Other Asia                 | 1,100        | 2,300        | 2,600        |
| Africa                     | 330          | 770          | 860          |
| Latin America              | 270          | 650          | 700          |
| <i>World</i>               | <i>3,500</i> | <i>6,000</i> | <i>7,000</i> |

The two variants of the projection for the year 2000 are based on assumptions about "low" and "high" fertility. Some fertility decline is assumed in both cases, faster in the "low" variant, slower in the "high" variant. Mortality is expected to continue its decline until the expectation of life at birth reaches seventy-four years. The variants have been selected from the projections in World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1963 (United Nations, 1966), on the basis of the experience in the 1960's.

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#### VOLUNTARY ACTION

B. Chatterjee, Programme Coordinator, Programme Associates for Family Planning, Ford Foundation, New Delhi

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Reviewed by P. B. Desai

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#### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury

# The problem

POPULATION in India has become like the weather, something which we have been talking about, but which the Almighty seems continually to endow us with, willy nilly. This, notwithstanding a new ministry, hundreds of crores of expenditure, and tens of thousands of doctors, nurses and auxiliaries working feverishly and with almost indecent haste.

The most 'successful' family planning programme, sterilization, if we are to take the government figures at face value, have infertilised 7.8 million adults (most of whom were above 35 years old and had more than four children).<sup>1</sup> Assuming Agarwala's estimate of preventing 1.9 births per sterilization, this effort will in total prevent about 15 million births over the next decade or two against an annual birth rate of about 20 million. In fact, all our efforts seem to be fruitless and going awry: the Intra Utrine Device, that cheap panacea foisted on the poor man in the poor country, was taken up with great hopes which have been crushed under the weight of rumours of pain and bleeding. We have not even bothered to write a decent epitaph to the sordid episode. In short, the objective of reducing the birth-rate from 40 to 25 per 1000 in a decade, may, at the best guesstimate, level off at one third of the 'target'. Since the medical measures to reduce the death rate muddle through less ineffectively, we will reduce death

rates and leave the net reproductive rate only slightly affected.

One would think a nation which has taken censuses and collected vital statistics for half a century, would, by now, know with near perfect accuracy, what its birth rate and death rate were. Like a classic Ripley's believe it or not story, we do not; we are still trying to 'rectify' the machinery. This nation which exports statisticians, economists and mathematicians, cannot fathom so elementary a fact as its own birth rate. The research problem is, however, infinitely more complex. This is a large and varied nation and what is true for Brahmins in one village is not true for the Harijans. They have differential birth rates, death rates, family planning practices and coital frequencies. He have no overall evidence of the knowledge about, attitudes towards, or adoption of, the different contraceptive practices being propagated, with any degree of certainty for any State or region or religious community.

In fact, the whole family planning business is a 'guessing game, with national stakes, played with blunt clubs in a dark room full of players.' No one knows what the score is or whether he is winning or losing and no one will turn on the lights. Modern computerized social science research is expensive but nothing is more expensive in both time and money as bad, old fashioned research. Most administrators, medical practitioners or politicians have no conception of what modern research can do or how much it costs. They budget for an insti-

1. B. L. Raina 'Medicine & Family Planning, Some Aspects', Paper presented at National Conference on Population Policy and Programmes, New Delhi. December 19-23, 1969.

tution the manpower, money and material resources which can barely cover one exploratory project. We have been fiddling around with this kind of inconsequential data and have lost 18 precious years.

On account of the government's massive effort in programmes, the public, non-government sectors have fought shy of family planning and the broader issues of population planning. The government is by definition conservative, bureaucratic, less flexible and public. Contraception or 'birth control' has been until a decade or two ago, a bad word, and even today only a small segment of society accepts and welcomes the advent of the second sex revolution and the era of completely controlled conception. It is, however, still, a very private affair. How can we expect any government to launch headlong into every contraceptive trick available and ignore the larger social and moral issues? Obviously such a problem requires far greater public support. The organized sectors like industry, labour and the voluntary bodies of society must be mobilised to complement and supplement the government programme. In fact the government should contract the large lacunae in the present family planning programme to non-government bodies.

The motivation of the masses through all channels of communication open to them has hitherto only touched the fringe of the problem. After the awareness and knowledge about contraceptives, the small family norm, the public good and private interest is initially propagated, all the persuasive and evaluative stages of conversion to final adoption decision, still re-

main. Due to the propriety of government interfering with private values, much of the strategy and tactics of delicate persuasion can never be tackled effectively by a government programme. A far wider-ranging and delicate approach is called for in the use of new media. Voluntary bodies, friends and relations all need to be mobilised, in addition to the personal communication of the family planning worker.

In short, the nation must now take stock of the total population issue as a *sine qua non* for our future. It must seek and obtain a public commitment from all sectors of our society. Even in good years our food production is perilously close to the brink. With the rising standards of expectations, it is not only the numbers but the quality of men we turn out in the next generation that is going to make increasing per capita demands on limited resources. In addition to family planning, the broader factors which affect population growth like migration, industrialization, women's employment, etc., must all be viewed in totality and policies thrashed out and enunciated. The National Conference on Population Policy and Programmes was an attempt to focus national attention on these issues and such a meeting of academicians, industrialists, labour leaders voluntary workers and government officials was long overdue. The birth of the Population Council of India will, we hope, turn a new leaf in mobilising human, material and monetary non-governmental resources to work for a more rational population stabilization policy and programmes to supplement governmental efforts.

# **An over view**

B. R. SEN

AS we are aware, India was the first country in the world to adopt population control as an official policy. From small beginnings, this has now become an item of importance in our fourth five-year plan. Yet, the impact of our efforts over the years has not been such as to make any significant difference. The primary cause for this lack of progress must, I think, be ascribed to an inadequate understanding on our part of the true nature of the problem. We seem to have proceeded so far on the basis that all we have to do to control the population growth is to promote contraceptives and other preventive measures, and all will be well in the long run. We have not given much thought, if at all, to

the consideration of a broader population policy, aimed at raising the standard of living of the masses in the rural areas, whose chronic poverty provides a constant stimulus to unrestrained reproduction and who make the largest contribution to the problem we face.

It is true that acceleration of the economic growth of the country as a whole has been the preoccupation of our government ever since our independence. The successive five-year plans testify to that. But there does not appear to have ever been a purposeful link-up in the minds of our planners or of our government between economic growth on the one hand and population growth on the other. Had there been such a linkage we would certainly have seen a different emphasis in investments as between large scale

\*This was the key-note address at the National Conference on Population Policy and Programmes, December 19-23, 1969.

industries and small agro-allied industries, and, more generally, as between industrialisation on the one hand and agriculture on the other. The specific question of creating employment for the growing work force through the developing economy appears to have been relegated to the background.

**T**HE base of our economy in India, as in most other developing countries, except those rich in oil and other mineral resources, is agriculture. A vast majority of our people live in the villages and are dependent on agriculture and allied industries and services. In 1967, the agricultural sector contributed around 50 per cent of the total GNP, provided 45 to 50 per cent of total exports of goods and services, and supported over 70 per cent of the total population. The fact remains, however, that agriculture by its very nature does not show growth in performance as readily as industry does. Over the decade 1955-65, the gross value of agricultural production in the developing countries rose at 2.8 per cent annum against 2.6 per cent population growth. It is because of this that national planners in most developing countries, impatient for the economic take-off, have tended to by-pass agriculture by more easily conceived and physically more spectacular industrialisation. In India also we have been unwilling to accept agriculture as the foundation for economic growth of our country. The results, so far as the material conditions of the masses in the rural areas are concerned, are for all to see.

In 1965 in F.A.O., we launched a study on an 'Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development,' the report of which is just out. It is a document of great importance for all countries, both developed and developing, and one which I would recommend to the attention of all interested in the population problem. The picture projected for the period 1970-85, i.e., the next 15 years, has a special relevance for our present discussions. It has been

estimated that 'on reasonable assumptions' there will be a billion more people by 1985, for India an extra 300 million. This alone will require an increase of 10 per cent in food supplies with no improvement in the quantity or quality of individual diets.

On present trends of population growth and food production, imports to fill the gap between demand and supply would then cost the developing countries approximately 26 billion dollars a year assuming constant 1962 prices, as against under 5 billion dollars at present. Whether such large surpluses would be available at all from the developed countries, who only have the capacity to hold surpluses, is a question that I need not go into here. A large percentage of these additional people will be born in the rural areas. If you believe as I do that the birth rate tends to fall with a rise in the standard of living, then work will have to be found for them in a sector where under-employment and unemployment are already serious.

**I**n 1963, Jawaharlal Nehru—the architect of India's industrialisation—remarking on the slow progress of agriculture, had to admonish the National Development Council, saying that 'If you fail in agriculture, then you fail inevitably in industry also.' We have made some progress since then. We are today talking of a 'green revolution.' We must remember, however, that the high-yielding varieties programme which has led to this new development has been extended by now to only a small percentage of our total area under food-grains. For the momentum of the growth rate to be maintained, there must be increasing support by way of investments, creation of institutions necessary and, in particular, more realistic price policies. The question for us in most cases in future will be not 'agriculture' or 'industry', but how to achieve balanced economic growth in which agriculture will help to speed industrialisation. Viewed against this background the recent measure of nationali-

sation of private banks acquires significance.

**W**hile on this subject of national planning for economic growth in the context of population control, one or two points may be raised which are relevant but are often overlooked. Take the question of urbanisation. What is our policy in the matter? What precisely do we mean by urbanisation here? Do we simply mean setting up new towns, or do we mean creating in rural areas, without destroying their essential rural character, certain basic facilities pertaining to urban areas, such as filtered water supply, electric power, elementary and secondary schools, better communications and minimum housing, so as to encourage the rural masses to stay in the countryside and engage themselves in more gainful employment?

The proposal that our population control staff should be able to work in rural areas with towns or cities as their base, appears to me a defeatist idea, though immediately that must be unavoidable. I am not questioning here the need of satellite towns to relieve the congestion of unwieldy cities. In fact, such satellite towns can be an important factor in stimulating both agricultural production and agro-allied industries of the surrounding villages. We do hear from time to time of proposals to set up new towns, but we do not appear to have any national policy in the matter. For the last hundred years people in search of education or employment, or people driven by sheer hunger and poverty have been moving to the towns and cities, and till today the rural areas in some parts of the country present a scene of poverty, misery and desolation which defies description. We have reached a stage when we must consciously plan to reverse this trend. I, therefore, feel that any scheme of agricultural taxation must be so devised as not to discourage the flow of capital to rural areas.

It should be clear that to give the rural population a higher

income, intensification of land use is imperative. In this, irrigation and drainage play a crucial role. In India we are fortunate in having plenty of water resources, but much of our water is flowing into the seas without proper use, and in that process creating havoc during and after the rains in our countryside. Year after year, government is spending crores of rupees in relief, yet we do not have any concrete long term plan or project to deal with our great river system on a comprehensive basis.

Intensification of land use also presupposes free mobility of the population within the country, but the trends that are developing are far from reassuring. Local and party politics, the unabashed hostility in some States against so called 'foreigners' from other States or arising out of what is known as 'Sons of the Soil Movement', sometimes erupting into widespread riots, give cause for concern. It has been said that after the Napoleonic wars, England emerged as two nations—the rich and the poor. Let it not be said that India in the 1970s emerged as 16 or 17 nations, remaining one only in name!

**L**and reform is another subject as closely related to the population problem as it is to the general well being of the society. It has to be remembered that land reform has two distinguishable facets—social justice and increase of productivity. Too small holdings, getting smaller under our inheritance laws, can only reverse the process of farmers moving into a market economy, which will be a negation of dynamic agriculture such as we must try to achieve. The whole problem calls for a judicious review. We have neglected it far too long after our first flush of enthusiasm in the immediate post-independence period. Consequently, today in some States, we are already facing a catastrophic situation.

Thus far I have spoken of population policy in relation to national planning for economic

growth. Although this whole matter, because of the fundamental and comprehensive nature of the problems involved, must be the responsibility of government with its command over the total resources of the country, we in the non-governmental sector have our own responsibility to discharge. We can, by our own research activities and studies, bring to the notice of the Parliament and government where we are lagging behind and why, what more things need to be done, and come up with concrete proposals for action wherever possible. I hope that in any organisation we may decide to set up as a result of the deliberations of the Conference, a place would be found for a committee to concern itself with population policy in all its aspects. Without a clear and comprehensive population policy on the part of the government, any attempt to control population on a nationwide scale will, I am afraid, be like an attempt to control a forest fire with a garden hose!

**C**oming now to the question of population control as such, I feel happy that the controversy that is at present raging in the western world over Pope Paul's Encyclical 'Humanae Vitae' has not overtaken us here in India. That is not because we are indifferent. We are aware that in all international discussions, whether in the UN or in the UN specialised agencies, Catholic countries exercise a dominant if not a decisive voice. Also, all the recent Papal Encyclicals bearing on the subject, beginning with Pope John's 'Pacem in Terris', are addressed not only to the Catholics but also to 'all men of good will'. Having lived under the shadow of the Vatican for so many years, I have been able to follow the controversy, and at times express my views publicly, since I was concerned with the problem of feeding the world population.

One may recall that Pope John had declared in 'Pacem in Terris' that every human being has a dual right—the right to life and along with it the right to a worthy

standard of living. He did not comment on the implication of this dual right in the developing world situation. It is, however, manifestly clear that owing to the unprecedented population growth since the beginning of this century, and in particular since World War II, 'the right to life' of those not yet living, that is, of larger and larger numbers of future generations, will no longer be a right parallel to, but will be in conflict with 'the right to a worthy standard of living.' In his preceding Encyclical 'On the Development of Peoples', Pope Paul had conceded certain scope for judgement both to parents and public authorities. His present Encyclical, 'Humanae Vitae' ('On the Regulation of Birth'), appears to have superseded those concessions.

In India we remain unconvinced that the use of contraceptives is contrary to the Natural Law and must be excluded. We feel that there is no higher morality than a decision of conscience that children born into this world should have a fair chance of living a normal life. We will invite guests to the banquet of life only when we are fairly sure that the covers laid are not going to be empty. It is true that the earth has not yet given up all its riches, that there are still great possibilities with the technological advances we are making for extracting new food and more food for man. But the real question here is not what possibilities may lie in the future, but whether at any point of time the imbalance between population growth and development of available resources poses a threat to the life and well being of generations unborn.

**T**he lack of any significant progress in actual population control is a matter to which the Conference is no doubt going to give very special attention. Let me emphasise one important aspect here, viz., the need to bring about altogether new attitudes and new outlook on marriage and parenthood. Ever since the evolution of human society, man has been told

that reproduction is the Natural Law. The universality of acceptance of this concept has no doubt been due to the general precariousness of human life, owing to man's inability to control the destructive forces in his environment. If the problem of over-population had manifested itself in the past, it had been limited and isolated in character, due mainly to undeveloped communications, and had been allowed to spend itself out—in the worst cases, by famines and pestilences, wars and migrations.

The problem became for the first time a matter of public controversy in the beginning of the 19th century, when in England following the social upheaval brought about by the Napoleonic wars and the industrial revolution, Malthus startled the world with his theory on population. The great debate has continued ever since, till today we find ourselves in a situation never before known. On the continuation of the present trends of population growth and development of the necessary resources, the implications for the welfare of mankind and the quality of human life are indeed too frightening to contemplate. The attitudes on marriage and parenthood that need to be changed are woven into the very texture of our being. To effect a real change will not be easy. Individual approach and individual persuasion are therefore so important, and this is where the community can play a most effective part.

The late Humayun Kabir at the preliminary conference spoke of the need of a massive educational programme in colleges and other educational institutions. I agree, but this is a highly complex matter. We will have to adjust our instructions to the psychology and receptivity of the different age groups. We will have to overcome traditional pedagogic and family prejudices and inhibitions. I would suggest that this whole question be taken up as a matter of high priority and referred to a specially qualified group of socio-

logists and educationists to examine on our behalf.

Another important vehicle for mass education could be farmers' associations, of which a number have grown up in recent years in the country. I would give a very special place to these associations, as what we most need to do is try and reach the rural people through their trusted local leaders. While in FAO, I had agreed to the UNESCO-sponsored Literacy Campaign being worked into the agricultural programmes with which these bodies were primarily concerned. Still another equally important vehicle is the women's organisations, as by their very nature they are specially suited to reach the home.

In this context, the effective use of those mass communication media that can actually reach the people becomes relevant. Radio can be an extremely useful medium, but the AIR programme patterns, one regrets to notice, still remain very much what they were when broadcasting first came into existence in India forty years ago. A government department run by the bureaucracy is bound to be conservative. I would like to add my voice to that of many leaders in the country who ask that the broadcasting system in India be made the responsibility of an autonomous—a truly autonomous public corporation. We have the example before us of some of the most advanced countries of the world. NHK, the Japanese System, which has proved such a powerful instrument of public education, could well serve as a model. The autonomous BBC is well known for its independence and maintains a quality which is recognized the world over. Unless the AIR is made to undergo this transformation, it will continue to be exposed to the criticisms that it is not sufficiently aware of its broad-purpose educational role and that it is primarily intended to be used for government publicity and propaganda. The present state of affairs could have been rationalised in the past but with the political situation as

it is now developing in the country, government will find its position increasingly vulnerable.

The case of television is another sad story. India is one of the few countries left in the world which does not yet have television. In a country where nearly 75 per cent of the people are still illiterate, what could be a more powerful instrument for mass education than television, with sets placed at all important rural centres at public expense, duly serviced and maintained, with properly worked-out programmes. I am aware that some tentative experimental programmes are being worked out in some restricted areas with UNESCO assistance. But what appears to characterise our approach in the matter is unwillingness to take a decision. Our whole thinking on national priorities seems to call for some readjustment. Meanwhile, let us hope that when television does get established in our country, it would, like the radio, also be made the responsibility of an autonomous corporation, so that its potentialities for mass education could be realised with all possible expedition. Education in family planning could then be given high priority in television programmes. At the recent SID conference, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai laid stress on the rapid development of satellite television. An exciting prospect, but not without television sets in general use in the country.

In his address to the preliminary conference, Dr. Deshmukh called our family planning programmes, in the absence of accurate and up-to-date basic information, 'a guessing game, with high stakes, played with blunt clubs, in a dark room full of players.' It is an apt description. Clearly, research should be one of the most important responsibilities of any organisation that we set up. We should undertake research relating to reproductive physiology, bio-medicine, sociology, and mass education, demography, action-research etc. Fortunately, apart from the scientific and technical research centres

for the scientific work, we have, for the socio-economic field, qualified bodies like the Council for Social Development, who only need more funds to make their research more comprehensive. These bodies could also be entrusted with the responsibility of training suitable personnel on a multi-disciplinary basis.

I have not spoken so far of the need for a conference of this kind that we are having today. This has already been explained in general terms in the invitation letter. There is a feeling that the time has surely come for the leaders of our community to look carefully at the problem which is assuming proportions capable of threatening ultimately our very survival as a viable nation. We feel that in dealing with a problem of this nature, the solution of which depends on the exercise of free choice by millions of people through voluntary acceptance, the community, as distinct from government, must boldly come forward to assume the responsibilities that properly belong to it. The task is of such magnitude that nothing short of a total mobilisation of community effort would suffice.

We are, of course, aware of the very valuable work that is being done by certain pioneering non-government organisations and also by certain leaders of industry. I should like to pay a special tribute to Dhanvanti Rama Rao who, first as the President of the Family Planning Association of International planned Parenthood Federation, has been a pathfinder for us whose guidance we will need as we proceed with our work. It is also a matter of satisfaction that we have the cooperation of an industrial leader like J. R. D. Tata who, through precept and example, has shown how we could mobilise the eleven million industrial workers as a spearhead in our work. We must take full advantage of the experience of these organisations and these leaders, and in any arrangement that we set up we should try and help them so that they

can advance and intensify their own activities.

Finally, I would like to say a word about India's population problem in the world perspective. With our 540 million people today we are nearly one-sixth of the human race. From that point of view alone, apart from other factors, we are a world problem. The stability of Asia and even of the world depends on the stability of our country. That is why there is so much interest in our population problem throughout the developed world. On a global basis, this interest in the population problem is finding expression in many ways. The leading Foundations have accepted family planning as a matter of high priority and are allotting increasing funds to support such programmes.

Countries which are in the forefront in aid programmes, such as the U.S.A., UK, Sweden, Norway, Japan, Holland and Denmark, are making funds available both direct to governments and through established institutions. The USA is also releasing counterpart local currency generated by Food Aid for this purpose. The United Nations Family is now taking a more positive interest. A Population Trust Fund has been established in the United Nations. The present level of the Trust Fund is 1.5 million dollars a year. A United States Committee under the Chairmanship of John D. Rockefeller has recommended that the level should be raised to 100 million dollars a year by the end of a three-year period, thus permitting a meaningful multilateral commitment and providing a real incentive to the governments assisted to develop effective and imaginative projects'.

Among the projects to be assisted, the Committee mentions particularly the training of medical and para-medical personnel, the support of family planning components of health facilities, the use of mass communication techniques, the manufacture of contraceptive materials, the establishment of special study centres

as well as ongoing statistical census and demographic work. The Committee further has recommended the appointment of a United Nations Commissioner who is to devote substantial resources from this Trust Fund to the support of research into better methods of fertility control, the operation of family planning programmes and the relationship between population policy and development policy.

Of importance is the recommendation of the World Bank Commission on International Development headed by the former Prime Minister of Canada, Lester Pearson, which states, 'Those (countries) which have already launched ambitious policies to bring down their birth rates should obtain energetic support. Aid-givers cannot be indifferent to whether population problems receive the attention they require, and both bilateral and international agencies should press for adequate analysis of these problems and their bearing on development programmes'.

I believe it will be desirable to take all these developments in the international field into account in our deliberations. There have been criticisms voiced in India against foreign aid. It may be news to some, but we also are subject to much the same kind of criticism in our aid to other countries. The stark fact is that the pace of economic development in the developing countries is bound to slow down if they are to depend solely on their own resources. The revolution of rising expectations that we are witnessing today will sweep away any government which cannot hold out a prospect of satisfaction of these expectations within a reasonable time.

We in India take pride in calling ourselves the world's largest democracy. But it is not numbers that make a nation great. Our pride should be in the values that we stand for, in the quality of our people, in our long civilising history. Let these not be submerged by numbers.

# Economic growth

P. B. DESAI

THE obvious and, in any case, an almost universally cherished goal of economic development is to secure as much and as fast as possible a rise in the general level of material well-being of the population. The most commonly used quantitative measure of the state, or level, or degree of development attained by an economy is its output or real income expressed in per capita terms. According to this index, the world of today is clearly divided into two categories of nations—the more developed, modern industrial nations and the less developed agricultural, or primary production, economies. The few countries falling in the first category enjoy income levels several times higher than those of the remaining great majority of less developed countries.

Most of the industrial nations had experienced their transformation into highly complex and integrated urban-industrial economies over fairly long time-spans immediately prior to the first world war. The process of transformation was characterized in

1. The term 'less developed' is used in preference to 'under developed' or 'developing' by Prof. Simon Kuznets. He defines LD countries as those with a per capita or per worker economic produce below a specified low limit, an indication of substantial failure to exploit the potential of modern material and social technology. "To call these countries 'developing' is to mask their problems and is, moreover, confusing since all countries are, or try to be, developing." See his "Economic Aspects of Fertility Trends in the less Developed Countries," in *Fertility and Family Planning: A World View*, edited by Bernham, Corsa and Freedman, pp. 157-179.

\* This paper was prepared for the National Conference on population Policy and Programmes, New Delhi, December 1969.

their case by a good deal of autonomy in the sense that in the era of laissez faire the State had played a minimal direct role in influencing the forces of economic change. It is, however, plausible that the colonial policies of several of these States were designed and vigorously pursued in the interest of their industrial growth. The remaining few of the more developed nations had secured much of the transformation during the subsequent period ending with the second world war. In the case of these late-comers, the role of the State in the promotion of industrialization was much more positive. In Japan, for example, the State took the initiative and followed consistently, all through the period, policies designed to secure and maintain a high tempo of industrial growth, while in the Soviet Union the State took upon itself the task of transformation through the agency of centralised planning.

In the course of its respective period of economic transformation, each of these developed countries had experienced a phase of rapid increase in its population. This phase did indeed vary in length from one to another of these countries. This population growth was in each case occasioned by a secular decline in levels of mortality unaccompanied immediately by any fertility decline. Secular decline in fertility did follow but after a rather long time-lag. This rapid increase in population did not become a cause of concern in any of the western nations. The context was quite different; industrial growth was creating new avenues of employment at home, while there obtain-

ed at the time abundant opportunities of emigration to new lands.

It is plausible that interaction of the two processes of economic and population growth was one of natural promotion under the circumstances of those times. Reflecting on this experience, Keynes held that the enormous population growth of the first six or seven decades of the nineteenth century was the cause of the great increase in the capital and aggregate income of that period.<sup>2</sup> Rapid population growth has, in any case, been viewed as a necessary consequence of the process of economic growth. Levels of mortality had declined first on account of an improvement in levels of living, then of public health measures and improvement in sanitation and personal hygiene and finally of medical progress and expansion of medical services; each of these three factors being a consequence either of economic development per se or of the permissive atmosphere created by industrial growth.

Likewise, the decline of fertility levels which came after a considerable time-lag, too, has been attributed to forces of social change promoted by industrial progress. Economic development did not exert a direct impact on fertility but it brought about far-reaching changes in social organisation which led to generalisation of the motivation for smaller families, leading in turn to decrease in fertility.<sup>3</sup> Thus, it might be said that economic development in the more developed nations did initially cause a disequilibrium of vital rates and

drew considerable strength from the resulting rapid increase in population. But it must be said also that it did ultimately succeed in bringing the phase of rapid population growth to a close and restored the equilibrium of vital rates at a much lower level than the one prevailing before economic development.

**T**he position of the less developed countries, referring in particular to those of Asia and Africa, is today much less fortunate. This is so, irrespective of the presumption that the liquidation of western imperialism in the years following the second world war had left them free to seek their own political and economic destiny. In the context of the rapidly shrinking post-war world, of which they came to be fully responsible members, they have tended to seek the remedy for their state of backwardness, already accentuated in most cases by imperialism's legacy of stagnation and retardation, in the long-standing experience of the more developed nations with the processes of industrial and economic growth.

The situation had become desperate for the reason, among others, that the attainment of independence had raised high expectations of economic betterment. There was, on the other hand, no hope of the forces of economic progress emerging spontaneously from within the backward economies. It was thus imperative for the State in these countries to undertake central planning for economic development.

This social experiment of centrally planned economic development has been in operation for more than a decade in several of these countries; in India it is now in its nineteenth year. This development effort has from its very inception attracted world-wide attention and has received a considerable measure of sympathetic concern from the more developed countries and of the different agencies of the United Nations. It has formed also a subject of con-

tinual debate, study and evaluation by scholars the world over. There obtain wide differences of opinion and judgement among the scholars in respect of each of the conceivable aspects of the effort. More often than not, its cumulating achievements have been viewed as quite encouraging. It is clear, however, that the Rostowian take-off into the stage of self-propelling process of economic growth remains to be attained in almost all of these countries.

It is recognised that these countries face a variety of more or less intractable problems in their development effort. Some of these problems are specific to individual countries, some are regional in character and some are much more general. The one, among the problems of the last category, which has caused widespread alarm is the problem of rapid increase in population. Statistics are available in abundance to indicate the acceleration of population growth which these countries have been experiencing since the end of the second world war.

**T**his acceleration is attributed to a welcome decline in mortality, which could indeed be viewed as a repetition of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century experience of the more developed countries of the West. We must, however, take particular note of the crucial difference between these so widely separated trends in the timing and tempo of mortality decline. Mortality in the less developed countries has taken in each case a much shorter duration of time from comparatively higher levels. Given the continuance of the pre-existing comparatively higher fertility levels, this has resulted in a more rapid increase in population.

This mortality decline has been caused not so much by improvement in levels of living as by the introduction of cheap and effective measures of public health and preventive (social) medicine, in respect of which these countries could draw upon the progress of

2. J.M. Keynes, 'Some Economic Consequences of a Declining Population', *Economic Review*, April 1937, pp. 13-17.

3. The continuation of the trend of decline in fertility levels and the consequent deceleration of population increase into the inter-war period did cause considerable alarm. It was thought to be a major factor responsible for the secular slow-down in the pace of economic development in these mature economies during the thirties. See A.H. Hansen, 'Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth', *American Economic Review*: March, 1939.

the West. A rapid mortality decline and the consequent rapid growth of population can, therefore, be said to have preceded economic progress in these countries, tending in effect to assume for the national economy the character of an exogenous variable in contrast to the western experience.<sup>4</sup> This precedence assumed by population increase is admittedly of crucial importance to economic development.

A trend of the progressive expansion of the dimension of requisite development effort came thus to be initiated much before development could be put into commission-through planning. It should be noted further that mortality decline and population increase have in most cases been so sudden, spectacular and unprecedented as to impart considerable uncertainty to the projection of their trend into the future, rendering it thereby much more difficult to anticipate and determine the course of development. In any case, forces of change, both economic and demographic, have been operating in these countries since the very beginning of planning. Their interaction is not the one of mutual promotion but the one where population increase impinges on economic growth as a serious constraint.

**H**ow serious this impingement could be in the context of an all-pervasive 'backwardness' is illustrated by the Indian experiment of planning during the last nineteen years. The characteristics of

economic backwardness,<sup>5</sup> often considered only in contrast to those of the developed economies, are too well-known to be repeated here. We may refer, however, to the demographic context in which the experiment was launched. The last census decade to record a decrease in the total population of the country, though of only 0.3 per cent, was 1911-20. For this decade, the census estimate of expectation of life at birth was barely 19 years; of death rate, 48.6 and birth rate, 49.2 per thousand of the population.

**O**ver the next three decades, expectation of life at birth increased successively to 26.9, 32.1 and 32.5 years, while the death rate had decreased to 36.3, 31.2 and 27.2 per thousand of the population. The birth rate had moved down to 46.4, 45.2 and 39.9 per thousand of the population; this decrease being almost wholly explained by the changing structure of the population, it was evident that the level of fertility had remained stable. There was thus an increase in the population of 11.0 per cent in 1921-30, 14.2 per cent in 1931-40 and 13.3 per cent in 1941-50. Although these variations do not indicate any acceleration of population growth, it was clear that the downward trend of mortality had been firmly established. In this connection, it is interesting to recall that the Report of the 1951 Census had viewed the situation with considerable apprehension and had in fact sounded a warning against the danger of 'imprudent maternity'.

In any case, there is no evidence to suggest that the population

4. As Prof. Sauvy maintains, 'When Europe was developing, medical progress could hardly ever advance beyond economic progress; both were dependent on the same source, the same inventions. All scientific discoveries (the thermometer, the microscope, chemistry etc.) were serving both the technique of production and the technique of medical care.. And since medicine was then mostly commercial, the diffusion of methods was to a large extent dictated by economic progress. Neither of these two interdependencies exists in the twentieth century in underdeveloped countries.. The result of this advance of medical progress over economic progress is that it has become possible to make people live both longer and worse'. See his *Fertility and Survival* pp. 48-50.

growth over these three decades had caused the economy to grow. In the course of this period, there was no remarkable improvement in the productivity of its predominating agricultural sector or in the general level of living. On the other hand, without reducing the predominance of agriculture, the economy had been turned in the course of this period from a substantial exporter to a net importer of food grains. Population growth had served presumably to maintain, if not to accentuate, the inequities inherent in the continuing situation of economic backwardness.

To proceed with the experience of planning it would appear that the compulsions and inequities of economic backwardness have dictated the particular formulation of the goals of economic development. In this formulation, maximization of per capita real income constitutes the goal of development but it must be attained in a manner consistent with two other goals, of providing employment to all those who seek it and of securing social justice by reducing inequality of incomes. According to its latest reiteration, 'The basic goal (of planning) is a rapid increase in the standard of living of the people, through measures which also promote equality and social justice'.<sup>6</sup>

**C**onflict between the goal of raising per capita output and that of social justice or of employment is theoretically possible; in such cases the latter may indeed override the former on extra-economic, social or political grounds. More crucial of the latter two in the present context is the goal of employment. Population growth resulting in successively larger increments to the labour force makes its attainment progressively more difficult and leads to the shifting of the target date of full employment more and more into the future. Meanwhile, it continues to constrain the planner's

5. A backward economy is characterized by (1) near-subsistence level of living, with incomes spent mostly on food and necessities; near-zero propensity to save; very little, and inefficiently used, capital stock per worker; and (2) great preponderance of the agricultural sector, producing, with primitive techniques and at low per acre yields, mainly cereals and raw materials, more for home consumption than for market, under the handicaps of poor transport, credit and marketing facilities; showing 'absolute' over-population; acting as a residual employment category; and disguising considerable unemployment. For detailed discussion, see *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth* by Harvey Leibenstein, pp. 38-45.

6. *Fourth Five Year Plan, 1969-74: Draft*; pp. 4.

choice of techniques, to stimulate search for intermediate technologies and to influence plan priorities in favour of labour-intensive projects.

With regard to the performance of planning, we may at once concede that the composition of the gross national product is much more diverse now than before planning, that rapid progress has been made in several fields including irrigation, power and heavy industries, and that social services, including health and education, have expanded more rapidly than the population.

For its over-all appraisal we must confine our attention to the principal national aggregates of income or output, investment and savings, the latter two indicating the dimension of effort and the former its broad result. According to the Fourth Plan Draft Outline of August 1966, 'in 1950-51, total investment in the economy is estimated to have been of the order of 5.5 per cent of the national income; this was financed wholly from domestic savings...In the years since, both these proportions have increased but at different rates. The ratio of investment to national income had, at the end of the third plan period, risen to about 14 per cent, while the ratio of domestic savings to national income rose at a somewhat slower rate to around 9 per cent in 1960-61 and about 10.5 per cent in 1965-66. These disparate trends in the investment and savings ratios arise from the fact that in subsequent years a part of the investment within the country has been financed by means of a drawal upon the foreign exchange reserves accumulated in the war and post-war years as well as utilization of credits secured from abroad'.<sup>7</sup> The subsequent Fourth Plan: 1969-74 Draft of March 1969, however, indicates that 'the current (1967-68) level of the ratio of net investment to net national product was only about 12 per cent while

the ratio of domestic savings was about 8.0 per cent'.<sup>8</sup>

About the achievements, the net national product valued at constant 1948-49 prices increased during the first plan at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent from Rs. 8,850 crores in 1950-51 to Rs. 10,480 crores in 1955-56 and during the second plan at the rate of 4.0 per cent to Rs. 12,730 crores in 1960-61. The corresponding rates of increase in per capita income were 1.6 and 1.8 per cent for the first and second plan respectively. In the third plan the annual rate of increase in the net national product was of the order of 2.5 per cent and in per capita income of barely 0.1 per cent.

The impact of the enlarging denominator, representing population in the computation of per capita income, is striking; as the 1969 Draft notes, 'per capita real income in 1965-66 was about the same as it was in 1960-61, the results of the meagre growth rate of national income having been almost completely neutralised by the 2.5 per cent rate of growth of population'.<sup>9</sup> Thus, according to the assessment of the 1966 Draft Outline, 'the first plan achieved considerable success. The performance of the second plan was also not unsatisfactory. The record of the third plan, however, has not, *prima facie*, been good'.<sup>10</sup> Planning began in 1951 with a goal of doubling per capita real income by 1976; in 1967 it was only 20 per cent higher, though the corresponding growth of total national income was of the order of 72 per cent.

Admittedly, the reasons for this rather dismal course of economic development in the current decade are many and varied, including the two conflicts with our neighbours and the proverbial vagaries of the weather. But rapid population growth is of crucial importance: This is recognised by the enunciation of the latest long term perspective of the 1969 Draft

of the Fourth Plan, which says, 'The assumption of population growth is an important variable determining the rate of improvement in per capita...'.<sup>11</sup>

We must, however, emphasise that the impact of rapid population increase is not limited to the enlargement of the denominator of the ratio of the national product and national population. It is much more pervasive. It is quite plausible that its absence would have made a positive contribution to the growth of the national product. Besides creating the imperative of demographic investment required to prevent deterioration in the levels of living, it has served to increase the dependency load, tended to undermine the achievement of the predetermined composition of the national product, hampered the path of changes in the structure of economy warranted by development, and led, in all possibility, to an accentuation of the imbalances in the regional as well as in the rural-urban distribution of population. Implications of rapid population growth should thus appear to be far more serious.

The experience of Indian planning thus suggests that effective population control, designed to restore the balance between vital rates by reducing the level of fertility, has a positive contribution to make to the process of economic development. An eminent student of Indian development summarises these benefits: 'A reduction in fertility would make the process of modernization more rapid and more certain. It would accelerate the growth of income, provide more rapidly the possibility of productive employment of all adults who need jobs, make the attainment of universal education easier—and it would have the obvious and immediate effect of providing the women of low-income countries some relief from constant pregnancy, parturition and infant care'.<sup>12</sup>

7. *Fourth Five Year Plan : A Draft Outline* p. 10.

8. *Fourth Five Year Plan, 1969-74; Draft* p. 31 and 42.

9. *Ibid.* p. 5.

10. *Op. cit.* pp. 2-3

11. *Op. cit.* p. 30.

12. Ansley J. Cease, 'Population and Economic Development' in *The Population Dilemma*, edited by Philip M. Hauser, p. 69.

# Voluntary action

B. CHATTERJEE

VOLUNTARY service has been defined as that action which is not directed or controlled by the State. It is a private enterprise for social progress. In India, as elsewhere, voluntary action has rendered yeoman service and pioneered in many branches of human welfare, long before the State entered the field. However, the scope and role of voluntary service necessarily depends on the prevailing concept of the role of the State.

Owing to several factors, voluntary social service which performed a matchless role earlier, has since lost some of its lustre. The evolution of a 'welfare State' has promoted the feeling that each member of society has certain rights and is entitled to a basic minimum standard of life and community services through State action. Political freedom is not a magic wand that can solve problems of social welfare by slogans or by an executive order. If our experience over the past two decades is of any relevance, life and living conditions today are more difficult, social problems more

pressing, and voluntary action less effective than it was before Independence. This has happened in spite of massive State support to voluntary action through public cooperation, community development projects and social welfare boards, one of which at least has resulted in a Commission of Inquiry.

The crisis which voluntary social action is facing in the post-independence period is quite alarming. What with floor crossing, defections, toppling and cross-voting, we are living in a highly 'politicalised' atmosphere where 'political power' rather than 'selfless social service' conditions status patterns. This has also resulted in greater faith in lobbying, parliamentary and legislative action rather than the slow but sure fire mode of social change through voluntary action. The enunciation of 'Directive Principles' and 'Fundamental Rights' in the Constitution have also built up rising expectations—of salvation through governmental action.

\* Paper prepared for the Southern Regional Conference on Population Policy and Programmes at Madras, April 1970.

Thus, the shift has occurred from 'improving circumstances around us' to a wide, distant and

often emotional approach to the eradication of poverty, equal distribution of wealth and ending exploitation by political arrangement rather than by dedicated social action. No one can question the noble motives of political idealists but social realism demands a more active intervention through voluntary action, so that at least the present downhill trend in social affairs is arrested, if not prevented.

**M**ounting economic pressures, high taxation and a more acute struggle for existence owing to poverty, unemployment and other stresses, have depleted the corps of voluntary workers and it is in danger of becoming a spent force owing to lack of replenishment in the rank and file. Similarly, people withdrawing to narrower loyalties, group selfishness, resistance to change and apathy are other road blocks to voluntary action. As for leadership, our educated women who in the past had made such invaluable contribution to social service and social reform are today either too busy in their household affairs or have taken to a career or employment, while those who had the surplus energy or resources took to political activities, thus precluding the flow of new blood, and overburdening the existing leadership resources. This is a serious flaw in the future of voluntary action in the field of social welfare in India.

It is generally recognised that State and voluntary sectors are complementary and are partners in a common endeavour toward social betterment. It is also acknowledged that voluntary efforts yield a better cost benefit ratio and, in the long run, are cheaper and more effective provided the service is efficiently executed. Lastly, social welfare and, more so, family planning touches such an intimate and personal aspect of human life that it is more amenable to a voluntary rather than bureaucratic approach.

In areas where social change is of the essence, voluntary agencies

and workers can achieve better results than the official approach. Family planning and fertility control is one such area. The problem of fertility control touches a very intimate, personal aspect of human behaviour and cannot be altered merely by coercion or governmental action. The task boils down to reaching a hundred million couples—or at least about a third, constituting the vulnerable or productive group, and to promote the acceptance of a small family norm by them as well as among all newly married couples and to secure their adoption to family limitation measures. Their support to various social reform actions like attitude to abortion, age of marriage, bachelors, employment of women and such other aspects which have a direct bearing on the fertility pattern, will go a long way towards the solution of the problem.

**I**n these spheres the voluntary agency has a distinct advantage over the official machinery. Besides, resistance to changes in attitudes towards family planning are heavily conditioned by taboos, traditions, superstitions, rumours, unrealistic fears, and misinformation. Above all, new social values cannot be imposed by legislative action, but must be infused, accepted and adopted by the people concerned so as to become an integral part of their heritage. In this transformation of values as well as in support of existing operational programmes for family limitation, voluntary agencies can play a crucial and a decisive role. Such agencies have a clear understanding of the power structure in their communities and can therefore communicate with the people through their natural leaders with ease and efficacy.

The Government of India has recognized the need to make family planning a people's programme, and has made substantial provisions to assist voluntary agencies engaged in family planning work. It feels that voluntary organizations and local bodies have a very important role to play

in the implementation of the family planning programme. In order to expedite decision on request from grants-in-aid and delays in payment of the sanctioned grant, the Government of India has delegated authority to State governments and Union territories. The State governments now have powers to consider and sanction grants-in-aid up to Rs. 50,000 for continuation and for new schemes without reference to the Government of India. They are even empowered to sanction grants exceeding this amount after obtaining the administrative approval of the Government of India. The Government of India on the other hand can grant up to Rs. 5 lakhs for experimental projects.

In order to facilitate smooth functioning of voluntary agencies, 25 per cent of the grant sanctioned for the previous year is released in April on receiving a certificate from the grantee institution to the effect that it proposes to carry on the activities during the ensuing year. Another 25 per cent of the grant is released by June on receipt of the progress report and statement of accounts of the previous year by May. The balance of 50 per cent is however released on receipt of audited statements of accounts and utilisation certificate by the organization to be given at the latest by August so that the balance of grant is available by December. It is said that only about five per cent of agencies are able to keep to this schedule.

**A**t present, 401 voluntary organizations and local bodies are engaged in the family planning programme and receive 100 per cent assistance from the Government of India. During the year 1967-68, grants amounting to Rs. 60.2 lakhs were released by State governments, while some 70 lakhs was sanctioned by the Central Department of Family Planning. This grant from the Government of India was of the order of 42 lakhs up to the end of February 1969.

Of a total of 1782 urban family planning clinics, 401 or 23 per cent

are run by voluntary agencies. The Statewise break up is:

|               |     |
|---------------|-----|
| Gujarat       | 68  |
| Maharashtra   | 58  |
| West Bengal   | 58  |
| Punjab        | 39  |
| U.P.          | 26  |
| —             | —   |
|               | 249 |
| Rest of India | 152 |
| —             | —   |
| Total         | 401 |
|               | —   |

In the Southern Region, relevant to the current Conference, the break up of activities of voluntary agencies are as follows.

#### Mysore

|              | 1968-1969      | 1969-1970<br>(upto 31-1-70) |
|--------------|----------------|-----------------------------|
| V. Agencies  | 9              | 6                           |
| Local Bodies | 6              | 2                           |
| Total        | 15             | 8                           |
| Grant-in-aid | Rs. 2.67 lakhs | Rs. 12.8 lakhs              |

#### Tamil Nadu

|              | 1968-69        | 1969-1970<br>(upto 31-1-70) |
|--------------|----------------|-----------------------------|
| V. Agencies  | 13             | 13                          |
| Local Bodies | 5              | 15                          |
| Total        | 18             | 28                          |
| Grant-in-aid | Rs. 40.4 lakhs | Rs. 13.6 lakhs              |

It has not been possible to secure performance figures in respect of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala.

It can thus be seen that the involvement of the family planning programme in this region is not very substantial except in Tamil Nadu which seems to have made remarkable progress in 1969-70. We all know that organizations like the Andhra Mahila Sabha, the Gandhigram Rural Health Centre, the Christian Medical Association, based in Bangalore have impressive records of achievement in this regard.

However, we often hear complaints both from the voluntary agencies and government officials regarding the efficient working of these provisions for assisting voluntary agencies.

Most of the difficulties faced by

voluntary agencies arise from an uncertainty about the continuation of the project due to lack of timely receipt of the governmental grant-in-aid. Very often it is processed and received at the fag end of the year. Moreover, grants are always for a routine or set pattern of activity, so they are compelled to follow a beaten path rather than explore new and better avenues. Voluntary workers also feel that grant giving authorities should enforce avoidance of duplication or unhealthy competition between grantee institutions. The grant requests are handled by administrators who have very little experience of, therefore sympathy for, the difficulties of

cies concerned provided they meticulously follow the stipulated requirements by submitting a progress report, utilisation certificate, statement of accounts, audited statement, etc., in proper time.

**W**hy is it difficult for the voluntary agencies to follow these simple requirements? If an agency gets a hundred per cent grant, what is the 'voluntarism' in such a venture' they query? Another question often raised is: if a voluntary agency cannot from its own funds support the activities of the agency for a couple of months, it must indeed be a very weak voluntary agency. It is only at best a sub-contracting agency of the government. Then, again, voluntary agencies have no performance targets or minimum level of staff, of accomplishments—which are urgently called for. They also feel that no review, inspection or evaluation of the work has yet been undertaken. There is a general feeling that each voluntary agency should at least be able to put in a matching contribution of say 5 per cent to 10 per cent of the total amount of the grant. The government, it is said, always gives a warning to poor performance before turning down a grant request. Thus we see that both sides have their own problems. The question is how to remedy the situation and reactivate the role of voluntary agencies.

voluntary agencies. Influence rather than merit, they say, secures grants. Also, the rules and regulations for securing the grant are rather complicated.

Government officials in charge of the grants-in-aid programme, have their own tale of woe. Firstly, accountability of public funds demands that every single paisa received from the government should be properly utilised and accounted for. Then they argue that the continuation of a project is not automatic, it has to be intimated to the government and sometimes this is done in April instead of March 31 of the particular year. Then the grant release schedule enumerated earlier can easily benefit the agen-

Firstly, the voluntary agencies which are engaged in family planning programmes are of three types. (i) Already well established social welfare agencies which can add a family planning programme component to their existing activities. (ii) Those that run hospitals, clinics and dispensaries and lastly (iii) those who engage exclusively in family planning work. It has been experienced that this programme when offered along with other social welfare services, becomes more effective. Therefore, those engaged in family planning programmes exclusively should only engage in the task of motivating

the people of their respective communities, and refer cases for IUCD or sterilization to appropriate agencies or hospitals.

Secondly, there are a very few voluntary agencies in rural areas, where the major bulk of the clientele resides and, therefore, well established agencies should make a determined effort to extend the family planning service in the villages.

Thirdly, the connotation of voluntary action should be widened to include local bodies, panchayats, cooperatives, trade unions, professional associations, the organized sector, industrial employees, association of employees, and professional individuals like medical practitioners, *ayurved vaidyas*, *hakims*, homeopaths, private nurses, social workers, etc., who can devote a part of their time to voluntary service in the promotion of family planning in some of the following ways.

1. Promotion of mass communication, education and motivation for family planning at the local community level.
2. Undertaking of studies, research, experimentation, and documentation to promote knowledge about family planning, so as to identify the factors contributing to success or failure of the programme.
3. Stimulation of community action to contact each married couple and especially those with newborn children, and to secure acceptance of the small family norm by these couples.
4. Establishing action programmes to set up clinics, and pilot projects to identify ways and means for successful implementation of birth control measures.
5. Undertaking of co-ordinated work with the existing governmental agencies, so that the efforts of the voluntary sector for motivation of people can be followed up by the services provided by the governmental agencies.

# Employment

B. N. GANGULI

THE size as well as the quality of population is an important factor of economic development. Economists have an easy way of showing how population is an important variable in their simple arithmetical formula of development. Economic growth is not merely a process of *increase* of output of goods and services, but also one of *cumulative increase*. Economic growth becomes cumulative when the amount of savings transformed into capital, combined with the average productivity of capital (high or low, as the case may be), yields an increase of output that is faster than the increase of population. Each year there will be an increment of output over the output of the previous year. And this increment, in its turn, will yield an increment in successive years. Even seemingly small gains can in this way add up to impressive amounts, like a small sum allowed to be compounded, although at a low rate of interest, over the years.

If, however, the savings are low, if they are not entirely converted into capital (which is quite a problem in undeveloped countries), if the productivity of the capital in the projects in which it is invested is low, the increase of output may barely match the increase in population. In that

\* Paper prepared for the Southern Regional Conference, on Population Policy and Programmes in Madras, April 1970.

event the economy will stagnate. Growth will cease so long as savings do not rise and/or increasingly take the form of investment; or the productivity of investment does not rise; or the rate of population growth does not fall. The positive factors may operate either singly or in combination to generate the cumulative process.

Let us take a simple illustration. If savings (capital) are 10 per cent of income, and if the productivity ratio is one-third, i.e., each rupee of investment yields 33 1/3 paisa of additional output, then overall growth will occur at 3.3 per cent per year (10 per cent x 1/3). It is obvious that per capita income will rise so long as the rate of population increase is less than 3.3 per cent per year.

The rate of population increase is, unfortunately, much higher in underdeveloped countries than in economically advanced countries. On the other hand, a given percentage increase of output on a high base has far greater significance than the same growth-rate on a low base. For example, during 1950-58 the U.S. growth-rate and the Indian growth-rate happened to be identical, viz., 3.3 per cent. Naturally, growth of 3.3 per cent did not have the same significance for the two countries.

A given rate of increase of population on a high base, as in our country, has far greater significance for economic growth than the same rate of increase on a low population base.

**T**he hypothetical illustration that I used earlier gave us a rate of economic growth of 3.3 per cent per year. This, as already said, turned out to be the annual growth-rate for India during the period 1950-58. The variables in our illustration are (1) a savings rate of 10 per cent, and (2) a productivity ratio of one-third. The actual figures might have been different in the case of India during this period, but whatever the values of these two variables, their combined effect was a growth-rate of no more than 3.3

per cent, and that on a low base. And much of this growth was eroded by the increase of population.

**B**etween 1950 and 1958, India's gross national product rose by 30 per cent in real terms, or, at best, by only 1.5 per cent a year faster than the population. Total agricultural production rose by about 20-25 per cent—a rate that barely balanced the rate of population increase. In industry we had a better performance. Indeed, it was impressive. But the industrial sector was, and is still, so small that impressive increases in output in this sector have had a small impact on total economic growth. Increases over a dismally low base, however heartening the increases themselves, have a tragic aspect: what appears as an impressive rate of advance along a statistical curve turns out to be a zero rate of improvement for the vast masses of our millions.

The simple arithmetical formula that I have been explaining is a useful expository device provided that it is not bandied about carelessly. Economic growth is a complicated process. The operation of the variables in this formula in relation to one another in a particular way is a *necessary*, but not sufficient, condition of economic growth. We go wrong if our attention is diverted from the critical factors of social and political change. It is a grave error to imagine that growth is a mechanical process. Savings, capital formation and productivity ratios are complex dependent variables, at the back of which there are a number of factors concealed from our view. Some of them will emerge as I proceed. Nevertheless, a great merit of this formula is that it gives us a perspective of economic growth, with population as a crucial variable, in the case of countries like India with a *low rate of increase of output on a low base and a high rate of increase of population on a high base*.

Let us try to visualise this situation in terms of employment.

Let us confine our attention to those who are, or can be, gainfully employed. In richer countries an increase of population means more hands and more gainfully employed persons and more products and services of all kinds to meet the requirements of an added population. An increase of population is an addition to the labour-force and not to the ranks of the 'unemployed'. If it adds to unemployment it can be corrected by an increase in the demand for goods.

Sometimes there is failure of demand, but there are means by which it can be adjusted upward. Those who are added to the labour force may be employed in the existing plants or farms if there is slack to be taken up; or, if demand justifies it and labour is forthcoming, there would be enough savings to be turned into additional productive capacity so as to absorb the addition to the labour force. I do not wish to suggest that richer countries do not necessarily have an unemployment problem at any rate from time to time. They also have sometimes a hard core of unemployment. But they can live with it, or deal with it, more or less easily.

**O**ur problem is different. Our existing agricultural base and our industrial and commercial superstructure are inadequate for offering useful employment opportunities to more people. There are not enough places in which additional people can find gainful employment. The new hands that are added as the result of increasing population do not add to our output. Either they are unemployed; or they displace others who are employed; or they share employment with others, so that there is more of part-time in place of full-time employment; or it so happens that work previously done by one person is now done by two or, maybe, three persons.

The increase of demand is not sufficient to bring into employment the substantially larger

number of persons seeking employment, because, among other things, the rate of increase of savings taking the form of investment, lags behind the rate of increase of population, the average level of productivity being so abnormally low for a variety of reasons. To a considerable extent, lack of capital may be compensated for by harder work in a poor country. But such a method of adjustment is not easy to achieve in India for a number of reasons which go beyond the arithmetic of economic development.

Faced by our situation, a sympathetic observer like John Kenneth Galbraith said: 'The only remedy is the control of population'. Let us consider this not as a bald statement which may perhaps upset some but in its proper perspective. Let us, for example, reflect on the experience of Japan during the last two decades. Japan is an Asian country which until recently suffered from the effects of high demographic pressure—the common fate of most of the Asian countries. Japan had an employment-oriented economic plan. She also had the ambition of eventually becoming one of the most economically advanced countries of the world. Among other things, she had the advantage of a strong agricultural base and a strong industrial and commercial superstructure. Japan realised, however, that she had a serious overpopulation problem in the sense that the rapidly increasing population obscured the prospects of her economic growth in terms of modernization of her economy and a revolutionary change in her employment structure. It is interesting to note how the population problem as well as the employment problem were tackled simultaneously as interrelated parts of the problem of economic growth.

Japan's effective birth-control programme is well known. But what is not well known is that her birth-control programme was wisely integrated with the planning of the volume and quality of employment. In terms of the arithmetic of economic develop-

ment, Japan's strategy was to operate on productivity per unit of capital as well as productivity per unit of employed labour under conditions of fairly full employment.

Japan's economy, like India's, has had a dual structure—a 'modern' structure co-existing with a 'pre-modern' structure. Agriculture has been the principal source of employment. At the end of 1960, 80 per cent of the farmers had less than 2 hectares of land per family. Small size establishments with less than 10 workers accounted for 36.3 per cent of all workers employed and 89.6 per cent of the total employed in the small-scale sector. Productivity in agriculture, fishery and production was only 36.7 per cent of the productivity in industry. Within industry, wages in large establishments (employing over 1000 workers) were double the wages earned in establishments employing 10-20 workers in 1954.

We have the same situation in our country, only in a more accentuated form. Japan's earlier economic plan was employment-oriented in the sense that it encouraged the growth of small and medium establishments which had a larger capacity for absorption of labour. The country had to meet the employment requirements of a suddenly increased labour force, without caring for the sharp differences in incomes so long as employment of some kind or the other was found. During 1953-59 the annual growth rate of the Japanese economy was 8.3 per cent, exceeding the plan target of 6.5 per cent. This favoured the broad employment strategy.

The Japanese with their keen sense of realism clearly understood that it would be a pragmatic policy to operate on the population variable, in the interest of the prospects of real economic growth. The quality of employment had to be improved by changing the employment pattern and by a gradual restructuring of occupations. In this way, produc-

tivity would be levelled up in the economy as a whole and the sharp wage differences would be narrowed as early as possible. With all their talent for disciplined work and efficiency, the Japanese clearly saw that unless the current additions to the labour force through increase of population could be substantially reduced by means of population restriction, they could not go ahead. Hence they adopted the policy of population restriction preparatory to the formulation of the *Doubling-the-National-Income Plan* in 1960.

While technological innovations proceeded apace, there was a drastic change in the demographic situation. The birth-rate dropped to 16.8 in 1961 and the death-rate to 7.41. This meant that until 1965 the productive age-group in the generation born during the period of high birth-rates was to increase by about 1.7 million persons annually; but after 1965 the situation was to be completely reversed, till in 1975 only 500,000 persons were to enter the labour-force.

After 1965, Japan has been experiencing a shortage of labour, especially in the lower age-groups. Japan's small establishments will bear the impact of this new demographic trend. They were so far absorbing the younger age-group entrants to the labour force at low wages—a phenomenon that is painfully widespread in our country, in our villages and cities, although our Constitution enjoins us to eliminate exploitation and deprivation from which our teeming millions in the younger age-groups suffer. In view of the reduction in the number of workers in the younger age-groups, in Japanese small enterprises wages have been rising and the higher wages can only be sustained by modernization and higher productivity. The sweated-labour argument against Japanese industry is gradually becoming a relic of the past.

The path of economic development is never smooth. Social problems will arise as a result of the disorganisation of small and even medium industry which

forms such a substantial sector of the economy. If experience is any guide, the decrease in the number of young workers in the labour force will reduce labour mobility and make the employment pattern relatively inflexible. These are, however, problems which will have to be faced and solved. But the logic of Japanese economic development cannot be contested by any rational individual.

**B**y way of contrast, let me indicate the broad trends of employment in the face of high rates of growth of population in many Asian countries including India. It has been estimated that in the period 1960-1980, well over 300 million jobs will have to be found in the ECAFE region to provide merely for new entrants to the labour force, as distinct from the existing backlog of unemployment and under-employment. In India, rational methods have not yet even been devised to estimate the volume of unemployment and under-employment. Nevertheless, the number of unemployed at the beginning of the second five-year plan was estimated at 5 million, but had grown to about 9 million by the beginning of the third plan. It was thought that, even if the third plan targets were fully achieved—which was not the case—the pool of unemployed would grow into 12 million by the beginning of the fourth plan which, again, has had a delayed start.

What have been the symptoms or indicators of the economic *malaise* in countries of the ECAFE region? A fairly common indicator is the heavy dependence on agriculture which is not necessarily bad, unless the gains of higher productivity are eroded by the increase of farm population, as they usually are. Lack of diversification of employment and the over-all weakness of the industrial sector are other indicators. Unemployment is commonly a problem of serious dimensions. As one may expect, in rapidly multiplying populations, unemployment tends to affect the younger age-groups most severely. There is also a high incidence of

unemployment among the educated young persons. Under-employment is also widespread, notably in rural areas. We have no difficulty in locating these symptoms of economic *malaise* in India.

When one advocates population restriction, in the context of our employment situation, one must not, as the analysis contained in this paper has shown, take a narrow view. One must consider it in the broad perspective of an employment-oriented plan of economic development. This is the lesson of recent Japanese experience as well as the lesson of our own experience.

We must start from the proposition that our population is much too large to permit decent levels of living and reasonable prospects of economic and social development. We need, therefore, a population balance which would ensure these minimum requirements. Whenever population control is mentioned, sometimes people try to rationalise their prejudices and inhibitions by saying that for a long period the size of the labour force will expand at rates determined by birth-rates in an earlier period and that, therefore, in view of the difficulty of creating employment, what can one do about it? But one should not forget that it is precisely from the angle of employment that one reaches just the opposite conclusion.

**P**opulation restriction becomes an urgent national concern, in view of its impact on employment not only in the long run but also in the short-term and the medium-term. How? In a rapidly increasing population the burden of dependency on the income-earners is much heavier. I have already referred to the problem of the younger age-groups. Those who belong to these age-groups are a burden which the individual families and the State are finding it difficult to bear. Deprivation, exploitation and frustration which are the lot of this vital section of the community have become a source of serious social tension,

apart from other causes of such tension.

A reduction of the birth-rate, by reducing the burden of dependency, will be beneficial *in the short run* by bringing about an immediate improvement in the levels of living of individual families. Children will become assets in terms of the quality of life to which they will have access to rather than in terms of the number of 'hands' that can possibly be employed in 'sweated' occupations under degrading conditions. Thus there will be an improvement of productivity and better utilisation of labour, apart from the fact that the children of smaller families will have a real chance of civilized existence.

**O**n the other hand, if the present situation is allowed to continue, the burden of what is nowadays called 'demographic investment' will be too heavy in a 'welfare State' to permit of adequate growth producing—or employment-generating—investment. Let me explain the meaning of 'demographic investment'. It is the investment required to keep the total product per head unchanged—providing labour with capital at unchanged average levels of productivity. Lower fertility would mean that a higher proportion of the income derived as 'savings' in our arithmetical illustration goes into 'growth expenditure' and a smaller proportion into late-yielding and/or low-yielding 'welfare expenditure' so that employment and income per head increases. The burden of dependency being less, it is no longer insupportable in relation to the limited resources of the family and of the State which has to incur a certain minimum expenditure on education, health, housing, child care, etc.

In poor countries, one should not exaggerate the importance of capital investment, important as it is. Use of surplus manpower (rather than surplus capital) which is, on the whole, the only kindly of surplus available has its possibilities. But certain func-

tional aspects of the rural economy have to be attended to before those possibilities can be realised. How best to deploy the existing means of production—land, agriculture inputs, rural infrastructure and organisation—in order to mobilise and use surplus manpower?

A country like India can increase its surplus manpower for physical capital formation and also increase its agricultural output. But the manpower has to be fed while it is engaged on capital construction. How can we ensure adequate supplies when increased production of food means higher food consumption by peasants who produce more food? There is also the problem of an adequate supply of wage-goods.

As I said, in the case of Japan, (although our economic situation is far more unfavourable), the path of development is never smooth. It is strewn with hurdles which have to be removed. But there is no doubt that we have to look at economic development in terms of achieving a higher labour input and greater labour efficiency. It will mean that more people should begin to be employed, that they should work longer hours and more efficiently as the Japanese did. Our unemployed masses will do so if they have the work opportunities and if they can organise themselves into cooperative ways of work. Capital will then play its part. If it is invested wisely, according to an employment-oriented plan, it will raise both labour-efficiency and labour utilization.

Here, we pre-suppose a number of things which cannot necessarily be presumed—reform of land tenures and tenancy, higher levels of health and nutrition and education, larger and better management personnel, improvement in the level of honesty in politics and administration and a heightened sense of purposive nationalism. These are important parameters, although they are outside the range of variables in our arithmetical illustration.

## The only way

PITAMBAR PANT

THE aim of economic development in India is to ensure a progressively rising standard of living to the people and to create conditions for this to happen without giving rise to undue concentration of economic power and large disparities in income and wealth. There should be widening opportunities for individual development and the social and economic disabilities from which various sections of the population suffer should be ended as quickly as possible.

This objective is embodied in the many articles of the Indian Constitution. It is also reflected in the decision taken soon after the adoption of the Constitution to initiate rapid economic and social development through national planning.

India has the unique distinction of being the world's largest democracy with a parliamentary system based on adult franchise. A system cannot be judged, however, on the basis of abstract principles alone. The appeal of political democracy is greatly increased when its institutions show enough vitality and resourcefulness to tackle effectively the multifarious economic and social problems facing the people. In a

\* Paper prepared for the Southern Regional Conference on Population Policy and Programmes in Madras, April 1970.

democracy, at the centre of the whole effort must be the people—the object of all endeavour as well as the agents of all change. It is their well-being which has to be fostered and it is they who have to bring it about.

**F**or a given rate of economic growth, improvement in per capita income and living standards depends on the rate of growth of the population; the faster the population growth the slower the pace of improvement in per capita income. The concern with the rapidly rising population of the country arises from the apprehension that the rate of increase in production might be too low in relation to population growth to make any tangible impact on living standards even after a fairly long time. While income growth in India since 1950 has averaged only about 3.5 to 4 per cent per year, the growth of population has accelerated from about 1.5 per cent in 1950 to 2.5 per cent twenty years later. Acceleration of population growth without a corresponding acceleration of the rate of economic growth must lead to the perpetuation of the poverty of the people.

The speed with which a country develops depends largely upon its ability to direct a sizeable part of its growing resources to savings and investment rather than to current consumption. It is difficult for a poor country to have a high savings rate. If it can set aside 8-10 per cent of its income for investment in the early stages of development, it is already doing not too badly. But at this rate, if its population is also growing at 2.5 per cent per year, it will probably be investing just about enough merely to stay where it is. What is more likely to happen is that the rate of investment might be further reduced as a growing population, with a high proportion of dependent children, might find it increasingly difficult to spare as much income from consumption under pressure of meeting the larger demands for housing, education, medical, health, sanitation

and water, etc., facilities arising account of the larger population.

Population growth does not only tend to reduce the flow of investment funds. It also means that resources available for building the economic infrastructure are insufficient and that capital invested in industry and agriculture is spread increasingly thinly over the larger labour force. As a result, productivity suffers and living standards cannot be raised rapidly.

The larger consumption needs of the people may also reduce availabilities for exports creating thereby additional difficulties for balance of payments. In the case of essential supplies, such as foodgrains, where the scope for raising domestic production beyond a certain level (given the limitation of land and water) may be restricted, excessive population could create serious problems as any effort to bridge the gap between supply and demand through imports for a country as populous as India may impose an unmanageable burden on the balance of payments. On the other hand, if the gap remains unfilled, there will be considerable pressure on prices of foodgrains which in turn may lead to an inflationary rise of prices all around and, ultimately, seriously impede the continued growth of the economy.

It is thus clear that in the context of the very modest rate of growth of the Indian economy, rapid population growth threatens to nullify the efforts to raise living standards in the country, and to create conditions which may make it very difficult for us to extricate ourselves from a most unenviable situation. The problem has, therefore, to be tackled purposively and effectively.

**F**ortunately, there is no need to accept as inevitable either the relatively slow rate of growth of national income or the acceleration of population growth, which have characterised the Indian economy in recent years. It is possible through planning and

determined effort to speed up the growth of our economy. The fourth plan envisages a rate of growth of national income of more than 5.5 per cent per year during the fourth plan, and accelerating thereafter to 6.0 to 6.5 per cent per year by 1980-81. Simultaneously, there is the need and urgency of deliberate control over birth rate and death rate so that while death rates are brought down steadily as a result of improvement of public health and medical facilities and general amelioration of living conditions, people are adequately motivated and suitably assisted consciously to regulate births and bring down the birth rate rapidly enough.

It is this twin-pronged approach which offers the right and rational course for dealing with a difficult problem. Measures for population control and those designed to accelerate development cannot be considered as substitutes for each other. They must be viewed as complementary and actually supporting each element of a long-term strategy. The long-term strategy outlined in the fourth plan is based on it.

**D**uring the fifty years, 1920-1970, world population has increased 93 per cent, from 1860 million to 3590 million. The population of the more developed regions has increased by 60 per cent and of the developing regions by 110 per cent. India's population during the same period increased by 120 per cent, from 251 million in 1920 to 554 million in 1970. The annual percentage rate of growth of India's population during the decade 1920-30 was 1.06 and during the next two decades 1.35 and 1.24 respectively. There was sharp acceleration to 1.97 in the next decade 1950-60 and further to 2.35 in the decade 1960-70.

While mortality has been greatly reduced in India, fertility has suffered only a slight decline. This will be evident from the fact that while the death rate decreased from 36.3 in 1921-31 to 15.6 in 1961-71, the birth rate in the same

period declined from 46.4 to 39.8 only.

As a consequence of the high rate of growth of population, the Indian population has a relatively high proportion of young people. Thus over two-fifth of the population in India is below 15 years in contrast to less than a third in developed countries, such as the USA, Canada and Japan which have a lower rate of population growth.

The Indian population is also characterised by early marriages. It is a striking fact that 19 per cent of the female population in the age group 10-14 is married. In the rural areas the proportion was as high as 22 per cent, while it was 7 per cent in the urban areas in 1961. The percentage of married among females in the age group 15-44 was 86 in rural areas and 79 in urban areas.

The general fertility rate (GFR), namely, the number of children born per 1000 women in the reproductive age group 15-44, for India is also significantly higher than the corresponding rate in countries such as Japan and England (including Wales). It was 195 for India in 1961 as compared to 72 for Japan (1960) and 91 for England (1962).

If the births of a recent year in India are classified by their order, that is according to whether the births represented the first, second, third, etc., child born to the mother, it is observed that the first, second and third order births, taken together, represent 55 per cent of all births, spread nearly equally between the three. The fourth and fifth order births contribute another nearly 27 per cent. The remaining 18 per cent are births of the order of 6 and over. Seen against the background of the need for curbing population growth, this raises the problem of preventing the higher order births (say over 3) and spacing out the lower order ones.

Estimates of the likely level of population upto 1985-86 have been made by an Expert Committee

TABLE I

| Assumption regarding percentage decline in GFR |                |                                  |
|--|----------------|----------------------------------|
| Variant  | GFR in 1985-86 | Percentage decrease from 1961-66 |
| 1. Uncontrolled fertility                      | 195            | 0                                |
| 2. Very high                                   | 142            | 27                               |
| 3. High  | 118            | 39                               |
| 4. Medium                                      | 100            | 49                               |
| 5. Low   | 84             | 57                               |

under the Chairmanship of the Registrar General of India on the basis of three alternative assumptions regarding fertility rates. The assumptions regarding mortality were kept the same in all cases. To the three estimates prepared by the Committee—high, medium and low—we have added two

1980-81, and 1985-86 are shown in Table II. The projection for 2000-01 is based on the simple assumption of continued growth of population beyond 1985-86 at the rate estimated for 1985-86.

Table II shows that the difference in population between that

TABLE II

| Variant                   | Population projections<br>(in millions) |         |         |         |
|---------------------------|---|---------|---------|---------|
|                           | 1957-76                                 | 1980-81 | 1985-86 | 2000-01 |
| 1. Uncontrolled fertility | 644                                     | 750     | 868     | 1347    |
| 2. Very high              | 639                                     | 727     | 806     | 1115    |
| 3. High                   | 639                                     | 720     | 784     | 1015    |
| 4. Medium                 | 624                                     | 690     | 740     | 919     |
| 5. Low                    | 610                                     | 663     | 700     | 834     |

more, namely (1) uncontrolled fertility and (2) very high.

It is important to draw attention to the probability of errors in such projections concerning future population growth owing to the wide range of expected future variations in both fertility and mortality. There may not be scope for wide divergence in mortality where the declining trend is assumed on the basis of parallel experience in other countries. There is, however, uncertainty as to the degree of decline in fertility which can be realistically expected as well as the timing in which the decline may occur.

The following table gives the decline in the GFR in 1985-86 postulated in the different variants relative to the base GFR figure of 195 in 1961-66.

The mid-year (October 1) population estimates arising from these projections for 1975-76,

based on the assumption of 'uncontrolled fertility' and the 'low' variant is 34 million in 1975-76, 87 million in 1980-81, 168 million in 1985-86, and can exceed 500 million by the year 2000. Thus a delay in effecting a reduction in the birth rate may not appear to be too serious a problem in the short run but it can give rise to an unmanageable problem of population growth in the long run.

The 'medium' projection is the one recommended for adoption by the Expert Group and actually being used for population projections upto 1985-86 by the Planning Commission. It is to be underlined that even this projection implies halving the gross fertility rate during the 20 years 1965-85 (Table I, line 4, col. 3). And even with such a reduction, there is the prospect of India's population exceeding 900 million in the year 2000.

The age structure of the 1986 population estimate under the

TABLE III

| Age (yrs.) | Age, structure, 1986 |           |       |        |       | (percentage) |
|------------|----------------------|-----------|-------|--------|-------|--------------|
|            | uncontrolled         | very high | high  | medium | low   |              |
| 0-4        | 16.8                 | 13.2      | 11.4  | 10.2   | 8.9   |              |
| 5-19       | 36.1                 | 36.0      | 36.4  | 34.6   | 32.6  |              |
| 20-64      | 43.5                 | 46.9      | 48.2  | 51.0   | 54.0  |              |
| 65+        | 3.6                  | 3.9       | 4.0   | 4.2    | 4.5   |              |
| Total      | 100.0                | 100.0     | 100.0 | 100.0  | 100.0 |              |

different assumptions is exhibited in Table III.

As one looks at this table from left to right it will be evident that the higher the population growth rate assumed the larger will be the proportion of younger people in the population. The uncontrolled fertility projection has, for instance, 53 per cent of the population in the age group 0-19 as compared to 45 per cent in the medium projection. This means that the burden of dependency will increase, the need for providing suitable nourishment for children will be greater and there will be mounting pressure on school facilities.

It is necessary to link the alternative projections made by the demographers with the quantitative increases that will be necessary in the use of corresponding contraceptive measures such as sterilisation, intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUCD) and conventional contraceptives to conform to each of the projections. Leaving out the 'low' variant as being outside the realm of practical possibilities, an exercise of this type has been carried out for the 'medium' projection (Table 4). This exercise illustrates the magnitude of the task to be faced in terms of the increases to be achieved for sterilisation, IUCD and conventional contraceptives even to keep to the medium projection, i.e., a population of 690 million in 1980-81 and 740 million in 1985-86.

Assuming a base level of 1.4 million fresh couples covered by sterilisation in 1969-70, the exercise throws up a figure of 3.3 million fresh couples to be covered by sterilisation in 1975-76, and 6.7 million fresh couples in 1980-81.

Sterilisations will have to increase, by 15 per cent annually until 1980-81, whereafter they could stabilise at 6.7 million per year. Expressed in another way, sterilisations need to increase from 3 per 1000 of population per annum at present to 5 per 1000 in 1975-76 and to 9 per 1000 in 1980-81 and each year thereafter.

On a base level of 0.48 million fresh couples covered by IUCD in 1969-70, the IUCD coverage will need to increase by 15-20 per cent annually upto 1980-81 and by 10% per annum till 1985-86. This implies an increase from 1 per 1000 per annum at present to 2.4 per 1000 in 1975-76, 4 per 1000 in 1980-81 and 6 per 1000 in 1985-86.

In the case of conventional contraceptives, the increases over the 1969-70 base level of 1.55 million fresh couples will need to be 20-30 per cent per annum till 1980-81 and 10 per cent annually thereafter till 1985-86. Per thousand of population this would mean an increase from 3 at present to 12 in 1975-76, 23 in 1980-81 and 40 in 1985-86.

Incidentally, it has to be pointed out that even the 'very high' variant, which aims at keeping the rate of growth of population at about the current level throughout the period, implies active steps for birth control. Specifically, it implies doubling of the number of sterilisations per year by 1985-86, the quadrupling of IUCD insertions and an almost eight-fold increase in the number of conventional contraceptive users (with 1969-70 performance as the base).

Although the birth control measures consistent with the

medium projection will pose a challenge to our administrative capacities, the 1985-86 targets of 9 per 1000 in sterilisations, 6 per 1000 for IUCDs and 40 per 1000 for conventional contraceptives can, by no means, be considered as being unattainable. The medium projection thus offers the best basis for action. The important question is whether the necessary tempo can be mounted and sustained to the degree and within the time-schedule as postulated with the existing programmes, policies, and organisational set-up for family planning. Shortfalls in year to year performance or delays in reaching the milestones in the prescribed path of birth rate reduction can significantly widen the gap between the actual and projected population in the terminal year. Any complacency in regard to the performance of the family planning programme or any tendency to accept minor or short run successes as sufficient advance are thus clearly unwarranted.

Operational performance needs to be related to demographic goals by means of exercises such as the ones illustrated above. The overall targets for different contraceptive methods have to be translated into specific performance yardsticks on a regional basis and for different age groups in the reproductive population and for couples classified according to the number of children they have had. Considering that more than 60 per cent of couples in the reproductive age group (wives aged 15-44) should be contraceptive users by 1985-86, this will be a formidable administrative task. Equally important is the necessity to keep under constant appraisal the acceptability and feasibility of different programmes, so that programmes and policies are modified and adapted to changing circumstances.

We have discussed so far the scale of the effort necessary on the family planning front in order that population growth in the next three decades will not exceed the 'medium projection'. It is useful

TABLE IV

Effect of contraceptive programme on population growth: 1966-67 to 1985-86 (Roughly corresponding to RG's Medium Projection)

| year | female population (15-44) | potential births | fresh couples covered by |          |       | births prevented through the use of specific means of birth control |               |          |       |       |        | total |
|------|---------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------|-------|---|---------------|----------|-------|-------|--------|-------|
|      |                           |                  | sterilisation            | I.U.C.D. | C.C.  | total   | sterilisation | I.U.C.D. | C.C.  | total |        |       |
| (0)  | (1)                       | (2)              | (3)                      | (4)      | (5)   | (6)   | (7)           | (8)      | (9)   | (10)  | (11)   |       |
| 1    | 1966-67                   | 104.500          | 20.377                   | .890     | .910  | .465  | 2.265         | .355     | .200  | .051  | .607   |       |
| 2    | 67-68                     | 107.100          | 20.884                   | 1.840    | .670  | .475  | 2.985         | .622     | .305  | .070  | .997   |       |
| 3    | 68-69                     | 109.700          | 21.391                   | 1.665    | .480  | .960  | 3.105         | 1.041    | .354  | .089  | 1.485  |       |
| 4    | 69-70                     | 112.500          | 21.937                   | 1.430    | .480  | 1.550   | 3.460         | 1.380    | .344  | .166  | 1.891  |       |
| 5    | 70-71                     | 115.300          | 22.483                   | 1.644    | .576  | 2.015   | 4.235         | 1.659    | .309  | .249  | 2.218  |       |
| 6    | 71-72                     | 118.200          | 23.049                   | 1.891    | .691  | 2.619   | 5.201         | 1.974    | .288  | .324  | 2.587  |       |
| 7    | 72-73                     | 121.300          | 23.653                   | 2.174    | .829  | 3.405   | 6.409         | 2.332    | .298  | .422  | 3.054  |       |
| 8    | 73-74                     | 124.700          | 24.316                   | 2.501    | .995  | 4.426   | 7.923         | 2.723    | .341  | .549  | 3.614  |       |
| 9    | 74-75                     | 128.100          | 24.979                   | 2.876    | 1.194 | 5.755   | 9.825         | 3.164    | .406  | .713  | 4.285  |       |
| 10   | 75-76                     | 131.700          | 25.681                   | 3.307    | 1.433 | 7.481   | 12.222        | 3.667    | .488  | .928  | 5.083  |       |
| 11   | 76-77                     | 135.300          | 26.383                   | 3.803    | 1.648 | 8.977   | 14.429        | 4.239    | .583  | 1.178 | 6.001  |       |
| 12   | 77-78                     | 138.900          | 27.085                   | 4.374    | 1.895 | 10.773  | 17.043        | 4.896    | .689  | 1.414 | 7.000  |       |
| 13   | 78-79                     | 142.700          | 27.826                   | 5.030    | 2.179 | 12.928  | 20.138        | 5.636    | .804  | 1.696 | 8.137  |       |
| 14   | 79-80                     | 146.600          | 28.587                   | 5.785    | 2.506 | 15.513  | 23.805        | 6.484    | .931  | 2.036 | 9.451  |       |
| 15   | 80-81                     | 150.700          | 29.386                   | 6.652    | 2.882 | 18.616  | 28.152        | 7.460    | 1.072 | 2.443 | 10.976 |       |
| 16   | 81-82                     | 154.700          | 30.166                   | 6.652    | 3.171 | 20.478  | 30.302        | 8.513    | 1.229 | 2.862 | 12.605 |       |
| 17   | 82-83                     | 158.500          | 30.907                   | 6.652    | 3.488 | 22.525  | 32.667        | 9.465    | 1.392 | 3.148 | 14.006 |       |
| 18   | 83-84                     | 162.000          | 31.590                   | 6.652    | 3.837 | 24.778  | 35.268        | 10.322   | 1.556 | 3.463 | 15.342 |       |
| 19   | 84-85                     | 165.400          | 32.253                   | 6.652    | 4.220 | 27.256  | 38.130        | 11.091   | 1.724 | 3.809 | 16.626 |       |
| 20   | 85-86                     | 168.600          | 32.877                   | 6.652    | 4.642 | 29.982  | 41.277        | 11.774   | 1.900 | 4.190 | 17.865 |       |

Notes : (1) Method of computation involves use of data assumptions based on census and surveys relating to (a) age distribution of acceptors, by each mode of contraception for each year of the programme, (b) age specific marital fertility rates (c) average effectiveness of each type of contraceptives and (d) allowance for mortality, widowhood and withdrawal from reproductive age group, wife aged 15-44.

(Contd) (Medium projection—)

| (0) | (1)   | (12)   | (13)   | (14)   | (15)  | (16)    | (17)   | cumulative users of        |            |            |            |               |
|-----|-------|--------|--------|--------|-------|---------|--------|----------------------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|
|     |       |        |        |        |       |         |        | births on<br>reduced basis | death rate | birth rate | population | sterilization |
| 1   | 66-67 | 19.769 | 15.400 | 39.364 | 2.396 | 502.223 | 2.135  | 1.698                      | .465       |            |            |               |
| 2   | 67-68 | 19.886 | 14.800 | 38.638 | 2.383 | 514.677 | 3.922  | 1.853                      | .475       |            |            |               |
| 3   | 68-69 | 19.905 | 14.200 | 37.751 | 2.355 | 527.274 | 5.492  | 1.769                      | .960       |            |            |               |
| 4   | 69-70 | 20.046 | 13.600 | 37.112 | 2.351 | 540.149 | 6.787  | 1.613                      | 1.550      |            |            |               |
| 5   | 70-71 | 20.264 | 13.000 | 36.619 | 2.361 | 553.392 | 8.260  | 1.544                      | 2.015      |            |            |               |
| 6   | 71-72 | 20.416 | 12.500 | 36.090 | 2.359 | 566.936 | 9.932  | 1.604                      | 2.619      |            |            |               |
| 7   | 72-73 | 20.599 | 11.900 | 35.467 | 2.356 | 580.789 | 11.819 | 1.589                      | 3.405      |            |            |               |
| 8   | 73-74 | 20.701 | 11.400 | 34.800 | 2.340 | 594.869 | 13.922 | 2.173                      | 4.426      |            |            |               |
| 9   | 74-75 | 20.694 | 10.900 | 33.976 | 2.307 | 609.080 | 16.277 | 2,607                      | 5.755      |            |            |               |
| 10  | 75-76 | 70.598 | 10.400 | 33.044 | 2.264 | 623.344 | 18.951 | 3.129                      | 7.481      |            |            |               |
| 11  | 76-77 | 20.381 | 10.000 | 31.972 | 2.197 | 637.492 | 21.999 | 3.683                      | 8.977      |            |            |               |
| 12  | 77-78 | 20.084 | 9.600  | 30.830 | 2.123 | 651.457 | 25.476 | 4.296                      | 10.773     |            |            |               |
| 13  | 78-79 | 19.688 | 9.300  | 29.603 | 2.030 | 665.087 | 29.439 | 4.968                      | 12.928     |            |            |               |
| 14  | 79-80 | 19.135 | 9.000  | 28.212 | 1.921 | 638.237 | 33.953 | 5.725                      | 15.513     |            |            |               |
| 15  | 80-81 | 18.409 | 8.800  | 26.654 | 1.785 | 690.678 | 39.110 | 6.583                      | 18.616     |            |            |               |
| 16  | 81-82 | 17.561 | 8.600  | 25.005 | 1.640 | 702.299 | 44.019 | 7.428                      | 20.478     |            |            |               |
| 17  | 82-83 | 16.901 | 8.400  | 23.694 | 1.529 | 713.301 | 48.664 | 8.294                      | 22.525     |            |            |               |
| 18  | 83-84 | 16.247 | 8.200  | 22.450 | 1.425 | 723.700 | 53.031 | 9.190                      | 24.778     |            |            |               |
| 19  | 84-85 | 15.626 | 8.100  | 21.305 | 1.320 | 733.465 | 57.084 | 10.133                     | 27.256     |            |            |               |
| 20  | 85-86 | 15.011 | 8.000  | 20.214 | 1.221 | 742.608 | 60.796 | 11.147                     | 29.982     |            |            |               |

Notes: (2) 1966-67 to 1969-70 figures of sterilizations (fresh) (col. 4), fresh IUCD (col. 5) and conventional contraceptives (C.C.) users (col. 6) are actuals.  
 Three different percentage rates of increase in sterilization, IUCD and CC; 15, 20 30, 15, 15, 20 and 0, 10, 10, have been assumed for the periods 1970-76, 1976-81 and 1981-86 respectively.

to complement this discussion by projecting the magnitude of the effort necessary on the food production side to meet the consumption demands of the expected population having regard to the growth in per capita incomes and consumption expenditure in this period.

The long-term perspective upto 1980-81 outlined in the fourth plan indicates the quantitative dimensions of growth in terms of macro economic magnitudes along with their implications for the levels of production to be achieved in key sectors, for balance of payments and for mobilisation of domestic savings. Net domestic product is projected to double over the 12 year period 1968-80 while population grows by 31 per cent. By the end of this period the economy would have been launched on the course of self-sustained growth and would be poised for an even higher rate of growth. Since

per cent of total households consumption and 85 per cent of the commodity consumption of households is comprised of agricultural products or manufactures based principally on agricultural raw materials. The demand for agricultural commodities arise primarily from increases in consumption expenditure and growth of population. Given the expenditure elasticity of demand for each commodity and its base year level of consumption, the requirement for human consumption can be easily computed. The projected growth of population corresponds to the medium projection. The aggregate consumer demand so estimated, together with the requirements for feed, stocks, seed, intermediate uses and exports, give the likely total demand for the various commodities. The domestic production requirements to meet the estimates of total demand for the major agricultural commodities are summarised in the table below.

TABLE V

Estimated production requirements for major agricultural commodities—India, 1968-69 to 1985-86

|              | <i>Unit</i>  | 1968-69<br>(actual) | 1973-74 | 1980-81 | 1985-86 | <i>Index 1985-86 over 1968-69</i> |
|--------------|--------------|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|-----------------------------------|
| 1            | 2            | 3                   | 4       | 5       | 6       | 7                                 |
| 1 Foodgrains | mill. tonnes | 94.0                | 126     | 163     | 190     | 202                               |
| 2 Oilseeds   | mill. tonnes | 6.93                | 11.0    | 15.7    | 20.6    | 297                               |
| 3 Sugar cane | mill. tonnes | 120                 | 151     | 217     | 286     | 238                               |
| 4 Cotton     | mill. bales  | 5.27                | 7.54    | 10.6    | 12.9    | 244                               |
| 5 Milk       | mill. tonnes | 21.2                | 29.3    | 48.5    | 70.9    | 334                               |

(Estimated production of foodgrains in 1969-70 is nearly 100 million tonnes)

the per capita private consumption in 1980-81 would be only 42 per cent higher than in 1968-69, an accelerated rate of growth would be necessary to make a tangible impression on standards of living. A seven per cent growth of income, one percentage point higher than for the period 1973-74 to 1980-81 would seem to be the minimum desirable rate.

The over-all rate of growth of the economy is greatly influenced by the rate of growth of the agricultural sector. Agriculture and allied activities contributed over 50 per cent of the national income in 1968-69. Nearly 60

The doubling of foodgrains production, three fold increase in oil-seeds and even more in milk, and two and half times expansion in production of sugar cane and cotton to be achieved in the course of the 17 years, 1968-69 to 1985-86, are on the face of it, formidable tasks. Notwithstanding the promise of the 'green revolution', the possibilities of doubling and tripling production of various agricultural commodities have to be realistically evaluated.

In order to assess the possibilities of achieving the level and pattern of output consistent with the demand, it is necessary to

examine the main factors generating production increase. These are:

- (a) the feasible addition to crop area,
- (b) changes in the crop pattern,
- (c) increase in per hectare yields arising from the spread of irrigation, use of better seeds, larger use of fertilisers and other yield raising inputs.

**G**ross cropped area is projected to grow from an estimated 164 million hectares in 1968-69 to 188 million hectares by 1980-81 and to 198 million hectares of 1985-86. The implied rate of increase (1.1 per cent per annum) is slightly below the rate observed during the first three plans.

However, it is necessary to note that only about 40 per cent of the additional cropped area can be expected from accretions to the net sown area. This increase will be mainly brought about by the reduction of fallows consequent to the spread of irrigation and introduction of moisture conservation practices and improved dry farming techniques. The major portion of addition to the cropped area, however, will have to come from multiple cropping. The intensity of multiple cropping (measured as the ratio of gross to net sown area) is projected to reach 1.28 by 1985-86, compared to 1.15 in 1964-65. The implied rate of increase in cropping intensity is much higher than the levels recorded in the past. Rapid expansion of irrigation facilities and the development of crop varieties which can be fitted into tight rotations are the two principal pre-requisites for achieving the targets.

The magnitude of the task is highlighted by the fact that the gross area irrigated has to be increased by 36 million hectares during the period 1964-65 to 1985-86. This order of expansion in irrigated area would call for a sustained tempo of new irrigation construction during the next 15 years. With the advent of shorter maturing crop varieties and bet-

ter utilisation of irrigation and water management, the irrigated cropping intensity is postulated to reach a level of 1.6 as compared to 1.2 in 1964-65. In un-irrigated tracts a marginal increase in the cropping intensity is also visualised, which is broadly in line with the trends observed during the first three plan periods.

**T**he long-term projections also imply a significant shift from the prevailing crop pattern. The proportion of area under cereals is smaller and that under commercial crops is larger than would obtain if the current crop pattern in irrigated and un-irrigated areas were to remain unchanged. There are several reasons to expect the crop pattern to shift in this direction. In the context of better, more assured irrigation and the promise of current research on multiple cropping, there are good prospects for expanding area under pulses, oil-seeds and cotton. In un-irrigated tracts, the physical factors which would bring about the desired change in the cropping pattern include soil and moisture conservation, evolution of drought and disease resistant crop varieties, and improved techniques of dry farming.

These physical factors will be reinforced by economic forces. If the existing crop pattern does not change, the supply of pulses, oil-seeds and cotton would fall considerably short of rising demand. On the other hand, the area under cereals can, on the basis of known technology, supply all the requirements and more. There is thus a prospect of relative prices shifting in favour of commercial crops, which in turn would induce a reallocation of area (and other inputs) from cereals to other crops.

We can also derive from the projected increases to total crop area and irrigated area under each crop, the expansion in the provision of inputs that will be necessary to achieve the increased production under each crop.

The requirements of fertilizers (N plus P) can be estimated on

the basis of recommended dosages for each crop under irrigated and un-irrigated conditions. It is assumed that while the average rate of fertilizers used in irrigated areas will reach the recommended levels by 1980-81, the rate of application in un-irrigated tracts will reach only 50 per cent of the recommended levels by 1980-81 and approximately 75 per cent of the recommended levels by 1985-86. The estimated requirements of fertilizers (N plus P) are of the order of 9 million tonnes in 1980-81 and 11 million tonnes in 1985-86 as against a consumption level of 1.8 million tonnes only in 1969-70.

Besides the expansion of area, irrigation and fertilizer, there are a number of other inputs which contribute to growth of production. Plant protection, higher seed rates and improved cultivation practices are some of the elements whose effects have to be reckoned in the calculations. In the absence of empirical data on which to quantify their effects, these residual inputs may be expected to contribute 15 to 20 per cent of the total additional production.

The total effect of the various elements contributing to additional production is summarised in the table below.

Given the expectations regarding the growth of various inputs, the targetted levels of crop production seem feasible of attainment. For ensuring success, careful advance planning will be necessary backed by sufficiently large resources and adequate technical and administrative inputs. Special attention will have to be given to (a) expansion of irrigation and improved water management, (b) fertilizer production programme, and (c) continuous high-class relevant research to solve problems of agriculture.

This is going to be a difficult task even as it is. It will become far more difficult to manage if a larger than envisaged population growth will call for further increase of production from the limited land within the same period.

Even if production potential is assumed to improve, excessive growth of population comes in the way of improving the content and quality of food available for consumption. Instead of the production potential being utilised for producing more nourishing food for a smaller population, it will have to be used mostly to supply the calorie requirements of the essential diet of a large population at the cost of nutritional standards.

TABLE VI

Annual growth rates (per cent) in area, yield and production.

| Crops      | 1968-69 to 1980-81 |       |            | 1980-81 to 1985-86 |       |            |
|------------|--------------------|-------|------------|--------------------|-------|------------|
|            | area               | yield | production | area               | yield | production |
| Cereals    | 0.6                | 4.1   | 4.7        | 0.7                | 1.8   | 2.5        |
| Pulses     | 1.4                | 1.9   | 3.8        | 1.6                | 2.2   | 3.8        |
| Oil seeds  | 2.6                | 2.3   | 4.9        | 1.9                | 2.6   | 4.5        |
| Sugar cane | 2.1                | 3.1   | 5.2        | 3.5                | 0.9   | 4.4        |
| Cotton     | 3.4                | 1.7   | 5.2        | 0.9                | 1.7   | 2.6        |

The step-up in yield will need to be brought about by the application of fertilizers, irrigation and other inputs and the adoption of improved agricultural practices.

The production possibilities for the various crops are broadly in accord with the projected demand for them in 1980-81 and 1985-86.

Thus, rapid growth of population far in excess of what is envisaged in our Plan can be a crippling handicap, since our population in relation to resources is already large, incomes are low and economic development and improvement of living standards is a desperate need.

# **B ooks**

**A REVIEW ARTICLE by P. B. Desai**

THE approach to population as representing a serious problem of public concern at the national level is fairly recent in origin. The period of planning which is now in the closing year of its second decade has witnessed a progressive increase of interest in the subject. This concern, which has often been voiced with alarmist overtones even in responsible quarters, stresses the need to deal directly with the numerical growth of population in the interest of social and economic development. This concern explains why from almost the beginning of planning we have sought to pursue an official policy specifically directed towards restraining population growth.

The concern has kept on growing, for the very reason that this policy has not yet succeeded in

achieving its objective to any appreciable extent. It is now generally recognised that the policy has been too narrow in scope. At a recent national conference on population policy there was a general consensus among the participants drawn from all the related fields as well as from the general public that it was necessary to evolve a comprehensive population policy as an integral part of our programme for social and economic development and to secure for such a policy the commitment not only of the Central and State Governments but also of the public at large.

This plea for a more comprehensive approach is in consonance with the successive pronouncements of the five-year plans. The third five-year plan, for example, had stated that the objective of stabilising

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
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population growth must be at the very centre of planned development. In the light of this requirement of a comprehensive approach to the multi-dimensional problem of population, we present here an over view of the available literature on the subject. A list of selected studies is given in the appendix in order to indicate the range of topics within the broad field of demography that are covered by the literature. We will take up below a few of the studies with a view to illustrating its substantive content.

Several of the studies listed in the appendix relate to the period prior to independence. The characteristic concern of these earlier writers was with the poverty of the people. They stressed the need to develop the economy and controverted the official tendency to trace the causes of poverty to excessive prolificacy of the population, which was in turn traced to the unchanging traditional social structure and values. The demographic part of these contributions, as illustrated by the writings of D. G. Karve (19), Radha Kamal Mukherjee (22) and Gyan Chand (7), is limited to a comparison of the trend of population as revealed by the census data with economic trends. While their main emphasis is on economic reconstruction, the validity of the concurrent attempt to restrain population growth through propagation of birth control is duly recognised. Besides their historical significance, these studies are of interest for indicating that most of the problems the present policy is facing are not new and were adequately appreciated much before the policy was introduced.

From among these earlier writings, we would like to make a particular reference to a lucid exposition of inter-relation between pressure of population and economic efficiency by D. Ghosh (20). Analysing the intricate inter-relationships between the demographic situation and economic trends, he concludes 'a vast population breeds and dies lavishly and lives and expands at a low level of economic achievement. A high birth rate is matched by a high death rate, and a big proportion of those who are born die so young that "the mean after-life time at birth" is less than half the corresponding western European figure. Income per head is extremely low. Important sections of the economy are seriously congested; and output per worker is small even in occupations which are ahead of others in efficiency'.

He pleads for the building up of a new morality with the aid of modern methods of birth control. Explaining the need of infusing this new morality, he says, 'We should start with the recognition that the sexual urge is a powerful, ever present but completely amoral instinct, which should be employed to serve both biological and cultural ends. To achieve this double purpose the individual must exercise continuous self-restraint and submit to considerable supervision by society.'

During the period of planning, the growing concern with the problem of population has been

matched by an even more rapid growth of demographic literature. While individual scholars have continued to pursue research in this field, much of the new literature represents government sponsored research which is claimed to be oriented to its policy. The scope of research continues to expand progressively; pure demographic analysis of population trends, of the behaviour of components of growth, and of the structure, composition and distribution of population is being increasingly taken up and, at the same time, analysis of inter-relationships between population change on the one hand and economic growth and social change on the other is acquiring depth and sophistication. Our reference to a selection from this growing volume of demographic literature of this period begins with a masterly treatise (11) based on a painstaking analysis of mainly the census data for undivided India and concludes with an exhaustive inventory of source materials on urbanization (5) which demonstrates the abundant scope for meaningful research on this crucial issue faced in any developing or modernizing society.

The former study by Kingsley Davis presents a competent analysis of the evolution of India's population between 1881 and 1941. It is comprehensive and complete; but for the India of today it serves the purpose only of providing an historical background to the understanding of the forces of population change. The observations with which he concludes his technical analysis of the mass of demographic data are, however, no less relevant now than at the time of its publication. In his assessment, the demographic situation in India had got out of balance, even compared to the imbalance usually produced by the industrial revolution. Progress toward the goal of greater real income had to reckon with the fact that population change and economic development were interlinked.

Contending that a point had already been reached where density and rapid population growth were impeding economic development, he suggested, 'Since the demographic situation is already handicapping economic progress, it seems foolish to foreswear any demographic policy and simply try to step up economic production. This would be as foolish as simply foreswearing any economic policy and trying to do it all on the population side'. (p. 223). He further emphasizes, 'When economic plans are undertaken with a view to, and in a way susceptible of, affecting the rate of population growth, they become a part of population policy. But pursued without reference to population, or as a perpetual compensation for population change, purely economic measures do not constitute a population policy.' (p. 223).

Then, in 1958, Coale and Hoover (10) demonstrated how a slower rate of population growth, attained sooner than later, served to accelerate the pace of

economic development. Taking the case of India as a typical representative of 'low-income countries', their quantitative exercise of projecting both population and economic trends seeks 'to bring out the important qualitative differences in economic development resulting from a choice of a very rapid population growth or a less rapid population growth.'

With regard to population they computed three alternative projections for a reference period of 30 years between 1956 and 1986, on the basis of a common assumption of a sharp decline in mortality, levelling off in the seventies, and of three alternative assumptions regarding the trend of fertility, viz., (a) unchanged fertility, (b) a 50 per cent decline in fertility between 1956 and 1981 and (c) a belated 50 per cent decline occurring between 1966 and 1981. The resulting estimates of the 1986 population are (a) 775; (b) 590, (c) 634 million. They proceed then to demonstrate that under conditions of less rapid growth of population (fertility assumption b), the 1986 per consumer income would be 38 per cent higher than the one that could be achieved under conditions of more rapid growth of population (fertility assumption a).

The implied annual rate of growth of per consumer income is 3.4 per cent in the former but only 1 per cent in the latter case. The corresponding rate of growth under conditions of population growth attained according to the intermediate assumption of a deferred decline in fertility is shown to be falling midway between the above two. They therefore conclude, 'In 1986 the economic gains from a reduction in fertility beginning ten years later but proceeding faster are about half as great as the gains to be expected from a decline in fertility that begins immediately.' (p. 286). This demonstration was very well received but the experience is conclusive that choices available to the scholar in his consumptions of alternative projections, do not obtain in the reality facing the policy maker.

Of more direct relevance to the practical aspects of a policy of restraining population growth is the United Nation's *Mysore Population Study* which was published in 1961. This study presents the results and findings of a comprehensive population survey which the United Nations had carried out in co-operation with the Government of India in 1951-52. The investigation was undertaken 'as an experiment in the use of a sampling survey of households to measure the trends and characteristics of the population and to investigate their inter-relations with the processes of economic and social change in an area undergoing economic development' (p.v.).

The merit of this study lies not so much in the substantive findings specific for the population of the Mysore State, which was chosen as the region of investigation, as in the development, application and testing of the techniques of survey research in the context of the peculiarities of the Indian situa-

tion. The scope of the investigation was comprehensive, its broad topics being (i) rates of birth, death and natural increase, (ii) influence of economic and social development upon fertility, (iii) guides to implementation of population policy, and (iv) economic implications of population growth. The major emphasis was, however, on fertility; here, besides the fertility level and differentials, the investigation related to age at marriage, widowhood, separation, remarriage and also to attitudes toward family size as well as knowledge and practice of the different methods of family limitation.

The Mysore study is illustrative of the course of the expanding survey research in the field of fertility and family planning, in which a pioneering role was played by the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, (12, 13). Thanks to the official policy of population control, fertility and family planning surveys have since become increasingly popular. The official policy has in fact been responsible for directing demographic research toward incidence of family planning, relative prevalence of different contraceptive methods, cost-benefit analysis of these methods, and communication aspects of propagating contraception; in short, toward the mechanics of administering contraception. This plethora of fertility and family planning studies do not, however, add up to a body of knowledge on which to base an appraisal of the factors governing fertility behaviour in India.

For an appreciation of the demographic situation in the country as a whole, we turn to the census of 1961 which was remarkable for the enlargement and modification of the scope and process of data collection, as also for the improvement in tabulation and publication of the results of enumeration. Its general report (21) seeks to assess the existing levels of regional development in India on the basis mainly of the district level data of the census. This is attempted by ranking the regions, sub-regions and divisions on the basis of about three dozen significant indicators relating to general ecology, agricultural infra-structure, participation in the traditional economic activity, potential human resources, distributive trade, manufacturing and infra-structure, and organised industry in the modern sector.

The hypothesis for this ranking exercise is: 'Given a certain amount of agricultural, general and economic infra-structure and a potential of human resources, one is entitled to expect economic growth in the modern sense of the word, particularly in organised industry, in direct relation to them. This process of delineation should be able to bring out zones of backwash and spread effect and also those which a further instalment of economic growth might be able to retrieve from areas of backwash into those of spread. It was assumed that these areas of backwash and spread would set in motion forces of polarisation.' (Preface)

With regard to the polarisation, the report finds it to be far from regional in character unlike the

North-South polarisation of Europe and the Americas. The picture that emerges is one of pockets and zones of backwardness invariably enclosed by areas of prosperity and spread effect. In very many areas except in the North and North East, the areas of prosperity and spread effect join hands across areas of backwash. Such a situation is particularly heartening for the logistics of development. It is no longer so much a matter of invasion of one region by another by organising and injecting all the pre-requisites of economic growth, but of encircling and mopping up of pockets.' (Preface)

This exercise is admittedly tentative and must be taken as a first step in exploring the regional configuration of economic activity. It is heartening that the hitherto neglected regional aspect of economic development is receiving attention. Regional demography has a significant role to play in this connection as a guide to the spatial planning of economic activity.

The data that the 1961 Census has produced is quite immense and await painstaking analysis by students in this field. As a part of the census publication programme a series of monographs on different aspects was planned. A few of these have been completed and are likely to be published in the near future. We might in this connection refer to our own contribution based on the analysis of the tables on variation of population given by the census (15). This exercise takes two basic demographic variables, namely, size and sex ratio of population and examines their variation over the period 1901 to 1961.

The course of these two variables has been examined for the country as a whole as well as for the different segments of the total population, namely census zones, States, rural and urban sectors, different size and classes of towns and also individual cities. This detailed examination has helped to identify particular segments of population that have grown rapidly in the course of the reference period as also the segments of population for which the incidence of sex disproportion is particularly acute.

Finally, we refer to an *Inventory of Source Material on Urbanisation in India* (5), which is the latest publication of the planning period. This represents the first comprehensive account of the source materials for the study of urbanization in India. It seeks to answer two basic questions: what is the scope and content of the available statistical material on the urban population as a whole as well as on individual cities and towns? And, how much of this material has been analysed as reflected in the contributions to urban studies in the form of books, monographs, survey reports, Ph.D. dissertations, research papers and articles. While it does not present substantive data on the subject, it is a valuable reference work which indicates an

immense scope for research in the field on the basis of secondary data alone. As the author suggests, the study of past trends and future projections of urban growth, the analysis of the migration streams and the migration differentials by demographic, economic and social characteristics are essential for a deeper understanding of the process of urbanization in the context of economic growth and social change (p. 16).

The impression that one gathers from the above reference to some of the important publications of the period of planning is not quite satisfying. The treatise by Kingsley Davis provides only a benchmark which calls for painstaking revision for relating the study to the Indian Union; the quantitative exercise of Cole and Hoover has served its purpose by demonstrating the obvious and their projections have already been surpassed; the *Mysore Survey* is useful only as a guide for methodological refinements which such investigations might attempt; the Levels of Regional Development attempted by the General Report of the 1961 Census is only the first step; and the *Inventory of Source Material* is only indicative of the abundant scope for further research in the field.

The numerous other contributions not referred to above, contain useful descriptive and analytical material but the task of demographic research in the context of economic and social development remains to be freshly undertaken. In this connection demographic research may legitimately concentrate on (1) measurement of population change and its components, namely, mortality, fertility and (2) determinants and consequences of population change, specifically determinants of variation in fertility, mortality and migration.

The second aspect has received little attention. This calls for contributions from other social sciences as well. Adequate understanding even of fertility behaviour warrants participation in demographic research of specialists in sociology, social psychology, social change or development, economics, economic change or development, human geography and anthropology. In the context of planning in which demographic change is sought to be influenced through official action, it is all the more necessary to consider demographic research as an integral part of a comprehensive design of social research into the inter-acting processes, policies and programmes of physical or environmental, economic and social development.

All the different processes of social change have a demographic aspect and this must be studied in the proper context of its causal inter-relationships with the forces of change in different fields. While demographers may concentrate on measurement of population change, other social scientists have to be drawn into the research programme for explanation and prediction of the population phenomena.

## APPENDIX

### Selected Studies in Indian Demography

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
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


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
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

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
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
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**XT MONTH : THE SUPER POWERS**

# 132

## NATION & COMMUNITY

a symposium on the  
role of minorities in  
the process of nation-building

### symposium participants

#### THE PROBLEM

A short statement on the issues involved

#### MYTHS : OLD AND NEW

P. C. Joshi, Associate Fellow, Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi

#### IN DIFFERENT SETTINGS

Ratna Dutta, Fellow, Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi

#### SELF-VIEW

Rasheeduddin Khan, Member of Rajya Sabha, formerly Head of Political Science Department, Osmania University

#### REDRESSAL OF GRIEVANCES

Danial Latifi, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India

#### POLITICAL KARMA

Satish K. Arora, Research Fellow, Indian Council of Social Science Research, Delhi

#### REPORT

The document passed unanimously by the members of the seminar

#### FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography by D. C. Sharma

#### COMMUNICATION

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#### COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury

# **The problem**

India is not a single-nation State. It is a continent of many communities united through shared experiences but powerfully motivated by parochial and regional considerations. The founding fathers of India's democratic, federal system believed that enlightened and healthy national consciousness would grow speedily once the industrial revolution and the advances in science and technology took hold of the continent. In other words, modernization would break the back of revivalist majority groups seeking to crush minority communities. We now know that these processes are very much more complex and that the forces of modernization have to face many challenges and confrontations. At this moment in India's transition to a modern State, a situation is sought to be crystallised in which every citizen of this land be compelled to express his Indian-ness, whatever this might mean. The present situation is shot through with tensions and violence of a kind not experienced since the fateful days of the transfer of power. The multi-communal fabric of India's social structure, a vital element in the humane growth of our democratic federal polity, is now threatened by the Indianisers. The battle is joined. It will develop many facets. But, as always,

it will be necessary to clear the cobwebs in the mind of thinking India. Too much half-knowledge is being peddled to confuse and confound.

In the following pages, we present the findings of a four-day seminar on 'Minorities in Nation Building: International Experience', organised by the India International Centre, New Delhi from March 31 to April 3, 1970. This was part of a series of seminars and discussions decided upon by the Standing Committee of the National Integration Council of the Ministry of Home Affairs to focus attention on issues concerning our national unity and solidarity. The theme suggested by the Standing Committee of the National Integration Council was 'Nation Building: An International Perspective'. A steering committee appointed by the India International Centre however decided to restrict the scope of the seminar to one aspect of nation building, viz., the role of minorities. The seminar was directed by the former Chief Justice of the Punjab, G.D. Khosla. We hope that this publication will help contribute to a better awareness of the problem faced by the minority communities and to a realization of the urgent need to tackle some of these problems.

# Myths: old and new

P. C. JOSHI

THE problem of minorities has emerged as an intractable problem before the new nations of the third world.

Contrary to expectations, freedom from foreign rule has not led to the smooth re-integration of diverse communities separated from each other by religious, ethnic, linguistic or other socio-economic differences into a single *national* community. Not only have the old schisms between majority-minority communities been revived and accentuated; but in almost all countries dormant differences within majority groups themselves have been transformed into open schisms. Thus, new minorities have come to the fore, with a heightened community consciousness and sense of separate identity.

As a result, along with the recrudescence of old tensions, the rise of new minorities has led to the eruption of new tensions. In short, the conflicts between the old and new types of majority-

minority groups have very frequently resulted in the outbreak of violence; they have posed a serious threat to national consolidation, political stability and social and economic development.

In this context, the question of majority-minority relations has assumed great political importance in the current period. It has been pushed into prominence as a subject deserving serious thought at all levels. No more can it be treated as a subject affecting only a section of society. On the contrary, even a preliminary reflection on this question brings one into close confrontation with the total society. For, to raise the question of minorities is to raise the larger issues of the developmental perspective of new nations. This question by its very nature therefore requires a multi-disciplinary treatment.

So far as social scientists are concerned, the study of majority-minority relations in the context of nation-building is only now beginning to emerge as a major area of social research. In the past, even

when this subject attracted the attention of social scientists, they concentrated largely on the proximate causes of tension and unrest. Indeed, not many were concerned with probing deep into the causes of these proximate causes. Not many again have attempted to relate these tensions and conflicts to the processes of socio-cultural, economic, political and technological change. Very few have attempted to draw upon the insights and information from several academic disciplines for an integrated perspective on this question. Needless to add, such a perspective alone can help in identifying the critical points or soft spots for social forces to intervene and to tackle these tensions and conflicts in a developmental frame of reference.

There are several reasons for the lack of intellectual initiative from social scientists. It can be said that in India social science has for long uncritically accepted the basic approach of the dominant political elite on this important question. Indeed, it has been influenced in subtle ways by the numerous untested assumptions and beliefs which for long enjoyed unquestioned sway in the political sphere. It is the serious threat to Indian nationalism posed by recurrent communal conflicts that has forced a re-examination of the basic approach to the problem of minorities. The new sense of urgency emanating from the political environment is also prompting social scientists to explore this problem area which has acquired over-riding political importance.

A crisis situation is always associated with a new dynamism in the intellectual and political spheres. Questioning the old and a search for new ideas is a feature common to all periods of social stress and unrest. In the Indian context new ideas are still in the process of crystallising. Social scientists can contribute to this process by attempting to appraise the ideas which have dominated political thought and practice in recent years. This should be

attempted in the light of the insights and information thrown up by social scientific research in the recent period.

Ideas which gain acceptance by the elites and provide the basis for social and political movements can be characterised as 'myths'. Great social and political movements are invariably associated with great 'myths' which capture the imagination of a class or a community or people belonging to various classes and communities. Grand 'myths' embody three elements at the same time: (i) 'a view of reality', (2) 'a vision of the future' and (3) 'a model of social action'. Drawing upon the theory of knowledge, it can be said that the intellectual basis for the multiplicity of 'myths' is provided by the many-sidedness of social reality. Thus, each 'myth' captures only certain features of reality and not all the features.

Drawing upon the sociology of knowledge it can be said that for a partial view of reality to develop into a full-blown 'myth' representing a unique mixture of 'fact' and 'fiction', the social and political basis is provided by the existence of interest-groups. An interest-group seizes upon one or the other view of reality which is functional for its needs and aspirations. The exaggerated representation of certain features of reality which serve to rationalise the wishes and strivings of an interest-group and the mystification or falsification of other features which do not correspond with them—this is the essential characteristic of each 'myth'. It is the function of social science to separate 'fact' from 'fiction', to show how the biased view of reality serves the needs of a specific interest-group and what role it plays in a specific social-historical situation.

On the question of majority-minority relations, three distinct viewpoints can be said to have crystallised in India in the past. For want of better terminology, we will categorise them as the 'traditionalist', the 'liberal-rationalist' and the 'socialist' viewpoints.

From these viewpoints have originated three great 'myths' embodying broadly three identifiable 'views of social reality', 'visions of the future' and 'models of social and political action'.

**T**he traditionalist 'myth' highlights a view of reality in which the cleavage along the lines of religious affiliation (specially Hindu-Muslim cleavage) is regarded as fundamental. Religious cleavage is said to imply not just a difference of religious faith but a comprehensive cleavage of different and distinct ways of life. Underlying this great 'myth', there are numerous smaller 'myths' projecting a view of the religion, culture and social structure of the majority as well as minority communities.

The smaller myths again are a peculiar blend of 'fact' and 'fiction'. The view of the contemporary situation is sought to be reinforced by a definite view of past history. Even in the view relating to the past not only does religious cleavage appear as the only question of fundamental importance, but it also eschews all facts pertaining to social cleavages cutting across community affiliations or to religious, social and cultural movements within both communities having integrative and progressive significance.

Further, one community appears as the embodiment of all evil and the other of all the goodness of the world. The 'traditionalist' standpoint is not totally blind to the social cleavages which divide the community having a common religion. Although not averse to limited social reform, it does not allow the conception of reform to develop into a comprehensive critique of the traditional society. An open or disguised opposition to the modernization ideal is a fundamental part of the traditionalist standpoint.

Corresponding to a definite view of the present and the past is also a definite 'vision of the future'. In the case of the majority community, it tends to stress the resurrection of the Golden Age of

the past and the revival of the 'genius' of the people; it tries to evoke at times even a mood of retribution for injuries suffered in past history. There is also a 'traditionalist' model of social and political action. It is rooted fundamentally in revivalism but is often disguised by an ultranationalism oriented towards a militant cohesion of the dominant religious community. It also calls for identification of the minority with 'indigenous' culture, meaning thereby the 'traditionalist' version of the culture of the dominant community. One nation, one language, one culture—these become the symbols of the traditionalist 'myth'.

The 'traditionalist' standpoint of the Muslim minority community has much in common with the majority standpoint—a view of reality emphasising a separate identity based on religious difference, the denial of integrative cultural elements in historical tradition, a stubborn resistance to the re-orientation of retrogressive attitudes and beliefs and any reform of outdated institutions, attachment to numerous smaller 'myths' giving a distorted view both of the religion, society and culture of the majority as well as the minority community.

There are, however, additional attributes characteristic of a minority community which have yet to get over the trauma of recent history. Thus, one finds a heightened sense of persecution, the interpretation of all disappointments in irrational terms, seeking psychological compensation for the unenviable present either in past glory or in the outside world where the co-religionists are the rulers. The minority 'traditionalist' standpoint thus has no vision of the future nor any coherent model of social action. They alternate between withdrawal from reality into fantasy and occasional outbursts of aggressive self-assertion.

Here is then, in a nutshell, the traditionalist 'myth' which exaggerates the features of reality

centred round the religious factor but casts a veil upon other factors which, from the dynamic point of view, are perhaps more fundamental.

Unlike the 'traditionalist', the 'liberal-rationalist' standpoint presents a dynamic rather than a static view of reality. The latter does not recognise the religious factor—or other factors leading to heightened community consciousness—either as primary or as enduring from the dynamic point of view. The 'liberal-rationalist' standpoint, however, recognises the strength and appeal of these factors in Indian society. An important ingredient of the 'liberal-rationalist' view of reality is to relate religious influence to economic, social and cultural backwardness.

This view further counterposes the modern to the traditional; religious and other forms of irrationalism are characterised as the concomitants of a traditional society. Modernity, on the other hand, is associated with secularisation or, in other words, the retreat of religion from the social and political sphere to the sphere of an individual's private life. The process of secularisation is idealised as a formidable force in as much as it is helped by the progress of modern science, industrialisation, urbanization and modern education; it is also helped by the growth of groups and associations based less on primordial, religious and other factors but more and more on a secular, rational basis.

The key to the 'liberal-rationalist' view of reality is thus the modern-traditional dichotomy. Its vision of the future and model of social action also follow from the basic premise that modernity is the dissolvent of the irrationalism based on religion, or other traditional factors. Industrialisation, education, scientific progress and modern political and social institutions thus appear as powerful unifying and integrating forces; they appear as agents of re-integration of the diverse traditional communities into a new national society. The 'liberal-

rationalist' myth has had a great hold over wide sections of the middle class in the country.

The initial premises of the 'liberal-rationalist' and 'socialist' standpoint are similar if not identical. Both are committed to a dynamic view of reality and both relate the influence exercised by traditional factors to economic, technological and cultural backwardness. Both the standpoints highlight therefore the modernizing integrational role of scientific, technological, economic and rational-cultural factors. The 'socialist' view of reality, however, contributes two significant, additional dimensions. In the first place, *class cleavage* and *class struggle* are recognised as facts of fundamental significance from the point of view of historical change.

The second idea pertains to the functional role of religion and other traditional factors in a class society. No doubt, these factors represent various forms of irrationalism but their resilience is explained by the fact that they help to obscure and obliterate from the perception of the exploited classes the harsh reality of class cleavage and class exploitation. Religious consciousness, therefore, is 'false consciousness'.

The influence of religion cannot be combatted merely by the spread of secular enlightenment and modern institutions as envisaged by the 'liberal-rationalists'. The intensification of the class struggle and the heightening of class consciousness are the necessary pre-conditions if religion and other forms of irrationalism are to lose their hold over the popular mind. A classless society represents, therefore, the grand 'socialist' vision of the future, and class struggle the 'socialist model' of political action.

To what extent do the views of reality embodied in the three 'myths' correspond to the reality of life as contributed by social scientific studies? What is the social function of these 'myths' and what is their relevance for

nation-building? It is with these questions that we shall be concerned with in the remaining part of this paper.

**B**eginning with the traditionalist 'myth', it can be said that it is vulnerable on many points. In recent years, social anthropology has made useful, methodological distinction between the book-view of society derived from religious texts and the field-view of society derived from the direct observation of life. Many valuable studies present now a 'field-view' of the Hindu society, though unfortunately we do not have similar studies of the Muslim social structure. Do these studies support the conception of Hindus constituting a 'single religious community'? Do they indicate the cleavage along the lines of religion to be the most fundamental cleavage in India?

In my view they support not a monolithic but a pluralist view of Hindu 'society'. Hindus are part of regional societies and cultures along with non-Hindus. They are also part of an all-India Hindu society and culture. Of the two facts the former is more important, so far as the majority of Hindus belonging to middle and lower castes are concerned. For, it is the top castes, specially the educated Brahmins, who share some basic features of the great Hindu tradition. It seems that the 'myth' of a single Hindu community was promoted originally by the upper-caste Hindu elite having a vested interest in obscuring the pluralist character of the Hindu society and the internal cleavages within this society.

It should not be overlooked that the integration of groups and communities achieved by Hindu society was an integration within an upper-caste dominated hierarchical system; it effectively neutralised all attempts by deviant or rebel groups to challenge the principle of hierarchy. The Hindu method of assimilating or absorbing new groups and communities was to assign them a place in the caste organization. 'Caste thus enabled Hinduism to

proselytize without the aid of a Church' (M. N. Srinivas, 1962). Vast sections at the lower rungs of the ladder therefore were marginal groups having meagre emotional identification with the Hindu society. To them other religions promising better treatment had always an irresistible appeal.

Against this background, Hinduism at the structural level can provide the basis for reintegration, even of the *declassé* of Hindu society let alone the non-Hindus, only by abandoning the principle of hierarchy. But this principle is fundamental to Hinduism. If at all a sanction has to be found for integration based on equality from within the Hindu tradition, that sanction is provided not by the dominant Hindu tradition but by the rebel and heretic traditions which asserted themselves all through Indian history, although they were ruthlessly suppressed by the upper castes. The traditionalist 'myth' is fundamentally rooted, however, in the dominant tradition, for without that there would be no cult of a separate and monolithic Hindu identity.

**T**he 'traditionalist' standpoint of a 'single, homogeneous Muslim community' appears to be as 'mythical' as that of a single Hindu community. Socially and culturally, Muslims also are far less a part of an all-India Muslim society than of regional, multi-religious societies and cultures. There perhaps does not exist even a monolithic religious tradition.

Percival Spear, for instance, has indicated that several ideological trends exist among the Indian Muslims. He has distinguished between the 'accepting' and non-crusading traditions of the Muslims in the South and the West and the 'non-accepting' tradition of Muslims of the North of India. The problem of modernization of the social structure is as urgent (perhaps more) for the Muslims as for the Hindus; many evils of the Hindu social structure like caste are also prevalent among

Muslims as among other religious minorities.

**I**n short, the internal cleavages within the Muslim community are as fundamental as among the Hindus. While the Muslim community does not have the problem of marginal groups like untouchables and the tribals, the unification of a single Muslim community on the basis of traditional religious principles is as doubtful as that of a single Hindu community on the basis of traditional Hinduism. The cleavages between Muslims and Muslims leading to explosive internal commotions in the Islamic State of Pakistan serve to reinforce the point that the principle of national integration in the modern context lies outside the religious sphere.

Even though empirical evidence does not support the traditionalist view of reality, the question remains why separateness of religious faith has tended again and again to blow up into a dangerous cult of separatism? To understand this paradox one has to study the religious factor not in isolation but in relation to the economic, political and social situation at specific points of history.

There are situations when the conflict over material interests may converge with a long history of political animosity between religious groups. On such occasions, irrational 'residues' in the collective unconscious can be set in motion, leading to collective frenzy and mass hysteria.

There is another general point which deserves particular mention. Positive nation-building in a backward country is a long and steep ascent. The traditionalist 'myth', basing itself on the non-rational forces of the community's unconscious and the attachment to tradition, seems to promise a short-cut. In moments of national frustration, such negative nationalism may have a dangerous appeal. The divorce of rationalist forces from national tradition may help this process. In one of his speeches, Mussolini said: 'We

have created a myth, a noble enthusiasm. It does not have to be a reality. Our myth is the nation, the great nation which we wish to make into a concrete reality.' The traditionalist 'myth' is also such a *myth* and in moments of crisis can sweep aside the other 'myths' appealing purely to the forces of rationality.

The 'liberal-rationalist' view of reality also suffers from fundamental inadequacies. At the cognitive level, they arise out of the uncritical acceptance of concepts, categories and models from the western world and the consequent disregard for the specificity of one's own society. They arise out of the tendency to universalise the western experience of social and economic development. In the West, however, nationalism and social integration followed the economic and political revolution. In India, as in other Asian countries, the problems of nation-building and social integration have to be tackled simultaneously with those of economic development.

In its fundamental social orientation, however, this view represents the outlook of an urban, English-knowing, upper class elite constituting a sub-society which has already become part of the international affluent society. It epitomises the deep schism between the urban and the rural world, the existence of 'two societies' as it were within the native society. The 'liberal-rationalist' view reflects all the unreality inherent in the very existence of such an elite in a mass-peasant society.

In short, here is an elite which exists primarily in itself without any basic communication with the larger society and without much potentiality to become a vehicle for its transformation. It suits this elite, therefore, to uphold a purely *technocratic* view of nation-building. Thus, the principle of social development is located by this elite outside the social framework which gives it a privileged position. Supernatural powers are, therefore, attribu-

ted to economic development, education and modern social and political institutions, without reference to change in the structure of privileges and power.

In effect, however, modern forces have acted more as divisive rather than as integrating forces. They have only served to enlarge the scope for cleavages between communities and to accentuate them. But these community cleavages serve to obscure the more fundamental trends of social change, viz., the extension of the social base of the urban upper class elite to the rural world, the rise of a sub-society within the rural society, the creation of a new elite in most backward communities.

In fact, the ascendant elite within each community has extensively mobilised the full force of caste and community sentiment to advance its position within the modern institutions. Western social scientists refer to the 'modernity of tradition' and the positive role of caste and community associations in the functioning of a democracy. It remains to be examined, however, how far community associations have served as vehicles of the urges and aspirations of the whole community and how far community sentiment has been mobilised to advance narrow elite interests within a community.

The 'liberal-rationalist' view fully reflects the duality of the new elite. At the ideological level it is committed to modernity which tends to equate tradition with traditionalism. At the operational level it has exploited fully the forces of traditionalism to consolidate its position in the modern institutions. Modernity thus in practice is identified with an unmitigated lust for affluence and power. The new elite provides the model for all levels of society. It symbolises moral and ideological poverty and the consequent inability to contribute a unifying frame for the total society. In a nutshell, what are known as conflicts between communities serve to disguise elite

conflicts and rivalries for strengthening respective elite interests in the modern economic, social and political structure.

To sum up, the 'liberal-rationalist' view of reality fails to comprehend some of the crucial dimensions of Indian reality relevant to the problem of nation-building. Its vision of the future has an attraction only for sub-society rather than the total society. Its model of social action assigns the pivotal role not to social forces but to techno-economic factors. The 'liberal-rationalist' view is exposed more and more as a rationalisation of elite interests in a changing context. The disenchantment with this 'myth' has thus been growing rapidly in recent years. No wonder the 'liberal-rationalist' myth is not any more a unifying force. It may suffer a throw-back into 'traditionalism' or grope towards a new view of reality.

The 'socialist' view of reality makes a fundamental advance over the other views by raising the question of cleavages relating to material interests in the Indian society. But having raised this question it fails to contribute a view of the class structure which takes adequate cognizance of the specifics of the Indian situation and of the complex interplay between class factors on the one hand and religious, caste, linguistic and other socio-cultural factors on the other.

At the cognitive level, again, the roots of the failure lie in the somewhat mechanical application of the classical concept of class to a predominantly agrarian, pre-industrial society. This constraint at the cognitive level has been re-inforced at the structural level by the middle class social composition and base of Indian socialism. Indeed, the 'socialist' view is still in the process of transcending these constraints arising out of a lack of direct association with the mass society.

Failure to grasp the full significance of the urban-rural cleavage and the complex and unique pro-

blems posed by the mass-peasant society for nation-building—these have constituted the chronic weakness of the 'liberal rationalist view' but the 'socialist' view also has not yet overcome this weakness.

**T**he 'socialist' view envisages that religious, caste and community conflicts would recede in the background as the class conflict assumes prominence. In the typical Indian situation, however, the peasantry constitutes the basic 'class' lacking many of the attributes implicit in the classical conception of class. It is socially fragmented into numerous religious groups, castes and communities. Thus 'class conflicts' of the peasantry do not always become manifest in their pure form. In fact, if past evidence is any guide, conflicts over material interests have most often taken the form of religious, community, caste and regional conflicts.

The economic background for the Sikh-Hindu conflict in the Punjab was provided by the rural-urban cleavage, the peasant exploitation by the trader-money-lender class and the lawyers recruited largely from the Hindus. Even Hindu-Muslim conflicts in many areas like Bengal and the U.P. were closely intertwined with peasant-landlord conflicts. The non-Brahmin movement in Tamil Nadu was as much an economic as a social movement of the peasantry against the Brahmin minority which seemed to monopolise wealth, status and power. Examples of the class conflicts of the peasantry breaking out in non-class forms and through a non-class ideology can be multiplied.

In other words, the peasant society does not proceed towards modernity and nationalism in a single leap, discarding religious and community consciousness at a single stroke. The interpretation of religious consciousness as 'false consciousness' grasps only one facet which is more significant, viz., the 'semi-mediaeval' forms of awakening to self-consciousness of a peasantry from semi-mediaeval

passivity. The spontaneous political articulation of the peasant often proceeds through the rise of religious heresies, through the re-orientation of the religious world-view rather than its outright rejection. The peasantry may for long respond to the modern problems in the language of the past.

This basic phenomenon has not only eluded the modernist of the liberal-rationalist variety. It has also not been studied in depth by modernists of the socialist persuasion. The lack of understanding by the modernists of Gandhi on the Indian scene is also a part of this larger failure—the failure to come to grips with the peasant problem and its dynamic linkages with the problem of religion, culture, historical tradition and language.

The roots of this failure lie again in the tendency to approach the Indian social reality through the conceptual frame applicable to Europe after the transformation effected by the Great Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. Before this transformation, however, the peasant awakening even in western Europe found expression in a series of religious wars and heretic religious movements.

**G**enerally speaking, both the liberal-rationalist and the socialist approach have suffered from a static and 'fixed' conception of modernity or progress unrelated to time and space. Far from defining modernity or progress in relation to the specific conditions and requirements of the Indian situation, the western road to modernity is assumed, often implicitly, to be the universal road to modernity; the western institutional forms of modernity appear as universal forms of modernity. This approach has been responsible for the general poverty of thought, lack of creativity or bold innovation in approaching the problems of nation-building.

To return to our main theme, the 'traditionalist' view emphasises religious cleavage as the funda-

mental cleavage and its vision of the future envisages a single national ideology and culture as the way to national integration. Its model of action logically leads to the role of a militant group as the promoter of national cohesion. The 'liberal-rationalist' view on the other hand regards the traditional-modern cleavage as of fundamental significance; its vision of the future envisages an expanding middle class as the main vehicle as well as the main expression of a unified, integrated society. Its model of action emphasises the role of modern forces of economic development, etc., as the promoters of such an integrated society.

**L**astly, the 'socialist' view identifies the cleavages relating to material interests as of fundamental importance. This conception has comprehended, apart from few exceptions, only the interests of the middle class and the urban poor. Thus, the socialist view also has not transcended the limits of urban orientation in general and middle class orientation in particular. Even when it has occasionally crossed the urban frontier, it has not been able, with rare exceptions, to go beyond the upper layer of the peasantry. The urban-rural cleavages and the schism between the middle class sub-society on the one hand and the peasant society on the other—these remain the fundamental cleavages of Indian society. And the socialists have yet to come to serious grips with them. Here is the crux of the problem of nation-building and it can be said that the problem of minorities is only one of the manifestations of this wider problem.

In a situation when the *real* social cleavages are left untouched, retrograde social forces have a chance to come to the forefront by accentuating *false consciousness* of cleavages in the realm of religions and culture. The recent slogan of *Indianisation* is one such variant of false solutions which seeks to obscure the real cleavages of the Indian society and so also the real problems of nation-building.

# In different settings

RATNA DUTTA

DOMINANT and dominated groups are as ancient as the history of man's relationship to man. But it is only in this century, with the transformation of individuals from *subjects* to *citizens*, that minorities have become a universal challenge and a most complex problem in national and international politics. Indeed, early in this century while the minority problem still slumbered in Asia and Africa under the heavy hand of colonial rule, European power politics inflamed it into two world wars.

The religious minorities in Europe played a critical role in international relations as far back as the middle ages. The attempt to eliminate all 'heretics' later gave way to wars between Protestant and Catholic princes on behalf of their co-religionists in alien lands. The gradual separa-

tion of the Church and the State, and the secularization of the modern State has rendered the religious minority problem innocuous at the level of international relations at least in Europe, whereas it is still a potent factor in Asia and Africa.

However, even in Europe, religious minority tensions are no less relevant for domestic politics. The Roman Catholic majority brews a cauldron of discontent, for instance, in their denial of civil rights to other religious minorities, such as the right of divorce (as in Italy and Spain), or the purchase of contraceptives for family planning (as in Spain).

With the growth of nationalism and the quest for national self-determination in the nineteenth century, a new dimension of the problem of minorities emerged in Europe. The 'national minorities'

originated in this era in Europe when each nationality sought to form its own State on the basis of language, ethnic and religious groupings. Some of the larger European States also attempted to unite their 'co-nationals' across the borders under one roof.

The Germans and the Italians showed special interest in uniting all German and Italian speaking people in a united Germany and Italy. Italian speaking regions outside Italy were considered 'unredeemed' (*irredenta*). Subsequently, the word 'irredentist' movements was also applied to other national minority aspirations for secession from the States in which they lived.

**T**he nineteenth century saw the growth of irredentist movements all over Central and Eastern Europe changing its territorial-political contours beyond recognition. One of the outcomes of the first world war was the general recognition of the principle of nationalism and national self-determination. However, the new map of Europe in 1919 left the national minority problem still as intractable as ever. Minorities continued to exist because it was found impossible to draw boundaries strictly along language and ethnic lines.

The economic viability of the new States, for instance, was an important consideration. Strategically and economically, the Czechs could not find self-determination without the inclusion of the Sudeten German minority in their territory. One might recall that at a later date, the same Sudeten Germans, under the protection of Hitler's pan-German movement, attempted to reverse the Czechs to minority status. Now that the Jews, a persecuted group throughout their long history, have a home of their own, they find it psychologically too small to contain Jews of the dark races happily.

Complex and tragic solutions had to be found for minorities, 'groups that do not feel at home in the State where they live', who know themselves to be different,

and are thought of by others as a differentiated group with negative connotations, who suffer discriminations of various kinds and therefore make political claims for special treatment. In Turkey, for instance, the problem of the Greek minority was solved by exchange of populations, the Arab Mohammedans (among others) were given the right of self-determination, the Armenians and the Kurds, on the other hand, were ruthlessly suppressed.

**O**ne has to concede that once a minority secessionist movement is given recognition, a Pandora's box of unanticipated identity aspirations are raised. The solution of one minority problem merely leads to another. When the Irish nationalists demanded independence from Great Britain, the Protestant minority in the North expressed fears of domination by the Catholic majority. The division of Ireland in response to this, however, has still not solved the minority problem of Great Britain. Riot-torn Ulster, the territory of the Irish Protestants, has still to find a solution to its large Catholic minority.

The recent tragedy of the Ibos in Nigeria symbolizes the extent of the problem in Africa. The partition of Africa by the European empire builders, of course, reflected their own balance of power and not the realities of Africa in terms of race, language, and culture. When transfer of power took place from Europeans to natives, the problem of primordial attachments *vis-a-vis* the various civil orders became acutely aggravated by fears of economic, political and cultural domination by rival ethnic groups. Such was the fear in which the Yorubas and Hausas held the Ibos.

The aggressive, bright and industrious Ibo spread far out from his homeland in Eastern Nigeria to dominate commerce and culture while 'living among strangers'. Technical, professional and civil service jobs were monopolized by Ibos who also were quite clannish in passing on employment opportunities to members of their own

clan. Their drive and arrogance (and perhaps also their success) infuriated the Yoruba and Hausa groups competing for some of the same opportunities.

The antipathy between the Ibo minority and the majority groups who controlled the army and the government was aggravated by the attempt at a military coup by the Ibos in 1966. The result was a series of severe measures to control and suppress the Ibo minority. The secessionist war which dragged on for more than two years has just ended under the most tragic circumstances for the dissident Ibo minority.

Both religious, national and/or cultural minorities such as the Ibos are what has been termed 'minorities by will'. These types of minorities are anxious to maintain their distinctive identities *vis-a-vis* the majority groups and express attitudes which are inimical to assimilation with the majority group. Race or caste minorities, on the other hand, are termed 'minorities by force', implying that their desire for assimilation with the majority community is barred by force.

**T**he pattern of culture of the racial minorities is derived from that of the dominant majority, although this is often of a 'pathological' or 'truncated' form (Myrdal). The desire of the lower castes to sanscritize their rituals to move up in the caste hierarchy seems to be of this order. Obviously, the latter also have the 'community' characteristics in the sense of an awareness of a commonality of fate.

However, theoretically it is possible to visualize the assimilation of Negroes or the American Indian into the white community, as also of the Harijans into the larger Hindu society, whereas this is not so in the majority-minority relations typified by Jew-Gentile, Catholic-Protestant, Hindu-Muslim, or Han Chinese and Tibetan relations. In the former case, forced reduction of inequities in opportunity structure seems feasible. For, in such a situation,

prejudice and discrimination keeps the minority in low standards of living, health, education, and morals, which in turn gives support to majority prejudice on the 'principle of cumulation'. In this case majority prejudice and minority standards 'cause' each other, in the sense that change in one reacts on the other, and *vice versa*, indefinitely.

If, therefore, some of the benefits of society are reserved for the minorities by legislations, and their standards are increased, prejudice against them will gradually decrease. But the point to note is that legislated reservation of resources for religious, national and/or cultural minorities, namely, minorities by will, cannot decrease prejudice or communal hatred between such groups since the social-psychological dynamics of the antipathy between such groups is of a different type.

**R**ace prejudice seems to be associated with certain types of tasks performed by the minority community. Racial minority status, of course, is more often deliberately maintained for economic exploitation. In the case of the religious, national and/or cultural minorities, on the other hand, anti-minority antipathy crystallizes over resentments harboured over long periods of history. These could be memories of humiliation, fear, or merely envy of conspicuous success as of the Chinese in South-east Asian countries (in the Philippines, for instance, they control 42% of the economy), Indians in East Africa, or Jews in central Europe and in many other parts of the world.

Such resentments and fears are of course magnified (and also used as justification for anti-minority propaganda), if there are real or imagined threats to the territorial integrity of the country. Such a threat could be in the form of an Ibo-type secessionist movement, or due to suspected extra-territorial loyalties to ethnically related States such as that of the Chinese in mainland China, or as in India where the Muslims are suspected to have loyalties to the Islamic

States. Apart from any threats to territorial integrity, any economic and/or political setback suffered by a society is often blamed upon the minority community. Recall the attribution of the economic ills of Germany to the Jews by Hitler.

**P**ersecution of religious and/or cultural minorities is, therefore, of a different order as compared to race or caste minorities. Take, for instance, a situation where inequities are sought to be reduced by legislation. Emotional reaction to the 'uppity nigger' or the Harijan who dares to flaunt his new-found privileges and prerogatives surely express a less serious type of communal harm relative to the communal harm which accrues due to the antipathy between two cultural groups. Special treatment given to religious or cultural minorities may only increase antipathy towards them even if there were no objectively justifiable reasons for this. Such a minority, then, is acutely vulnerable to being made a scape-goat for the ills of society.

The policy implications of different types of majority-minority relations, the types of communal harm which each type may perpetuate, are perplexing problems in these days of compulsory modernization. In most Asian and African countries today the governments clearly take a leading role not merely in the development of the economy and industry, but also in social reform, in the modernization of laws of marriage, inheritance and in the modernization of educational institutions, indeed, the whole social infra-structure—a requirement of a modern economy and polity. In taking the burden of initiating social change, the modern State inevitably comes into conflict with the core of private faith and intellectual yearnings of individuals and groups, since the social infrastructure is rooted in religious and cultural traditions of a community.

In so far as there exists some cultural homogeneity, the politics of compromise with regard to

these things are easier to work out. But where there is cultural heterogeneity, and larger numbers of minority groups, then the State's ambition to leap-frog into a modern institutional structure is faced with a dilemma, i.e., the need to respect the cultural traditions of minority groups and at the same time to attempt at some homogeneity in the cultural input to its citizens.

The language policy, for instance, is intimately related to programmes of technical education, development of skill-structure relevant to a modern economy, patronage of recruitment patterns and mobility. At the same time, since the creative ability of a people is most superior when expressed through its own cultural idioms, the official language policy will discriminate in favour of some and against others in the community. The Hindu Tamils in Ceylon, therefore, worry about Sinhalese linguistic and racial extremism. Muslims in India would like more patronage for Urdu. And where there is close relationship between language and religious practice, an emotional claim for cultural protection of the minority becomes ever more urgent.

**T**he Chinese and the Russian way out of the dilemma was to adopt the dialectical point of view 'to solve contradictions on the basis of recognizing them'. They phrased their policy, therefore, in terms of regional autonomy. While China jealously guarded her territorial integrity, Russia went even so far as to recognize minority self-determination. Immediately after the revolution, the new Soviet Government was too weak to deny the Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Finns independence. The Great Russians formed at that time barely a majority of the population, although one might note that in any case the term minority is not a numerical but a political concept.

In China, however, the Hans constitute by far the majority of the population, and yet they have not been careless in embarking on

a well co-ordinated programme of research, education, and political development of the national minorities. The policy has been to select students from the minority groups for special training and indoctrination and then return them to their respective minority region to act as a source of influence and leverage on behalf of the Central Communist Government. As one might imagine, however, the regional autonomy notion is in fact somewhat subverted by these totalitarian measures, in addition to the policy of encouraging immigration of large numbers of Han Chinese into minority areas.

One might note that in Burma, this same forward looking theory of regional autonomy for protection of minorities was subverted in fact by the party system. U Nu's Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League's aggressive Burmanization policy created so much minority discontent as finally to necessitate the take-over of the government by the army.

Regional autonomy is possible only when the minority groups are concentrated in particular regions. However, if their geographical distribution is diffused throughout the State, then this becomes impossible. The policy of 'communal autonomy' attempted, for instance, by the Jewish *Kahal* in the middle ages, or the Turkish *Millat* in more recent times, has been unsuccessful, and is probably impossible to work out in the context of the modern constitutional structure.

Even a cursory reference to the minorities in various settings should help to put the current demand for Indianization of minorities (Muslims) in India in its historical perspective. There is nothing new or revolutionary about the emphasis on Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan. But, as has been amply demonstrated since Independence, its deep emotional appeal to the majority community cannot be effectively counteracted merely by intellectual appeals to secularism. It is of the greatest importance, therefore, to explore how secularism and the secular State became living concepts in other lands in history.

# Self-view

RASHEEDUDDIN KHAN

'THE nation is today the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands man's loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society, reaching ultimately to mankind as a whole. In this sense the nation can be called a '*terminal community*' with the implication that it is for present purposes the effective end of the road for man as a social animal, the end point of working solidarity between men'.<sup>1</sup>

The consequences of the far-reaching techno-scientific revolution which had reached a nodal point by the mid-twentieth century, are felt profoundly in terms of communications, mobility of goods, services and persons, and cultural and scientific interdependence of nations and countries. Its impact on the conduct and mechanics of international and national politics has radically changed the very assumptions of power-equations, of security and welfare, of economic and political development and their mutual inter-relationship. The challenges facing mankind in the 'seventies' of this century are therefore

1. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964) 95-96.

qualitatively different and often shockingly new, even if vaguely foreseen, largely due to the inter-linking of causality between events.

**O**ne major aspect of the new challenge is the complex process of nation-building involving the congruence of the various segments of a territorially defined political community, otherwise heterogeneous, into a viable and functionally homogenous political identity. The process, which anyhow is most cumbersome, becomes more so precisely because of the pervasive effect of the contemporary techno-scientific level of 'world culture' which generates contradictory forces in a given situation.

For instance, the growth of nationalism as a process of the democratic right of self-determination also gives rise, simultaneously and significantly, equally if not more powerfully, to sub-national identities round cleavages based on religious-community, language, region, race, tribe and the like. As a manifestation of the democratic demand, it is arguable that the rise of what are called 'parochial loyalties' probably are more primary, more inevitable and more 'legitimate' than the demands for larger, general and agglomerative, loyalties. As a matter of fact, looked at from the angle of social-psychology, probably the primacy of the 'parochial loyalties' and their prior 'integration' is a necessary prerequisite for the stabilization of a rational and firm foundation of the larger loyalties to (what Emerson calls) 'the terminal community', i.e., the nation.

The process of 'national integration' which is mainly political and ideological in plural societies would have to be necessarily 'gradualistic', however disheartening its slow pace may be to contemporaries. The existence of a modernized political and economic system, of uniform legal procedures, of nation-and-development-oriented bureaucracy, of general institutional ethos attuned to modernity and what Max

Weber called 'rationalization', would itself tend to erode the obscurantist domains of primordial pockets of allegiance. Coercion to escalate the process might generate forces of resistance and counter-revolution. To paraphrase Bernard Shaw, nothing is more vulgar and unwise than to compress the slow evolution of history into the short span of one's own life-time. It is at best an illusion and at worst a tyranny—both unworthy of reason, compassion and humanism.

Let us look at the minority situation in India in terms of nation-building and the response of a dominant minority—the Muslims—to the process.

**A** significant aspect of Indian politics is the behaviour and motivation, alignments and animosities, tensions and conflicts, and the collective attitude and contributory role of the minorities in the evolving participatory system of republican India. In an all-pervasive democratic system, superimposed by a governmental authority, which is almost total, encroaching as it does on all aspects of social life, it is no longer possible for any type of minority—religious, cultural, linguistic, ethnic or regional—to remain isolated from and outside the all-embracing domain of politics. The reconciliation of minority identities with national objectives takes many forms. A study of minority politics, in all its ramifications, acquires a certain primacy for any valid construction of a relevant and realistic hypothesis of Indian politics.

The politics of democratic India, at this stage of federal—and in that sense) nation-building—is primarily the politics of (a) territorial integration; (b) of identifying and maximising national interests; (c) of modernization of society; and (d) of secularisation of politics.

Functional politics in India is determined by the interaction of three primary factors: i) constitutional and legal structure; ii) political and international power-

equations impinging on internal politics; and iii) social composition, dominant traditions and the contemporary historical ethos.

**I**n a segmentary society like India—where, while the political institutions are 'democratic' and the political system, by and large, 'modernized', but the social organization and sociological environment remains 'traditional' and 'pre-democratic'—the process of nation-building passes through, what might be called, phases of 'fission' and 'fusion'. While these phases of 'fission' and 'fusion' in the short span appear as a negation of each other, yet in the long-term historical dimension they acquire a relationship of complementarity and their alternating occurrence is intrinsic in the development of a plural policy towards its political integration.

While the 'fission' between coherent segments manifests the existence of mutual discord necessitated by conflicts of interests and/or of values, on the other hand, the 'fusion' reflects the possible area of agreement and the limits of reconciliation arrived at by them. That the two phases have a causal relationship is also evident from a close historical survey of plural societies.

In India, these coherent segments include those based on communal, caste, regional and language identities or a combination of some or all of them. These segments, in terms of their political rôle and dimension in national life, achieve the status of sub-national units capable of attracting a part of the political allegiance of a bulk of the people. Community-based segments in India—particularly the Hindus and the Muslims—cut across regional, caste and language identities, and acquire in functional politics almost a continental dimension. They are, of course, composed of closer-knit regional sub-segments, but the point to remember is that in their political manifestation, they are potent as a regional, a State, a local as well as an all-India phenomenon though in an unequal degree, dependent on

many factors, particularly their numbers and political traditions.

In this context, the 'fission' and 'fusion' of the Hindu and the Muslim segments, especially in the last one hundred years, is a factor of tremendous significance to the current working of the federal democratic polity in free India and the nation-building process. With the possible exception of the *Jatis*, and, may be the language-groups, no other segment has demonstrated a coherence so complete, or an identity as zealously protected by its votaries, as the communal segments in Indian society.

Let us now turn our attention specifically to the 'Muslim Situation', as a distinctive problem of a dominant minority in a plural society.

Of all the minorities, the Muslims occupy a special place in the Indian polity. Their proportion in the population, historical role, cultural contribution, social distinctiveness, urban and semi-urban habitation contrasted with their present educational and economic backwardness, mass un-and under-employment, concentration in certain economic activities, fear of the majority, lack of creative leadership and bewildered political consciousness as a community, makes it all the more important to undertake objective and systematic studies of Muslims in the process of change.

The Muslims in India are in a quandary. They appear lost and out-of-grips with the evolving reality of contemporary Indian political life. And this for many reasons. In terms of the immediate historical antecedents, their major political 'conditioning' is the ever-present memory of the movement for the formation of a Muslim State in the sub-continent: Pakistan.

In terms of the contemporary political situation, their basic problem is how to reconcile their sense of religious and communal belonging to their political identification with the national process of change in India, and thereby

play a legitimate, and numerically proportionate, role in consonance with their collective status as the single biggest religious minority in the evolution of a modern federal and democratic all-India polity. This problem in its essence is not an isolated problem and the peculiar concern only of the Muslim community, but part of the larger political challenge facing India and its national policy of secularism and democracy. Therefore, any solution of lasting value would have to bear the stamp of consensus of all, including that of the majority community.

**T**he remarkable coherence and exclusive identity of the Hindu and Muslim communal segments is not based entirely on the peculiar characteristics of communal identities *per se* or of the Hindu and Muslim communal identities in particular. A vitally determining factor which indeed conditioned the very ethos of current political relationship between the Hindus and the Muslims as communal segments is the heritage of British political history in India. By politicising the communal differences, the British bequeathed a legacy of communal politics that under conditions of free speech and association and equal protection of the laws as envisaged in the Constitution of Republican India, found a congenial atmosphere to perpetuate itself.

All this might have remained just a part of the bygone past if either the partition of India as a pre-condition to the withdrawal of British power were not done on communal lines, or even if done, the proportion and the absolute number of the first communal minority (i.e., Hindus in Pakistan and Muslims in India) were small and socially insignificant to preclude the possibility of their effective political role.

In India, while the proportion of the Muslims (10-12%) might appear small in an abstract statistical discussion, the significant point to remember is that in terms of their absolute number (55-60 million) and in view of the fact

that in 11 out of 16 States of the Union of India (viz., Assam: 23.2%, Bengal: 20%, Uttar Pradesh: 14.6%, Bihar: 12.5%, Mysore: 9.9%, Gujarat: 8.5%, Andhra Pradesh: 8%, Maharashtra: 7.7%, Rajasthan: 6.5%, Madhya Pradesh: 4.1% and Orissa: 1.2%) they constitute the largest religious minority and in one State, Jammu & Kashmir, a decisive majority (68.3%), it is clear that they are big enough to play and indeed have often played a decisive role in national politics.

Coupled with this is the fact of the political tradition of the Muslims in the sub-continent, which reveals that they had never been a dormant or inconspicuous minority, but on the contrary, had almost continuously been an active and, for centuries, also a leading segment of India's cultural and political life. For a clearer and complete understanding of the Muslim reality in India, all these inter-linked aspects will have to be kept in sight.

The 'Muslim problem' socially and culturally, and in a very specific sense politically, is not so much a vertical phenomenon as it is a horizontal one; not really a monolithic all-India problem as is made out to be, but a genuine regional—and therefore a fragmented—problem. By perceiving it the other way (i.e., as essentially a vertical, monolithic, and basically an all-India phenomenon) one tends to have both exaggerated (and imaginary) fears and despair. This way of looking at it is heavily conditioned by pre-independence politics of agitation of the immediate past. The point to remember is that both the context, the style and idiom of the politics of sovereign democratic India is basically different and (one might add for emphasis and to invoke the norm) ought to be different.

**T**he 'Muslim problem' may be viewed regionally, as part of the competing politics of: i) the Indo-Gangetic plains—mainly the pulls and pressures of the troublesome Hindi populous belt; ii) Kashmir, with a dominant Muslim population caught in the vortex of inter-

national power politics and sentimentalist national politics; iii) Assam, a border area under the shadow of tribal turbulence, an increasing Muslim population, and a distinctive ethno-religious ecology; iv) Gujarat, including Kutch and Surat, with close-knitted Muslim commercial communities, for centuries governed by the Hindu Mitakshara law, and, therefore, a class apart in their sub-identities; v) the Deccan-Maharashtra, Andhra and Mysore, with a significant Muslim population, restive and occasionally exclusivist but with pockets of composite culture; and vi) the 'deep South'—Tamil Nadu and Kerala—with a more or less culturally integrated and politically regional-oriented Muslim population.

The Muslims, like the Hindus but unlike the Sikhs and the Parsees, are a fragmented community—fragmented regionally, linguistically, culturally and ethnically. The manipulative strategy of the British imperial rule had politicized communities by attributing to them an exclusive juristic-cum-political identity that was sought to be juxtaposed for obvious reasons of colonial administration against the latent and emerging composite national identity. The irrational, but logical, birth of Pakistan was the one major consequence of the communal polarization of politics under the auspices of the benign British Raj. However the continuing adherence to that polarization, maintained by certain interest-groups and power-elites, is a conversely illogical but politically natural development. One dimension of the competing politics or bargaining at the local, State and central level is the transformation of communities, or parts thereof, into pressure groups.

The proclamation of the Indian Republic in the name of the people whose liberty, equality and fraternity—irrespective of caste, creed and colour—was enshrined in the fundamental rights of the Constitution and protected by an impartial, independent and supreme judiciary, has resulted in a

new structuring of power-relationship in India. This has generated a process of secularization and democratic diffusion.

All sections of the people, including the Muslims, are caught up, as it were, in a vortex of change. The challenge is both wide in its magnitude and activistic at all levels. The response from the various sections and groups of the people is unequal, dependent in its commitment and intensity, among other things, on that section's or group's receptivity to change, on its leadership-situation and on the stage of its socio-economic growth.

**T**he Muslim response is further limited by four particularistic considerations:

- i. their adherence, as a community, to the traditional view of Muslim polity based on the common law of Islam (*Shariat*) and its *Corpus Juris (Fiqa)*, thereby questioning (by inference) the total legitimacy of the legislative competence of the democratic law-making processes in India;
- ii. painful awareness of their minority status and communal-cohesion, thus giving them a psychological reservation in committing themselves to the ideal of total identification to the nation;
- iii. fear of 'Hindu' domination, being indicative of their lack of confidence in their creative and contributory role in a competitive polity thereby making them resist the process of adjustment and integration;
- iv. lack of interest and issue-orientation and in their aggregative functions of politics, thus betraying a lag between their level of modernization and that of other communities in India.

In order to comprehend the peculiar nature of Muslim politics and leadership in India, it might be worthwhile to begin by understanding certain typical aspects of the Muslim mass psychology

which, however irrational and factually untenable, nevertheless remains subjectively the frame of their responses and stimulation, of their actions and reactions. Any behavioural study, even random, if not systematic, would reveal that of all the diversified components of Indian society based on religion, culture, language and the rest—only two components or groups (that are numerically of any consequence) reveal a subjective awareness of their collective superiority, indeed akin to the sentiments of the *herrenvolk*, namely, the Indo-Aryans and the Indo-Muslims.

This psychological position makes the Caste Hindus (as the successors of the original Indo-Aryans) on the one hand, and the Muslims on the other, resort to the inevitable process of group-isolation and collective introversion, thereby making them resist structural changes involving total aggregation of the Indian polity and its national integration. The former exhibit accentuated caste attachment and the latter an acute communal consciousness. Thus, we find *caste* and *community* as the two traditionist forms of cohesion, which today have become the biggest impediment in the new structuring of Indian society. The Muslim consciousness of superiority born out of an indelible memory of 700 years of Muslim hegemony in the Indo-Gangetic plains and in many parts of the Deccan, is augmented in its separative aspect by the fact of its tenacious adherence to a faith, non-Indian in its origin and international in its character.

A long quotation by one of the most perceptive writers on India, Percival Spear, would further amplify the point. He writes: The Muslims as a whole had come to consider themselves not so much as an Indian minority with special rights, but as a separate community with a distinct civilization. '...the term minority is really a misnomer (for the Muslims) before the partition of India. The word implies helplessness, a minority must normally take what a majority chooses to give it. But the Muslims, after their early days,

were a minority only in a numerical sense. For long periods of time they were able to impose their will on the Hindu majority and...they were too numerous to receive the conventional minority treatment. It could be said that it was the attempt to do this which turned them into separatists.<sup>2</sup>

Strictly in terms of self-image the Muslims have always considered themselves as the single biggest compact segment of the Indian polity. This feeling was based on their consciousness of the solidarity of Islamic brotherhood, and their homogeneity based on religion as contrasted by the unbridgeable divisions in Hindu society compartmentalized by exclusive and endogamous castes and sub-castes. If the Scheduled Castes and the tribes are considered as peripheral and even non-recognized components of the *Varnashram Dharma*, then the proportion and absolute number of divided caste Hindus was not much larger than the total Muslim population before 1947. Indeed, this point was rubbed into the Muslim masses by the Muslim League demagogues of the pre-partition era.

Further, in areas where the Muslims have been either in majority or in political dominance, the common Muslim was bred on the illusion that the spiritual strength of his faith gives him a physical prowess four-times more than that of the infidel! In any case, it would be correct to report that the Muslims until 1947 never felt themselves as a helpless minority but at least as equal competitors to the numerically majority community. If Hindus were the majority community then they, the Muslims, conceived of themselves as 'the other' community, to be treated on a par and with due deference to their historical and cultural contribution in the making of India. This self-consciousness of being 'the other

community' rather than a minority is reflected in the articulation pattern and demand in-put of Muslim politics between 1905 and 1947.

**B**y and large, the Muslims have considered themselves as the finer specimens of refined urban culture in India. They have always fancied the richness of their sartorial fashions, the delicacies and varieties of their culinary arts, extrovert and spendthrift style of living and compulsive hospitality<sup>3</sup>, refinement of manners, politeness of etiquettes, urbane styles of social expression, no less than the patronage and contribution in classical music, miniature painting, calligraphy, handlooms, crafts and architecture as the manifestation of their distinctive contribution to Indian civilization and a hall-mark of their 'superiority' as culturally and socially the more advanced segment of the Indian body-politic.

'During the Mughal period', writes Spear, 'they took the centre of the Indian stage, leaving little room in the wings for others. European travellers, while conceding that Hindus were to Muslims in the ratio of eight or nine to one, considered the Hindus rather as 'pagans', bound, like the rustic inhabitants of the Roman Empire, by outworn superstitions.'<sup>4</sup>

They have also prided themselves in the doctrinal simplicity and directness of their faith, which had emancipated them, at least notionally, from the encrustation of tribal and caste divisions, myths and taboos, priesthood and the paraphernalia of customs bound in other belief-patterns. Even when in the real facts of life and in social relationships

they had deviated from the norms of Islam, they nevertheless longed for the 'ideal' as prescribed in the Quran and preached and lived by the Prophet and the first four 'virtuous-and-wise' Caliphs (*Khulafa rashidun*), while attributing their worldly miseries to their incapacity to live according to the tenets of the 'perfected faith' (*Ad-din al-Kamil*).

In India, particularly contrasted with the complex, elaborate and often cumbersome rituals, conventions, traditions and customs of the rich and varied Hindu pantheon, its philosophical speculations and mythological legends and the wide range of their interpretations with regional nuances and scholastic differences, the Islamic creed, in its clear monotheistic formulations and explicit injunctions covering the entire gamut of social life, appears more direct, forthright and simple, and easy to observe.

To a devout Muslim mind, the explicit enunciation of the concept of the 'brotherhood of the faithful' as the inner concentric of the larger 'brotherhood of mankind', infuses not only a sense of solidarity and operational fraternity among the Muslims who are otherwise divided by region, language, class, avocation, tribal and caste origin, etc., but also inspires them with a 'humanizing' mission for proselytisation of 'the ignorant, the blind, the deaf and the closedhearted' who are denied the blessings of the 'benefactor of the universe' (*Rehmat-ul-lil-alameen*): the Prophet. This self-image explains a large part of the compulsive Muslim desire to preach his faith and to provide its 'spiritual bounties' to those who, in his imagination are the 'unfortunate victims of superstition, ignorance and darkness'.

**W**hen this self-righteous zeal of the 'faithful' is countered, he not merely feels disappointed and frustrated, but also annoyed and angry at the insouciante of the 'infidels' to appreciate his compassionate concern for their own spiritual welfare and eternal bliss!

In terms of the challenges of contemporary politics in India

2. Percival Spear, 'The Position of the Muslims, Before and After Partition', in Philip Mason, *India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) 30-31.

3. There is a saying in Hyderabad (in Urdu) regarding the financial condition of a typical Muslim in the four weeks of the month, which highlights this aspect admirably. It may be translated as follows: First week — Gaiety and Festivity; Second week — Caution; Third week — Chits (to the Money-lender); Fourth week — Inevitable death!

4. Percival Spear, 'The Position of the Muslims, Before & After Partition', in Philip Mason, *India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity* (London, Oxford University Press, 1967) 31.

there is a realization that in democratic India, by the application of the principle of majority rule, the Muslims are condemned, so long as they retain their identity as Muslims, to the unenviable position of a perennial minority. This minority, in its numerical strength, is so big as to make it the third biggest Muslim population in the world and, what is more significant, in absolute terms it is an aggregate bigger in number than the populations severally of more than two-thirds of the States in the world.

Yet, such a number, in the population-complex of India, can never be more than a minority in the national context and, what is worse, due to the dispersal of its people in the various federating States, the Muslim population everywhere has merely a marginal political value and significance.

In new India, the 55 to 60 million Muslims, comprising about 10 to 12 per cent of its population, are faced with a doctrinally new and socially radical situation. This may be stated in the words of a leading Muslim leader, the late President of the Republic, Dr Zakir Husain. Clinching the basic political challenge facing the community he said: 'In the past the Muslims had been either the rulers or the ruled, today in India they are co-rulers as joint sharers of national sovereignty.' As an analogy it can be said that the problem before Indian Muslims on the national scale is identical to the basic problem of international living itself, namely, that of co-existence *inter-se*, on a level of mutuality and reciprocity with other groups and sections of the people, united on the fundamentals of common objectives like democracy, secularism and the pursuit of socio-economic justice.

The Muslim despair over their minority-status need not be overplayed. Firstly, a minority so big and culturally so impressive like the Muslims in India, with centuries of composite history and composite traditions behind it, cannot but be creative and dominant if only its leaders play a positive and uninhibited role.

Secondly, in a secular democracy, itself in a process of modernization, like India, the operational categories would inevitably change, and with it a new political culture would relegate to the background the role of communal groups and would supplant it by interest-oriented groups, which, in the nature of things, would have to be multi-communal in their composition, corporate in their demands, composite in their outlook and issue-oriented in their politics.

In a plural society, tensions and conflicts between viable segments—regional, linguistic, cultural, communal or political—are not only unavoidable, as is evident in any situation of dynamic change, but the significant point is that, if these tensions and conflicts are 'contained' within the legitimized political system and mediated through functional and not dysfunctional methods of pressure and bargaining, they are capable of becoming the creative catalyst of change itself.

Since socio-cultural, linguistic and regional cohesions are antecedents to the adoption of the Constitution and the legitimization of the political systems as well, the latter ought to take cognisance of and reconcile them within the federal framework if these cohesions do not militate against the basic premises of a democratic order. The vulgarity of uniformity and the rude desire to order life from a position of political dominance is the very antithesis

of the federal reality and the objectives of an open society.

The inadequate in-take of the Muslims in all-India government services (Tables I & II) and less than proportionate share in terms of population in their representation in the State Legislature and Parliament (as for instance from Andhra Pradesh) (Table III) is exploited by the 'exclusivist' parties, playing what may be called 'passion-politics' like the *Majlis-i-Ittihad-ul-Muslimeen* of Hyderabad (A.P.).

When in an election contest such a party is matched by an opposing community-oriented party like the Jana Sangh, then a communal polarization becomes almost complete. Table IV will reveal how in the Charminar Constituency of the city of Hyderabad during the Fourth General Elections in 1967 the divergence between the total Muslim electorate and the Majlis vote was as close as 7.6 per cent and similarly the divergence between the total Hindu electorate and the Jana Sangh vote was only to the tune of 12.9 per cent.

While attempts at forming and/or maintaining 'exclusive' parties of the Muslims at any level—local, State, regional or federal—will insulate the masses of the second biggest religious community of India from the mainstream of national life, the attempt at building an all-India Muslim political organization will not only not serve the interests of the Muslims all over the country but also will undermine the secular political framework of the country itself.

On the contrary, it will arouse, and not without reason, fears in

TABLE — I

| Number and proportion of Muslims and Christians in the two all-India services |           |       |            |            |
|---|-----------|-------|------------|------------|
| Position<br>as on date  | Service   | Total | Muslims    | Christians |
| 1   | 2         | 3     | 4          | 5          |
| A — Position in the States of the Union                                       |           |       |            |            |
| 1. 1. 1965  | IAS Cadre | 2,105 | 111 (5.3%) | 74 (3.5%)  |
| "   | IPS "     | 1,208 | 42 (3.6%)  | 55 (4.6%)  |
| B — Position in Andhra Pradesh  |           |       |            |            |
| 1. 1. 1965  | IAS Cadre | 163   | 21 (12.9%) | 3 (1.8%)   |
| "   | IPS "     | 80    | 6 (7.5%)   | 4 (5.0%)   |

the minds of the majority and other non-Muslim communities, of a Muslim desire for a vertical parallel living and political separation. That one or two all-India parties operationally if not formally have an aspect of exclusive Hindu character is bad enough; but that cannot become a valid and a rational basis for a minority to emulate. While majority communalism can and does pass off as nationalism in any society of the world, because the majority community is bound to be the first beneficiary of national independence, minority communalism ironically cannot remain concealed under that garb. Thus, while majority communalism may be viewed as the primordial level of national integration, minority communalism cannot but give the contrary impression of weakening that very national integration.

**F**urther, while majority communalism in the first phase of nation-building increases the bargaining power of the community, minority communalism, on the other hand, weakens its bargaining power by the sheer working of competitive politics. It is therefore in the interest of the minority, more than of the majority, to transcend its communal orientation and play a leading role as the exponent of genuine secularization of politics and of modernization of the polity.

Socially and culturally fragmented as the Muslim community is in the all-India scale, and further segmented as these 'fragments' are in terms of class-divisions, professions and sects, etc., the Muslim reality in India has to be more meaningfully perceived as a heterogeneous phenomenon. Except the bond of religion, and that too merely at the sentimental level rather than in specific terms, if one is to remember particularly the local variations of social customs, personal laws and historic myths and symbols among the Muslim communities (plural added deliberately), there is no other binding force to coalesce a so-called Muslim identity.

The bond of religion, on the one hand, is weakening perceptibly in

TABLE — II

| All-India Services and other Central Services:<br>Number and proportion of the Muslims |                                   |       |         |                      |  |
|--|-----------------------------------|-------|---------|----------------------|--|
| Position<br>as on date   | Class and<br>Service              | Total | Muslims | Muslim<br>Percentage |  |
| 1  | 2                                 | 3     | 4       | 5                    |  |
| A — All-India Services   |                                   |       |         |                      |  |
| 1. 1. 1965   | IAS                               | 2,105 | 111     | 5.3                  |  |
| "  | IFS                               | 270   | 12      | 4.4                  |  |
| "  | IPS                               | 1,208 | 43      | 3.6                  |  |
| B — Central Secretariat Services   |                                   |       |         |                      |  |
| 1. 5. 1966   | Selection Grade &<br>Grade I      | 681   | 6       | 0.9                  |  |
| 1. 10. 1962  | Grade III                         | 1,975 | 4       | 0.2                  |  |
| "  | Grade IV                          | 5,457 | 21      | 0.4                  |  |
| C — Central Service  |                                   |       |         |                      |  |
| 1. 11. 1962  | Stenographer's<br>Service         |       |         |                      |  |
|  | Grade I & II                      | 1,959 | 4       | 0.2                  |  |
| 1. 2. 1962   | Clerical Service<br>Grades I & II | 9,900 | 21      | 0.2                  |  |
| E — Central Civil Service  |                                   |       |         |                      |  |
| 1. 4. 1966   | Class I                           | 126   | 1       | 0.8                  |  |
| "  | Class II                          | 600   | 3       | 0.5                  |  |

TABLE — III

|  | Muslim Representation in State Legislative and Parliament from Andhra Pradesh |      |     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |    |
|--|---|------|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----|
|  | 1952<br>Hyderabad<br>State  |      |     |      | 1957 |      |      | 1962 |      |      | 1967 |    |
|  | MPs   | MLAs | MPs | MLAs | MPs  | MLAs | MLCs | MPs  | MLAs | MLCs |      |    |
| 1  | 2   | 3    | 4   | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    | 9    | 10   | 11   | 12   | 13 |
| 2. Total                                   | 25  | 175  | 43  | 300  | 43   | 300  | 90   | 41   | 288  | 90   |      |    |
| 2. Muslims                                 | 3   | 11   | 3   | 11   | 3    | 8    | 9    | 2    | 7    | 7    |      |    |
| 3. Congress<br>Muslims                     | 3   | 8    | 3   | 10   | 3    | 6    | 4    | 2    | 4    | 6    |      |    |
| 4. Percentage of<br>Muslims in Total       | 12  | 6.3  | 7   | 3.7  | 7    | 2.7  | 10   | 4.8  | 2.4  | 7.6  |      |    |
| 5. Muslim percen-<br>tage in population    | 12  | 12   | 7   | 7    | 7    | 7    | 7    | 8    | 8    | 8    |      |    |
| 6. Percentage<br>divergence<br>Cols. 5 & 4 | 0   | -5.7 | 0   | -3.3 | 0    | -4.3 | +3   | -3.2 | -5.6 | -0.4 |      |    |

TABLE — IV

| Ward<br>No. | Muslim<br>Electorate | Majlis<br>Votes | Diver-<br>gence | Hindu<br>Electorate | Jana Sangh<br>Votes | Diver-<br>gence | Percentage |   |
|-------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------|------------|---|
|             |                      |                 |                 |                     |                     |                 | 5          | 8 |
| 1           | 2                    | 3               | 4               | 5                   | 6                   | 7               |            |   |
| 21          | 51.1                 | 43.5            | 7.6             | 49.9                | 34.3                | 15.6            | 20.5       |   |
| 22          | 67.6                 | 59.8            | 7.8             | 32.4                | 23.6                | 7.8             | 14.9       |   |
| 23          | 55.6                 | 46.4            | 6.2             | 44.4                | 29.5                | 14.9            | 19.6       |   |
| Total:      | 57.9                 | 50.3            | 7.6             | 42.1                | 29.2                | 12.9            | 18.9       |   |

functional politics and, on the other, for the Muslims, like the Christians, has an 'international' rather than a 'national' dimension. Strictly according to the faith, while an international bond of the faithful is both permissible and desirable, the 'national' bond is reprehensible as it tends to reject the universal validity of Islam. Maulana Maududi is doctrinally clear on this point when he rejects nationalism (and, be it remembered, particular of Muslim Nationalism) as anti-theoretical to the political order of Islam.

In the context of secular-nation (i.e., federal—) building in India, the primary task is obviously to modernize the Hindu society—traditional in a very primordial sense, ideologically amorphous, socially rigid both by the institutionalization of the caste and sub-caste segments and the regional and local variations thereof. But the process would remain not only incomplete and partial but also politically dysfunctional if the 'other' major community, the Muslims, which looks proportionally not significant (about 10 to 12% of the population) but which both in absolute numbers and in terms of its historic and cultural contribution is really more than a 'minority', does not play or is inhibited from playing its legitimate democratic role in stabilizing the foundations of New India.

In playing this role two courses, among others, seem to be rational and creative: i) the mass-mobilization and increasing participation of the Muslims as equal citizens of India in the diverse fields of nation-building, but particularly due to the primary and maximal role of politics in our own time, more keenly in the politics of national consensus; and ii) the building of pressure groups for the interest-articulation and interest fulfilment of non-political issues, mostly at the State and local level, but again not as exclusive communal factions, but composite factions including *Indians* as *citizens* irrespective of caste or creed, but respective of the interests to be pursued.

## Redressal of grievances

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ENLIGHTENED democracy recognises that minorities, whether based on religion, race, language or culture, are an integral part of our country. Enlightened democracy further realises that such minorities have made, are making and will continue to make significant contributions to the variegated richness of our national life and above all to our national resurgence and struggle for economic, political and cultural advancement. Enlightened democracy appreciates that the unchecked operation of the democratic process itself must, in the ordinary course, be expected to lead to certain imbalances and injustices and to grievances, supposed or real, of the minorities. Enlightened democracy therefore must of necessity show special solicitude for the redressal of minority grievances, hence the need for institutions.

The confidence generated in the minorities by the existence of

such national institutions as safeguard their legitimate rights will undoubtedly inspire them to make the maximum contribution to the nation's resurgence. The contribution made by members of the minority groups of the nation, particularly those in the armed forces during the last great National Emergency of September-October 1965, can be some indication of their potential in this regard. In this, civilians have much to learn from our armed forces.

The absence of appropriate courses for redressal of grievances of minorities can in certain circumstances generate frustrations that lead to alienation of minority groups from others. Only by having such courses open can the minorities be weaned away from resorting to other inappropriate primitive defensive mechanisms which keep the minority isolated and backward and which in the long run harms the minorities themselves and are also bad for the nation.

What is an appropriate course must be determined first in the context of our national ideal of secular democracy and, secondly, in the context of the nature of the grievance sought to be redressed.

The first criterion need not be elaborated at this stage, except to say that minority safeguards must always be the means to an end and never an end in themselves. They must be like the protection given to nascent industries until they are in a position to stand on their feet and compete on an equal footing. They must be like the scaffolding erected round a building under construction and can never replace or become the pillars and beams of the structure.

I turn next to consider the nature of the grievances that might from time to time arise among the minorities for which they may seek redressal.

The most urgent and important types perhaps relate to the operation of State agencies in such fields as law and order, welfare,

education and health, public services (which would include services under the State Corporations), State contracts, credits and licences, judiciary, etc.

Law and order is no doubt the first and paramount field of concern. Unless the minorities can be guaranteed security of life, property and other ordinary rights they can easily be stamped into supporting conservative and reactionary policies. This is no doubt the political objective of certain groups.

We shall have to consider appropriate institutions and machinery in respect of each of these.

**T**he grievances of minorities are not, however, confined to the operation of State agencies. Formations other than the State, such as political parties, certain so-called social and cultural societies, trade associations, caste and communal bodies and others, may operate to create material disabilities against minorities giving rise to such grievances.

Thus, the Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha at its forty-eighth session held at Cholapur, Maharashtra, in May 1964 adopted a resolution suggesting that the Muslim citizens of India be decitizenised and sent to Pakistan in exchange for Pakistani Hindus to be imported here. This organisation has been meeting from time to time and repeating the same slogan. However limited its appeal, the tendency of such slogans is plainly treasonable and should be viewed as such. It calls for State action. No one should get away with making such statements. It is just as bad as it would be for some individual Muslim or organisation of Muslims to call upon Indian Muslims to pay allegiance to Pakistan. Such trends must be repressed with an iron hand. Disparagement of its citizenship is the destruction of the Republic.

In his book *Bunch of Thoughts*, R.S.S. leader M. S. Golwalkar has referred to (1) the Muslims (2)

the Christians and (3) the Communists as internal threats on the ground of their being votaries of ideologies having an 'un-Indian' or 'extra-Indian' origin. This book, perhaps, contains the thesis underlying the present slogan for 'Indianisation' raised in certain quarters.

**S**ocial and cultural societies (and this must include publishing agencies) that disseminate literature calculated to poison the minds of any group against the minorities in general or any particular minority group must also be closely watched. Exaggerated or out of context historical references to oppressions or alleged oppressions by feudal or imperialist rulers of the past (some of whom might be labelled as belonging to one or other minority group now in the country) are particularly used to excite revanchist sentiments among the less mature sections of the public which, at best, create feelings of 'non-fraternity', and, at worst, incite communal riots. One Oak of Maharashtra has propounded the theory that the Taj Mahal is in its origin a desecrated Hindu temple.

Although serious scholars may not pay much attention to this, it is widely read by the ignorant and semi-literate. The suggestion that the most famous building in India has such an origin, if and when believed, is calculated to create, in a primitive mind, the desire to do 'rough justice', e.g., by desecrating some mosque. This actually happened in Ahmedabad. The persons who propagate such stories, often out of honest conviction, little realise the damage they do to the fabric of Indian nationhood.

Trade and employment boycotts directed against particular minorities may be more difficult to detect and identify but these must be looked for and remedied as such in the private and in the public sector.

Landlords' malpractices directed against particular minorities (refusal of accommodation, demand

of higher rent etc.) must also be examined. Sometimes these are disguised under such labels as 'Vegetarians only'.

Cultural, recreational and other bodies, also hotels, boarding houses, restaurants and places of amusement must all gradually be brought under social control and prevention of discrimination. This may also result in minority institutions also coming under similar control to check their exclusiveness. This would be a desirable end provided it is achieved in a manner that ensures that the majority institutions lead the way for the others and do not insist that the defensive institutions of the minorities are first liquidated to leave the minorities helpless in the face of the overwhelming majority pressures.

**W**hat are or should be the courses open for the redressal of minority grievances?

The judicial process wherever appropriate is an obvious course to be favoured and to be enlarged wherever possible. Effective provision of this no doubt involves a general improvement in our judicial machinery, judicial appointments and functioning. Such improvements are desirable in everybody's interest, and particularly so in the interest of the weaker and more vulnerable sections of society. The minorities, especially, have a vested interest in our country having a first class judiciary. Unfortunately, it cannot be said that present day judicial standards measure up to the *desideratum*.

The right of Indian citizens to retain their citizenships acquired by birth or other lawful means must itself be declared a constitutional fundamental right which cannot be taken away except by the due process of law or by a deliberate voluntary act of the party concerned and so found by a Court. This is not at present the case.

The farce of executive determination of so-called voluntary renunciations of citizenship particularly by persons of the minority

community must be ended. An Indian citizen should at all times have a right to an Indian passport and this should be judicially guaranteed. At the same time, it could be made a penal offence for an Indian citizen, without just cause, to obtain or use a foreign passport. This would be more reasonable than the present practice of the administration in denying passports to Indian citizens, thereby compelling them, in predicament, to seek foreign passports, the acquisition of which is, cynically, treated as renunciation of Indian citizenship.

The minorities, and particularly the Muslims, are especially victims of this, of which a glaring example, out of many, is *Bakhtiar Khan's Case*, decided by Mr. Justice J. M. Shelat (as he then was) at the Gujarat High Court, reported in (1961) II, G.L.R. 57. Unfortunately, Mr Justice Shelat's judgment upholding Bakhtiar Khan's citizenship has been reversed by the Supreme Court and is no longer the law.

It may be considered whether the Union executive machinery needs strengthening in particular directions. Thus, it may be considered whether law and order and particularly the protection of life and property of passengers and travellers on the railways and national highways should not be permanently and exclusively a Union responsibility. In addition, should not the Union have an overall responsibility throughout the country in the protection of life, and right to work of minorities? This is particularly important for protection also of linguistic minorities in view of the establishment of linguistic States.

**E**ducational text books and publications of any kind tending to create animosity against any group of citizens should also perhaps come under Union executive superintendence.

The protection of places of worship throughout the country should also perhaps be a matter of ultimate Union responsibility. This may include powers to notify a suitable space barrier round, say

upto 100 yards, places of worship to prevent discordant activities by persons professing antagonistic creeds.

An English judgment has laid down the only legitimate 'use' of a public highway is that of passing and repassing along it in a peaceful manner without unreasonably annoying persons who occupy the adjacent land. Unfortunately, this is not the same as laid down for India by the Privy Council and, it is submitted, without full deliberation, followed by the Supreme Court.

It may be considered whether the Speaker should be empowered to constitute a permanent committee of the House on Minority Grievances with a whole time Commissioner reporting thereon to the House. This would help to keep such matters outside party politics and yet before public attention. This may be considered for each House of Parliament and also the State legislatures. Procedures for invoking the attention of such committees on the part of aggrieved individuals and groups should also be elaborated.

**B**eyond Parliament and the legislatures stands the electorate which exercises the franchise. The process of exercise of the franchise itself needs to be studied from the point of view of providing courses for redressal of minority grievances arising therein.

This may in one instance take the form of tightening up the loopholes in the definitions of corrupt practices under the Representation of the People's Act and improving the machinery for checking of corrupt practices.

Another aspect of this question of franchise to be studied is the desirability of retaining our present single member constituencies and whether we should not resort to some reasonably workable system of proportional representation. This may conceivably help to remedy some of the electoral imbalances operating to the prejudice of the minorities.

Adequate social control of other grievances of minorities such as

those relating to trade and employment in the private sector, landlords' malpractices, and cultural, recreational and other institutions must also be brought about by devising in each case appropriate institutions and machinery, under the control of appropriate judicial, quasi-judicial or representative institutions.

A very important role has been played and should in future be played by dedicated individuals and associations of citizens determined to grapple with the problems of the minorities. Gandhiji always held this to be the crux of the matter. For this he was martyred. A noteworthy contribution in this regard has been made by such a body as the Sampradayikta Virodhi Committee and its journal *Secular Democracy* that have done yeoman service to the cause of the protection of minorities. It is too early yet to say what the newly formed Insani Biradari and Khudai Khitmatgars may achieve. The term 'Khudai Khitmatgar' despite its honourable pedigree is perhaps unfortunate because there are today many in India who desire to serve humanity but deny any God.

It cannot be said that the members of the minority groups have no responsibility in the matter of contributing jointly with other secular-minded citizens and also where necessary independently to the cause of ensuring fairplay for the minorities and the unity and fraternity of the nation. Self-help by a minority, within the proper frame of reference, can also facilitate redressal of grievances and problems. Some problems of the minorities which have a bearing on the ultimate redressal of grievances turn on the enlightenment and uplift of the minorities. For this purpose it may in particular circumstances be justified to have a particular organisation of a particular minority to deal with some of these problems.

Thus, in 1968 the Muslim Progressive Group was formed in New Delhi having among others

the following objects: 'To combat outmoded ideas, to help Indian Muslims confront the problems of modern life, to promote scientific ideas in the Muslim community, to work for the economic, educational and social advancement of Muslims as an integral part of the nation, to assist Muslims to participate in emerging economic opportunities and to contribute fully to present day scientific and technical advancement, to sponsor sociological studies of Indian Muslims, to create a proper awareness of the Muslim contribution to Indian life and culture, to work for the improvement of the status of Muslim women...to reform the Muslim personal law and to bring it into conformity with modern thought, to promote family planning consciousness among Muslims, to work for the reform of waqf, to work for acceptance of the Roman alphabet for Indian languages starting with Urdu.'

It is submitted that such trends can also have a healthy bearing on the redressal of minority grievances.

Perhaps the most important of all social democratic institutions that should be stimulated to study the question of redressal of minority grievances and the adequate safeguard of minority rights are the trade unions, Kisan Sabhas and liberal professional associations, e.g., those of lawyers, doctors, journalists etc. This they may be urged to do among other things because only such activity on their part will halt the trends to fascism that are in some places creeping to power in this country. Only if all these important institutions play their full part can democracy and equal citizenship flourish in this country.

The task before us is to generate and establish among all sections of our people supreme mutual trust. Trust begets trust.

This is perhaps the highest, most sublime and solemn duty with which our generation of Indians is charged.

# Political karma

SATISH K. ARORA

IT is the historian and the political scientist in whose realm the subject of citizenship is generally placed. Too often, however, the charting of psychological boundaries of identification are ignored, and we are left with rather unsatisfactory analyses of the structural relationship of 'the people' on the one hand, and 'the State' on the other.

It is useful to conceive of the individual—regardless of his position as a subject or a citizen—as constituting a self-system which includes the ego plus significant 'others'. And if we further accept that there appear to be manifest urges in man to associate with others and emotionally identify with collectivities, then the concept of self acquires richer dimensions.

A collective identity is often—but not always—a matter of choice. The elements which enter into this choice, and which hinder it, are of special interest to us today. We are also interested in elements of collective identity which lie beyond choice.

A basic point to remember is that our notions of citizenship are not embedded in the mind as *tabula rasa*, but that current assessments of the term have to account for the colonial trauma that is an integral part of our legacy. The damaged psyches of the members of the present estab-

lishment have their counterpart in the general population. The colonial experience induces not only a fragmented identity that needs coherence; it also unleashes powerful forces of self-hate.

Above all, the setting facilitates a sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious, identification with the aggressor. This unanticipated behavioural pattern manifested itself with a particular poignancy in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany where enough victims collaborated with their persecutors to enable the latter to function efficiently.

A nation which has emerged from a colonial heritage must come to terms with its past—to explore it, to unravel areas of its vulnerability, and especially sensitively to locate those points which lend themselves to manipulation by the outsider in such a way that the self is either neutralized and rendered ineffective, or, worse, actively or passively assists the aggressor. This analysis is imperative regardless of the 'humane' pretensions of our elite which deflect us from conducting this painful enquiry into the self under the rationalization that the past must be forgotten and attention must be given only to the urgency of the present and the tasks for the tomorrows.

This rationalization is not only intellectually indolent, but it also

ties against all the theoretical insights of social science, which demand an appropriate location of the self (private as well as national) in a context that is at least aware of the sequential process of the growth of identity patterns.

**I**n insight into the past can be disturbing; but it can also be therapeutic. A major function of enlightenment is to push back the boundaries of unconsciously suppressed knowledge. This at once makes life more complicated; but it also lends greater possibilities of manipulation of datum into higher, and more realistic, levels of integration. Related to these observations is a particularly damaging component of our cultural style: we seem to display an uncanny ability to avoid situations fraught with conflict regardless of the fact that such conflict may be functional and necessary for the effective survival of the private self or the national system.

It is an exercise in futility to consider the question of identification, which we may call citizenship, solely in a context which takes only the immediate present as relevant. Identification with the nation has been, over time, neither a very common nor a natural phenomenon, nor is it altogether a matter of choice. The modern nation-State is, if anything, above all a community of fate. One is born into it; one only rarely selects the nation one chooses to identify with. The problem of citizenship might really not be much of a problem if people simply accepted this aspect of their fate. And, in fact, passive acceptance of one's fate as a citizen even of a democracy is increasingly becoming a policy recommendation of some political scientists.

A passive majority can devote itself to routine private concerns and the elites thereby can form their tasks that much more efficiently. As S. M. Lipset has stated it: 'Essentially, I have urged the view that *realistically* the distinctive and most valuable element of democracy is, in complex socie-

ties, the formation of a political elite in the competitive struggle for the votes of a mainly passive electorate.'<sup>1</sup>

It is important to recognize that even in nations whose intellectual establishment and politicians are content to have a largely passive citizenry, large investments have been made into the socialization process of these citizens to make them aware of, and affiliate with, their national identities. For, if the nation-State has been identified as the ultimate permissible community, or, as a currently circulated term has it, the 'terminal' community, such definitions we would adjudge as excessively legalistic and oblivious to modes of identification stimulated by reference groups.<sup>2</sup>

**P**eople need to be socialized into a sense of citizenship largely because the nation-State, far from being a natural collectivity, is of fairly recent origin; other identities, the family, the clan, the tribe—may at varying times have claimed partial or even total allegiance, and for longer periods of human history. Nor ought we to believe that just because the nation-State is here today, this is a permanent unit of world organization. The contours of the globe have changed enough times (even in recent centuries) to indicate that it would be rather shortsighted on our part to believe that what is now will always be, that the nation indeed constitutes the ultimate political form.

The need for socialization to citizenship becomes even more important if the nation-State concerned has a particularly rich and varied history. For, regardless of how 'modern' the particular State may be, a citizen's response springs from his own well of collective memories, usually characterized by myths, legends and condensed

symbols thereby forming a basis for identification with the past.

This identification may be transmitted by symbolically re-enacted events; by *credenda* and *miranda* such as flags and anthems; and by mythical and historical personalities with whom the individual can personally identify. This is political socialization in the most refined sense of the term because it provides not only appropriate models of behaviour but also creates a linkage with the past and thus facilitates a sense of community which, no matter how deficient, nonetheless provides clear directives as to the ideal type of behaviour and institutional arrangements.

It is, however, perhaps the fate of all communities with a rich historic past that their responses to political stimuli tend to be internally differential. Given a situation where the storage and retrieval mechanisms are especially good—i.e., where there is a rich body of literature well-known and readily available to the public—the selectivity of identities, even conflicting ones, becomes possible. It is only the non-historic groupings which have a consolidated myth of origins, and it is this non-availability of counter-myths which may largely account for the repetitive behaviour which tends to mark them.

**H**istorically rich communities are likely to manifest an intellectual liveliness and provide an initial impression of fragmentation. Symbol creators and manipulators, i.e., the intellectuals, are permitted to reach easily into the stored history and to weave out patterns and counter-patterns of political identification. Political events and personalities, simply because the universe is large enough, can be patterned and justified according to the value preferences of the elites or counter-elites.

Historical selectivity of identity is not a new pheonomenon. But we may choose to note here that it is a heuristic device which permits the creation of alternative

1. S.M. Lipset, quoted in Alexander Cockburn and Robin Blackburn, *Student Power* (London, 1969), P. 190.

2. See, for instance, Tamotsu Shibusaki, 'Reference Groups and Social Control,' in Arnold M. Rose, Editor, *Human Behaviour and Social Processes* (Boston 1962).

images of the self. Conflict in the political arena is a function of the specialized maps of reality and the relation of the self to this reality which is largely attributable to this selective scanning of the past.

**L**et us be terse: the question of citizenship is a question of self-definitions, it pertains to identity it answers, at least partially, the question, 'Who am I?'

To gain an answer to this question, attention to the levels of identifications is particularly instructive. In two studies carried out in 1965-66 in Poona and Coimbatore (under the auspices of the UNESCO Research Centre on Economic Development in Southern Asia) it was reported that in the Poona region 'we found that in the rural area a person's frame of reference did not go beyond his caste and village. In the case of the urban-industrial workers it appears that the frontiers of his frame of reference extended from his name and occupation to the factory, then to the factory area, and then to the city'.

And, in Coimbatore, 'the normal pattern of identification for the rural group was to mention their occupation and place of residence. For the urban group, the pattern was the place of work, their occupation and place of residence.'<sup>3</sup>

These findings, related to the question 'Who are you?', suggest the largely parochial and restricted patterns of identification that obtain in our country today. But evidence from other societies, at roughly comparable socio-economic levels, shows that this process of identification is one of historic development.

Consider the following from the memoirs of a Polish mayor, covering the period 1842 to 1927:<sup>4</sup>

'As for national consciousness, I have mentioned that the older peasants called themselves

Masurians, and their speech Masurian. They lived their own life, forming a wholly separate group, and caring nothing for the nation. I myself did not know that I was a Pole till I began to read books and papers, and I fancy that other villagers came to be aware of their national attachment much in the same way.'

Again: Philip E. Converse reports:<sup>5</sup>

Zaniecki has observed, for example, that the vast majority of peasants in nineteenth-century Tsarist Russia were utterly unconscious that they were supposed to belong to a Russian society united by a common culture. Again, he reports that a 1934-35 study of those inhabitants who were ethnically White Ruthenian had no idea that such a nationality existed and regarded themselves as belonging at most to local communities.'

However, cognizant as we are of the historical processes of identification, we need also to consider that our contemporary global context may not be permissive of a 'normal' rate of growth of identification with national collectivities. Both instruments for inculcating allegiance, and subverting loyalties have been sharpened simultaneously within the context of a communications revolution involving symbol creation and diffusion.

**L**et us look at the problem from a related, but slightly different, perspective: individuals and even collectivities (and not just minorities) have habitually identified—sometimes too positively for the well-being of their own nation—with areas and peoples even outside of the nation. It is not only sectors of Muslim Indians who feel a special affinity to the Muslims of the world outside our borders; the Christians to have effectively demonstrated their special regard for their co-religionists,

especially those who come from the West.

Indeed, in acts of specific and formal identification, Christians may very well have a more tenuous relationship to the nation than the more visible and perhaps psychologically more vulnerable Muslim minority of our country. Yet this fact seems to have largely escaped serious attention and analysis. The intensity of identification with Israel on the part of the Jews dispersed over the globe may similarly be cited as a phenomenon of extra-national affiliation. Our own ambivalence regarding overseas Indians and their identity ought to stimulate realistic understanding.

**T**he point is that affiliations are politically significant only when they are relevant to the security of the State. It is doubtful that if Indian Muslims felt special affinity and identification with Muslims of Albania it would arouse anxiety similar to that associated with their identification with Pakistan. Americans of Irish descent are permitted to indulge in psychological attachment to Ireland because this does not in any manner affect the national interests of the United States.

However, we may safely assume that Americans of Chinese extraction may not safely seek an emotionally gratifying relationship with mainland China: their permitted identification is acceptable only if they fix their emotions upon the island of Taiwan, a few miles away from the mainland. Minorities may also be politically exploited to serve the larger interests of the State. A pertinent example is the campaign among Italian-Americans, officially inspired, to write to their relatives and friends to vote against the communists in the elections in post-war Italy. The scale and success of this campaign was impressive enough to affect the political future of western Europe.

All this is to suggest that the way in which we define the situation has important consequences for the way things turn out. A

3. A. Bopegaré and P.V. Veeraraghavan, *Status Images in Changing India* (Bombay, 1967), pp. 41-42; 133.

4. From *Selfdom to Self-Government: Memoirs of a Polish Village Mayor* (translated from the Polish by William John Rose) (London, 1941), p. 171.

5. 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,' in David E. Apter, *Ideology and Discontent* (New York, 1964), p. 237.

widely accepted proposition in the social sciences has it that such defining contains elements of a self-fulfilling prophecy. When we link up this proposition with the proposition on the tendency selectively to perceive one's identity, we may be led to express dissatisfaction with the almost closed notions of minorities which we have adopted in our country. Let us ask if a purely religious definition of minorities has consequences of its own. Is it not possible to conceptualize the minorities in equally realistic socio-economic terms?

**F**urther, can we visualize that, comparatively speaking, identification with language and region constitute a progression, rather than a retrogression, in terms of developing a more 'secular' identity? Does every act of aggregation and protest in the name of non-religious symbols contribute to a redefining of the traditional notion of minorities?

In this regard the socio-economic differences which may—although obviously not always—cut across religious lines may pose the far more meaningful threat to national integration and the building up of national loyalties. In fact, these differences often underly much of the conflict which manifests itself under different masks. An indication of the importance of this may be gained from a simple glance at the results of a survey of villagers in Andhra Pradesh which we conducted. There we found that feelings of political efficacy were positively related to education, as well as socio-economic status based on caste and land-holding.<sup>6</sup>

Some scholars have postulated that in order for there to be a healthy democracy, citizenship patterns must be accompanied by a set of specific cultural traits. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, authors of one particularly well-known and influential study,

found that of the five nations they studied, the United States and Great Britain presented the most ideal picture of democracy and citizen behaviour. They also reported that the samples of these two nations ranked distinctly higher than the other three (Germany, Italy, and Mexico) on measures of inter-personal trust. Their conclusion: fusion of personal and political attitudes is a good and even necessary prerequisite for healthy democratic behaviour.<sup>7</sup>

Such conclusions about citizenship need careful re-evaluation, however, if we introduce some of our own data regarding Indian responses to the measurements of inter-personal trust. On the basis of our study referred to above, we find evidence to indicate that on almost every individual question in this scale (and on the scale as a whole), our Indian sample ranked third, following closely the United States and Great Britain, but exhibiting much higher levels of trust than samples drawn from presumably more established democracies such as Italy, Germany and Mexico.<sup>8</sup>

**C**an we then conclude that Indian political behaviour and citizenship patterns are more democratic than Germany's, Italy's or Mexico's? Hardly. In fact, as we have postulated elsewhere, regardless of how one rates any measure of inter-personal trust, under conditions of uncertainty and anxiety, a degree of political cynicism may be functionally necessary in order to operate effectively in one's environment. If the legitimacy of the political and bureaucratic elites has been eroded due to their inability to match performance with promise, then indeed political cynicism may be the first step toward political wisdom.

Political participation is another attribute of what many

scholars consider to be good citizenship. In our Andhra study we found that not merely did a large majority of our rural sample participate in elections, but three-fourths seemed to be aware of the function of the ballot in a democratic society.

**O**nce again, however, we would suggest that just because a large majority of citizens participate in, and know the significance of democratic elections, they need not necessarily also feel personally and meaningfully related to the structure. What should be of greater relevance and concern to both policy makers and scholars are the underlying attitudes toward politics. Such attitudes are sometimes only vaguely perceived and rarely articulated. But they assume crucial proportions in times of crisis; and thus can and do affect the survival of the political order.

Take, for instance, the degree to which an individual is politically cynical. We have found that over half of our rural sample feel that politicians stand for elections only out of selfish motivations. Persons with this type of assessment of the political elite are not very likely to share a sense of national pride or identification with them. And when we find that three-fourths of our sample of ordinary villagers, and almost sixty per cent of the local leaders feel that people like themselves 'don't have any say about what the government does,' the concept of citizenship becomes a rather empty one. We would suggest that although a relatively passive citizenry may well be a boon to some national elites, if such citizens refrain from activism because of cynicism and feelings of impotence, they can scarcely, in the long run, be relied upon to uphold the nation should it be threatened.

There is another related aspect of this problem of citizenship: how do we evaluate such alienation as it manifests itself in an urge to opt out altogether? It is possible partially to measure

6. S.K. Arora, 'Exploring Political Predisposition: Efficacy and Cynicism in Rural Andhra Pradesh,' *Behavioural Sciences and Community Development*, v. 3 (September 1969)

7. G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, 1963).

8. S.K. Arora, 'The Political Relevance of Social Values: A Cross-National Comparison,' *Behavioural Sciences and Community Development*, v. 3 (March 1969).

alienation from the national community by utilizing data pertaining to the extent to which citizens choose to emigrate. The analysis must be cautious, since a multiplicity of motives might be involved. With this reservation in mind, the figures do have value for us in any consideration of citizen alienation and allegiance.

The concept of citizenship (divorced from its legalistic connotations) has larger implications for the public order when we introduce the factors of voluntary affiliation and allegiance on the one hand, and alienation on the other. Any public order ought to be sensitive to the outward identifications of its citizenry; are citizens desperate enough to opt out of the system? What are their motives for desired emigration? If the motives are mixed, then what is the nature of the 'mix', and can we isolate at least the basic and manifest themes?

**C**onsiderable discussion has taken place on this issue, but most of the data remains unorganized and unanalyzed. Purely as suggestive of the magnitude and dimensions of this problem, we present some findings based on a sample of what might be called the politically effective sectors of our society—the literate adults of Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras.<sup>9</sup>

The following question was posed: 'There are certain foreign countries which offer better employment opportunities. Given a chance would you like to migrate to one of these countries?' Nearly half (46 per cent) expressed a desire to leave India and migrate to foreign countries. In itself this figure is impressive enough to alert us to the volume of potential discontent with existing conditions; but this concern is heightened when we note that the more educated our citizens, the greater their desire to migrate; the more affluent they are, the

higher the desire to leave India.

One would have assumed that, occupationally, the professionals would have greater satisfaction and that government officials and business executives would similarly have enough security so that they would prefer to remain at their jobs. Yet these are the socio-economic categories which express the greatest alienation. Clearly, we cannot base policy on these figures alone, but neither can we ignore the potential political implications of such large-scale predispositions to opt out of our system.

If we turn to countries selected for migration, we note that the preferred nation is the United States, followed by the United Kingdom. Does this fact tell us something of the ordering of extranational preferences? We believe it does. The motives for migrating include desires to make money, improve skills, but a sensitive analysis of latent content may alert us to the socio-political preferences involved in the selection of host nations. Our metropolitan sample is obviously short of strong affiliation with what the existing identity offers and it seems to be politically fairly well disposed to the Anglo-Saxon group of nations. Will an open-frontiers policy siphon off the discontented and will it then have some effect on the composition of elite cadres?

**T**he nurturance of citizens into allegiance to the collectivity is probably an easier task to perform in an underdeveloped society such as ours than in most contemporary, highly developed societies. This formulation appears heretical on the surface and seems to fly in the face of all available evidence as recorded in commission reports, textbooks and similar repositories of traditional information. To support our contention we suggest that one needs to re-examine afresh the *qualitative* aspects of demands made upon the State and government. In countries like India, citizen demands are for values such as security (adequate police protection), well-being (medical attention, water, housing), enlightenment (education)

and skills to facilitate employment and upward mobility. In each of these areas, available indigenous resources and technology is permissive of demand fulfilment.

**C**onsider, on the other hand, the set of demands upon the systems of highly developed nations such as the United States, France, Germany and Japan. The articulate and powerful minority demands are there in terms that call for a radical restructuring of the relationship between society and technology; the questions posed, and the demands projected, have reference to the total relationship of man and organized society.

Important value demands may be sub-sumed under agitation for greater privatization (individualism); leisure; experimentation and exploration (legitimization of mind-expanding drugs); openness and freedom of the interaction between the sexes and redefinition of the nuclear family; and, above all, a demand for the primacy of the spontaneous and aesthetic elements in human existence.

These are values which pose institutional threats to the social order with grave implications. Very likely, the highly organized technocratic and managerial-oriented society cannot satisfy such extensive basic restructuring demands without dissolving existing patterns. Satisfying these demands is certainly infinitely more difficult—regardless of resource availability—than the simple almost mechanistic demands of our citizenry. What our establishment may well seek to alert itself to is that, given the tempo of contemporary communication flows and the ease and facility with which symbols diffuse cross-culturally, further denial of the elementary demands of our citizenry may well facilitate linkage with the much more basic revolutionary demands of the western deviant minorities. The world revolutionary centre may have shifted from Moscow to the barricades of Paris, Chicago and Berlin. We may need to redefine the role of the 'citizen' and the 'State' along newer, more imaginative lines.

9. Indian Institute of Public Opinion, Public Opinion Surveys, v. 13 (December 1967).

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# R eport

The subject matter of the first day's discussions was 'Myths: Old and New'. In his paper on this subject, Dr P. C. Joshi sought to trace the circumstances and the climate which give birth to and aggravate the problem of minorities and the entire complex of prejudice, guilt, suspicion, grievances, hostilities, the demand for special privileges and fissiparous tendencies that eventually grow up and are built round the concept of minorities. He dealt with the social perspectives of the political elite which, at times, seemed to be interested in keeping alive the tension and pressures in a world where one segment was more developed than the other. He categorised prevalent views under three heads: (a) traditionalist; (b) liberal rationalist; and (c) socialist. The first, viz., the traditionalist, insisted on the religious aspect of the cleavage, implying the monolithic character of each community, Hindu as well as Muslim. Upper caste Hindu society had, according to him, a vested interest in projecting the idea of a monolithic society. The religious conflict thus was not really or wholly religious and only when religion impinged on some material interest did the cleavage become acute.

The liberal rationalist myth overlapped the traditionalist and added a special category of interests emanating from educated westernised administrators, technocrats and so on. They emphasised the cleavage between tradition and modernity.

In the socialist view, two additional dimensions were found. These raised the question of cleavages relating to material interests and to class conflicts.

A tentative definition of minority was put forward as a group of people with an area of common interests who felt that these interests were in jeopardy and had to be preserved. These interests might be of a religious, regional, cultural, linguistic or economic nature. It was pointed out by some speakers at the Seminar that this definition would not hold good universally because even a majority may assume the character of a minority for certain purposes and may demand special treatment, e.g., the women of India on the ground that they are a backward category. Indeed, there were indications that in India it was a section of the Hindu majority which seemed to entertain fears of suffering at the hands of the minority. Attention was drawn to the fact that it was not always advisable to give special or preferential treatment to backward people or to minorities and that, in the case of women, it had not been considered advisable to give them preferential treatment and thereby they had made a substantial gain socially and politically.

One speaker stated that a parallel could be drawn between the English-speaking and French-speaking Canadian problem, and the Hindu-Muslim, as also the linguistic questions in India. We should,

however, differentiate between the Muslim League and the Muslim community. It was said that economic development alone would not solve problems, as suggested by Dr Joshi, because increase in production did not solve social problems. Another speaker questioned the conceptual framework presented and said that the talk of western and eastern in the context of social sciences was unscientific. A plea was made for a social revolution based on Marxism as a starting point for nation-building, taking into consideration the Indian reality.

Attention was also drawn to the accentuating effects of a minority's bargaining power in a competitive political situation and it was pointed out that not only Muslims but other communities or categories had made use of this weapon in promoting regional, communal, linguistic and other narrow interests.

On the second day's morning session, Dr Ratna Dutta introduced her paper on 'Minorities in Different Settings'. She gave instances of minorities in different places and in different environments. She drew a distinction between minorities anxious to maintain their identity by will and minorities barred by the majority from assimilation. From this distinction, she drew the conclusion that legislative reservation of resources for minorities by will could not decrease prejudice or communal hatred. Tracing the history of minorities in Europe, whether they were religious minorities or political, she expressed the view that once a minority secessionist movement was recognized, 'a Pandora's box' of unanticipated identity aspirations opened up. The religious minorities in Europe arose from religious differences leading to wars between Catholics and Protestants. There were linguistic, ethnic and religious groupings as was witnessed by Germany and Italy. Sometimes, the solution of the minority problem was found to be complex and tragic as in the instances of inter-change of population between the Greeks and Turks. She pointed out the manner in which the Armenians and Kurds were suppressed. Another instance of the evil effects of minority secession was furnished by the Protestants in Ireland where the separation of Ulster did not put an end to religious differences.

In the general discussion which followed, a number of views, some of which agreed with the premises of Dr Dutta and others which disagreed, were put forward. One speaker thought that he preferred the expression minority status to minority groups, and gave the instance of the Negroes in the USA, Overseas Chinese and the minorities in the USSR, China and other socialist countries. A speaker pointed out that the hostility towards, and on the part of, minorities was born of a sense of insecurity and the resentment of majorities was accentuated by economic backwardness and unemployment of the former. Another speaker pointed out that unless the economic problems were solved, even additional autonomy would not improve matters as had in fact been observed in India.

Another speaker said that equality and special treatment were not compatible and that what was required in the ultimate analysis was equality. The Scheduled Castes, for instance had had, under the terms of the Constitution, ten years of preferential treatment but this had to be extended by another ten years and that there may still be a further extension. This was not in the real interest of the Scheduled Castes, because it militated against equality.

Another aspect of the problem of minorities was that certain communal groups in the majority, by using the minority as a scapegoat, established a vital interest in building up hostility in the minds of the majority. This, according to the speaker, was what the Hindu communalists were aiming at, giving their ideas and movement a Fascist character. Another speaker reiterated

the previous argument that economic status and political aspirations were the real motivating forces behind the demand for a special treatment for minorities on other grounds. Attention was drawn to the fact that the partition of India had created a special type of minority situation because it had not only divided the categories of communities but had divided families. This had happened in some other countries also and that the birth of certain nations was, in a sense, arbitrary and created nation groups cutting across traditional loyalties.

An important point made by one speaker was the effect of Indo-Pakistan relations on the minority situation in India. Relations between these two countries had a special bearing on Hindu-Muslim amity, and their improvement could help materially, e.g., by the settlement of the eastern river water disputes.

In the afternoon session, Dr Rasheeduddin Khan introduced his paper, 'Self-View of Minorities: The Muslims in India'. The 'Muslim reality', he said, could be more meaningfully perceived in the framework of Indian pluralism. No other polity with a continental dimension, is as authentically plural and genuinely federal as India is. Autonomy of sub-cultures and their reconciliation with national identity are the two basic principles to be recognized. He said that the 'Muslim problem' ought to be seen at three levels: local, regional and national; for like the Hindus, but unlike other minorities, the Muslims are a fragmented community. Regional variations require careful study, as many problems are local and regional, rather than national in character. Referring to the subjective Muslim self-image, he said that collectively the Muslims, apart from cherishing 'a sense of superiority' as a community (like the Brahmins), also considered themselves as the single biggest compact segment of Indian polity; more cohesive internally than the caste-ridden Hindu community.

In conclusion, Dr Rasheeduddin Khan said that the prospects of Muslim participation in nation-building could be improved if an enlightened Muslim leadership educated the community to a sense of realism and commitment to modernization. In this connection, he cited figures of the low intake of Muslims in Central services and their inadequate proportion in State Legislatures and in Parliament. He felt this fact was being exploited by exclusivist parties, who tended to give a communal colour and thus impeded the process of national integration. It was, however, pointed out by another speaker that this disparity need not necessarily be traced to denial of opportunity but may be the result of economic and educational backwardness. It was also stated that in the urban areas the Muslims were educationally and economically backward and that this circumstance was reflected in the figures presented by Dr Rasheeduddin Khan. A speaker challenged the conclusion which Dr Rasheeduddin Khan had drawn from these figures by pointing out that, at the time of Partition, Muslims had a fair share of jobs in India and that in Pakistan there was a much smaller number of Hindus in government service proportionately than of Muslims in public employment in India.

Another speaker conceded the fact that Muslims had not been taken into nation-building activity to the extent to which they should have been. But he questioned Dr Rasheeduddin Khan's self-view of Muslims as being conscious of having been rulers of the country. Most of the Muslims in medieval India belonged to the class of the ruled, just as a section of the Hindus belonged to the ruling class. Several speakers stated that the Hindus were as much the sufferers of communalism as the Muslims.

A speaker pointed out that there were some Hindu leaders who exploited the linguistic and religious factor wholly out of

proportion to reality. For instance, 70% of the Muslims could not read or write Urdu. The ill-treatment of a cow in Haryana did not have the same disturbing consequences as a similar incident in Aurangabad. It was a curious commentary on the development of communalism among Hindus that, although in 1947 and 1950 a Constitution prepared by a majority of Hindus could give guarantees to minorities, in 1970, ironically, there was a demand for Indianisation on the part of some individuals. He argued that there was a case for political parties drawing Muslims into their activities on the basis of secular ideals.

Another speaker expressed the view that Muslims had an inferiority complex which needed a new Muslim leadership which could only come from among members of their own community. It followed that there was a type of community activity which was, in no way, antagonistic to nation-building.

A speaker pointed out that, although religion was a binding force in Islam, it was not so among Hindus, and there were visible conflicts within the same Hindu group. The modern Indian should not accept the slogan of Indianisation.

A major trend of discussion that emerged at this session indicated that by placing wrong emphases on the distinctive characteristics of a minority, a state of communal suspicion and heat could be brought into existence, but that, if emphases were placed on the real issues, there could be a development of all sections of the people which would not militate against concord and a sense of belonging among them. The idea of a single nation was quite consistent with the whole consisting of a number of minorities which developed their own respective cultures, languages and religion, without injuriously impinging on the activities of the others. It was really a case of a correct emphases and a correct analysis of the real distinctive features or differences in the context of the perspective of the totality of national interests.

On the third day, Mr Danial Latifi introduced his paper on the 'Courses open for the Redressal of Grievances'. He said that minorities were based on religion, race, language or culture, and must, for sometime, continue in our country, and, therefore, an enlightened democracy must show special solicitude for redressing minority grievances. Some of the grievances to which he drew attention were: (1) Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Maha Sabha, in May 1964, adopted a Resolution suggesting that the Muslim citizens of India should be decitizenised and sent to Pakistan; (2) the R.S.S. Leader, M. S. Golwalkar, in his book, *Bunch of Thoughts* had referred to the Muslims, Christians and Communists as internal threats; (3) a writer had propounded the theory that the Taj Mahal was a Hindu temple, which had been desecrated and re-fashioned by Muslims; (4) house-owners denied access to Muslims by saying that they wanted only vegetarians as their tenants.

A number of tentative suggestions for redressing these grievances were made by Mr Latifi. He suggested social control of cultural, recreational and other bodies as also hotels, boarding houses, etc.; recourse to the judicial process whenever necessary to remove Muslim grievances; a categorical declaration that citizenship being a fundamental right may not be taken away except by the due process of law; safeguards against the denial of an Indian passport which sometimes leads Muslims to seek a Pakistani passport; strengthening of the Union executive machinery to give security to Muslim life and property; the re-writing of educational text-books to exclude matter which creates animosity against the minority; the protection of places of worship throughout the country; the appointment of a committee to consider

minority grievances; re-consideration of present single-member constituencies and the replacement of the system of proportional representation; action in the matter of grievances relating to trade and employment in the private sector; the role of individuals and associations of citizens to deal with the problems of minorities; a realisation of a sense of responsibility on the part of minorities regarding their obligations; the setting up of social democratic institutions charged with the study of the question of redressing minority grievances.

In the course of the discussion that followed, a speaker raised the grievances which the majority group had against minority groups. A major grievance of the minority groups is the prevalence of insecurity and fear and even terror due to the extremity of communal and sectional groups and communal and sectional riots.

The emphasis, however, was on the attitude of the majority and also the attitude of the Administration in not discouraging or rooting out the hostile and provocative attitude towards the minority. For instance, it was stated that no action was taken against the Shiv Sena, although the activity of this body had provoked rioting, arson and looting on more than one occasion. The victims were not non-Hindus but non-Maharashtrians, including Muslims.

A speaker dealing with the case of Christian minorities said that many of the grievances about missionary activities were imaginary or manufactured, and the information supplied was false. The government should accept reports only after a careful investigation. He argued that in the interest of democracy, Christians, like Muslims, had given up the demand for a separate electorate at the time of the framing of the Constitution.

Certain statements made with regard to the Indianisation of Muslims and other communities figured prominently in the discussion and it was pointed out that these pronouncements did not promote harmony and were not only disruption of order but went deeper into the consciousness of the various communities whether they belonged to the category of the majority or minority.

The appointment of a Commission to examine the grievances of the minorities was approved by several speakers. A speaker suggested that the Commission should examine the grievances of major groups.

Several speakers stressed the need for giving proper orientation to Home Ministry intelligence with a view to curbing the activities of communalist groups. In this context, a speaker regretted that the Home Ministry did not regard the R.S.S. as a communal organisation. It was suggested that specific legislation should be enacted to deal with some of the matters which had been brought out in the course of the discussions.

At the afternoon session, Dr Satish Arora introduced his paper on 'Evolution of Indian Citizenship'. The point he made was that our colonial heritage had conditioned our conception of citizenship and that we must come to terms with this part of our history, however painful it might be. He deplored the fact that we had an uncanny habit of avoiding situations of conflict and urged that we learn to face these facts. The Nation and the State, as far as India was concerned, he argued, was a recent phenomenon. So a sense of citizenship among our people had to be inculcated in our new environment. Generally speaking, wherever a nation had a rich and varied history, the people manifested an intellectual liveliness and gave the appearance of a tendency towards fragmentation. This was true in the case of

India also. But it was not a circumstance which need cause any apprehension in our mind. A study carried out in Poona showed that people were not really conscious of their nationality of their country or that their awareness did not go beyond their family, their caste, and, at the most, their village. On the other hand, individuals sometimes identified themselves with outside areas and the concern which we often expressed regarding Overseas Indians might help us in understanding this phenomenon. We must, however, bear in mind that extra-territorial affiliations are relevant politically only if they affect the security of the State.

Dr Arora pointed out that a Muslim owing affiliation to Pakistan is looked upon with suspicion because there is a feeling of suspicion and hostility between the two countries. But a Muslim who shows his concern for what takes place in Albania, may not be decried. It may also be noted that citizens may choose to adopt a new identity for economic reasons. For instance, he pointed out that results of a survey of literate adults of four metropolitan cities showed that 46% of the persons questioned expressed the desire to emigrate in order to better themselves materially and the country they selected was not the country with which they had any cultural affinity, but the USA and the UK where their material prospects were expected to be better.

Dr Suren Navlakha, speaking about his paper, which was introduced as background to the discussion, said that a State was ideally a nation, and that the nation-building process was not quickly done nor could it be achieved by legislation or safeguards alone. Nation-building was a process which had to emerge through living together in a democratic frame in which the differences between minorities and majorities were disregarded, if not obliterated.

On the main subject of Dr Arora's paper, one speaker expressed the view that if a minority, e.g. Muslims, banded together in order to safeguard their interests, Hindu communalists would try to take advantage of this situation, but another speaker pointed out that India could scarcely be regarded as a single nation State, and that it was a multi-national and multi-cultural State. The creation of 35 or 40 States could, therefore, be envisaged without any apprehension regarding the disintegration of the country.

Speaking about the contention that Christians owed their affiliation to an extra-territorial focus and that the influence of the missionaries had been against national loyalties, one speaker pointed out that Christianity had not had this result and that the Christians in South India, for instance, did not consider themselves, in any way, affiliated to an extra-territorial focus. Nor was the influence of the missionaries and their schools confined only to the upper classes and that, after Independence, more and more middle class and lower middle class children went to Christian schools.

Another speaker maintained that the differences between minorities and even extra-territorial affiliations of a superficial nature need not give us a pause, because at no time had India been a nation in the sense in which we talked of a nation now. He deplored the fact that history in the North was taught as the history of power located at certain places such as Delhi and Agra which were not really representative of what was happening in the country as a whole. For instance, he pointed out that the Nagas had taken no part in the freedom movement and that there was nothing outrageous about their demanding an autonomous State.

In conclusion, it was said that nationalism was a reality and that, though the expression 'unity in diversity' had become a

repetitive cliche, it had a certain validity and the concept of citizenship in India involved a certain psychological make-up which was consistent with allegiance to the country as a whole and allegiance to a smaller territorial area or group. Cultural and ideological affiliations can also transcend national boundaries.

In conclusion, there was unanimous agreement with the proposed amendments to the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and Representation of the People Act, 1951, recommended by a sub-committee of the Seminar.

Amendments to the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and representation of the People Act, 1951 recommended by a sub-committee of the Seminar consisting of Mr Danial Latifi, Mr A. G. Noorani, Professor Rasheeduddin Khan and Mr D. R. Goyal.

(The amendments suggested are in *italics*.)

**Indian Penal Code, Section 153A.**

Whoever—

- (a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes, or attempts to promote, on grounds of *place of birth, religion, race, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities, or*
- (aa) *impugns or questions or attempts to negate or deny the right of any such group or caste or community as is referred to in clause (a) above, to possess, exercise or enjoy the rights of Indian citizenship, or*
- (aaa) *advocates use of violence against any such group, caste or community as is referred to in clause (a) above, or*
- (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities and which disturbs, or is likely to disturb the public tranquility, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

**Representation of the People Act, 1951.**

**S 123 (3A)**

The promotion of, or attempt to promote, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India on grounds of *place of birth, religion, race, caste, community, or language, or impugns or questions the right of any such classes of citizens to possess, exercise or enjoy the rights of Indian citizenship or advocates the use of violence against any such class of citizens, by a candidate or his agent or any other person, with the consent of a candidate or his election agent for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate.*

Promoting enmity between classes in connection with election. Any person who in connection with an election under this Act promotes or attempts to promote on grounds of *place of birth, religion, race, caste, community or language, feelings of enmity or hatred, between different classes of the citizens of India, or impugns or questions the right of any such class of citizens to possess, exercise or enjoy the rights of Indian citizenship or advocates genocide against any such class of citizens, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.*

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
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# Communication

THE July, 1970, issue of SEMINAR on 'Foreign Technology' (No. 131) provides a very helpful series of analyses of the adverse impact of the indiscriminate importation of foreign technology on India's ability to achieve self-sustaining industrial growth through increasing reliance on her own scientific and technological skills. I would like to consider the problem from another angle by looking comparatively at social myths and social realities which condition the environment for research and development in two societies, India and America.

Social myths have much to do with industrial research and development, whether in India, America, or anywhere else. For, it is the larger social and cultural environment for R & D activity in any society which provides the critical incentives and constraints for that activity. Nowhere has this been put more succinctly than in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s foreword to J. J. Servan-Schreiber's analysis of the crisis confronting Western Europe, *The American Challenge* (New York, Atheneum, 1969, pp. ix-x): 'Yes, some Americans will no doubt comfortably reflect at this point, the Frenchman is right; free enterprise is best. But this is not at all what M. Servan-Schreiber means. He does see in the United States not the unfettered workings of competitive capitalism but something very different: a highly organized economic system, based on enormously large units, nourished by an industrial-academic governmental complex and stimulated, financed and guided by the national government. And he does not stop there. To speak of a "managerial gap" is really too superficial; the real gap is institutional and cultural... "All cliches to the contrary, American society wagers much more on human intelligence than it wastes on gadgets." The real American secret, he concludes, is the discovery that social justice, far from being the enemy of economic growth, is the necessary technical condition for growth in an industrial society...'

Bernard Nossiter, an acerbic correspondent in India for the *Washington Post* until recently, describes the incident of a salesman injured in an accident on a well-travelled

road near Delhi and allowed to lie, unattended, by the side of the road for three or four hours in the hot sun until he died.

Every society can produce its catalogue of 'horror stories' about man's indifference to his fellow men, and India is no exception. Pointing out the gross inequalities in Indian society is not, furthermore, confined to acerbic foreign observers like Nossiter.

It is easy to agree that Indian society, segmented and stratified, is afflicted with a deep-seated and pervasive social pathology and that all too many Indians, particularly those in positions of potentially constructive influence in society, are indifferent to the melancholy condition of most of their fellow citizens. If Schreiber is right that 'social justice' is the 'necessary technical condition' for economic growth in an industrial society the outlook for industrial research and development in India is bleak indeed.

But is Schreiber necessarily right? Does he possibly have an idealised view of American society? Are there, as thoughtful Americans have come painfully to realize in the last few years, deep-seated racial and social inequalities in their own society? And if there are, what implications do they have for the R & D activity in American industry which has apparently been a major factor in the extraordinary affluence of American society, not to mention the increasing American economic domination of western Europe.

To match Bernard Nossiter's 'horror story' of the dying salesman on the road near Delhi there is the young woman in Queens, a district of New York City, who was murdered in broad daylight while any number of witnesses looked on, refusing to come to her aid for fear of 'getting involved' with the authorities. For social pathology of a more pervasive and less individual character, what sharper indictment is possible than the discrimination, economic, social, and educational, of Black and other disadvantaged, racial and cultural minorities in American society by the affluent white majority.

President Nixon's recognition of the political potency of the 'silent majority'

in American society suggests that this kind of doleful diagnosis of the malaise in American society may be closer to reality than most Americans are willing to admit. For, while an increasing proportion of white Americans wallow in what is, by world standards, indescribable affluence, the US Government's investment of resources in the growing gap between the rich and the poor in the modern world is decreasing absolutely and relatively (measured over the long term).

The social pathology implicit in the possession of great wealth and social indifference is indeed America's paradox. This paradox is simply possession of the apparent means to meet for the first time critical human needs and the failure on the part of American society to do so.

The excuse so often advanced for the failure of American society to begin to meet the needs of the disadvantaged at home and abroad is the burdensome cost of the American military involvement in Viet Nam. But this excuse is not really convincing in light of the fantastic growth in national wealth and the relatively modest levels of taxation. Indeed, as more than one observer of contemporary America pointed out, it is by no means certain, once the Viet Nam conflict has been resolved, that the political leadership in American society, reflecting the will of the dominant majority, will allocate substantial resources to the effort to abolish poverty at home and abroad.

Racial and social injustice in American society is scarcely the consequence of research and development in American industry. But if research and development is a major factor in technological innovation, if technological innovation is a principal cause of American affluence, and if American society generates indifference toward the plight of others in the modern world, then one may legitimately wonder what will happen if the social tensions in American society reach a point where widespread disorders, particularly in large American cities, become endemic.

But, the problem is not confined to American society. The parallels between the deep-seated crisis in the American social order in the mid-1960s and the 'international poverty crisis' are striking. Max Millikan has written (*Television Quarterly*, Spring, 1968, pp 82-83): 'A very interesting parallel can be drawn here between what is happening to the newly awakened people of the underdeveloped world and what is happening to our own .

underprivileged minority groups in the United States. There was no violence in the slums, no emergence of a Black Power movement, and very little extremist agitation among American minority groups until their economic, social and political position began to improve. People do not revolt against conditions they regard as hopeless and unchangeable. It is when conditions begin to get better and aspirations previously regarded as hopelessly unrealistic begin to seem possible that frustration mounts and spills over into extremism and violence.'

All societies have their mythologies. Just as one of the American myths is that American society represents the ultimate stage of social justice and individual mobility, so is there an Indian myth that Indian civilization has the ultimate capacity among major civilizations for synthesising diverse external cultural influences. On the contrary, argues Ainslie T. Embree in a provocative essay entitled 'Tradition and Modernization in India: Synthesis or Encapsulation' (in *Science and the Human Condition in India and Pakistan*, New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1968, pp. 29-30).

Can science as understood in the West, asks Professor Embree, find a ready and compatible lodging within the context of these values and attitudes that give Indian civilization its distinctive character? Most modern Indians, he suggests, would respond not only with a resounding affirmative but would even deny the question's validity.

If, on the other hand, Professor Embree is right, the growth of modern science and technology in India may have quite a different result from what many Indians anticipate. 'The scientific and cultural impact of the modern world may indeed transform it. However, the process may be marked not by synthesis, but by erosion and decay of the traditional values and ideals of Indian culture. This conclusion may, of course, be accepted with equanimity or even pleasure, but it is surely worth consideration and thought, for something quite different may happen. As in previous encounters with alien elements, Indian society may encapsulate the scientific and technological learning of the modern world.'

There is no reason to assume that this kind of encapsulation process will be confined to scientific and technological elites in Indian society. For, if the disparities between the rich and the poor societies on a global scale continue to increase at the rate at which they have been in recent years, the North Atlantic Community (with the addition of the Soviet Union and

Japan), already controlling 80 per cent of the world's wealth with 20 per cent of its population, will be by the year 2000 encapsulated 'golden ghettos' in a vast world-wide slum. Virtually every projection of economic growth rates over the next 30 years to the end of the second millennium in the year 2000 shows an alarming increase in the gap between the rich and the poor nations.

Per capita income in the United States, now in the neighbourhood of \$3,500 may well rise, according to the projection of Herman Kohn and Anthony J. Weiner (*The Year Two Thousand*, New York: Macmillan, 1969, p. 110), to almost \$7,000 in the next three decades. In contrast, this estimate, which places India's per capita gross national product at \$99 in 1965, projects a growth rate which, while somewhat higher than that of the United States, will still only result in a per capita income of around \$200 in the year 2000. Thus, the gap will increase between the United States and India from \$3,400 in 1965 to somewhat more than \$6,500 in the year 2000. It will indeed be, as Barbara Ward has suggested in her recent book of the same title (New York: Norton, 1968), a 'lopsided world'.

These global social phenomena may seem remote to the more immediate concerns of those preoccupied with technological innovation in India and America. Yet it is precisely because technological innovation holds out such promise for increasing wealth in order to make possible a more equitable distribution of material things in life that those involved in technological innovation should be conscious of the critical role which they have to play.

If public freedom and dignity are in fact based upon the capacity for technological innovation, those who now enjoy that freedom and dignity have, most of all, reason to be concerned, as Kalman Silvert argues in *Scientific Myth: The Social Reality of Scientific Myth* (New York: American Universities Field Staff 1969, p. 234): 'Increasing demands for public freedom and dignity throughout the world are putting to the test of innovation those groups that have been enjoying the freedom that accompanies power. If the privileged free their power to deny the growth and spread of freedom for others, they will probably sacrifice their own measure of innovative and creative liberty.'

If Schreiber is wrong in his insistence that 'social justice' is the crucial pre-condition for technological advance in the modern world, India's prospects may, in a perverse

way, be enhanced. If America has been able to advance technologically, without achieving 'social justice', then India need not wait for 'social justice' before moving forward technologically.

But, the fact remains that American society is vastly more affluent than Indian society. If 'social justice', which is lacking in both societies in greater or lesser measure, is not the critical ingredient, what is? A number of possibilities suggest themselves, but no clear and unequivocal answers are available. Is it, perhaps, a better natural resource endowment and a more hospitable environment, largely unpopulated and unspoiled, with which the United States began its extraordinary economic advance, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century?

Is it lack of colonial subjugation in modern times which provided additional opportunities for social and economic growth in the United States that were denied to India under British domination? Can it be said that the United States had easier access to the science-based technology which began to emerge in western Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?

If these are all factors in the American economic advance and technological pre-eminence in the modern world, what then are India's prospects, lacking these particular advantages, and worse than that, saddled with the inhibiting factors of disease, poverty, and overpopulation so eloquently described by the architect of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru: 'It is science alone that can solve the problem of hunger and poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening custom and tradition, of vast resources running to waste, of a rich country inhabited by starving people. Who indeed can afford to ignore science today? At every turn we have to seek its aid. The future belongs to science and to those who make friends with science.'

Only the hindsight of the future will make possible conclusive answers to these questions. But if social justice is not a pre-condition for technological innovation, self-sustained industrial growth, based on the increasing use of India's own scientific and technological talent and freed from the uncertainties and costs of dependence on foreign technology, is surely one means of achieving that goal.

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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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


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


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
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
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# The problem

WHEN the tenth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations was celebrated in San Francisco in 1955, an atmosphere of hope persisted amidst the prevailing cold war tensions. It was the more remarkable as the U.N. had been misused. For instance, it was a combatant in the Korean war and, up to today, the antagonist of North Korea across the armistice table in Panmunjom is neither South Korea nor the U.S.A. but the United Nations.

Today, as its twenty-fifth anniversary nears, the atmosphere is greatly altered. In some ways the U.N. has come into its own: it cannot be misused easily. Neither the U.S.A. nor the Soviet Union can take it for granted. Yet there is a sense of disenchantment, even despair. Secretary-General U Thant said last year that the U.N. would collapse within ten years if it did not become effective. Why the disenchantment? An obvious answer is that the U.N. now confronts some very complex issues such as environmental pollution, race conflict, economic development, peace-keeping. While unanticipated problems have arisen, those anticipated have proved intractable. A feeling of inadequacy has spread in the U.N. Idealism has given way to doubt.

A deeper search leads us to look at the history of the U.N. It reveals an abrupt shift in its purpose. The shift was noted by many observers: 'The United Nations was conceived in the midst of the second world war and, although international cooperation was to be the cornerstone, the primary goal was security, defined in the narrowest sense. This is not to say that no attention was paid to the economic and social aspects but rather that they were given secondary importance. Ecosoc, after all, existed from the outset but, according to Edward Stettinius, it was only the insistence of the United States at the Yalta Conference that secured agreement for its creation, the other Great Powers being less convinced of the

need for an organization that was broader in concept than a security body' (*Jackson Report*, Vol.II, p.5)

Moreover, international security was to be achieved not by conventional methods but by a new diplomacy. Reporting on the Yalta conference, Franklin D. Roosevelt told the U.S. Congress that the founding of the U.N. 'spells the end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balance of power and all the other expedients which have been used for centuries—and which have failed. We proposed to substitute for these a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will have a chance to join.'

The plan to establish collective security in place of power politics was never implemented. But power politics failed to produce a balance of power or create a sense of international security. After President Roosevelt's death in 1945, the US Government failed to implement its commitment to collective security. As it was the major proponent of collective security, as well as the strongest State in economic and military terms, its defection from the proposed system of collective security embodied in the United Nations was climactic: it put an end to the role of the United Nations for which it was created, namely, the instrument for international security. The major reason for the change was the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the U.S.A. As Inis Claude observes, 'I am entirely convinced that the fact of the thermonuclear revolution has made a drastic difference in the nature of the United Nations and the kind of role it has had open to it on the stage of the Globe Theater' (*The Changing United Nations*, p. 4).

In the present writer's judgment, the nuclear weapons traumatized American leaders. The threat of humanity's—and America's—annihila-

tion rose as a spectre. American leaders could not trust anyone to keep the finger on the nuclear trigger. Moreover, nuclear monopoly provided the U.S.A. with a dominant position in world politics, which it has sought to protect and enhance. Thus, the assumption underlying the United Nations Charter shifted suddenly. The U.S.A. was no longer one of the great powers but the only superpower. Britain's rapid decline as a world power and the communist revolution in China intensified America's sense of lonesome responsibility and power.

When the United States under President Truman and his successors proceeded to develop itself as the dominant world power, the U.N. was useful only as a means to that end. So long as the U.S.A. expected to maintain worldwide political supremacy, the U.N. retained a sense of purpose as an instrument for that end. But the U.S.A. did not gain universal acceptance as the dominant world power and the United Nations also became increasingly intractable as an instrument of American diplomacy. In other words, while the U.N. was becoming less easy to wield, the U.S.A. was becoming less certain of what to wield it for.

In the meantime, the U.N. had been diverted from its original purpose and has proved unable to recover it. Deprived of its main function at the very moment of birth, the United Nations suffered a 'loss of identity' and grasped at substitutes. But the diversion of its energies to economic and social issues is makeshift. As it was not planned to serve as promoter of economic and social development, the growing concentration on these activities makes demands upon the organization that it cannot meet.

For instance, more than 80 per cent of the activity of the U.N. and its agencies is devoted to problems of economic and social development. In 1960 it launched the first development decade, aiming to bring about a rate of growth in developing countries of 5 per cent per year. It was expected that the developed countries would agree to devote 1 per cent of their Gross National Product to economic and technical assistance. Neither of these aims has been realised and, with a sense of growing desperation, the U.N. has launched on the second development decade beginning this year. It is unlikely that by 1980 the developing countries will make significant progress relatively or in absolute terms. The process of development has proved more intractable than was believed even a decade ago. Transferring of technology and generating socio-political momentum have turned out to be very difficult operations.

Worse still is the persistence of parasitical and exploitative relations between the developed and the developing countries. The industrialized States cannot desist from exploiting the economically weaker ones, retarding and

distorting their growth. The exploitative relations spring from the objective economic, social and political conditions of the States. Even if governments or public bodies in the developed countries want to help those in the poorer lands, and even if the latter want to obtain help and use it, the socio-economic conditions on the two sides form a barrier.

The exploitative relations can be altered only by a great effort, a deep political change. The weaker States must break out of the sphere of influence and control of the developed nations, but the latter interpret such attempts as insurgency, rebellion, threats to world peace justifying armed intervention. The United Nations has been active in the political emancipation of dependent countries but, as captive of the great powers, there are severe limits to what it may accomplish. Paradoxically, the political thrust of the U.N. is anti-imperialist but its concepts of social and economic development are colonialist. The anomaly partly explains the ineffectiveness of the U.N.

Industrial nations face a deep challenge to their socio-economic structures from the disaffected youth and radical intellectuals. There is disenchantment with the results of advanced industrialism: environmental decay, over-consumption, dehumanization. It has produced a feeling of insecurity among the dominant economic and political elites. Faced with the growing challenge, the great powers are unwilling to compromise with insurgent Third World powers. Rather, they rely increasingly on their involvement abroad to maintain power at home. Thus, not merely does President Thieu of South Viet Nam rely for his survival on the U.S. Government but the American military-industrial establishment depends on Thieu for its survival.

Successful revolutions abroad deprive industrial countries of their markets but, more importantly, knock out the props of their political and economic structures. Thus the developed industrial States cannot permit unhampered growth of the economically weaker nations. Among countries that have made decisive progress in economic development after World War II, the political problem was solved in one way or another before economic miracles happened.

These countries include Japan, China, West Germany, East Germany, even though some of these were not undeveloped lands to begin with. Some of them solved the political problem by virtually renouncing their sovereignty. West Germany and Japan, for instance, became political dependencies of the U.S.A. and East Germany of the Soviet Union. China solved its political problem by a resolute assertion of autonomy. Only after the political issue was resolved, permitting the focussing of the society's energies on economic tasks, did economic growth become rapid. The fact of the

matter is that economic tasks cannot be separated from political goals.

Programmes of technical and economic assistance of the United Nations depend on the support of the industrial States, not merely financially and administratively but for ideas. In propagating the western ideas, however, the United Nations obstructs rather than fosters economic development. The constraints on the power of the United Nations in programmes of economic development are revealed in the fate of attempts to generate investment capital through the U.N. The first attempt was the establishment of the Special United Nations Development Fund (SUNFED).

As the *Jackson Report* summarizes the outcome: 'This move was prompted by several forces, among which were the rapid growth in the understanding of development problems, the great expansion of practical technical assistance work, and the incipient concern felt over the developing countries growing debt service burden. It naturally attracted the enthusiastic support of the developing countries, whose political strength in bodies such as the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the Specialised Agencies had by then increased very substantially. However, the majority of the richer countries expressed a rooted dislike of the idea...' (*Jackson Report*, Vol. II, p. 11).

The second attempt was made in 1966 when the developing countries, 'feeling even more sharply the deficiencies of both bilateral and United Nations systems of aiding their development, finally used their voting strength in the UN General Assembly to force through the Capital Development Fund, in the hope that their urgent needs would prompt the more generous of the donors to endow it adequately. The purpose of the Fund was to provide capital at low rates of interest and the intention was to finance it by voluntary contributions. But the pledging conference was boycotted by the developed countries and its resources limited to convertible currencies. Three years later, pledged contributions to the Fund still totalled only US \$ 2.6 million, of which not more than US \$ 128,000 had been paid in by June 3, 1969. No separate organization has been set up, the administration of the Fund being entrusted, for the time being, to the Administrator of UNDP.' (*Jackson Report*, Vol. II, p. 17)

This brings us to the structural crisis of the United Nations. Prevented from fulfilling its original function and diverted to secondary purposes (but disabled from accomplishing also these), the United Nations has atrophied, even though departments and agencies have proliferated. Agencies often fail to meet the problems they were created to solve but provide occupation for the growing body of international civil servants. Individuals are appeased in this

way. Expansion of the departments and agencies becomes a way of evading the issues. The organizational disbalance has reached a point where, instead of adequately meeting its tasks, the U.N. is unable to manage itself.

Recent studies of the organizational structure of the U.N. have pointed out that it has grown octopus-like where one limb does not know what another is doing. Each limb tends to arrogate universality of functions to itself. A critic has noted: 'It is clearly in the interests of the promoters of any change or project to imply that their proposed problem coverage policy is "comprehensive"—while soliciting funds—and then limit themselves at an operational level to what is manageable—once the funds have been obtained. This form of misrepresentation can lead to assumptions that a given project or programme will solve the comprehensive problems and to serious, but hidden, gaps which will be detected years later. . .' (Anthony J. N. Judge, 'Planning for the 1960s in the 1970s': Part I, *International Associations*, March 1970, p. 137).

Thus, the United Nations Development Programme regards itself as the core of the entire organization. Where several agencies feel thus, the result is mutual incapacitation. Any proposal to improve the functioning of the United Nations leads to the formation of a new agency, adding to the already unwieldy structure.

The *Jackson Report* points to the hoarding of information by the different agencies: 'Often the information required is known to one or other parts of the UN development system but is not readily available, either because communication facilities are inadequate, or because it is "hoarded" by the agency.' (*Jackson Report*, Vol. I, p. 30). The breakdown in the communication between different divisions and agencies is a phenomenon familiar to members of other organizations. It is a symptom of the deeper malaise, for the United Nations was virtually decapitated when it was deprived of its original function.

The loss of the purpose made survival the main concern of the organization. The organization turned increasingly inward, seeking to justify and protect itself. An organization can function effectively only when it is imbued with a sense of purpose outside of itself. Loss of the purpose drives it to struggle for survival and it adopts a defensive posture.

The situation resembles that projected for a civilized society by historian Rushton Coulborn in his study, *Feudalism in History*. When a civilized society loses the organizing values that held it together, the political order disintegrates. However, Coulborn argues that no civilized society disintegrates into fragments smaller than a viable social unit, which is the feudal fief. One may discern a similar process in the decay of organizations which dissolve into small but sur-

viable fragments, namely departments. These constituent units assert an increasing autonomy or new units are added that assume a parasitic relationship to the parent organization. The fragmentation cannot be reversed by organizational therapy. Only a new purpose that serves an energizing role can recreate the organization as a dynamic body.

Critics point to the predominant share of economic and social programmes in U.N. activity; they imply, as do the authors of the *Jackson Report*, that streamlining economic development programmes would be tantamount to streamlining the U.N. Our arguments is that its focus on social and economic activities followed the loss of its essential function; further enhancing these activities would lead to still greater demoralization of the U.N. Yet, it cannot be an effective agent of economic and social development unless it becomes an effective instrument of military and political security.

The problem of the United Nations is the atrophy of its function as an instrument of security. Yet the function has not been revoked formally. It remains on the books and is activated for peace-keeping purposes occasionally. Even the Military Staff Committee meets every Thursday in the Headquarters although it does not have soldiers to command. Thus, as Inis Claude argues, Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter, for equipping the Security Council with military forces have been 'for all practical purposes, deleted from the Charter...' (*The Changing United Nations*, p. 30f.) When all permanent members and four non-permanent members decide to do so, the Security Council is empowered to apply military sanctions.

These powers remain shadowy relics of the original plan. But the discrepancy between shadow and reality (or reality of the shadows) haunts the United Nations. The discrepancy must be resolved or the shadows dispelled. Even if the United Nations were organized to deal with problems of economic and social development, it would remain important to solve the political issues, particularly the continuing dependency of the developing upon the developed countries. Only when the United Nations is fully seized with the task of maintaining international security could it provide the framework in which weak States might attain genuine political autonomy.

Present trends point towards the depoliticization of the United Nations. Ambassador J. A. Castro of Brazil asserted recently: 'It becomes a little more obvious every day that the United Nations plays a smaller and smaller role in the political strategy of the super powers who prefer to negotiate secretly and bilaterally on a considerable number of issues.' ('The Embarrassment of the United Nations,' *The Center Magazine*, May 1970, p. 72). Ambassador Samar Sen of India added: 'Unfortunately, one of the

reasons why the United Nations has not been as effective as it should have been, could have been, and yet can be, is that the facts are not made public...' (*Ibid.*, p. 79)

The policy of bypassing the United Nations initiated by President Truman has been accepted by the other super powers. But the USA was unable to establish *pax americana*. Nor will the two super powers be able to establish *pax russro-americana* because they are rivals and other challengers are emerging. The American nuclear trauma does not permit sharing power and responsibility with the Soviet Union. If the United Nations was depoliticized and, as Ambassador Castro put it, changed into 'a branch of the Red Cross,' it would rob many of its 126 members of actual or potential political influence.

Yet, the super powers also find the shadowy political and security functions of the United Nations useful. The refusal of the U.S.A. to act against South Africa or Rhodesia is explained away by blaming the irresponsibility of the United Nations. But the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. present the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a U.N. decision which members are morally expected to honour.

The withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Indo-China heralds the failure of its effort, which commenced with the acquisition of nuclear weapons and rejection of collective security, to establish world hegemony. Neither separately nor jointly are the super powers able to resolve the deepening crisis in the Middle East. They will have to turn to the United Nations to seek and ratify a settlement. But the security function of the United Nations has virtually atrophied. The international situation today is not what it was in 1945 when the Charter was promulgated. Is the United Nations in the new and unanticipated circumstances capable of recapturing its purpose?

A precondition of its success is the rejection of conventional western concepts of security as of economic and social development. The influence of military technology in producing insecurity is coming to be appreciated. If the unchecked growth of technology jeopardizes security, new challenges face the United Nations in fulfilling its security functions. Unfortunately, the United Nations, Unesco and other agencies have become captive to conventional western notions of military security, technological proficiency, systems management, social development and modernization. In this way the U.N. is suffused with obsolescent concepts; it is incapable of innovative ideas. New concepts are necessary for security and development. It is here that member States such as India as well as scholars can play a part in reorienting the United Nations family to creative paths.

# **Action for reform**

C. D. DESHMUKH

ANY tolerably objective appraisal of the United Nations today, on the occasion of the completion this year of the 25th anniversary of

the organisation, is likely to point to a more or less widely-shared view that it has proved ineffective when seriously tested. The main

concerns of the United Nations have been world peace, world economic development, human and social rights and the scientific and technological revolution. Except in regard to the last, achievements have been poor to disappointing, the bulk of the problems touched remaining practically unsolved.

General Carlos P. Romulo, speaking on the 25th Commemorative Session of the UN in San Francisco, California, on June 26, 1970, made observations which may fairly be called representative comments and not carping criticism. He said: 'Today, twenty-five years after San Francisco, the bright vision of a world at peace thriving under a just law retains its hold on the minds of men. But there is wide-spread disillusionment with the United Nations, the instrument that was to translate that vision into reality.'

Even in regard to economic and social work the role of the United Nations is, he pointed out, marginal. According to him 'in the enforcement of measures to ensure respect for fundamental human rights its role after twenty-five years also tends towards marginality'. U Thant, the Secretary-General himself, in a speech prepared for delivery at a banquet in San Francisco commemorating the 25th anniversary of the signing of the UN Charter, characterised the current assessment of the situation in regard to the functioning of the UN as a crisis of confidence. His own view, however, seemed to point to a graver diagnosis. 'Unlike other institutions', he declared, 'the United Nations had not emerged from relative impotence to the position of accepted power and authority'.

**F**rom diagnosis every responsible pronouncement has to proceed to prognosis. General Romulo exhorted all nations to rededicate themselves to the historic purpose of the United Nations, recognising that it is indistinguishable from the 'cause of man', and to reaffirm their belief that the UN is the heart of the human community, on the basis of national independence and international interdependence,

buoyed up by faith in the ultimate wisdom of peoples to govern their own destinies as members of the world society.

U Thant presented in his San Francisco speech a 6-point plan, comprising (a) a radical change on the part of government from the present power-politics to the policy of collective responsibility to mankind, (ii) on the part of the super powers a change from confrontation and division to the building up of a safe and peaceful world, (iii) involvement of the People's Republic of China in international affairs, (iv) a closer look into the obstacle of ideologies—can there be in this uneven world any universal recipe or system for elimination of poverty?, (v) a new and more helpful angle in regard to justice and human rights, and (vi) perceptive and resolute facing of new collective challenges and dangers arising from 'rapidly mushrooming scientific and technological civilization'.

**I**t is doubtful if harking back to 'the same high level of determination and vision as that of the authors of the Charter' drafted in San Francisco 25 years ago is in reality likely to mend matters. Many competent observers have pointed out how right at its inception the great powers who promoted the UN, apart from the USA, only reluctantly agreed to the original purpose, viz., security, being enlarged so as to include economic and social development. Security itself, it was fondly hoped, would be achieved by substituting, through an international organisation which all peace-loving nations would join, for power politics a new open diplomacy.

A little reflection would show that, the nature of power being what it is, such an attempt was foredoomed to failure. The major factor that made such a fate certain was the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the USA. This gave an entirely new dimension to power and transformed the attitude of the USA from enthusiastic support of the UN as the main hope of mankind for peace to a respectable instrument for maintaining

the position of the nation as a dominant world power.

**I**n retrospect, it seems strange that such an expectation should have been entertained inconsistent with the history of the advance of science and technology. Within less than a generation from the inception of the UN the world has now an imposing nuclear club. Proliferation is a real danger and even the belief that nuclear proliferation will inevitably involve nations rather than limited resource organisations because of the high 'entry prices' is being discredited by the technical information and data on nuclear weapons available in public literature. Conceding that the forces that determine the extent of nuclear proliferation are not so much technical as political and military, it is easy to see why instead of peace by open diplomacy the chief aim of the super powers of the world is to create a credible deterrent.

In the meanwhile the balance of terror has reached a height that seems to guarantee an uneasy peace, which is subject to one grave qualification. That is the outbreak of small conventional wars or hostilities which the super powers individually or collectively through the UN cannot control or limit. Indeed, on considerations relevant to this muted power struggle they frequently add fuel to the fire by freely supplying sophisticated but non-nuclear arms to one or the other side, while the UN watches the raging hostilities helplessly.

Inherently, transfers of technology and bringing about social change are difficult operations. What is more, the means at the disposal of the UN for fulfilling this part of its responsibility are entirely dependent on the will of its member nations. Their decisions are essentially political in nature and naturally tend to favour bilateral foreign aid rather than aid through the multilateral and to a large degree non-political channels of the UN. An uncharitable view expressed in this con-

text goes to the length of stating: 'Paradoxically, the political thrust of the UN is anti-imperialist but its concepts of social and economic development are colonialist.'

The government of a State or a nation takes decisions and follows policies which are neither predictable nor in accordance with any constant pattern. There are important values which have to be taken account of by those responsible for critical policy decisions in international relations in particular. Some years ago, Dr and Mrs Philip E. Jacob of the University of Pennsylvania undertook a programme of comparative studies on value influences in international policy making but the results are not available to the writer. It is probable that a major finding will be that the will of the people ultimately makes itself felt in the nations' political behaviour across national lines. Neither the people nor the government of a nation can be expected to take risks in regard to matters that touch their vital interests, human nature being what it is. Nearly always the people are likely to be more charitable, understanding and generous than their own governments, these latter being in the nature of trustees.

**A**t the UN is structured today there is no likelihood of member States, especially the super powers, adopting in relation to security or aid for economic development a more accommodating attitude. This is because the decisions of the UN are dependent on a simple majority of its General Assembly, each member State, irrespective of size or importance having one vote. nor are the veto-wielding members of the Security Council likely to risk sacrifice of interests considered vital and are bound, as they have done in the past, to obstruct decisions tending in the least in this direction.

If better performance is desired of the UN the first essential is to re-structure the mode of voting. Clark and Sohn in their *World Peace Through World Law* have suggested a revised scheme, which does

not give adequate weightage to the nations which have a high per capita national income indicative of affluence and power. On the other hand, votage in accordance with total population will give undue dominance to the voice of weak developing countries like India. A scheme striking a compromise between affluence and numbers in the matter of voting strength will probably be acceptable generally. With such a change, the surrender of national sovereignty implicit in any conceivable UN Charter will be followed up by a less inhibited approach by member States to the collective exercise of the powers conferred. Indeed, a gradual extension of the scope of such surrender to cover, for instance, the creation of an effective international police force or a world development authority will encounter less resistance at the member State and each popular level. What seems to be called for, in effect, is a more viable world order.

**O**f the few global organisations working out models to this end, the World Law Fund is the most active. It has currently under way the World Order Models Project, under the direction of Dr. Saul Mendlovitz, which is a research programme simultaneously conducted at Centres in Africa, Germany, India, Japan, Latin-America, the USSR, the USA, and a couple of other centres. Each research team will submit the final draft of its 'model' in December 1970. There have been several meetings of the Directors of these projects at which conceptual matters have been discussed and clarified.

The World Order Models Project envisages not only a wide-ranging overhaul of the machinery of the UN but also the quest of some other radically different instruments, adapted to the conditions of the world some 20 years hence. In preparing their models the research teams will be concerned with the role, in 1990, of world organisations, supranational and international institutions, transitional arrangements and the

nation-State—as well as the part played by individual citizens'.

**W**hile this exercise in futurology is necessary and bound to be of great significance, and its completion and wide publication, as intended, will stimulate thinking all over the world, it is clear that such thinking has to be assisted by a wide spread educational programme in schools and colleges. The World Law Fund has, as part of its activities, built up much instructional material. It is also heartening to note that during the past decade the study of world order has become an acceptable academic concern. Supporting programmes to translate such concern into educational practice are already being undertaken.

The search for a world order is a far more complicated business than the above outline could indicate. The substantive matters comprehended are a range of actors and a range of dimensions of world political and community processes. The former include world institutions, international organisations, regional arrangements, transitional actors, the nation-State, infra-national groups and the individual. The latter, i.e., dimensions of political and community processes, are what we are familiar with in the Charter, plus one that has recently attracted world attention as vital for man's very existence, viz., ecological stability.

It is interesting to recall that almost every notable anniversary of the UN has evoked a pessimistic appraisal of the organisation and occasioned the putting forward of ideas on, 'A constitution of the World'. In 1965, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary, the Centre for the study of Democratic Institutions, put out a pamphlet carrying such a title and re-publishing the Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution by a Committee of USA academics, assisted by a group of legal scholars, social scientists and political philosophers and their assistants, accompanied by an assertion that the bulk of the Draft, and the voluminous research material on which it was

based, has maintained an amazing currency.

**I**t is crystal clear that the remedy to the ills of the UN lies not in solemn exhortations to the member nations generally or the super powers in particular to rededicate themselves to peace, but in initiating deliberative action for concrete reform based on a better understanding of the changes that have taken place in the world since the halcyon days of 1945 when the UN was conceived.

Richard Gardner, a former US Deputy Under-Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs has outlined a ten-point plan as a basis for discussion, comprising universal membership, reducing the gap between voting power and the real power in the organs, to pay special attention to the violation of human rights and improvements in administrative and financial procedures. Finance, incidentally, is pitifully short and uncertain; voting power and financial contribution, so far as the General Assembly is concerned are irritatingly ill-matched—in the view of the big powers.

Lester Pearson has perceptively observed that from the beginning the big powers have used the UN primarily for their narrow national purposes. He has urged that the Secretary General should appoint three well-qualified individuals of broad experience and high reputation to report on what should be done to make the UN function more effectively. This is in all conscience a very modest step forward. But, if and when it comes to making even the minimum structural changes, will there be a meeting of the minds between the few big nations and the numerous others? In the short run, i.e., within a period much briefer than what would be required for an evolutionary or science-induced genetic change in human nature, the chances of such a consummation devoutly to be wished for are slim. Momentous decisions follow only cataclysmic events.

The establishment of the League of Nations and of the United

Nations were the product of the world's war-weariness after an Armageddon. Man's chastened spirit influenced the leaders of nations enough to induce them to hammer out some sort of rudimentary world government for the first and second time in human history. But their mental reserves were very much alive. It is almost as if they agreed to promote the world organisations mentioned above with their tongues in their cheeks. This being so it is doubtful if the world's statesmen will be prepared to go further in these periodical exercises, especially as, paradoxically enough, the possibility of World War III is so remote as to be negligible. Furthermore, as has been well pointed out, the development of nuclear weapons has made victory an empty term when applied to modern warfare.

**F**. J. Norman, writing on prevention of war and timely intervention in the *Army Quarterly* (V. 98 July 1969) observed: 'Neither arms control nor disarmament offers a realistic answer to the basic problem of the nuclear age—finding a reliable means of preventing war. The only effective means of achieving this objective at present is to maintain a credible deterrent; i.e., one which does not rely solely on nuclear weapons but includes a capability for timely intervention to prevent escalation of smaller conflicts into general war. This requires a flexible force structure, great strategic mobility, and a broadening of the instruction of professional soldiers in the political aspects of warfare.'

With the super powers likely to be preoccupied with the above problem, they and their people are likely to be inhospitable to any plan of reforming the UN which involves a markedly extended surrender of sovereignty.

But the world is already in the space age and no one can predict accurately what the womb of the future, especially in relation to science and technology holds. It is not impossible that man will realise sooner than is imagined what senseless folly it is for men to be ranged in rival camps.

# **Renewal of faith**

G. PARTHASARATHI

TWENTY FIVE years ago, the United Nations was founded as a solemn affirmation of mankind's determination to rid the world of war and want, to enlarge the frontiers of freedom and ensure respect for the dignity and worth of the human person. As we approach the Silver Jubilee Celebrations to be held in October in New York, there is more than the customary interest everywhere in making assessments of the functioning of the World Body, of its achievements and deficiencies. In the

context of an unsettled and anarchic international situation, where a menacing arms race is escalating to dangerous proportions, where strife, violence and tension prevail in many parts of the world and small nations feel insecure, where freedom is suppressed and indignity is heaped upon many subject peoples, where the yawning gap between the rich and poor nations is widening piling up grave social and political problems for the future, it is not surprising that there should be disenchantment

with the United Nations and its efforts to build a democratic world order.

The developments which cause concern to the international community are well known. The horrors of the long war in Indo-China remain unabated, with no early prospect of peace or lessening of tensions in that sensitive area. Three years after the Security Council passed a unanimous resolution on West Asia, there is a streak of hope that the first steps may be taken in the implementation of the resolution. But the situation still remains uncertain and grave. In Southern Africa, the white minority rulers continue to oppress millions of African people in blatant defiance of the decisions of the United Nations. Till this hard core of colonialism is eliminated, the attention and energy of the people of Africa will remain diverted from the main task of development and progress and prevent them from rising to their full stature in the world community.

**M**eanwhile, the arms race is in full swing and the precarious balance between the two super powers is being threatened by menacing developments in the field of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Secretary-General has noted that the estimated world expenditure on armaments is of the order of 200 billion dollars a year. While these resources are being wasted, there has not been sufficient political will and commitment on the part of the developed countries to take the necessary steps in the field of trade and aid to achieve even the modest targets set for the Development Decade.

The prognosis in respect of the economic growth possibilities of the developing countries is grim. Trade between the developing and developed countries will continue to decline; so will foreign aid. Employment in the developing world will fall. Estimates of per capita incomes show that the gap between the developed and developing countries will increase

Against this background of prevailing international tensions and mounting social problems, it is natural that there should be a set-back to the eager optimism generated when the UN was founded.

**S**ome of the basic causes for the failure of the World Body to fulfil the high hopes and expectations that were raised in 1945, have been analysed lucidly in the 'poser' article. The analysis is generally valid in historical and organisational terms. The nagging doubt which runs through the article, as to the capacity of the United Nations to deal resolutely with the grave problems that face the world of today and tomorrow is also understandable. Nevertheless, a prudent assessment has to be made to determine the future course of action. Renewal of faith in the Charter is necessary; so is reform needed for the Organisation to function in a more effective manner in the new international environment. However discouraging the prognosis, we can only build on what has existed.

As we survey the world scene in the post-war years, with its bitter power struggles and ideological conflicts, the surprise is not that the United Nations has not ushered in the new world order, but that it has survived at all. It has not only survived but played its part in preventing a major war. This in itself is no mean achievement.

Moreover, the United Nations has in some notable cases been able to bring about a cessation of hostilities and also prevent tense situations from developing into armed conflicts. These achievements have been made possible not because the United Nations has been able to exercise its authority with any special means at its disposal, but because it represents the fervent wish of mankind for peace and peaceful settlements. Its greatest value is that it provides a forum where the influence of international public opinion can be brought to bear on nations which are in conflict. Every nation, big or small, is accountable for its international conduct before the

United Nations. In spite of blatant defiance by some notorious member States, on the whole this aspect of accountability to a World Body is important; it acts as a restraining influence.

The Charter provides that the United Nations should be 'a centre for harmonising the actions of nations' in the attainment of its noble purposes. While this objective has not been fully realised, the United Nations does provide valuable opportunities for multilateral diplomacy and the use of good offices which have proved beneficial in critical situations.

**U**ndoubtedly, the role of the United Nations has been most significant in hastening the process of decolonisation, initiating schemes of social and economic betterment and the development of international law. The United Nations has been particularly vigorous in its passionate support for the freedom and independence of subject peoples. In the field of economic and social affairs, it has provided a forum for discussions and negotiations between the developing and developed countries in vital matters of trade, development and distribution of the world's wealth.

Thus, a proper reappraisal of the functioning of the United Nations needs to be done without undue satisfaction over its past achievements or scepticism and cynicism regarding its capacity to deal with the manifold and intricate problems of the future. Obviously, much remains to be done to make it a truly effective world organisation which would fulfil the objectives of the Charter.

In this context, it is significant that the Secretary-General, who is a sensitive and dedicated person, has been urging for a year that the 25th Anniversary should be celebrated 'with due solemnity' and that the celebrations should be substantive and not ceremonial. The theme of the commemoration would be 'Peace, Justice and Progress' and a special effort is being made to reach specific agreements among member States on such

major issues as development, peace-keeping, disarmament, decolonisation, human rights and friendly relations among nations. This is an approach which should commend itself as being constructive and help to kindle faith in the World Organisation.

But the task facing the United Nations in the sombre international situation of the seventies demands more than renewal of faith; it needs reform, innovation and action. Hence the significance of the oft-quoted warning of U Thant: 'The UN has ten years to become effective or disappear.'

The effectiveness or otherwise of the UN is conditioned by the balance of forces within the Organisation and the world outside. Any discussion, therefore, on suggestions for improving the functioning of the UN has to be placed in that setting. The balance of the Organisation has shifted drastically since it was founded in 1945 with 51 members, the majority of whom were European and American. The majority of the 126 members today are African and Asian, rendering the problem of 'management' of the General Assembly more difficult. While the super powers often succeed in blocking adverse votes on issues in which they are vitally interested, they cannot have their own way in the Assembly.

Again, not all the great powers of 1945 are great any more. The two 'enemy States' are major powers by virtue of their economic strength and military potential. China has emerged as a contending power defying the authority of the super powers. The world of the seventies is therefore infinitely more complex than what was envisaged when the Charter was drawn up.

In its early life, the United Nations was bedevilled by the bitterness of the cold war which eroded the major premise of great power unanimity on which the UN security system was based. Today, the spectre of super power 'collusion' is being raised. It used to be remarked in the UN lobbies that

if the super powers were opposed the world was worried about the consequences, but if they were agreed they were equally worried. This is a cruel dilemma in a world dominated by considerations of power.

It must be pointed out, however, that the nature of the relationship between the super powers is not an either/or proposition. They have their own basic approaches to world problems and their long-term goals. They have to retain their dominant positions in a fast changing world. For these purposes they make mutual adjustments to avoid direct confrontation which might lead to dangerous consequences. We have thus entered a period in which the super powers negotiate on issues that are vital to them, work for a detente on local issues when their involvement may lead to dangerous confrontation and yet pursue their ideological and global objectives. So there is both identity as well as divergence of interests in their relationship.

The ambivalent nature of their relationship gets reflected in the United Nations leading to both hope and fear. Two recent examples, the West Asian crisis and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, illustrate the two trends mentioned above. When the Security Council met on June 5, 1967, to deal with the Israeli attack on Arab countries, the duty of the Council was clear. In line with past precedents, it had to order a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. Such action would have stemmed from the principle of the inadmissibility of the use of force in relations between States and the disallowance to States of the enjoyment of the fruits of aggression.

However, because of the conflict of interests among the big powers, the demand for withdrawal was turned down. It took months to iron out a compromise resolution in the Council. It has taken nearly three years now for the super powers to agree to use their influence with the parties to the conflict and arrange for the first steps

to be taken towards its implementation. Meanwhile, the tension and conflict in the area have made the task of achieving a just settlement even more difficult.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, on the other hand, brings out the dangers of accommodation between the super powers against the common interest of the rest of the world community. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a major plank in the programme of almost all member States, particularly the non-aligned. But it was premised on mutuality of obligations and responsibilities; it was to lead to nuclear disarmament.

The super powers, however, chose to freeze nuclear development and create a new exclusive club of nuclear powers, with no definite commitment in regard to nuclear disarmament. The world was asked to place its faith in the sense of responsibility of the Nuclear Five for the preservation of peace. The super powers exercised the utmost pressure to ensure the passage of the resolution, against which only a few were able to stand up. This was a classic case of the exercise of power politics in the UN.

Having taken a measure of the problems facing the UN, it may be useful to set out briefly some of the steps that could be taken to revitalise it. It is essential that the World Body should be made truly universal to deal with problems in a global context. The seating of the People's Republic of China is imperative if the UN is to reflect truly the power relations in the world and contribute to the solution of vital problems like disarmament and peace in Asia. Likewise, divided countries like Germany, Vietnam and Korea should be represented in the United Nations without prejudice to the peaceful resolution of problems connected with their recognition and reunification.

In the changed circumstances of the world today, it does not seem even remotely possible, nor indeed desirable, that enforcement mea-

sures under Chapter VII would be taken by the Security Council through an international military force. However, there are possibilities of using the provisions of Chapter VI more imaginatively to assist in reaching peaceful settlements of disputes. There could be greater recourse to conciliation and informal consultations with the parties to a dispute.

The composition of the Security Council, the cold war over-tones of the debates, the glare of publicity and the need to take extreme positions in public, all these militate against narrowing down the areas of disagreement. In the last three years, there have been more informal consultations among members of the Security Council; but the contacts with parties are generally left to be made through their respective supporters or in a formal sense through the President. Experience of the working of the Security Council suggests that there is greater scope for patient diplomacy.

**A**suggestion which deserves consideration is the appointment of a panel of conciliators from whom the parties to a dispute could choose a mutually acceptable person to assist them in resolving their differences. But it has to be realised that, as sovereign nations, parties are highly sensitive. They are as a rule resistant to ideas of mediation lest the mediator's assessment of the situation goes against their national stand in a dispute. Conciliation proceedings, however, should stand on a different footing. They should be envisaged as a diplomatic effort of an experienced personality to narrow down differences between parties; there should be no report at the end of the conciliation proceedings unless agreement is to be recorded.

Another proposal that is often made is that there should be periodic meetings of the Security Council at the level of Ministers to consider measures to strengthen international peace and security. This would be desirable and may even be fruitful, if they are closed meetings in which representatives learn to develop the habit of ex-

pressing their views objectively without partisanship.

While some of these measures may help to revitalise the peace-keeping and peace-making responsibilities of the Security Council, the General Assembly remains the forum where expression will be given to the deep urges of mankind for a better world. The complaint is often made that with the new membership the Assembly has become unwieldy and ineffective. Measures will have to be taken to stream-line its procedures as well as those of the Committees.

The agenda of the Assembly with its more than hundred items is so heavy that some of the major issues which are its primary concern do not get the attention they deserve and are rushed through towards the end of the session. It has always seemed to me that there could be more than one meeting of the Assembly in a year. The main annual session should deal with large political issues, while economic and social problems, which are becoming increasingly important, should be taken up at a second meeting and get the careful consideration that they deserve.

**I**t has often been remarked that the UN can only succeed to the extent that its members are committed to it. So far as India is concerned, as a founder member of the United Nations, we have had a deep sense of commitment to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. Over the years, we have functioned in the Organs and Committees with dedication and a due sense of responsibility, in cooperation with other member States to work for peace, freedom and progress and the realisation of the objectives of the World Organisation.

Apart from the Permanent Members, India is represented on more Committees than any other member State. This is clearly an index of the importance of India in world affairs. It is also a recognition of the deep interest shown by members of the Indian Delegation, at all levels, for many

years in the problems of the United Nations, and their capacity for hard work. They have been able to discharge their responsibilities with understanding and sensitivity, because they have been nurtured in the world view of Jawaharlal Nehru and inspired by his dedication to the United Nations.

**I**t behoves India and the non-aligned nations to bestir themselves now in the United Nations and strive for peace, justice and progress with renewed vigour and a clear-cut programme whose main elements could be as follows.

- (a) Extension of freedom and independence to all colonial peoples. The unfinished anti-colonial revolution in Southern Africa should be completed.
- (b) Resolution of conflicts by peaceful means within the framework of an undertaking not to use force under any pretext.
- (c) Efforts to bring about disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, to have the highest priority.
- (d) Renewal of negotiations with the developed countries for the creation of a just international economic order which will promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples.

We live in a fast changing world where the kaleidoscope of power changes rapidly, where nationalism is still a deep-felt urge, where the forces of social revolution are breaking the citadels of those who stand for the maintenance of the status quo. If the United Nations continues to be supported by the vast majority of people, it is not only because it is the last hope for the maintenance of world peace but because it provides the only forum where public opinion could be mobilised in support of the establishment of a democratic world order, peaceful change and economic and social betterment of the impoverished people who form the vast majority on this planet.

# **Third world perspectives**

ARTHUR S. LALL

THE U.N. Charter and the concepts in the minds of the founders of the Organization allowed for only an incipient role for that large part of the world which has come to be known as the third world and which consists mainly of non-aligned States. At the core of the Charter system was the presumed unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and in the field of peace and security the General Assembly was to play a supportive role which could in general be hortatory or cautionary.

As the 'poser' points out, the original concept did not contain a

fully fledged social and economic wing for the Organization. This was created not only because of U.S. insistence but because, even at that early stage, of the emphasis placed upon international activities in the economic sector by the few developing States represented at the San Francisco Conference. The statements of Ramaswamy Mudaliar were strongly weighted in the direction of a significant economic and social role for the new Organization.

However, what was supposed to be an organization based on great

power unanimity turned out to be a battleground for rivals contending for world leadership. And on the periphery economic and social matters were treated rather like items for debate in subsidiary women's clubs.

The United States, which in the early years had a comfortable majority of supporting votes in the General Assembly, thought up an interesting innovation to give expression to the western attitude in regard to world order. This innovation was the Uniting for Peace Resolution of the fifth session of the General Assembly which set up a procedure to divest the Security Council of an issue that had become frozen as a result of the use of the veto by a permanent member, and to transfer that issue *immediately* to an Emergency Special Session of the world assembly where it was expected that a large majority would support U.N. action and thus nullify the effect of a paralysing veto in the Security Council. The Russians fought bitterly against the United States proposal but it was adopted by a handsome majority. However, in the next few years this resolution did practically nothing to alleviate the confrontation between the two super powers. Moreover, ironically enough, when it was first called into play, it was used not against the Soviet Union as had been the universal expectation but against the United Kingdom and France on the occasion of their invasion of Egypt in 1956.

**W**hat has the above recital of facts to do with the third world and the non-aligned? It indicates that the efforts of the contending super powers, consisting largely of procedural manipulations, were not going to be of any significant value in giving life to the Organization, particularly at its centre; i.e., in regard to issues of peace and security.

Before coming to the role of the non-aligned it should be pointed out that the big power secret sessions on the problem of disarmament, carried out mainly in an unbalanced subcommittee of five States—the United States, the

USSR, Britain, France and Canada—also proved to be completely futile. Again, a procedural manipulation had failed to yield any results.

**W**hat was needed was a wider participation in UN affairs than that implied in the original security concept of the Charter and which had been the basis of great power efforts in the field of security. How was this wider participation to be secured? No one knew the answer. A dramatic fact intervened and provided an occasion for a new role in United Nations affairs. This dramatic fact was the Korean war which very soon brought China into the fight and created a problem beyond the capacity of UN great power political manoeuvring. At this point, B. N. Rau, the then Indian permanent representative, took the initiative to bring together the Asian and Arab States, and the one or two African States then in the United Nations, into what later came to be known as the Afro-Asian Group. The new Group was not taken seriously because, like the Pope, it had no battalions that counted. However, this lack of military strength was quickly to be demonstrated to be not necessarily synonymous with a lack of political capacity in the international field.

The Americans and the Chinese locked in discussions at Panmunjon were unable to resolve the issue of the prisoners of war; this meant that the Korean war continued. It took a non-aligned input to resolve the situation and this was done by an amazing *tour de force*. At the 1952 Session of the General Assembly, the Indian delegation introduced a complete plan for resolving the prisoners-of-war issue and presented it to the Assembly in what was at that time, and for many years thereafter, the longest resolution to be introduced in the sensitive Political Committee of the Assembly.

There was a rival draft resolution before the Committee. This was a western resolution which sought, in the traditional fashion, to obtain a UN imprimatur for the

western position in the ding-dong negotiations at Panmunjon. For the western States, the big guns had assembled in the Political Committee: Dean Acheson, Anthony Eden and others. On the small non-aligned side there were no such power-packed names. For the Soviet Union, there was the redoubtable Andrei Vyshinsky. However, the plan presented by India was so forcefully and effectively argued that the seemingly secure majority support for the western draft resolution, which was sponsored by 16 States or more, rapidly fell away. The Indian draft resolution was adopted and laid the basis for the cessation of hostilities in Korea. This was the emergence of the non-aligned role at the United Nations.

**S**uddenly, it became apparent to the great powers that they had to take into consideration other parts of the world. They did so grudgingly. When, for example, it was proposed that India should be invited to the Geneva Conference of 1954, where the Korean and the Indo-Chinese situations were to be discussed, the western great powers said firmly, 'No'. This was the conventional wisdom of 1945: 'We, the Great can resolve these matters ourselves and this is how we intend it to be.'

However, at the Geneva Conference, they resolved absolutely nothing so far as Korea was concerned and it is an open secret that there was a third party role played by India in regard to Indo-China, even though India was not a participant at the Conference. Moreover, the great powers found it necessary to set up an international commission for Indo-China consisting of India, Canada and Poland, in which to the extent that there was any final say on issues concerning the commission, it lay with the non-aligned member of that body.

In regard to disarmament, too, the introduction of the significant new concepts again came from the third world and mainly from India. Thus, it was Jawaharlal Nehru's initiative in 1954 which brought to the United

Nations agenda the issue of the testing of nuclear weapons and it was the non-aligned States that maintained a steady and even vociferous pressure through the years for action to end the testing of nuclear weapons. Only partial success was achieved in the 1963 agreement and that too after another long and concerted non-aligned effort at the 18-Nation Conference on Disarmament which opened at Geneva in March 1962. (The body has now been expanded by the introduction of other States and meets as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.)

It is always hazardous to claim that one element in the complex of forces which pushes the international world in a certain direction has been the essential cause of such results as come to be achieved. It cannot be claimed that the very tentative beginnings in the field of disarmament and the limited success at the United Nations achieved in regard to Korea, in the Suez crisis in 1956 and in the Lebanese crisis in 1958, were mainly due to the efforts of the non-aligned. Certainly, the great powers would reject such a statement out of hand. But their rejection would be at least as invalid as the claim that the non-aligned must be given the credit for these developments. What can and should be affirmed is that there was a significant non-aligned input, often bringing in new ideas, new proposals and new concepts in regard to world politics which started to give some life and purpose to the Organization in the decade 1952 to 1961.

**W**hat was significant about this non-aligned effort was that it was not directed mainly to problems of immediate concern to the non-aligned States themselves. The focus was on problems of world concern, and of special concern to the super powers. What was demonstrated was that a third party could make a significant contribution towards resolving some of the major issues in our world.

It was never part of this effort to acquire for the non-aligned States

as a group the capabilities of a third military force in the confrontation between the two major military machines. True enough, there was some tendency on the part of the super powers to brush off the non-aligned because they lacked this capability. At the same time, those very powers would have been highly disturbed if India, for example, had headed a movement to develop a nuclear strike force to be at the disposal of the third world.

**H**owever, because the nation-State system has remained the basis of national security, and because a firm posture in regard to national security has been a traditional prop of international prestige, when towards the end of 1962 it became clear that India was not a great military power, the capacity of the third world to be effective in world politics received a grievous blow. Not only the super powers but the pygmy powers and all those that ranged between the two ends of the spectrum tended to take the view that military incapacity was equivalent to incapacity to play a significant role in world politics. One might decry and even lament this kind of attitude, but there it is.

In world politics this has meant virtually that since 1962 the third world has not played a significant world role. In the sense in which a world role must be conceived, it is not a playing of that role when the African States, of course with every justification, ask for UN action in regard to South African apartheid and political domination and Portuguese colonial domination on their continent. These are important issues but they are not directly world issues. They do not go to the root of the matter so far as international politics and security are concerned. True, the African States pile up impressive majorities in the voting. But as at present constituted the Organization will act only when unanimity or near unanimity is achieved. Action can only result when a consensual basis acceptable to the two super powers is found. Until this is achieved—and it was achieved

in Suez in 1956 and the Middle East in 1958—the UN will remain paralysed at its central core.

Can the third world do anything to rescue the United Nations from this situation? Before answering this question, it must be pointed out that the effort now required is greater than it was in the cold war decade. Now the two super powers can set up bilateral forums such as the present one for discussions on the nuclear arms race (SALT). More difficult though the present task before the non-aligned is, it is at least as essential as it was in the cold war years. This is so because it can be predicted that the super powers left to themselves are not likely to agree on any real steps towards an international system which will be based on concepts more humane and less friable than that of the maintenance of nuclear terror.

**N**o one knows exactly what has transpired in the SALT talks; but if published reports are near the truth, then the two thousand launching or delivering arrangements which each of the super powers wishes to maintain in its nuclear arsenal will, when those arrangements and delivery systems have been finalised, give each of the nuclear giants several times the number of nuclear warheads which either of them had before the SALT talks began. Clearly, this is nowhere near nuclear disarmament. What seems to be likely to emerge from SALT is simply a series of guidelines which will amount to a mutual understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union as to the limits within which they should, in the future, programme the development and refinement of their respective nuclear arsenals.

What is happening in the SALT talks and what is likely to happen vividly demonstrates that a new third world effort is absolutely essential if our globe is to move on from the present precarious maintenance of peace and nuclear terror to a more humane and economically less wasteful system. It will not be through procedural

wrangling such as the insistence that the SALT talks should be held in the forum of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, that a genuine contribution to a better world order is going to be made.

To switch now to economic issues, it is not going to be by implementation of the Jackson Committee's recommendations and by such other procedural devices that any significant thrust will be given to the second development decade. Again, fundamentally new concepts must be found as a basis of world development. If the present indefensible economic disparities are to be removed, the relevant process of decision-making should not be one in which western models or Soviet models or other ready-made models are sought to be imposed on the developing world. The models must be indigenous and the main inputs must also be indigenous. The flow from the developed world must be one that agrees to be directed by the indigenous imperatives.

It would take another full-scale article to develop the kinds of initiatives which are now required by the third world. However, to dispel from the reader's mind that such initiatives exist only in the realm of fantasy, it is necessary to indicate in outline a possible initiative.

Take the crucial issue of world security and disarmament. As I have said, nothing can be achieved by procedural manipulation or by continuing to plead with the great powers that they should stop maintaining nuclear arsenals as a basis in the world order. At the same time, the situation is desperate. Studies such as those being undertaken at Stanford University under the direction of Professor Robert North and others indicate that the curves plotted on the basis of the present actions of nations are moving to fatal clashes. The techniques on which these gloomy forecasts are now based are sophisticated, and have been empirically tested. For

example, on the basis of data, the decade 1870-80 curves were plotted which indicated clearly the 1914-1918 war.

What can we now do to stave off the next cataclysm, which would engulf all of us and would make the whole human experiment meaningless? This is the question which the third world States must ask themselves. I do not, of course, mean that at the United Nations they must stop their efforts to deal with problems such as colonialism, economic issues and so on. But they must evolve concepts in the realm of peace and security which will be really relevant to the question which has now been posed and the poser is right in pointing out that the inter-relationship between peace and security and economic development is absolutely fundamental, which means that the latter cannot be resolved without the former being resolved. Any other basic premise is much more in the realm of fantasy than the thought which we are now developing.

Can India, to take our own case, help in the evolving of the necessary new concepts? I believe that it can and should do so. It could make a significant conceptual and factual contribution which might in itself turn the tide of events. I have in mind the formulation of a new type of treaty in the realm of international security. This treaty would consist of two parts. The first part would state, with the usual deftness and politeness of international treaty language that India is determined to resolve all disputes with other States by peaceful means and renounces resort to war. This, of course, is not new. But now we come to the basic point. India would go on to undertake that it would unilaterally freeze the size of its military apparatus, that it would undertake not to manufacture nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and that it would undertake gradual and unilateral disarmament under international supervision and control. All these steps would be taken provided

that the second part of the treaty would come into operation.

This second part of the treaty would be a protocol attached to the Indian declaration as briefly sketched above. The protocol would simply say that the Government of ... welcomes the declaration of the Government of India and undertakes solemnly to prevent the use of force by or against India in regard to the foreign relations of India, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It should be provided that this protocol would become effective if and when adhered to by the two super powers and by, say, 60 other States.

When duly ratified by India, the two super powers and sixty (or other agreed number of) States, the treaty would of course be registered with the United Nations in accordance with article 102 of the Charter.

A move on these lines would present the world with an alternative route to the present route of destruction. It would give the non-aligned a prestige (i.e. a position of initiative and respect) such as they have not enjoyed since 1962. It would, moreover, enhance India's national security and assist it to focus clearly on economic development. It would strongly inhibit the flow of arms to all States in the neighbourhood of India, and it would create a precedent for genuine moves toward regional and worldwide disarmament measures. It could lead to a genuine downturn of nuclear armaments and point the way to a new world order based on values which were in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. It is an effort of this order of magnitude which is now required of the non-aligned world. Lesser moves or competitive sabre-rattling will amount to little more than joining the suicide squad—also known as the nuclear club—or to hastening the outbreak of more wars and the continuance of large-scale human misery.

# **H**as it a future

RAJESHWAR DAYAL

THE twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Charter is as good an occasion as any other for making an evaluation of the achievements and relevance of the United Nations. But it should equally be a day of introspection for its member States. What, after all, is the United Nations? And what is it not? The United Nations is an organization set up in 1945 by a group of States, to which many have adhered since, for the purpose of promoting and maintaining international peace

and understanding by trying to harmonise the interests of its members. Its aim is the renunciation of the use of force for the settlement of international problems, and its replacement by the processes of discussion, mediation and arbitration. Recognizing the fact that lasting peace cannot be attained without social justice and economic progress, the Charter has laid special stress on international action for the removal of social inequalities, economic backwardness, illiteracy and disease. And

all the activities of the Organization are conducted within the framework of the sovereign equality of all States, large and small. Flowing from these broad aims, there have sprung up a dozen subsidiary organizations known as the Specialized Agencies which are concerned with every major sector of human activity.

The Charter, which governs the activities of the United Nations and to which all States' members have declared their allegiance, imposes a number of obligations. These are laid down in detail in the purposes and principles of the Organization. Each member State has bound itself to do certain things to promote the objectives of the Charter and to desist from actions militating against them. The strength of the United Nations is therefore, derived from the extent to which member States carry out the obligations which they have voluntarily undertaken. If a member State fails to carry out its obligations or actually violates them, it is up to the other member States to bring it to order in the manner prescribed in the Charter itself. But here is the rub. Member States, for a variety of reasons, have generally refrained from taking effective action against a recalcitrant State. This, of course, is not the fault of the Charter, but reflects the state of international politics and international morality.

**N**ow what is the United Nations not? It is emphatically not a super State. It has no interests of its own apart from those of the collectivity of its member States. It has no distinctive ideology, though it has its ideals. It has no economic interests to promote, no territory to safeguard. It has no armed forces and no diplomatic service. It cannot enforce solutions independently of the will of its member States.

The United Nations is, therefore, an instrument at the disposal of its member States by means of which the aims and principles to which they have ostensibly subscribed can be promoted. There is nothing inherently wrong with

the instrument; its efficacy depends upon the manner in which it is used. The Charter itself is a most eloquent and skilful document which has remained unchallenged and unshaken through the quarter of a century of the troubled life of the United Nations. The fact remains, however, that however perfect the Charter and however well-structured the institutions which it has created, the United Nations has fallen far short in its achievements of its early promise.

**N**ow, precisely where and with whom does the fault lie? If the United Nations has had a difficult past, does it have a more promising future? This brings one to an evaluation of the past achievements—or lack of them—of the Organization. The most eye-catching aspect of the functions of the United Nations is in the political field, and especially that of the maintenance of international peace. It is there that the critics point their finger of accusation, forgetting that the Charter had placed equal emphasis on the economic and social aspects of the functions of the Organization.

But even in the political field, the achievements of the United Nations have by no means been negligible. The United Nations has played a great role in ending the era of colonialism and it is no small credit to the Organization that no less than fifty-nine sovereign independent States have emerged since the second world war. This single development, one of the most significant in the modern world, can be likened in the physical sphere, to the discovery of the secret of the atom which has unleashed a tremendous force for good, if properly understood and used. It cannot be denied that the discussions on colonialism, which have been among the most animated at the United Nations, and in which India has taken a leading part, have directly, and sometimes indirectly, contributed to the result. Membership of the Organization, on a basis of sovereign equality, has given to the new

States, many of which are small and weak, a sense of belonging to the community of nations, where they can raise their voice on all world problems. The United Nations has also given them a recognizable identity without which they would have been obscure names on a map.

The lounges and corridors of the United Nations provide a channel of access and communication between States, a neutral area where even the most estranged may meet and probe their way towards a solution of problems that divide them. The end of the Berlin blockade is a striking example of this. At the open forums of the United Nations, the misdeeds of any power, great or small, the unjustified use of force and territorial ambitions, are brought under the sharp scrutiny and moral judgement of mankind. In a number of cases the United Nations, by interposing itself or by the quiet exercise of good offices, has prevented local conflicts from expanding into major conflagrations. The peace-making and peace-keeping role of the Organization in many dangerous situations should not be forgotten. The Suez crisis and the crises in Lebanon, the Congo, Cyprus and Kashmir are still fresh in our minds. But while the United Nations has often been successful in defusing a situation, it has not been equally successful in finding lasting solutions.

**I**t may well be asked why, despite the existence of the United Nations, peace has hung by a thread all these years, and why the United Nations has been so tardy to act, or has not acted at all, to resolve the conflicts raging in West Asia and in South-east Asia. One of the principal reasons has been the acute rivalries and sharp differences between the five great powers, allies in the second world war. These powers, permanent members of the Security Council, had cast upon themselves the responsibility for preserving world peace. But the period of euphoria following the war soon saw the would-be policemen at daggers drawn with each other.

Instead of being the guardians of the peace, their policies and actions threatened the tenuous peace that marked the cold war period and the disruption of the United Nations itself. Most of the failures of the United Nations in maintaining international security are due to the failure of the great powers to live up to their Charter obligations. And yet, many dangerous situations which could have led to a global war were tided over, due largely to the open forum of the United Nations being used to sound the alarm.

To overcome the paralysis which seized the Security Council where the permanent members were ranged on opposing sides, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold frequently took the initiative to quench local conflagrations and to prevent them from spreading. In this he had the backing of the medium and small powers, to whom he turned for political and military support. All the peace-keeping missions of the United Nations have drawn on the personnel of the non-aligned and neutral powers, who have also contributed most of the principal mediators and good officers. It was Jawaharlal Nehru's firm policy to meet Hammarskjold's requests for assistance promptly and generously as he did in the crises in the Lebanon, the Congo and elsewhere. Politically, the United Nations is neutral and non-aligned, and the powers which pursue non-aligned policies are the closest in spirit to the aims of the Organization. A United Nations solution to a problem or dispute must inevitably be a neutral solution, for the Charter itself proclaims no ideology but that of peaceful co-existence and mutually beneficial cooperation.

But apart from actual field missions, both Hammarskjold and U Thant have frequently used their good offices, with remarkable if unpublicized success. Examples of such efforts are the release of the American airmen held prisoner in China, the settlement of the dispute regarding the Buraimi oasis or the border differences

between Thailand and Cambodia. A recent example is the Bahrain good offices mission undertaken for U Thant for the peaceful solution of the differences between the United Kingdom and Iran.

Unfortunately, during recent years the middle group of powers, which have been the backbone of United Nations peace-keeping efforts, have tended to abdicate the responsibilities which they had assumed. This may be partly due to the pressure of their own internal problems which have been crowding in on them and partly to their feeling of impotence in face of the new relationship developing between the super powers. How else can one explain the absence of any determined or combined efforts by the middle group of powers to intervene effectively to end the tragic conflicts raging in South-east and West Asia? The super powers today find their basic interests, in the words of a former United States Under Secretary of State, to be 'common, complementary or compatible'. They seem to prefer to settle not only bilateral problems directly, but even those concerning others. Examples of such an approach are their common stand on the question of nuclear non-proliferation and what amounts to a virtually imposed settlement which they are in the process of bringing about in West Asia. One may well ask whether we are about to enter a period of super power hegemony.

During the worst days of the cold war, India and many other countries had urged the super powers to settle their differences peacefully so as to avoid the very real danger of a nuclear explosion. But they certainly did not intend the super powers to dominate the United Nations or the rest of the world. One of the functions of the United Nations is to preserve the power balance as between the great and small nations, for the Organization is not intended to be used as an instrument for the promotion of the particular interests of any nation or group of nations, however powerful they

may be. But the middle and small powers must, for their part, make their voices heard and their influence felt.

This does not mean that they must keep their equidistance from the super powers or remain in constant opposition to them. They should take the initiative in matters affecting their basic interests and persuade or compel the super powers to go along with them. Furthermore, they expose themselves to outside pressures and manipulation if they fail to settle their own differences peacefully. If two hereditary enemies like the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany can come to an agreement between themselves and even sign a non-aggression pact, surely the newly independent States who form almost half the membership of the United Nations, could emulate their example by settling their own problems—many of them the legacy of colonialism—by bilateral negotiations. That would insulate them from the interplay of power politics and free their hands to face the problems of the changed world of the 1970s.

The world of the 1970s is very different to that of the 1950s or even the 1960s. A central fact is the change in the equation between the United States and the Soviet Union who are in the process of establishing a working relationship between them. They are determined to avoid a direct military confrontation or to be dragged into war by the indiscretions or follies of their client States. They are realizing that absolute military power is self-defeating and are, therefore, inching their way towards mutual understanding at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The recent sky-jacking of planes by the Arab commandos shows the impotence of military power in dealing with frustrated fanatics. The stalemate in Vietnam illustrates the inefficiency of overwhelming military might against a determined people. The super powers are no longer likely to be found ranged on opposite sides in

a conflict between smaller powers, but rather pulling together to end it. The United Nations would not as before, be needed to interpose itself in conflict situations in which the super powers are vicariously involved. But the United Nations peace-keeping processes would be brought into play to underwrite settlements already arrived at as a result of quiet diplomacy or the application of discreet pressures. And the Organization would be expected to give the seal of international approval to such agreements.

This is the very reverse of the situation prevailing during the last twenty-five years of the Organization's existence when the principal danger to international peace and security came from the super powers, with the smaller States busy at the United Nations and elsewhere to prevent it. Now, the danger is from unresolved conflicts between the smaller States, conflicts which the super powers would combine to forestall or avert. We are, therefore, entering a period of peaceful co-existence between States, a goal which the Charter has proclaimed and which the non-aligned States have preached, but not always practised between themselves. And China must be brought into the world order if it is not to continue as a disruptive force.

The changes in the world have by no means been only political. The scientific and technological advances in the last quarter of a century have been unparalleled in the history of mankind. Science is today the great unifier and leveler, and is making irrelevant the conflicts between ideologies and political systems, races and religions. Man has probed into the infinitude of space and into the infinitely small. He has landed on the moon and he has established a system of communications in outer space. He has discovered the hidden energy in the nucleus and is in the process of splitting the genetic code. The world's population has increased from two and a half billion to over three and a half billion; and will reach six billion

before the turn of the century. World industrial production has trebled, the output of petroleum has increased five-fold while that of plastics has multiplied fifteen times. Even food production may be on the threshold of a dramatic revolution.

But, these profound changes have brought with them their own contradictions. While the population explosion is the greatest in the poor countries, the consumption explosion is the greatest in the rich ones. The capital needed to bring the great scientific achievements to the service of all of mankind is not available to the poor, while 200 billion dollars a year are being squandered on armaments. The tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that even the poor countries are emulating the rich in wasting their meagre substance on the futile armaments race. If the poorer nations, who comprise two thirds of the human race, are to benefit from the vast scientific and technological advances taking place in the world, they must turn from their obsession with political attitudinizing both at home and abroad, to a determined effort to understand and absorb the new techniques which are changing the very pattern of life in the advanced societies.

For its part, the United Nations, as a living institution, must adjust itself to meet the needs of the contemporary world not only in the political field, but equally in the economic and social. It has already done useful pioneering work in carrying out studies and analyses and has laid the framework for multilateral efforts to help the developing nations. But much more has to be done. U Thant has called for a Summit Conference to launch a global partnership to end the arms race, to improve the human environment, to stem the population growth and to give a momentum to world development efforts. Indeed, he advocates the establishment of a Committee of the Future to study the problems affecting the future of mankind

and to develop a system of international cooperation for their solution.

The poorer countries of the world must look to the future, whatever may have been their past, and should not be content to remain at the outer fringes of the nuclear revolution which has dawned. Their efforts to better their lot through concerted international action have been fitful and sporadic. They must join together to seek the cooperation of the advanced countries, through the agency of the United Nations, to share in the benefits of modern science and technology. No nation is an island unto itself and chauvinistic and short-sighted attitudes towards foreign or even multilateral assistance are based on hopelessly outdated concepts which are completely out of tune with the demands of the last quarter of the twentieth century.

The rich and strong nations may sometimes feel that they can do without the United Nations. But can the rest? Hammarskjold called the United Nations the Summit Meeting of the medium and small States. It is not the fault of the Organization that it has not been more effective. The smaller States who comprise the bulk of the membership, and particularly the developing countries, should use the instrumentality of the United Nations to press for a more just and equitable world order. They should take up the problems of the future and not be diverted by the sterile controversies of the past. Individually, they count for little in relation to the industrial and military giants; collectively, they could help to shape the world in the image of their dreams and the objectives of the United Nations Charter. Ideas are not the monopoly of any country. The developing countries should take the lead in putting forth new ideas, based on careful study, to enable the machinery of the United Nations to be employed for the betterment of man's lot on earth. Then indeed would the high purposes of the United Nations attain their fulfilment.

# Our responsibility

VIJAYALAKSHMI PANDIT

THE United Nations approaches its 25th birthday in a sombre mood. The promise of the bonny baby has not been fulfilled by the young adult, and the grim words of the Secretary General uttered at the last General Assembly that 'the UN has ten years to become effective or disappear' is a serious warning.

For the last quarter century, since its birth, the UN has represented the world's best hope for peace and even today when there is wide-spread disillusion it is well to remember two things—firstly, that there are many achievements to its credit which we are apt to loose sight of because they are the result of quiet, solid work done by its specialized agencies and therefore not newsworthy and, secondly, and more important, that in spite of everything the UN remains an indispensable part of the machinery of international relations. We have found nothing to replace it.

In 1945 when the UN was born it was a time of idealism—men's minds filled with revulsion against the agony of war, were determined to save succeeding generations from this scourge and even nations seemed willing to give up some of their sovereignty in the larger interest—but this was for a brief moment only. As the memory of the war receded so did the rejection of war as an instrument of national policy. The UN has often been subordinate to the foreign policies of many individual

member nations. It has been used when convenient or in time of need on many occasions and the inadequacies ascribed to it are fundamentally limitations of national commitment.

The stirring speeches and all the flowery oratory which echoed through the vast General Assembly hall during the years have been powerless to steer the course of the UN because of the lack of commitment behind them—the UN in effect became confined in its development to the willingness of national governments to let it develop workable methods of keeping the peace.

Recently, at a meeting called by U Thant, Norman Cousins and the Quaker group at the UN, the question of human survival was discussed by 25 invitees, men and women from various countries and groups, but all having a deep dedication to the United Nations. There were scientists, statesmen, politicians, writers and I had the good fortune to be included. The question I have mentioned above was one which was discussed at length and all agreed with Lester Pearson when he said that there was no point in deceiving ourselves: 'the world remains organised and operates through sovereign nation-States'.

Surely we know—or we should know—that any international organisation, however idealistic and far reaching the principles of its charter, becomes politically helpless if it is merely an adjunct

of, and a platform to promote, national policy and national interest. Until there is a stronger sense of international commitment and responsibility, specially among the more powerful member States, and until it is accepted that the UN does not exist to help governments promote their national interests, but to help them discover and promote an international community of interest which will ultimately be the greatest protection of national freedom and national security.

In 25 years the UN has changed greatly. From a small membership of 51 nations it now has 126 member States on its roll. This by itself is change enough and brings new elements and new issues into play, but the dramatic fact is that the little UN with its largely white membership is now a great body of predominantly black and brown people. They have different backgrounds and different aspirations and all share to some extent similar memories of exploitation. They are in a hurry for already they are two centuries and more behind the times, yet some of the basic problems relating to their progress move in the UN at a snail's pace causing frustration or anger. I mention only one of these problems, Apartheid, which has been allowed to grow and expand through the years. Of all issues before the UN it is perhaps the most inflammable and its potential for destruction rivals the hydrogen bomb—but look what has happened.

Since 1946 India has repeatedly brought the issue of Apartheid which began as discrimination of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, before the General Assembly. The small group of Asian and African nations with some help from others succeeded in condemning South Africa by a two-third majority vote, but year after year resolutions have succeeded each other and the area of Apartheid has not diminished by a square inch. These resolutions have expressed 'grave concern' at what the Gen-

eral Assembly describes as 'the aggravation of the explosive situation in the Union of South Africa'. Appeals have been made to the union government to abandon its policies which are 'a crime against humanity'.

The policies however continued since the UN was not able to take any action. The sad thing is that it took the ex-colonial powers, the Commonwealth (white) and America a decade to cast a vote in favour of the ending of discrimination. For one reason or another they abstained and when finally near unanimity was achieved, South Africa was already extending Apartheid. If all the activities now being sponsored in and outside the UN had been promoted in the beginning, this grave situation might have been eased if not wholly resolved.

The present is a time when human existence on our planet is endangered. Human population is increasing at a rate that will strain to breaking point the ability of the earth to sustain human beings in dignity and freedom. There are wars in Indo-China and the Middle East and there is the threat of war in South Africa. There is an escalating arms race which the super powers seem unable to halt or contain. We see youth protesting in a world in which they feel they have no future, a world in which nations exempt themselves from the orderly and national behaviour they demand of their citizens, a world in which an accident or miscalculation could obliterate civilization and make a farce out of human evolution, a world in which force is immediate and total and justice is indefinite and partial.

The extent to which our hopes can be realized and the existing grave problems be dealt with is directly tied to the full development of the UN. One cannot contemplate the future of human society with any optimism unless the world organisation is given the means and authority to act effectively in those matters concerned with common dangers and common needs. If the human race

is to survive, the human interest must be placed above the national interest.

There is encouragement for the acceptance of the new concepts in the growing spirit of world community and citizenship becoming apparent in many parts of the earth. Among the youth of the world especially is it possible to sense a new allegiance of man to man inside the human family. Definitions of patriotism have been widened to include service to the world community.

The UN system, including regional agencies, should be given resources and responsibilities in the field of international development. The list of what the UN should be allowed to do and how it should be strengthened is a long one and opinions may vary. But whatever power may be given to the world organisation, the best boost can only come from deeds following protestations of sincerity. This has been one of the main stumbling blocks to effective action. The mere enlargement of resources and responsibilities will not achieve the end we seek.

On the occasion of the UN's 25th birthday the best present the member States can give is to widen their thinking and to act up to their oft repeated commitments—we, the ordinary people of the world can also give the UN a birthday present. We must accept duties to each and to the generations of men to come. 'The duty to save the world and everything in it from senseless violence. The duty to create the conditions of durable peace, so that man neither has to kill or be killed. The duty to safeguard the conditions of human existence and to use our knowledge to make life beautiful and safe'. In order to carry out these responsibilities and duties men must assert their allegiance to one another in the family of man and to create adequate world institutions to meet world problems. The UN can still become an effective instrument for peace, security and progress. Whether it will depends entirely on us.

that the dignity of the human personality should be respected, irrespective of colour, creed or sex; that international problems can be solved through peaceful processes and not by the use of force or the threat of force. These were the hopes and aspirations of mankind at the end of World War II and are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

The UN set up various organs for the implementation of its Charter and laid down various procedures to meet these objectives. The Charter of the UN is both an idealistic document as well as a recognition of the realities of the world situation in 1945. The ideals remain as valid today as they were in 1945. The realities have changed. It is, therefore, necessary to assess the role of the United Nations, its failures and its successes, and to adapt it to the present situation of the world and give it enough flexibility to adapt itself to the changes that may occur in future.

In 1945, five great powers were recognised as such and given a permanent seat in the Security Council and the right of veto. Today we find there are only two super powers while the third—China—is looming large on the horizon. Two of the great powers—Britain and France—are really medium powers and not great powers any more. New powers are emerging in the world, like Japan and Germany, which may in the foreseeable future assume the characteristics of great powers.

India, by virtue of her size and population and her natural resources, could easily aspire to be a great power but she realises that the future of the world cannot be determined by great powers alone. Not even the greatest power in the world today can dominate or dictate to the smallest power because of the growing strength of nationalism, of wanting to safeguard hard-won freedom, of a pride in one's independence. The future of the world must be based on cooperation and not on domination. And, the United Nations will have to take note of this

important consideration.

The membership of the United Nations has more than doubled since 1945. More than half the members of the United Nations are non-aligned. The non-aligned group of countries exercises an increasing influence in the General Assembly and even some influence in the Security Council. This fact should not, and cannot, be ignored because non-alignment represents the urge of all newly independent countries to safeguard their political and economic independence without being dominated by bigger powers through military alliances and the like. India, as a member of this group, believes that international politics should be democratised and decisions on important issues facing the world should not be monopolised by the super powers or the great powers. All countries have a stake in the peace and progress of the world and must have a say in determining how peace is to be safeguarded and progress achieved.

An amendment of the Charter is, therefore, necessary to reflect the changes that have occurred in the world since 1945 and to provide for the possibility of further changes in the '70s and the '80s of this century. However, this is not an easy task because the powers that have acquired a vested interest are not likely to give it up; at the same time, they cannot ignore the pressing demands of the world community. There have thus been attempts and tinkering with the problem by an expansion of the Security Council and the ECOSOC. However, these are not enough and the demand for giving greater say to newly independent countries who form a majority in the United Nations must be recognised.

The United Nations represents both the imperfections and the weaknesses of the world as it existed in 1945. No organisation can be better or stronger than the constituents it is composed of. The basic assumption in the UN Charter, providing for permanent seats to the great powers in the Security Council and the right of

veto for them, was that for world security to be maintained it was necessary that the great powers must be in agreement or, at least, not in open disagreement. The experience of the last 25 years shows that whenever the interests of the great powers are in conflict with each other the Security Council, as the main instrument of the UN for maintaining peace has been ineffective. Apart from this, the non-universality of the United Nations makes it difficult for this organisation to play any role in certain areas, e.g., Indo-China.

A third tendency that has grown during the last decade is the attempt by the super powers to try to reach agreements between themselves and put them before the world community as a *fait accompli*. It is, therefore, necessary that while recognising the necessity for super power agreement and welcoming the growing *détente* between them as a sign of relaxation of tensions in the world, the United Nations must insist on the right of all its members to be associated with any decision affecting them, individually or collectively.

Secondly, it is necessary that countries which are not represented in the United Nations must be invited to join the organisation provided they are prepared to abide by the Charter. If this is not done, the effectiveness of the United Nations as a world organisation will suffer. Thirdly, the voice of the General Assembly must be heeded by the Security Council and, particularly, by the great powers if the UNO is to become a forum for the large majority of the countries and peoples of this world.

It is not possible in this brief article to review the failures and successes of the UN, and an attempt has been made merely to point towards the trends and indicate the causes. What can India do in this context? India has played a leading role in voicing the hopes, aspirations and sentiments of the vast majority of the non-aligned developing world in the United Nations. She must continue to do

this, with greater force and vigour.

India has always given first place in the conduct of its foreign policy to the attainment of world peace. She has taken a lead in the General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament. India must continue her efforts along with other like-minded countries to ensure that the nuclear powers take positive steps towards nuclear disarmament as well as towards general disarmament, with effective international safeguards, without discrimination against non-nuclear nations. India's subscription to the partial test ban treaty in 1963 and her refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indicate her desire to see that nuclear energy is used solely for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind and not for the benefit of a few countries only. We must stand firm on this policy. We must also continue our efforts for a joint ban on chemical and biological weapons.

India has shouldered more than her share of responsibilities for maintaining peace in various parts of the world—in Korea, in Gaza and in the Congo, in Cyprus and, outside the UN, in Indo-China. It is important that India along with other non-aligned countries should be ready to carry out her responsibilities under the Charter in any part of the world where peace is threatened. The Organisation is in a position to prevent local wars from escalating into world conflicts or major conflagrations.

India has shouldered more than of the struggle for liquidation of colonial rule and she must intensify her efforts, along with other countries, towards wiping out the remaining pockets of colonialism from the face of the earth.

India was one of the originators of the idea of the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the Atoms for Peace conference. India's role in regional organisations like ECAFE must be further strengthened. India along with other countries must see that the

United Nations programme for the second development decade is a success. India must, along with other developing countries, exert all her influence to see that the widening gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world is bridged without further loss of time.

It is often asked why India is taking such a prominent part in the United Nations Organisation. What does India get out of it? The answer is that India, with its vast population and size, with its rich culture and traditions, with its passionate desire to promote peace, with its faith in the peaceful solution of all international problems, is a firm supporter of the UN Charter because its implementation is not only in its own national interests but also in the larger interests of world peace and progress. While India has shouldered many responsibilities under the UNO in various parts of the world, she has also benefited from the specialised agencies of the UN, like the WHO programme for malaria eradication and the establishment of primary health centres in the villages, the various programmes of education and social development launched by UNESCO and UNICEF, plans for water and land resources, undertaken by the FAO, and several important programmes of the UNESCO.

India does not believe in isolation—splendid or otherwise. India does not believe in the domination of any country over any other country in the world. India believes in bilateral, regional and international cooperation, between all countries of the world, based on a spirit of equality of sovereign nations, mutual respect and mutual benefit. The future world cannot exist on the basis of world hegemony by any power, however great. The only way to save the world from the scourge of a third world war is through the United Nations. India must, therefore, cooperate and even take a lead in all measures that will strengthen the world organisation and make it truly universal and effective in the years to come.

# Books

**THE UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY**, by Ruth B. Russell, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1968.

**THE U.N. AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, 1967**  
by Arthur Samuel Lall, New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.

'At the end of World War II, the United States stood without challenge as the strongest State in the world. Militarily it was armed with a monopoly of atomic power. Politically it headed the United Nations coalition that had just defeated the Axis powers. Under its leadership, the victorious allies had agreed to the Charter for a permanent Organization through which they and other like-minded nations would seek to maintain international peace and security in the future.' With these opening remarks in her book, Ruth Russell sets the stage for the fateful misunderstanding between the super powers of the post-war world which lies at the root of the cold war and has contributed to ever increasing international insecurity.

No learned treatises are needed to tell us why the United Nations failed to establish peace and security but became an instrument of the cold war. The reason is simply the unwillingness of the United States Government to treat the Soviet Union as an equal partner in establishing an orderly world. Such a partnership was to be the fundamental of the United Nations, whose security provisions were based on the assumption of unanimity and collaboration between the great powers, meaning particularly the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is ironic that, having accepted its own worldwide political and military pre-eminence as axiomatic, American leaders accused the Soviet Union of seeking 'world dominance that it clearly sought in terms of its revolutionary strategy.' The implication was that the U.S. had pre-empted the position of world dominance by virtue of its being the strongest State and political leader of the wartime Allied coalition. In terms of this self-definition of U.S. power, the Soviet Union became, as Lucifer to God, inevitably evil, rebel, outlaw. Whereas the Soviet Union was branded expansionist and aggressive, the United States brought increasing areas of the 'free world' under its hegemony. The process continues to this day—in the Middle East, Africa and South-east Asia.

Stalin claimed that, if the Soviet Union had intended to conquer Western Europe by force of arms, there was nothing to stop it in the closing days of the war in Europe in 1945. Ruth Russell notes elsewhere that 'in the early post-war period, atomic

weapons were in short supply, as were conventional forces, once the hasty demobilization was completed.' The U.S. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy stated that 'uncontradictory testimony' indicated in 1947 '...our nuclear weapons position verged on the tragic. The United States then possessed so few (atomic) bombs...that we might have tempted fate if public statements even mentioned the importance of numbers in building an atomic deterrent to aggression.'

In short, there is little reason to believe that the Soviet Union was bent upon conquering the world, or even Europe. But the myth was important and it was plausible because the Soviet Union was bound to protect its virtual exclusion from decisions in the post-war world political and economic arrangements. Similarly, economic aid was denied to the Soviet Union to repair the destruction it suffered during the war, not because it would have misused it but simply to keep it weak and occupied with internal economic problems while the outside world was being remade by the United States in its image.

The foregoing discussion enables us to understand the role of the United Nations in U.S. security policy. The United Nations was founded under the umbrella of American nuclear monopoly. The guarantee of the effectiveness of the U.N. as a vehicle of international security depended upon the credibility of American military power. Under the circumstances, the U.N. became an adjunct to U.S. security policy: it was useful if it served the purpose but useless if it did not. The same held true of the U.N. as a political institution. It could be treated as a product of American statesmanship.

Contriwise, the antagonists of the United States were sceptical of the political purpose to which the United Nations might be put. For, the temptation was all but irresistible that the U.S. Government would use the machinery of the United Nations to fill the gap between its claim to worldwide military and political pre-eminence and the realities of its power and political influence.

In the first few years the United Nations served just such a purpose and the Soviet Union was put on the defensive on several issues, ranging from the presence of its troops in Iran to the denial of civil liberties to its citizens. In 1950 the Soviet Union withdrew from the U.N. temporarily, on the refusal of the world body to seat the Communist Chinese Government, and refusing to play the permanent loser in American U.N. diplomacy.

Intervention by the United Nations in the war in Korea was a turning point. A recent writer has

elaborated the issue: 'However justified President Truman's decision to intervene [in Korea], it was a cold war decision, unilaterally made. Yet Washington decided that it would be politically advantageous to intervene under the U.N. flag, and it had the votes to get the U.N. authorization. Thus, for the use of the U.N. flag and a token number of contingents from other countries, the U.S. made the U.N. a party to the war and ruled out whatever role the organization might have played as mediator.'

But, the U.N. became even more involved. When Truman decided to intervene, he, as he wrote in his *Memoirs*, 'wanted it clearly understood that our operations in Korea were designed to restore peace there and to restore order'. In short, Truman's goal was to restore the situation as it existed before the North Korean invasion. However, once the American and South Korean armies repelled the nearly successful North Korean invasion, there was a complete turn about and the allied armies poured northward. Truman then changed his goal and decided not to stop at the 38th parallel but to conquer North Korea. Because of American dominance in the U.N. General Assembly, he again got authorization. It was one thing for the U.N., even as a cold war partisan, to take part in an operation to restore the previous situation; it was quite another to participate in the attempted conquest of North Korea.

What made the confusion of international security worse confounded was that no one foresaw the revolutionary transformations that nations were to undergo in almost all aspects of their mutual inter-relations in the years after World War II. These form a common theme of histories of the role of the United Nations in world politics. Ruth Russell notes several of these, especially the 'vigorous anti-colonial drive that, with unanticipated speed, brought over fifty new States into being by 1967.' On the other side, the U.S. Government had not anticipated the rapid decline in the power and influence of older imperialist States, such as Britain and France, for 'the United States had assumed that Great Britain would retain her great power status after the war, but in early 1947 the American government was shocked into shedding [this] illusion.'

Ruth Russell reports that the U.S. Government is at present 'concerned politically by the rapid advances of Communist China in nuclear technology.' David W. Tarr states: 'Weapons technology represents one of the many revolutions that confound contemporary politics. The United States has hoped in vain that its technological excellence could be converted into national safety. Instead it has compounded the dangers.'

The arms race is justified by and propels the continuing struggle for world domination. That is why breakthroughs in weapons technology occur every few years and basic developments take place before the earlier ones have been digested and deployed. It means there are no dependable means of military

security. The great powers are not trying to defend any given piece of territory.

When Miss Russell argues that 'peace through the politics of States is the only practical road to world order,' she gives voice to the major thread in American political experience. But it was ignored that the USSR is also a powerful and multi-ethnic and multi-national federation. The experience of the Soviet Union in conducting 'the politics of the States' may not be as old as that of the USA, nor as well articulated, but it is an important fact of international life. There are other complex multi-linguistic or multi-racial States, such as India and China. In the post-war years, an element in the struggle between the powers was concerned with the validity of their political experiences and traditions for the nascent world community.

I have argued in this paper that the armaments race, initiated and dominated by the USA, is not irrational or accidental; it is not a 'runaway' beyond the control of those who keep it going.

The arms race can be justified only by the need of new weapons to protect the old. Scholars have noted the paradox that 'contemporary military technology has clearly heightened the insecurity of all nations, yet the quest for military power as a method for enhancing national security is, as it has been throughout history, unabated.' Ruth Russell points one way out of this vicious circle: 'Until governments can reach a level of political accord that will permit the development of a common system of values pertaining to the international politics of war and peace, they will continue unable to develop within the United Nations framework a viable system of ground rules for the conduct of peaceful international relations.'

The method of preventive diplomacy achieved its greatest success and then met its greatest setback in the Middle East. In 1956, the United Nations acted to separate the great powers whose interests were heading toward a direct clash in the war between Israel and Egypt. The United Nations presence helped to establish peace. But this was successful mainly because the USA and the Soviet Union were of one mind in opposing the joint front of Israel, France and Britain against Egypt. In 1967, when this commonality of purpose was not there, the United Nations was practically thrust out of the arena. This is the lesson of Arthur Lall's important book, *The U.N. and the Middle East Crisis, 1967*. A virtual paralysis overtook the world body and international diplomacy while the Arabs and the Israelis rushed headlong into the disastrous six-day war. Collective security and preventive diplomacy could not have been more dead.

This paralysis persists, although at one time U.S.-Soviet accord seemed to have been reached. However, as Arthur Lall points out, the accord was not acceptable to the Arab States. Today, almost three

years later, Arab leaders would be willing to accept it, but in 1967 immediately following their debacle, they wanted the stigma of defeat to be wiped out. Whereas the position of the Arab States has softened during the past three years, that of Israel has hardened. But the important fact remains that the United Nations was unable to play a creative role: it could not prevent the war nor could it help to bring peace.

More than any other event, the disastrous war in the Middle East of 1967 turned the attention of the United Nations towards peace-keeping. There was bitter controversy over the quick withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force, which had supervised the truce between Israel and the Arab States after 1956. Legally there was no question at all that the Secretary-General was bound to withdraw the Force when the United Arab Republic, on whose territory it was stationed, asked him to do so. The Secretary-General pointed out in his Annual Report for 1966-1967: 'The first reality of United Nations peace-keeping is its voluntary nature. Peace-keeping efforts must voluntarily be accepted by all parties to a conflict if they are to be effective at all—and, as we have seen recently, the time may come when that voluntary acceptance can be suddenly and unexpectedly withdrawn. When that happens, the usefulness of a peace-keeping operation almost automatically comes to an end.' But the U.N. chief could not escape the moral responsibility involved in the circumstance that the withdrawal of UNEF was prelude to the war. What was needed was 'the establishment of a more durable framework for peace-keeping operations, with agreed and authorized guidelines and ground rules for setting them up, conducting and financing them . . .' Thus the emphasis has shifted from preventive diplomacy to peace-keeping; it is a return, by a circuitous route, to the old idea of collective security. At present a special committee of the General Assembly is engaged in developing models of operation for peace-keeping. The success or failure of this attempt remains a matter for the future.

In this sense we are back at the beginning. For, the United Nations is useful only insofar as it serves to establish international peace and security; it is useless insofar as it fails to do so. But its success depends on the U.S.-Soviet understanding that would enable the Big Two to seek the support of the world community through the United Nations. In turn, it requires abandonment of *pax americana*. We are unfortunately a long way from this propitious turn of events.

Surindar Suri

**THE UNITED NATIONS : A VIEW FROM WITHIN**  
by Ralph Townley, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1968. pp. 353.

For the past few years, scholarly writings on the international organization have indicated a definite tendency to understand the United Nations through highly personalized analyses of its functioning. Both

the officials serving under the United Nations auspices and the scholars relying upon direct contacts with the UN personnel capitalize upon the availability of first-hand personal knowledge on contemporary issues and occasionally come out with studies which can provide excellent source material for those to whom such access is denied. Townley's *United Nations: A View from Within* arouses high expectations, more so because the author claims that 'this is the first book dealing broadly with international organizations to be written by a serving member of the United Nations Secretariat' and 'gives an occasional insight into the practical problems inherent in the daily task of the international public servant.'

Townley could not have been more honest about assessing his work because he is only occasionally insightful in his analysis and those occasions are not too many. To mention one, he states that 'the spirit of the United States is one that abhors failure,' (p. 3) and considers it a determinant factor in the efforts of the Charter framers to dissociate themselves from the League 'since in the United States there were guilt feelings over its failure.'

At another place, while summing up his views of the UN attempts at peace-making he contends that 'Power is seldom in question, prestige is put to test all the time.' (p. 85). But on the whole there is not much of 'a view from withinness' in Townley's book. It is a rather generalized and often discursive account of the structure and functioning of the United Nations, its various organs and specialized agencies. The distinctiveness of Townley's approach lies in a tendency to race through the history of the Charter provisions punctuated by obvious comparisons with the Covenant. When he tries to project himself into the future, he is just sufficiently cynical to avoid being unrealistic but his concluding chapter reads very much like a discourse on international moralism.

In two respects, Townley can be considered remarkably original. Firstly, in his differentiation of 'peace-making' from 'peace-keeping'. Unlike the generally prevalent practice to consider the institutional problems concerned with the efforts to meet the threats to international peace and security as the subjects for UN peace-keeping, Townley views them as issues of peace-making. His understanding of peace-keeping is overwhelmingly concerned with the problems of disarmament.

In the second place, Townley can justifiably claim originality in contributing a whole lot of interesting phraseology to describe the much too familiar aspects of the United Nations. The General Assembly has been described as 'the parts of its sum' (Chapter 3) and anti-colonialism as 'Harambee' (p. 147). Human Rights have been discussed as 'a great wild goose-chase?' (Chapter IX) and United Nations Technical Assistance Programmes as 'The Reversed Swiftian Theory' (Chapter XII).

The analyses which is capped by these colourful phrases is rather prosaic and one wonders if Townley's description of 'intellectual brutality' of the

voting procedure in the Security Council (p. 68) has been at all strengthened by his lengthy and tame analyses of the 'social cosmos' he ends up with.

Swadesh Rana

### **THE UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL SYSTEM**

by David A. Kay, (Editor), John Wiley & Sons Inc.,  
New York, 1967.

This is a volume of 24 essays on diverse aspects of the structure and functioning of the United Nations, specially prepared to serve as an introduction to the subject for college and university students in the United States and elsewhere. And, like many another contemporary works on the international organisation, it owes its inspiration largely to Leland Goodrich, the leading American scholar and specialist on United Nations affairs.

However, for an introductory treatise it has a somewhat pompous title—it could well be entitled simply 'The United Nations'. As it is, the editor owes it to the readers to explain how the term 'political system' suffixed to the title fits in with the nature and work of the United Nations. The absence of this terminological clarification tends to invest this work with a measure of obscurity at the very outset.

Moreover, the various essays presented here are of very different and uneven quality and content. Thus, on the one hand, there are the highly analytical and perceptive contributions of Inis Claude Jr., John W. Holmes, Herbert Nicholas and Stanley Hoffmann. On the other hand, there are the purely descriptive and uncritical essays by U Thant, Lester Pearson and Pierson Dixon. Regrettably, even the essays by Leland Goodrich and Dag Hammarskjold are rather dull and commonplace. In Hammarskjold's case, we are immediately struck by the glaring contrast between his contribution in this volume and his great, indeed very great, posthumous work—*Markings*.

The United Nations was founded with the principal aim of ensuring international peace and security in the world. This was sought to be achieved primarily through a four-fold arrangement: i) great power concert or unanimity; ii) pacific settlement of international disputes; iii) disarmament; and iv) building up of a U.N. military force to deal with the breaches of peace. Now, it can be stated without fear of contradiction that on all these four fronts, as it were, the United Nations has failed unmistakably.

Thus, great power unanimity became vitiated, and later impossible, by the cold war early in the career of the United Nations. And the recent detente between the West and the Soviet Union has only restored it marginally. As for international disputes, most of them, as for example, the Indo-Pakistan dispute, the German problem, the Cuban crisis, Arab-Israeli confrontation, the Rhodesian

problem, etc., are either continuing unresolved or have been partially resolved outside U.N. auspices. And disarmament—the next most important U.N. aim—has in fact been pathetically moving towards a terrible anti-climax, the so-called 'balance of terror'. Lastly, the constitution of a U.N. military force is as good as written off on account of its unfeasibility and futility.

All these failures of the United Nations have been touched upon in some of the better contributions of this volume noted above, namely those of Claude, Holmes, Nicholas and Hoffmann, and have been rightly blamed on the innate contradiction of an international organisation composed of rival sovereign States. However, these contributors have invariably fought shy of openly stating the resultant conclusion that the United Nations has unmistakably failed in its basic objectives this far and that, short of divine dispensation or an improbable world revolution, it is unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future. This may be due to scholarly reserve, prudence, timidity or otherwise. But whatever the motives, it is rather unfair to muffle or evade the ultimate issue in a work meant primarily to educate the young and the uninitiated.

S. C. Ganga

### **WORLD ORDER AND LOCAL DISORDER : THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNAL CONFLICT**

by Linda B. Miller, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 234.

Ever since the establishment of the United Nations, academicians and others have been engaged in a study of the relationship of the world community's interest to the developments inside the national communities especially in the context of the maintenance of international peace and security. The framers of the United Nations Charter were very clear in their minds that the developments in the sphere of social, economic, and cultural life had much to do with the creation of an international environment and these were as important as problems of inter-State politics. That is why they decided to operate through the United Nations in non-political spheres as well. Nevertheless, they were also frank enough to admit that the United Nations should not be allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the member States unless a threat to international peace and security arose out of this source which necessitated the imposition of enforcement measures.

This conflict between the need for collective concern on the part of the world community and the desirability to allow members to have exclusive jurisdiction in matters of internal concern have figured in a large number of cases which have been brought to the United Nations. Linda Miller's book examines one of the facets of this mutual conflict. It examines how the United Nations has handled cases dealing with local disorders or internal con-

flict, the difficulties faced by the world community and the trends which are found in practice.

The book under review is composed of five chapters. In Chapter I the author examines the various reasons for civil strife: These include revolution against colonialism, proxy aggressions or subversion from outside. In this connection the arrangements of the United Nations Charter and how the world community has tried to meet situations not foreseen by the framers of the Charter have been discussed. A reference is also made to the relevant rules of international law.

In Chapters II, III and IV, the United Nations role in Colonial Wars (Indonesia, Algeria, Angola), in *International Conflicts Involving a Breakdown of Law and Order* (Congo, Cyprus, Dominican Republic) and in *Proxy Wars and Internal Conflicts Involving Charges of External Aggression or Subversion* (Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Lebanon, Yemen, Indo-China) have been examined with a detailed case study of each conflict. The last chapter deals with the conclusions based on a study of different categories of disorder.

The main contribution of the author lies not so much in the conclusions as in the method of the treatment of the subject matter which the author calls the 'empirical studies of international organisation as a structural component of the international system'. One may have doubts, however, whether it has helped in providing new insights into the behaviour of States and the world community.

The author's conclusions that diversity of internal disorder precludes development of general rules for the treatment of civil strife; that the U.N. has more or less been guided by the political environment; that its influence in cases in which the super powers have been interested has been negligible; that the U.N. Charter provisions have been flexible enough to suit any kind of action taken or that the United Nations has shown concern in these matters by providing machinery for investigation and observation, etc., portray accurately the working mechanism of the United Nations.

It must be mentioned, however, that this kind of an approach is applicable to almost all the other activities of the United Nations not only in the sphere of matters of domestic concern but even with regard to one which clearly falls within its competence. Notwithstanding these comments, the book under review is scholarly and deserves the attention of all those who are interested in a study of this vital problem.

J. S. Bains

**THE WORLD BEYOND THE CHARTER,** by  
C. Wilfred Jenks, George Allen and Unwin, London,  
1969, pp. 199.

Despite enormous published material on the subject of the international organisation, there is

little that would match this book in its depth of analysis of the maladies of the world community, and suggestions regarding the future course of action. This is not merely because of the author's professional experience in the international organisation, but also because of his deep emotional involvement in the process of evolution of a better and more harmonious and stable world community.

Even though the last chapter is most instructive, the first three chapters also give an incisive analysis of the various forces that led to the formation of the League of Nations and the United Nations. The United Nations has been compared to the League of Nations not only in its structure and working but also in its flaws and failures. The author refers to the difficulties confronting the United Nations caused by the political climate of the world, the atom bomb and the fears engendered by it, and also by the selection of New York as the U.N. headquarters, with its affluence, expensiveness, and showmanship characteristic of Hollywood's atmosphere.

Despite the United Nation's tradition of resilience in the face of various political, financial and procedural crises, the organisation is faced with many anxieties and perplexities in meeting the tasks ahead. Such anxieties and perplexities originate from:

- (a) the limit set to its influence and authority by absences from its effective membership;
- (b) the fact that the substantial powers are unmatched by precise obligations;
- (c) the fact that the breadth of approach has not been followed by deep occupation in the most critical sectors of economic progress and personal freedom;
- (d) the confusion as to what range of operational and executive functions should be discharged permanently on a world basis and at whose cost, and when and how properly international and properly national functions should be reshuffled; and
- (e) the fact that the whole U.N. system is financially flimsy.

The most original contribution of the author lies in providing (in the last chapter) an extremely scientific analysis of the world political environment within which a viable world community has to evolve. The world is faced with seven paradoxes in the task before itself. The first is political. There is too much emphasis on State sovereignty. The second is military. There is overwhelming concentration of military power in so few hands. The third is economic and social. Despite so many resources being spent for human welfare and so much recognition of the common responsibility towards this end, the gap between affluence and economic frustration continues to widen.

The fourth paradox is in the field of human rights. Despite general recognition of the freedom and dig-

nity of man, they are denied. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Covenants on Human Rights remain unimplemented. The fifth paradox is in the field of science and technology. Despite enormous progress in these fields, our foresight, breadth of outlook and strength of purpose are not equal to our technical integrity. The sixth paradox is with regard to the role and rule of law. Despite the fact that the scope and range of the common law of mankind have widened beyond all precedent in recent times, we have all too little confidence in the relevance of our law to our problems.

Lastly, the paradox is moral. In our age, moral vitality is at a discount; we may call it a morally colourless or toneless age. Moral purpose is not the characteristic temper of the world of the Charter. According to the author, the progress of the world community in the face of the seven paradoxes presupposes some fundamental political conditions whose attainment is further contingent on the elimination of racial, ideological and economic tension in the world.

In this chapter, the author while giving a picture of the world 'beyond the Charter' on the basis of his enormous experience and deep study points out certain institutional needs which are not fully met by existing arrangements. These are the needs to make a more perfect international organisation. They are:

- 1) to establish effectively the universality and permanence of the institutional framework and structure of the world community;
- 2) to create a natural and organic relationship between the world community and various developing regional communities;
- 3) to bring about functional decentralisation by enlisting as executive agencies of the world community the national instrumentalities through which alone community policy can be made effective in action; in other words, to establish some more specialised agencies in the fields of trade and industrialisation, scientific and technological development, and matters relating to peace and security;
- 4) to evolve responsible processes of arriving at decisions;
- 5) to evolve respect for the due process of law so that there is universal acceptance of the obligation to live with decisions with which one disagrees, until one can get the decisions changed by persuasion; and
- 6) to evolve effective means of implementing decisions of the world community.

The author sounds a note of realism by pointing out that ultimately all the institutional arrangements

or modifications suggested above resolve themselves into questions of attitude, discipline and will-power of the people of the world. In bringing about these modifications, and in resolving the questions of peaceful settlement, arms control and disarmament, science and technology, economic frustration, and social justice, the basic need is replacement of age old prejudices by a broader loyalty to the world community. The book ends with a note of optimism and faith in human foresight and insight, courage and magnanimity. What is needed, according to the author, is 'vision, vigilance and vigour nurtured by faith, hope and charity.' The outcome will be determined, says the author, not by the gods alone, but by the 'response of human leadership and human effort to human need'.

One must express deep satisfaction at having come across a book which is a rare combination of scholarship and pragmatism. The deep study and analysis of the League, the U.N. and 'the world beyond' is matched by the author's inspiring idealism and infectious optimism. The author has been sufficiently realistic to point out that while the requisite improvements in the structure of the world community are extremely difficult to make, they are not impossible, given the will and discipline to do it. The will and discipline will of course flow from the human need to have a more peaceful and purposeful world.

One may venture to point out, however, that optimism is not always an unbridled virtue. Too much of it can distort the perspective. One must not forget that scores of newly independent nations have long unfulfilled aspirations—political, economic and psychological—which will take them years before they can take kindly to the idea of shedding a little bit of State sovereignty. The ultimate advantage of doing so may be intellectually convincing to them, but not immediately obvious. Patience and perseverance is not the characteristic spirit of politics of developing States. Therefore, a slow, careful, and constant process of education is necessary to build in these States an ethos conducive to eliciting their cooperation in the process of evolving a less imperfect world order. Developed States must similarly be educated, though at a faster rate, to see the virtue of sharing their 'development' with the less developed communities, in the interest of building this world order.

This book, nevertheless, will be indispensable for such a process of education.

Seminaris

**DAG HAMMARSKJOLD'S UNITED NATIONS**  
by Mark W. Zacher, Columbia University Press,  
New York and London, 1970, pp. 296.

No single individual in the history of an international organization has ever played so vital and

# CENTRAL HINDI DIRECTORATE

( Ministry of Education & Youth Services )

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dynamic a role and exerted so lasting an impact on the organization in the cause of promotion of international co-operation and peace as Dag Hammarskjold. During his term as the Second Secretary-General of the United Nations for eight and a half years (1953-1961) Dag Hammarskjold progressively and successfully enlarged the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and attempted to use the machinery of the United Nations to its utmost capacity.

The immense impact and the enormous contribution he made in such a relatively short span of time to the conception and content of a genuine world society can hardly be exaggerated. This rightly earned him the title of 'Mr. United Nations' and led to the not so infrequent reaction of member States in crisis situations with a policy of 'leave it to Dag' who successfully executed 'the most impossible job in the world' by choosing to 'live dangerously'. Though the man is gone, his work and words remain with us, helping to provide guide posts towards the establishment of a better world society with firmer foundations of international order in support of peace, freedom, equality and justice.

Several books and articles in the recent past have tried to analyse and appreciate the impressive achievements of Dag Hammarskjold in the growth of the United Nations and particularly in the art and skill of 'crisis diplomacy', during the critical days of Korea, China, Indonesia, Kashmir, Palestine, Suez, Hungary and North Africa.

*Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations* by Mark W. Zacher, published as part of the Columbia University (New York) Studies in International Organization is yet another admirable effort to present the late Secretary-General's conception of the goals and basis of power of the Organization as well as the strategies and tactics which the member States and the Secretariat should pursue to realize its goals.

The author, after a brief introduction, starts with (Chapter I) a short description of Dag Hammarskjold's background and the political attitudes which he possessed when he came to the United Nations. The Second Chapter attempts to analyse Dag Hammarskjold's conception of the United Nations' objectives and bases of power, contained in the introduction to his 1961 Annual Report, wherein he had recalled that the end goal of the Organization was to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war, through prevention of armed conflict, negotiations, the prohibition of the use of force 'save in the common interest', equal economic opportunity, political equality, and the rule of law or justice. Chapters III to VI are devoted to Dag Hammarskjold's strategies and tactics for achieving the main goals of the United Nations, in the promotion of the peaceful settlement of disputes, in controlling the use of force, in promoting arms control and dis-

armament and in the building of a more peaceful world order.

In the process of enumerating these, the book supplies a good deal of information concerning the concrete roles of the United Nations during the years 1953-1961 and the crises in which it was involved. A special insight is provided with regard to the Sino-American Conflict of 1954-55, the Suez Crisis, the Hungarian question, the Lebanese Crisis of 1958, the Cambodian and Thailand questions, and the Congo Crisis.

Some of the theoretical principles, inasmuch as they uphold the status quo, reflect to some extent a fatalistic view on the state of things and certain self-contradictory prescriptions and predictions are of doubtful validity. In support of these theoretical principles and practical propositions with regard to the tactics and strategies that Dag Hammarskjold adopted, the author makes exceedingly liberal and exhaustive use of quotations and views of various writers and statesmen, which he properly acknowledges in the footnotes. The large number of quotations, though they may add to the scholastic quality of the book, makes it a little hard going. Here one is struck by the fact that in a book dealing with Dag Hammarskjold's conception of the United Nations, so little use is made of his book *Markings* which forms his personal philosophy and spiritual beliefs.

Further, in reading the book one cannot fail to notice the striking absence of a critical appreciation of the strategies and tactics of Dag Hammarskjold. As the author himself admits in his introduction, 'the accuracy and desirability of various aspects of Dag Hammarskjold's conception of the Organization both during his tenure as Secretary-General and during the present and future will have to be judged by every student of the United Nations for himself.' Besides, most of these concepts have been borrowed from the writings of Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, and the general structure of the study has been strongly influenced by this policy-oriented approach to the study of politics.

Nevertheless, the book has value beyond the apparent, inasmuch as it throws light and stimulates thought on some of the dilemmas that have persistently confronted the students of world order. The book is fairly comprehensive and covers a wide range of subjects. The author has made an attempt to give some system to the range of material he had to deal with. The impressive footnotes and useful bibliography enhance the value of the book.

It is interesting to note that the publication of the book happens to coincide with the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the United Nations. The book thus, no doubt, provides an opportunity to re-evaluate the problems and prospects of the world Organization and to answer the question 'Is the United Nations of Dag Hammarskjold Dead?' 41

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# Communication

DR. Ratna Datta's essay (SEMINAR 132) surprises me in its contrast between the religious/cultural and the race/caste boundaries. Where exactly the argument is pitched is unclear, but I can think of several levels where it would not be tenable and of only one where it would be:

*Where it does hold:* In India in the late 60s, the caste boundaries seem to be giving way while some of the religious boundaries seem to be gaining strength.

*Other levels:* 1. The religion/race contrast is questionable. In the Germany of the 30s, the persecution of the Jews was, officially, on racial grounds (not religious, as Datta implies). Children of mixed marriages—presumably reflecting their parents' will to cross the minority boundaries—or Jews turned Christian were just as vulnerable as 'pure' Jews.

To consider religious, national and/or cultural minorities as 'minorities by will' is untenable. That one is a Muslim is as much an act of God as his neighbour's being a Harijan; indeed, anyone familiar with Muslim-converts-to-Hinduism-in-1947-in-the-Punjab will testify that Hindu society virtually denies non-Hindus the opportunity to become Hindus except perhaps as distinctive endogamous groups. In other words, the strength of a minority's boundaries depends, in large part, on the prevailing norms, within and without the minority, concerning what kinds of boundaries are permitted or necessary or both.

If I understand Dr Datta correctly—and I am not sure that I do—she argues that the religious/cultural minorities are more vulnerable to majority hostility ('being made a scapegoat for the ills of society') than racial ones. Not so. During World War II in the U.S. it was the racially distinct (but culturally fairly well assimilated) second-generation Japanese, and not German-Americans

that were moved to relocation camps. In the contemporary U.S., Catholics and Jews (held there to be a religious and not a racial minority) are well assimilated; the Blacks are not. Examples from contemporary U.K., South Africa, and elsewhere could be added.

Or is Dr. Datta proceeding from a 'psychological unity of mankind,' arguing that Rational Man should be able to see (theoretically it is possible to visualize the) assimilation of Negroes or the American Indian into the white community... that racial differences, acts of God, can be condoned more easily than religious differences, acts of human will? If there is such a theoretical system, the foregoing would suggest that it is highly vulnerable.

Where, then, are we left? I submit that the explanation of which communal boundaries are salient in a particular region lies in the historical antecedents of the population groups there and of the potency of human effort directed at erasing one or another boundary. Comparing ethnic relations in the U.S. with those in India, a distinguished social psychologist once told me that the Americans had taken care of their religious and regional problems, but the racial boundaries had been neglected. Which wall is raised or lowered depends on where, in particular historical contexts, effective effort is applied. The sociologically interesting question is: in what social conditions is corporate effort likely to be aimed at which wall and to what purpose?

Satish Saberwal,

Indian Institute of Advanced Study,  
Simla.

**Correction:** Para 2, column 1 on page 19 of SEMINAR 133 should be enclosed within quotation marks.

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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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**EXT MONTH : OUR CONSTITUTION**

# 135

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a symposium on the  
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# **The problem**

For too long has the petrified hostility between India and Pakistan been allowed to become the backdrop for all commentaries on these two neighbours. The usual attempts have been made to score diplomatic triumphs or to pretend to enlightened initiatives or to make polite noises about the need to improve relations, but there has been no rigorous exercise to cut through the petrified hostility and to present realistic alternatives. And, yet, there can be no rapprochement, minimum or maximum, without the presentation of such alternatives. To continue to live in mutual fear and suspicion, amounting to hatred, is to invite untold suffering upon this strategic sub-continent. Over the years, the borders of our land will have to be defused, demilitarised. This cannot be done in a romantic, sentimental crusade. We have got to keep pummelling at the problem in the hope that mutual enlightenment will dawn. All searches for normality are a sign of health. Here is another effort in this direction...

# **The coming phase**

B. SHIVA RAO

WITH the general elections in Pakistan on the basis of adult suffrage fast approaching, it would be futile to speculate on their possible outcome. Pakistan has gone far from its original moorings, first as a basic democracy based on an extremely restricted franchise

(which incidentally denied east Pakistan the advantage of a numerical majority of the population) followed later by two military dictatorships. At long last it has decided on establishing a democracy of the western type with a weak federal structure and cir-

cumscribed authority over a number of units into which both east and west Pakistan have been divided.

**W**ho will be the new rulers of Pakistan after the elections? Will there be, as now in India, different political groups with different ideologies securing power in the different units? Centre-State relations in India have been subjected to many stresses and strains in recent years, and the immense benefits we derived in the early years from a single party being in power at the Centre and in (practically) all the States have receded into the background.

All round there was in India a keenness to reach quick agreements and an atmosphere of accommodation. There were leaders of the stature of Nehru, Patel, Rajaji and Rajendra Prasad (to mention only a few) whose advice and guidance discouraged the prolongation of barren controversies. The task of the Constituent Assembly was further simplified by the expert knowledge and wide experience of Sir B. N. Rau, the Constitutional Adviser.

Despite these favourable factors, India's Constituent Assembly took twenty eight months to frame the Constitution, its last session being on November 26th, 1949. The first general elections came more than two years later, in January, 1952. This interval of a little over two years was taken up with the delimitation of constituencies, preparation of electoral rolls and all the other essential preliminaries. Taking all the phases into account, between the Constituent Assembly's first start and the first general election under the new Constitution were five years of hectic activity.

Pakistan's plight will probably be considerably worse than ours in this respect. East Pakistan has never been a willing or happy partner with the western wing. It has resented being ruled from Islamabad, and regarded the administration as an imposition on it. It is now determined to assert its autonomy in all possible ways

for the improvement of the economic and social standards of its poverty-stricken population.

The first question that will inevitably arise, whenever civilian authority is fully restored, is in regard to the composition of the implementing authority on points of agreement and of the deciding authority on points of controversy.

The introduction of a federal form of government, with an executive responsible to the legislature with a much weaker central authority than in India does not really help Pakistan in her present predicament. The classification of subjects into Federal and State, especially with the proposal to reduce the former category to the barest minimum is bound to give rise to acute controversy.

Some months, even a year or more—who can tell—must elapse before a clear picture emerges of the new groupings and their trends in both wings of Pakistan. The maintenance of a central authority was possible all these years with difficulty because of the armed might of the military dictator, though defiant student crowds proved on more than one occasion that martial law had no terrors for them.

**D**ifficult as were our early years, our problems in the formative period following the end of the second world war appear to be comparatively simpler than those that Pakistan may face under the new regime.

The problem of minorities in Pakistan has never been considered from the standpoint of securing for them their just rights. Here, again, our procedure adopted in 1947 deserved to be followed, if Pakistan's intention was the establishment of a democracy fully acceptable to her minorities. We constituted a Minorities Sub-Committee in India with only the representatives of the minorities as its members, to suggest safeguards in the Constitution that they would regard as adequate. The abandonment of separate electorates

and of reservation of seats for certain minorities was a recommendation of the Minorities Sub-Committee made after a careful study of the report of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee. One must hope that this grave omission in the Pakistan Constitution will sooner or later be rectified in the democratic institutions that her people are now establishing for themselves.

**T**his article is being written with complete detachment, with no desire to magnify the difficulties ahead for Pakistan's leaders. The India-Pakistan Conciliation Group, of which I have the honour to be a member, has for a decade and more missed no opportunity of fostering an improvement in the relations between the two countries. Candour compels me, however, to observe that at no point in our history has there been a convincing case for the establishment of a separate, independent Pakistan on the basis of the two-nation theory. Jinnah was an ardent nationalist until almost the eve of the second world war, a liberal by conviction brought up in the Gokhale tradition. He broke away from the Congress in 1920 when it adopted the non-co-operation programme under Gandhiji's leadership; but he did not forsake his liberal principles, nor lose his deep faith in India's progress towards responsible government as a self-governing Dominion.

In 1924, in a debate in the Central Legislative Assembly on Pandit Motilal Nehru's proposal for a representative Round Table Conference, Jinnah, in supporting the proposal, demolished the two-nations theory. Here is a passage from his speech: 'India is not a nation, we are told. We were a people when the Great War was going on and an appeal was made to India for blood and money... We are a nation when we become a member of the League of Nations to which we have made a substantial contribution... We are not a people, not a nation when we ask you for a substantial advance towards the establishment of responsible government and

liamentary institutions in our country.

At the first session of the Round Table Conference in London in 1930, he supported the national demand for 'a new Dominion of India ready to march along with the other Dominions within the British Commonwealth of Nations'. At that time, he did not believe the break-up of India as an administrative unit and in fact warned me (also at that time a delegate to the Conference) that the separation of Burma was being secretly contemplated by the British Government.

Jinnah felt, however, through the years that he was a supporter of the national movement, as he was being ignored by the Congress leaders. In the twenties, they preferred to utilise the services of other Muslim leaders who accepted Gandhiji's leadership, like Dr. Ansari and Maulana Azad. At the Round Table Conferences in London, the British delegation found men like Sir Muhammad Shafi and Sir Zafrullah Khan more helpful for their purposes as spokesmen of the Muslim community. Jinnah felt completely isolated at this stage. India's progress towards freedom that he quietly dropped out of active politics for more than two years and practised law in London.

There was no talk of Pakistan in any quarter in the early thirties. When the 1935 Constitution Bill was under the scrutiny of a Joint Parliamentary Committee, no support for the scheme devised by a young Muslim student in Cambridge, Rehmat Ali, as forthcoming from any representative section of the Muslims. His evidence may be cited the view of a Muslim deputation led by A. Yusuf Ali who told the Committee that Pakistan was 'a student's scheme which no responsible Muslim would put forward'. Asked by Sir Reginald Craddock, a member of the Committee, about the implications of Pakistan, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan intermed with the comment, 'we consider it commercial and imprac-

ticable'. Jinnah chose to maintain complete silence about the proposal.

Even in the summer of 1937, after the general elections under the 1935 Constitution (by which time Jinnah had returned to India), his thoughts were not in the direction of a separate State of Pakistan. In a public statement shortly after these elections which gave the Congress decisive successes in seven provinces, he declared, 'nobody will welcome an honourable settlement between the Hindus and Muslims more than I, and nobody will be more ready to help it'; and he followed it with a public appeal to Gandhiji to tackle this question. The latter's response was prompt but somewhat depressing 'I wish I could do something, but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is bright as ever; only I see no daylight but impenetrable darkness, and in such distress I cry out to God for light'.

The circumstances under which the campaign for Pakistan grew to formidable proportions in the short space of three years (between 1937 and 1940) are peculiar and deserve notice. The British authorities, under the impression that the morale of the Congress had been broken by the prolonged detention of its leaders during the earlier years of the decade, had viewed with little apprehension the outcome of the first general elections in 1937. Many Congress leaders, particularly of the Left wing, had no doubt spoken of their plans to 'wreck the Constitution from within'. But the party was torn by internal dissensions at the top and all the principal lieutenants of Mahatma Gandhi had threatened resignation from the Working Committee unless Nehru, in his capacity as the President, abandoned the policy of preaching socialism as the goal of the Congress.

The results of the general elections in the early part of 1937 completely upset all previous calculations and altered beyond recognition the outlook of the

different political groups, of the princes and of the British authorities. Apart from the Congress successes in seven provinces, in the Punjab it was the Unionist Party—and not the Muslim League—under Sikandar Hyat Khan that had secured a majority at the polls, with a ministry subsequently formed under his leadership consisting of three Muslims, two Hindus and a Sikh. In Bengal, Fazlul Huq, the leader of the Praja Party, had come to the fore with a strong tenants' programme. His plea for the abolition of the permanent settlement and the release of political prisoners and detainees had brought him and his party much Congress support before and during the elections.

The performance of the Muslim League was in comparison dismally poor; of 482 Muslim seats in all the provincial legislatures, only 109 went to League candidates. In one or two provinces, notably the U.P., the success of the Congress party at the polls was due, in great measure, to the support of the peasantry. Immediately after the elections, Nehru said: 'the election has brought a patent fact to the forefront which is this: the masses are hungry and they want bread. Education is starved and the children of the poor classes should be given proper education. The peasantry is crushed by the burden of debt. How to give bread and education and how to relieve the masses from their debts should be the concern of all.'

Trouble, which quickly developed phenomenal proportions, started in the U.P. There was an informal understanding in the U.P. before the date of polling between the Congress and the Muslim League for the formation of a coalition ministry after the elections. No one expected the Congress to emerge as the largest party in the legislature with a definite majority. Under such altered circumstances, it preferred to exercise the right of forming a single party government, since that was held to be the verdict of the electorate. A coalition, it was

argued by the left-wingers, could not 'wreck the Constitution'—the avowed object of the Congress. Then came Nehru's 'mass contact programme' to win over the Muslim masses to the Congress creed. Muslims even outside the U.P. felt that the League's existence as an organisation was being threatened by this move; and in the subsequent bye-elections, the results showed that Nehru had committed a tactical error.

The defeat of the Congress candidates in these bye-elections had a visible psychological effect. The stock of the Muslim League rose all over India. Other parties, which had been defeated in the elections, saw in the League a rallying point for a combined opposition to the Congress. Landlords, in particular—Muslim and Hindu—apprehensive of the Congress agrarian programme, naturally turned to the League for indirect assistance and in return gave it support.

An entirely new situation arose at this stage, unforeseen by the active participants in the struggle for power. Provincial autonomy was introduced under the 1935 Constitution through the general elections held in the first half of 1937. Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, was keen on hastening the introduction of a federation. The Congress had secured a majority in seven provinces in the provincial elections of 1937. Vested interests were determined to prevent the repetition of similar success for the Congress in the federal elections which were expected in 1938 or 1939. Landlords, industrialists, princes—Muslim, Hindu and Sikh—all saw in the Muslim League the only hope of offering effective resistance to the Congress. Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan and Muslim leaders in Bengal, who were lukewarm towards the League until 1937, were persuaded to accept Jinnah's leadership, though their loyalty was never deep or convincing.

It is on record (see Khaliquzzaman Chaudhuri's *Pathways* to

Pakistan) that the creation of Pakistan as a separate State originated with him, and Jinnah was at first a reluctant and half-hearted convert to the scheme. Later, however, he developed the two-nation theory to support his claim.

**S**uch, in brief, was the genesis of Pakistan. In retrospect one can see that it had really little to do with Hindu-Muslim differences. Other elements in India's life—the landlords, the industrialists and the princes—lent their support to the Muslim League in a bid to form an effective coalition opposition to the Congress at the federal Centre. No one, not even Jinnah, had thought of a separatist movement. How strange, sometimes, can be the ironies of history! The ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity right up to 1937, the caustic critic of the theory of India being more than one nation in 1924 completely went back on his earlier convictions after 1937.

During the war, the Pakistan movement admirably suited the Churchill Government for rejecting India's demand for immediate freedom. After the war, the British Government under Attlee sent in 1946 a Cabinet Mission consisting of Lord Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Lord Alexander in the summer of 1946 to evolve a procedure and a plan for the Constituent Assembly. On the vital problem of partition, the Mission was convinced that there was 'an almost universal desire, outside the supporters of the Muslim League, for the unity of India'.

Nevertheless, the proposal was examined with great care and from every aspect. The Muslim League's claim for 'a separate and fully independent sovereign State of Pakistan'—comprising two areas, (a) the Punjab, the North-Western Frontier and Baluchistan in the North-West; and (b) Bengal and Assam in the North-East—was rejected as administratively and economically unworkable. The alternative of a smaller sovereign

Pakistan was next examined, excluding from these areas regions in which the Muslims did not form a majority. The Mission declared that 'any solution which involved a radical partition of the Punjab and Bengal, would be contrary to the wishes and interests of a very large proportion of the inhabitants of these provinces. Moreover, any division of the Punjab would of necessity divide the Sikhs, leaving substantial bodies of Sikhs on both sides of the boundary'.

The Mission was 'forced to the conclusion that neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign State of Pakistan would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem'. In addition, said the Mission, there were 'weighty administrative, economic and military considerations' against any sort of partition; there was also 'the geographical fact that the two halves of the proposed Pakistan State are separated by some seven hundred miles'.

**F**rom the side of the Congress, in the summer of 1942, Rajaji had no doubt felt compelled by the threat of an imminent Japanese landing on the Madras coast, to concede the principle of Pakistan, leaving the details to be settled at the end of the war, provided the transfer of the substance of power was immediate. Two years later, Gandhiji was willing to go so far as a treaty with Pakistan to effect a smooth transfer of power during a period of transition for the joint administration of subjects like external affairs, defence and currency. From the records it is abundantly clear that Jinnah had not finally made up his mind about Pakistan even until towards the end of 1946. Congress leaders seemed singularly anxious in the penultimate stages of the freedom movement to dispel Muslim fears of coercion at any stage.

In the early months of 1947, however, worried by the lack of progress in the Constituent Assembly and apprehensive of a possible Balkanisation of the country, they decided to accept partition as the lesser of the two

dangers. On the British side was a noticeable diffidence about a war-exhausted Britain being able to carry on effectively India's administration until the final date fixed for the transfer of power, not later than June, 1948. The decision was the British Government's declaration in February 1947 that the question would remain open to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over on the due date (not later than June 1948), 'whether as a whole or to some form of Central Government of British India, or in some areas to the existing provincial governments'.

**T**here was hardly any time in those hectic weeks preceding the transfer of power in 1947, for calm reflection. Lord Mountbatten's announcement on June 3 that the date for the transfer of power was being advanced to August 15, 1947, leaving but eighty days for the completion of the numerous but important details to make it effective and smooth. Nehru had in a broadcast suggested an assessment of the Indian situation even more gloomy than his predecessors. For generations we have dreamt and struggled for a free and independent united India. The proposal to allow certain parts to secede, if they so will, is painful for any of us to contemplate. Nevertheless, I am convinced that our present decision is the right one even from the larger viewpoint. The united India that we have laboured for was not one of compulsion and coercion but a free and willing association of a free people. It may be that in this way we shall reach that united India sooner than otherwise and that she will have a stronger and more secure foundation'.

The broadcast gave Mountbatten's announcement of British withdrawal from an increasingly untenable position the appearance of a deliberately-forged policy. 'A free and willing association of a free people' was not possible within the framework of a single federal structure. The dream of a united India to which Nehru

referred was no longer possible, after the creation of two independent sovereign States in 1947. But numerous problems, whose solution was essential for smooth and friendly relations between the two States after independence, remained undecided at the time of partition and created in the last two decades deep suspicion and ill-will between them.

In regard to Kashmir, if Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah will decide to contest with his followers the next general elections in 1972, it is possible he may secure a sufficient number of seats to enable him to negotiate with the Central Government for a new relationship acceptable to both sides. After the Pakistan elections, the position of Azad Kashmir may have to be reviewed in the light of actual experience of the working of the new Constitution.

**W**hat in the vastly changed circumstances of today are the prospects for the future? India will watch, with vigilant care but with real sympathy, developments in Pakistan. Provided that the functioning of the new democratic institutions is genuine, it may be easier hereafter to secure economic, social and cultural collaboration with fruitful results. Joint boards representing the two governments could be set up in regard to a number of subjects of common concern specified in the Tashkent declaration if possible, with the assistance of economic and financial experts from the U.N.

The next year or two may be profitably utilised for improving Indo-Pakistan relations as a preliminary to the solution of the problems that have vexed the two countries through the adoption of the following measures:

- (1) The establishment of a Conciliation Group in Pakistan similar to the one in India under the chairmanship of Jaya Prakash Narayan;
- (2) a free exchange of newspaper correspondents between the two countries; and
- (3) an exchange of professors and students between the universities in the two countries.

# The obsession

SEMINARIST

A DOMINANT urge of the statesmen of Pakistan ever since its inception has been to charge India with trying to destroy Pakistan by every possible means. The wildest of accusations have been made against India, and every act of hers has been interpreted as governed by a desire to weaken Pakistan. Mohammad Ayub Khan, the former President of Pakistan, said in his autobiography, *Friends Not Masters*, 'The cause of our major problems is India's inability to reconcile herself to our existence as a sovereign, independent State. The Indian attitude can be explained only in pathological terms. The Indian leaders have a deep hatred for the Muslims... Elsewhere in the book, the former President said, 'India's aim is to expand, dominate, and spread her influence. In this, she considers Pakistan as her enemy number one.' Referring to some events after the partition, the President said, 'India's attitude to Pakistan contin-

nued to be one of unmitigated hostility. Her aim was to cripple us at birth'.

What Mohammad Ayub Khan wrote in 1967 has been stated endlessly by Pakistani leaders since the partition. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister, stated at a public meeting in January 1948, 'Indian Union leaders, who have never accepted the partition of India sincerely, have been making elaborate designs to end Pakistan since its very birth.' Now that twentythree years have elapsed since the partition of the sub-continent, and Pakistan is passing through its historic moments, it becomes necessary to examine the validity of this Pakistani charge, and consider the motivations behind it.

No solid evidence has ever been advanced by a Pakistani to substantiate the charge that India wants to destroy Pakistan, or re-absorb her. Some statements of

India's National Congress leaders made at the time of partition are frequently quoted in this connection. For instance, Mahatma Gandhi told his prayer meeting immediately after the plan to partition India was announced (3 June, 1947), 'We Moslems and Hindus are interdependent on one another: we cannot get along without each other. The Moslem League will ask to come back to Hindustan. They will ask Jawaharlal to come back, and he will take them back.'<sup>1</sup> The Congress President, Acharya J. B. Kripalani, said in July 1947, 'The freedom we have achieved cannot be complete without the unity of India.'<sup>2</sup> Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Indian Home Minister, said at about the same time, 'Sooner than later, we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country.'<sup>3</sup> Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, once told United Nations representative Josef Korbel, 'We want to cooperate and work towards cooperation, and one day integration will inevitably come. If it will be in four, five, ten years—I do not know.'<sup>4</sup> A few more statements of this sort can be collected.

**I**t is amazing that any one even barely acquainted with the ideology of the Indian National Congress and its leaders should interpret these statements as evidence of India's desire to destroy or re-integrate Pakistan. It is common knowledge that the Indian National Congress was opposed to the partition of the country, but accepted it as the lesser evil, to cut short the perpetuation of foreign rule. It did not accept the two-nation theory on the basis of which the Muslim League demanded partition. It considered the partition of a compact geographical entity on merely religious lines as antagonistic to mid-twentieth century concepts of a viable nation State. It had been

agitating to overthrow the alien rule and not to oust a large chunk of its own population. Its leaders had been moved by visions of a free India in which the sons of the soil—whether Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs or Christians—would equally prosper. The partition plan, therefore, came as a shock which they took time to reconcile to.

Their statements quoted above were therefore expressions of remorse and disgust at the prospect of partition, and hope that the wrong, for which they were no less responsible, would be rectified soon. The statements were not made in anger and enmity. They were devoid of language that could be considered strong, abusive, or threatening. They did not contain any reference to the wilful destruction of Pakistan, by force or otherwise. They should be noted for their emphasis on 'interdependence of Muslims and Hindus', 'common allegiance to our country', and 'work towards cooperation'. Therefore, attempts to misinterpret these statements as evidence of India's desire to undo the partition can only be taken as reflecting Pakistan's own guilt complex at having been the result of an imperialist conspiracy to disrupt the stability of the Indian subcontinent.

**I**ndian leaders, having reconciled themselves to partition, strove for cooperative relations with Pakistan. 'We accepted (the partition) as a fact and we hoped that it would at least solve some of the problems that had troubled us', said Jawaharlal Nehru in the Indian Parliament on March 17, 1950. His attitude towards Pakistan was governed by the conviction that the two countries were destined to be friendly. Addressing the Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi on March 22, 1949, Nehru said, 'There is also no doubt at all in my mind that it is inevitable for India and Pakistan to have close relations—very close relations—sometime or other in the future. . . We can be either rather hostile to each other or very friendly with each other.'

Ultimately, we can only be really very friendly, whatever period of hostility may intervene in between, because our interests are so closely interlinked.'

'He never thought in terms of war with Pakistan. . . I do not feel hostility towards them (people of Pakistan) and I cannot conceive of a war with Pakistan without the utmost dismay', said Nehru in the Lok Sabha on March 29, 1956. He gave evidence of this by repeatedly making the offer of a 'No-War-Pact' to Pakistan, so unceremoniously rejected by the latter every time it was made. Thus, if statements of leaders are any proof, these should be enough to refute the Pakistani contention that India has evil designs against Pakistan.

**F**or further evidence, the acts of Indian leaders should be noted. Mahatma Gandhi, a martyr in the cause of communal unity, is quoted by Pakistani writers in support of their allegation of Indian hostility towards Pakistan. What they forget is his magnanimity and regard for international commitments demonstrated through his fast in January 1948 to pressurize the Government of India to pay to Pakistan the cash balance of Rs. 550 million, in the wake of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir. That a national leader should be risking his life and staking his prestige to help an 'enemy' country in a crisis situation is unparalleled in the history of international relations. The Government of India decided to pay the amount immediately as a gesture of goodwill to Pakistan and as their contribution 'to the non-violent and noble effort made by Gandhiji.'

Some reasons are occasionally suggested by Pakistan's statesmen and writers as being responsible for India's alleged desire to destroy Pakistan or re-integrate her. For instance, as remarked by President Ayub in one of his statements quoted above, 'Indian leaders have a deep hatred for the Muslims', and that explains their hostility to Pakistan. Another

1. Quoted by Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *India, China and Pakistan*, Karachi, 1967, p. 18.

2. Quoted by Sherwani, *ibid.*

3. Quoted by Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, London, 1967, pp. 115-6.

4. Quoted by Sherwani, n. 1, p. 17.

possible reason, according to Pakistanis, is that India was deprived of 19½ per cent of its pre-partition population and 23 per cent of its pre-partition territory. She wants it back.<sup>5</sup> Yet another reason is that Pakistan's potential eminence in the Muslim world poses a challenge to India's ambition of leadership in the Afro-Asian region.<sup>6</sup> And, finally, it is said that India because of its sheer size and resources, which are many times more than Pakistan's, is a constant threat to Pakistan's existence.

All these reasons are, by standards of mature international relations, too flimsy to deserve serious consideration. However, lest the benefit of doubt should go to Pakistan, a brief comment on each may be worthwhile. The charge that Indian leaders hate the Muslims is untenable for the simple reason that in a democracy like India, no leader worth the name can afford to 'hate' about 12½ per cent of the population. As regards the charge that India wants to recover its lost population and territory, by this logic India should like to recover Afghanistan and Burma, too, if not large areas in Afro-Asia with sizeable populations of Indian origin. This is inconceivable. It goes against all that India has stood for in international relations ever since her independence. Besides, even after the loss of a certain population and territory to Pakistan, India's position in the world remains the same i.e., the second largest population-wise, and seventh largest territory-wise.

The third reason is that India is jealous of Pakistan's potential eminence in the Muslim world, and *ipso facto* in the Afro-Asian region. Well, to answer this, one must wait for the day when Pakistan acquires that eminence. Lastly, Pakistan, we are told, is afraid of India's size and resources. For this, unfortunately, India cannot be blamed. It cannot slash itself into pieces merely to satisfy Pakistan. All that it can do is to

assure Pakistan that it would never on its own wage a war against her. Unilaterally, this commitment of India stands, but as stated earlier, India's offers of a 'No-War-Pact' were always turned down by Pakistan.

It is necessary to examine at this stage whether India should or should not like to merge Pakistan with itself. In other words, Pakistani reasoning apart, would it be in India's interest, politically and economically, to conquer Pakistan or manoeuvre its return to India's fold by other means, granting of course that India is capable of doing so, which in itself is highly doubtful. Politically speaking, India's most intractable problem still is national integration. Despite a large measure of success in this respect since independence, Kashmir in the north-west and the Nagas and Mizos in the north-east are constant irritants to the Centre. The politics of India is yet to stabilize. The society and economy are passing through a transitional period.

As a bye-product, political aberrations like the Naxalites and the Shiv Sena crop up frequently as new challenges to Indian polity. India should congratulate itself if it succeeds in forging national unity before it is overtaken by disruptive forces from inside or abroad. It would therefore be highly imprudent for India to wish back more than a hundred million people who opted out of India and whom even the divine bond of a common faith is finding it difficult to keep together.

Economically speaking, to acquire an area which is more backward than itself is never an attractive proposition to any country. That Pakistan has survived economically is little short of a miracle to many people. For this miracle, the people of Pakistan should be grateful to their foreign benefactors. Pakistan's economy has been sustained by a large inflow of foreign capital. India also received foreign capital. But as estimated in the middle of 1967, Pakistan received foreign capital

twice as large per capita as India. Whereas in India foreign capital inflow accounted for only a quarter of the net aggregate investment, in Pakistan it was as much as two-thirds. Despite this large dose of foreign capital and consequently accelerated rate of economic growth, Pakistan's income per capita has remained less than India's. While Pakistan's per capita net national income at current factor cost in 1967-68 was Rs. 506,000, India's per capita net national income at current prices in the same year was Rs. 541.8.

A few more economic indicators of the two countries may be compared to get an idea of the economic potentialities of Pakistan vis-a-vis India. According to 1965 estimates, while 34 per cent of Pakistan's total population is economically active, in India it is 43 per cent. Out of this, 74 per cent is engaged in agricultural occupations in Pakistan, while in India it is 70%. Again, while in Pakistan the per capita availability of arable land is 0.27 hectares (1964 estimates), in India it is 0.33 hectares (1965 estimates). The consumption of energy per capita in India is 176 kgs. coal equivalent per year, while in Pakistan it is only 92 kgs. (both 1967 estimates). The consumption of crude steel is 13 kgs. per capita per year in India, while in Pakistan it is 8 kgs. (both 1967 estimates).

As regards the availability of certain basic commodities essential for economic growth, by 1967 estimates, India produces 3.6 per cent of the world's coal, 1.3 per cent of crude steel, 1.3 per cent of aluminium, and 0.3 per cent of crude petroleum, while Pakistan does not occupy any significant place in the production map of these commodities. Even cotton which is one of the two main foreign exchange earners of Pakistan is produced by her only to the extent of 4.9 per cent of the world production, while India produces 10.8 per cent.

This being the relative economic potential of Pakistan, her re-absorption should on the face of it be an extremely unwelcome

5. Sherwani, n. 1.

6. Ibid., p. 19.

proposition to India. The only motive of such a policy could be blind expansionism unrelated to national needs. This cannot be attributed to India, if her history and ideology are any guides.

The pertinent question therefore is that if the validity of motives attributed by Pakistan to India for desiring to undo the partition is questionable, and if it is not necessarily in India's interest to do so, why should it be a constant refrain of Pakistani leaders that India is a threat to Pakistan. Does it in any way serve Pakistan's interest continuously to raise the bogey of an Indian threat? Perhaps it does. Recent events have shown that Pakistan is again at the cross roads of history.

**T**he eternal question in Pakistan is what is her *raison d'etre*? The only answer available is 'Islam'. But, as has been proved for the nth time recently, Islam is not adequate to keep the Pathans, the Baluchis, the Sindhis, the Punjabis and the Bengalis together. Therefore, ever since the partition, a hostile India has been conjured up in the minds of the Pakistanis as a great external threat to keep the nation together.

To the whole generation of Pakistanis born after 1947, India has been painted as a despicable foe out to devour Pakistan at the slightest opportunity. All educational media, including textbooks, and publicity media have been used to this end. Lest the people of Pakistan should know the reality about India, all channels of contact between the two countries at popular level were gradually closed, and every pretext was used to keep them closed. Every suggestion from within Pakistan for an exchange of goodwill delegations, books and literature, films, or revival of trade with India is looked upon as anti-national. In fact, the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations can be explained largely in terms of Pakistan's need to maintain an anti-India posture.

It may be worthwhile to illustrate how this posture is harness-

ed to serve Pakistan's interest. The people of East Pakistan, for instance, were exasperated with the way in which some of the bilateral disputes with India were being magnified out of proportion to suppress internal criticism against unresolved problems. For instance, the recurring floods, the food shortages, the scarcity of foreign exchange, scarcity of capital for industrial development, under-representation in the army, the civil services and politics of the country—these were problems of greater concern to the people of East Pakistan than Kashmir for which they had to suffer two unsuccessful wars, and which even some of the West Pakistanis would now like to forget. The Central Government of Pakistan therefore felt it necessary in 1968 to resurrect the issue of the Farakka barrage and project it as a major Indo-Pakistani dispute.

**P**erhaps this was not enough. The inventive genius of Pakistan found expression in manufacturing the so-called Agartala Conspiracy Case in 1968. This was a double-edged weapon. By involving India in the 'conspiracy', it was supposed to heighten anti-India tension. By accusing Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and others, it was intended to weaken East Pakistani nationalism vis-a-vis the West. But the 'conspiracy' misfired. The Sheikh's popularity and prestige increased many times. The bluff of Indian involvement was called.

How long Pakistan will consider it necessary to use the 'threat of India' as an essential instrument of its statecraft and diplomacy is a matter of concern to India. It may be necessary for Pakistan to do so until it finds a viable basis for its nationalism. This does not appear possible in the foreseeable future, unless a spirit of real democracy pervades Pakistan's polity, taking cognizance of regional needs and aspirations, and regional contribution to national life.

# Cost of tension

RATHY SAWHNEY

EVER since independent India and Pakistan came into being as sovereign nations there has existed between them a state of perpetual cold war, with the degree of tension varying from time to time. On three occasions open conflict has erupted; in Kashmir in 1948, in Kutch in 1965 and, again, later that year in the 22 days September war. In addition, there have been innumerable border violations and minor clashes between the troops of the two countries deployed permanently on the frontiers, in a state of constant operational readiness.

This bitter confrontation has loomed large on the horizon of both countries and has very significantly influenced their internal and external policies. There can

be no doubt that this confrontation has imposed its burden on both nations. *Prima facie* it may appear that the burden is heavy. But is this really so? And has the burden fallen with equal severity on each of them? The very act of partition, which gave birth to the two nations, inflicted a grievous wound on the erstwhile entity of undivided India. But the costs of partition, which were undeniably high, are irrelevant and must be excluded in computing the cost of the tension which has prevailed between the two nations which came into being in August 1947.

In attempting to calculate this cost, considerable difficulties arise. Some items such as the relative burden of defence expenditure and perhaps losses due to inter-

ruption of trade can to some degree be quantified in mathematical terms. Others like the political costs, internal and external, do not lend themselves to mathematical evaluation.

**E**ven in the field of defence expenditure, no exact comparison is feasible, since straightforward comparisons between officially published figures would not be appropriate. After the 1965 war, Pakistan no longer discloses the breakdown of its demands for grants on defence accounts, and there are valid reasons to believe that a considerable portion of the capital expenditure incurred on its armed forces is excluded from Pakistan's defence budget. It is also quite likely that other defence oriented items are concealed under various heads of civil expenditure.

In 1969-70, Pakistan's declared defence expenditure was Rs. (P) 260 crores which, (assuming a GNP growth rate of 5 per cent) works out to 3.6 per cent of its GNP. The maintenance of one Pakistani division, including normal support elements, must be in the region of Rs. (P) 20 crores per annum. Since Pakistan has the equivalent of fourteen army divisions (two armoured and twelve infantry) it cannot be spending less than about Rs. (P) 250 crores on their annual maintenance alone. Adding the maintenance cost of its air force and navy at about Rs. (P) 85 crores and Rs. (P) 15 crores respectively, the maintenance cost of Pakistan's existing force levels amounts to at least Rs. (P) 350 crores, and this without making any provision what-so-ever for capital expenditure. It may, therefore, be justifiably assumed that Pakistan's actual defence expenditure in 1969/70 was not less than Rs. (P) 400 crores which amounts to about 6.16 per cent of its GNP.

India, on the other hand, loads its defence budget with non-effective charges, such as pensions, which even in the UK are not debited to defence. Also included are other elements, such as health

services and domestic accommodation, which could more appropriately be debited to social services, as is done in the case of similar services provided to government servants controlled by ministries other than Defence and Railways.

Furthermore, cognisance must be taken of the fact that India, which is currently allotting a modest 3.4 per cent of its GNP to defence, is also confronted with a live threat from a presently hostile China against whom the bulk of the country's armed forces are deployed. Consequently, the greater part of India's present defence expenditure would still have to be incurred even if no tension existed between India and Pakistan. India only became aware towards the end of 1958 of the military threat posed by Chinese forces in Tibet and started to take steps, which in the event proved inadequate, to safeguard its frontiers in that direction. Defence expenditure during the 1950s rather than in the 1960s would, therefore, provide a more appropriate index of the burden of the Indo-Pak confrontation.

**A**t the time of partition, the armed forces of undivided India together with their equipment and stores, were divided between the dominions of Pakistan and the Union of India in the ratio of 1:2. It was therefore but to be expected that India's defence expenditure would be greater than that of its neighbour. Throughout the 1950s, India's yearly defence expenditure was below Rs. 200 crores. It was 1.8 per cent of the national income in 1950, 1.9 per cent in 1955 and 2 per cent in 1960. Pakistan's declared military expenditure was 3.7 per cent of a much smaller GNP in 1950, 4.1 per cent in 1955 and 4.3 per cent in 1960.

The armed clash which erupted over Kashmir between the two countries towards the end of 1947, the period of hostilities that followed and the virtual armed truce which continues till today, have undoubtedly made India spend more on defence than she would

otherwise have done. It is possible that this also to some extent might have applied to Pakistan, but for that country, in search of a national identity, an anti-Indan posture would probably have been deemed expedient and, even in the absence of the Kashmir issue, Pakistan would very probably have considered it necessary to build up its military power vis-a-vis India.

**T**he fact that Pakistan entered into military alliances and expanded its armed forces to reach 70 per cent of the strength of India's forces and also secured massive military assistance from the USA including weapons and equipment superior to those in service with Indian forces, further accentuated the problem for India. Despite all this, India was not panicked into entering into an arms race, but continued to invest a larger portion of her defence budget, than did Pakistan, in capital projects. Whilst this long term policy was eminently sound, it temporarily reduced funds available for currently building up the Indian armed forces.

It is unrealistic, in the light of the situation which prevailed in the aftermath of partition, to maintain that tension between the two neighbours could have been eliminated or even substantially reduced. This also applies to the erroneous belief that in the absence of such tension India's force levels and, consequently, her defence expenditure could have been drastically reduced. In the imperfect world in which we live, military power still remains an essential ingredient of national security. Even Japan whose security was fully guaranteed by the USA and who had no land frontiers with hostile neighbours, found it necessary to maintain self-defence forces. India's military impotency vis-a-vis Chinese military power was undoubtedly an important factor in India's low key reaction to China's subjugation of Tibet in 1950.

Furthermore, if India had significantly reduced her armed forces

during the 1950s, she would have found herself in an even worse position than she did when subjected to the massive attack from China in 1962. Although India's forces failed to hold the Chinese attack, the fact that they resisted Chinese occupation, clearly stakes India's claim to the territory in question. If the force level had been significantly lower, India might not have been in a position to dispute China's annexation, without let or hindrance, of large chunks of Indian territory. Viewed in this light, the tension which prevailed during the 1950s may in the long run have been somewhat of a blessing in disguise for this country.

**I**t is widely assumed that increased defence expenditure is detrimental to the nation's economic development and that savings affected through reduced defence spending can be fully utilized to speed economic development. The thesis of the strain imposed by the defence burden on the nation's economy is, however, a very over-worked bogey. An analysis of the relevant figures by K. Subrahmanyam, Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, reveals that no correlation can be derived between defence expenditure and the rate of annual economic growth achieved in India, and also that no correlation can be established between increasing defence outlays and the rate of savings.

During the period 1960/61 to 1965/66 when defence expenditure nearly trebled itself, savings rose from 9 per cent to 10.5 per cent, and during the same period there was no retardation in growth rate. In 1963/64 defence expenditure as a percentage of GNP reached the all time high figure of 4.5 per cent and yet the growth rate that year compared favourably with that of other years in the same decade. The fact that there have been cases of funds allotted for development not being fully utilised tends to indicate that even if sav-

ing in defence expenditure had been affected, it does not necessarily follow that all the amount saved would have been utilised gainfully for development purposes.

In developed nations, manpower shortages are common and, consequently, maintaining large armed forces diverts urgently required workers away from productive employment. However, this does not apply nearly as much to developing nations like India and Pakistan which are confronted with a chronic unemployment problem. Although defence and development do, to some extent, compete for the limited national resources they are not completely incompatible. Security is essential for development and defence production also stimulates economic growth, and industrial advancement.

India has achieved a considerable degree of self-reliance in defence production. Practically all weapons and equipment up to and including the divisional level are produced indigenously. March—2 aircraft, medium tanks, missiles and frigates are now being made in the country. The high standard of precision required of defence industries make them pace setters in the nation's industrial development.

**F**urthermore, India's large-scale requirements and her comparatively advanced industrial base make it feasible and economically profitable for her to undertake indigenous production to a much greater extent than is practical for Pakistan. The latter will, therefore, have to rely to a far larger degree on importing military hardware. Now that it is no longer receiving free military assistance and will, like India, have to pay for its imports of military hardware, the cost of tens'on will undoubtedly be far heavier in the military sphere for Pakistan than for India. Even Bhutto recognises this, as he recently told a press conference that Pakistan could not match India in an arms race and

must therefore augment her efforts by diplomacy.

There are other factors which would have to be considered in any estimate of the cost of tension between the two nations.

**F**or a short period immediately after partition, overland trade between India and West Pakistan was disrupted, but trade with the eastern wing and by sea continued. With the resumption of overland trade across the West Pakistan border, the pre-partition trade pattern more or less reasserted itself fairly soon. This was seriously disrupted in September 1949 when consequent on Britain's devaluation of sterling the Indian rupee was also devalued, whereas Pakistan which had a favourable trade balance largely based on its exports of raw jute, decided not to devalue its currency. Since India did not accept the new ratio of 144:100 between the Indian and Pakistani rupee, all trade transactions came to a standstill. Subsequently, limited trade agreements were negotiated with prices of commodities specified.

However, henceforth the economies of the two countries began to diverge and to compete against each other. Pakistan's policy enabled it to cash in on the dependence of India's jute industry on supplies of raw jute from East Pakistan, and on the boom in the world demand for raw materials which followed in the wake of the Korean war. It also fostered the growth of jute and textile industries in Pakistan as well as diversification of its trade and, at least temporarily, created a serious problem for India's jute mills, which compelled this country to divert to jute cultivation of some lands previously utilised to produce food crops. In the long run, Pakistan, too has suffered. According to a statement in April 1970 made by its Minister for Agriculture, Pakistan's production of jute, which was 80 per cent of the world's total production in 1947, has now declined to 30 per cent.

After the 1965 war, Pakistan banned all trade with India and

despite repeated approaches made by this country for the reopening of mutually beneficial trade, the Pakistan government has maintained the somewhat dogmatic political posture that until the Kashmir issue is settled to its satisfaction, there can be no lifting of the trade ban. Due to the vast potential of its own internal market, this trade ban does not seriously affect India's economy. It has a far more adverse impact on Pakistan and in particular on its eastern wing. As recently as July 12, an East Pakistan daily has strongly pleaded for resumption of trade with India, as a step to create a favourable climate for an amicable settlement of other problems between the two countries.

The *Pakistan Observer*, Dacca, said in an editorial, 'It is a proposition by which we stand to lose nothing in any way and certainly not politically, but gain substantially and provide great relief to the masses. Trade resumption would help to remove the unbearable burden of the consumer by drastically reducing the huge cost of coal and cement and some other essential commodities imported from distant countries. It would enable Pakistan earn substantially by selling out jute, fish and other commodities to India which is eager to buy them.' It is also understood that Soviet experts have pointed out that the Indian mines in Goa would be the most appropriate source of iron ore for the Soviet aided steel plant proposed to be built in the vicinity of Karachi.

India has from time to time made friendly financial gestures towards her smaller neighbours at heavy cost to herself, but these have never been reciprocated and, on the contrary, by attributing such concessions to successful pressure on India, Pakistanis perhaps tend to view such concessions 'as proof of India's weakness. India released to Pakistan in 1948 Rs. 55 crores as its share of cash assets arising from partition and for the reimbursement of the pre-partition public debt, provision was made

annually in India's budget for several years. However, Pakistan whose share of Rs. 300 crores was to be repaid to India has not repaid a single rupee and the chapter now seems closed.

During the Indo-Pak war, Pakistan seized Indian property worth Rs. 110 crores and India seized Pakistan's property worth Rs. 27 crores. After the Tashkent agreement India generously released the Rs. 27 crore worth of property it held, but Pakistan made no reciprocal gesture. India, under pressure from the World Bank, once again over-generously paid Rs. 84 crores to Pakistan in connection with the Indus Water Treaty (1960).

**A**part from the incalculable cost of the casualties suffered by the forces of both countries and the miseries entailed to the families of the brave servicemen who laid down their lives or were wounded in defending their respective nations, the material costs of the 1965 conflict and the operations in Kutch and Jammu and Kashmir have been severe for both countries.

Their somewhat irrational but evidently implacable hostility towards each other has in the past, and seemingly still remains, the predominant factor overshadowing all other considerations in the shaping of the foreign policies of India and Pakistan, and has tended to reduce considerably, if not cancel out, the influence they might justifiably have exercised in the comity of nations either individually or jointly.

Pakistan, in order to obtain military hardware, which it otherwise could have ill afforded, found it necessary to join military alliances and even to grant the United States a military base on its territory near Peshawar. Through astute diplomacy, Pakistani leaders have remarkably successfully managed to minimise the price their country might otherwise have had to pay for the military aid she secured first from the United States and the western

bloc, then from China and recently also from the Soviet Union. Whilst India managed to adhere to her cherished policy of non-alignment, her foreign relations have certainly been considerably inhibited due to a marked Pakistani focus, amounting almost to an obsession, in all her policy formulations.

The western powers exploited the situation and attempted fairly successfully to create in the 1950s and 1960s an artificial military balance between India and its smaller neighbour, and in so doing reduced to almost zero the power potential and influence that the Indian subcontinent could perhaps have exercised in the world balance of power. By withholding, even on payment, military hardware required by India on the grounds, at least ostensibly, of not wanting to annoy their staunch Pakistani ally, the western powers, left India with no option but to become increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for its supply of modern weaponry.

The Indo-Pak confrontation has also had a considerable impact internally within the two countries. It has resulted in the large scale exodus of minorities from one country to the other. The migration from India to Pakistan stopped shortly after partition and has been negligible thereafter, but large numbers of refugees from time to time are driven out of Pakistan and even today a large scale exodus continues unabated from East Pakistan. It also has been a major factor in accentuating communal passions, which have from time to time erupted into horrifying communal riots.

**F**ocusing attention on the alleged threat from India and keeping alive a perennial hate India campaign, has been one of the main props relied upon by Pakistan's ruling elite to perpetuate its power, to maintain unity between the two ethnically and culturally different and widely separated wings of the country and to suppress democracy and maintain its military dictatorship in power for over a decade. The repercussions

of this policy have made it more difficult for India successfully to safeguard its cherished ideal of a secular society.

The Indo-Pak war of 1965 clearly demonstrated India's will and ability to prevent Pakistan from attempting through the use of military force to alter the status quo on the subcontinent, and the attitude adopted by India both before and after the conflict including the Tashkent agreement has made it clear that India has no territorial ambitions against her smaller neighbour. Perhaps this position will be brought home to the people of Pakistan with the expected return in the near future of parliamentary democracy in that country. If it does and the new government concentrates on solving urgent economic and social problems which have been kept dormant under military rule, then tension between India and Pakistan may perhaps diminish in time. However, the 'hate India' campaign may well again be whipped up by politicians wishing to win cheap popularity. It would, therefore, be premature as yet to pin hopes on the early elimination of tension.

A realistic reappraisal shows that the actual cost of the confrontation has not been, nor is today, as significant as it appeared at first sight, and also that when weighed in the balance the burden has been considerably less on India than on its neighbour. To minimise the cost to herself, India firstly must shed the exaggerated Pakistani fixation which her foreign policy has suffered from in the past. Secondly, she should continue to adopt, consistent with her national sovereignty, a cooperative attitude in reaching reasonable settlements of outstanding issues. Finally, India must make unmistakably clear, by maintaining adequate military power, her determination and ability effectively to deter Pakistan from attempting, either on its own or in collusion with an ally, to coerce this country militarily, and should deterrence fail, to force the aggressor to pay an unacceptably heavy price.

## A divided community

ZARINA BHATTY

'What about Indian Muslims?'

'I have written them off,' answered Mohammad Ali Jinnah while stepping into the plane which was to take him to Karachi, capital of the new State of Pakistan. From a man who had set himself up as the leader of Muslims in India and had won for them, through the tortuous paths of the two nation theory, a country; this was certainly a callous statement. One wondered whether this was not an unguarded utterance of a man who had served none but his own ambition. Having reached the pinnacle he could dispense with the scaffolding. But could parents write off their children or sisters their brothers? This is precisely what Partition meant because it must have been clear to everyone

that there was not enough room for all Muslims in Pakistan.

Of course, it might not have been so bad had the Partition not riven the population into two frenzied masses impelled into a senseless holocaust of blood and plunder. Nobody would have believed that such a carnage was possible; nobody forgot it after it was all over. It left behind a trail of hatred, bitterness and mistrust. But even these sharp feelings would have worn down to permit a working relationship between the two neighbouring populations had politics, or what went in its name, not ruled it out. Suspicion and mistrust persisted fanned by conjured up fears and culminated finally in a war.

Mercifully, the war was short. Peace when it came had promising features and led one to think that perhaps the sacrifice of fighting men on both sides had cleansed the air of hatred and there might be a new era of understanding in the offing. This hope was almost totally belied by events. Relations since the war have been more circumscribed and there has been greater insulation, particularly on Pakistan's part. In this atmosphere Muslim families in India have had to make some difficult adjustments.

The post-Partition riots were frightening and many Muslim families, specially those residing in predominantly Hindu localities, fled to Pakistan. In their case it was not, at that time, a calculated decision. But as the riots receded into the past many more went for whom the decision to go represented a conscious choice. Some were motivated by a desire to rejoin relatives who had already gone, others to better their professional future and yet others to seek spiritual rejuvenation or social security in an Islamic State.

The decision to stay was also consciously taken and was induced by such motives as unwillingness to leave the land of their forefathers, ideological commitments, the feeling that professional prospects were more promising in

India and unwillingness to lose property or sever family attachments. In this criss-cross of personal motivations many families were inevitably divided. Very often, of two brothers one would opt for Pakistan and the parents would be left torn between the two sons. In many cases sons went looking for better jobs while the daughters were married in India, or vice versa. Families who have stayed back have found it difficult to get good matches for their daughters as the brighter boys have been lured by the prospects of better career opportunities in Pakistan.

Where property, particularly land, was involved a division of the family resulted in additional problems. Declaration of the migrant's property as evacuee property meant litigation for the remaining family. When the court's decision went against the migrant's family, new and unfamiliar owners replaced a member of the family. Emotional and social readjustments were required and, progressively, a new set of people had to be trusted and relied upon.

In a society where family and kinship relationships still play an important role in a person's life, the divisive pattern of migration caused a great deal of emotional stress. In times of distress or rejoicing the familiar faces of dear ones were missed. In times of need there were fewer people one could turn to. Very often, those left behind were less capable of extending help than those who had gone. The sense of security implicit in the extended family within the broad kinship framework was rudely shattered for many families. The process of securing new ties, seeking and finding new friendships might have been easier had the relations between India and Pakistan been normal and friendly.

Travel restrictions, enhanced after the Indo-Pak conflict, particularly by Pakistan, have increased the hardships of divided families. I know of a family who managed to get the sons across the border during the riots while the

rest of the family stayed behind. Subsequently, the daughters were married to Indian Muslims. One of them is married to a person with communist leanings. On the other side, one of the brothers has risen to be a high ranking officer in the Pakistan army. He is naturally not permitted to visit India, and the sister on account of her husband's political views is not given a visa to travel to Pakistan. As a result, brother and sister have not met since Partition—a fact with which the sister is not yet reconciled. She keeps trying and continuing to hope, though in her heart of hearts she knows that they will meet, as she sadly puts it, 'only in heaven'. There are numerous such cases and even where there are no embargoes on movements many cannot afford to visit as often as they would wish to.

In the matter of travel between the two countries, the plight of the Christians is even worse. One often forgets that the Partition divided many a Christian family as well. In most of these cases brothers, sisters, sons or daughters happened to be on either side of the border at the time of Partition and elected to stay where they were. Of course, there were some who chose to migrate from Pakistan as they found the ideology of the Indian leadership progressive and more inspiring. While before the Indo-Pak war Christians were reasonably free to come and go, since then their travel is practically prohibited.

It is indeed very difficult for any Indian Christian to acquire a visa for Pakistan or for a Pakistani Christian to get his passport endorsed for India. An intimate relation of mine—a lady to whom I was very close—was ailing and keen to visit her brothers and sisters who were all in Pakistan and whom she had not seen for several years. She made many attempts, including on occasions when there was serious illness or death in the family, but was consistently refused a visa. Nor were her brothers or sisters given passports to visit India. To the poor lady this was

a matter of much grief which she carried to her grave.

All of these are essentially personal problems which disrupted populations are subject to whatever the country. In time, a new generation grows up to whom old severed ties mean very little and cause no sense of deprivation or emotional stress. Other changes also occur which lighten the burden of the past. In fact, one of the major effects of Muslim migration to Pakistan has been the break-up of the joint family.

This form of family organisation was as firm among the Muslims as among the Hindus, perhaps even more so in some classes. The lower middle, middle and upper classes whether living in urban or rural areas had protected their feudal traditions more assiduously than others, because in doing so they were consciously or unconsciously keeping alive their link with the pre-British past when they were the ruling class. Except at the top rungs of the social ladder, they had resisted more than others the impact of western ideas and institutions on their social behaviour or institutions.

An outstanding example of this is the continuing resistance to any change in the personal laws governing marriage, divorce and inheritance for Muslims. The sense of cultural superiority from which the Muslims have suffered might have been a contributory factor in making them more insular to western influences. Whatever the reasons, the more feudal they were, the more formal the family organisation and the more important family and kinship ties.

The break-up of the joint family began with the migration of some of its members. A migrant's property, particularly agricultural land, was usually declared as evictee property and more often than not was lost to the joint family. Curtailed means of support forced the remaining members of the family to seek other means of livelihood. For rural families this most often meant migration to urban centres. An increase in mobility

occurred in the urban families also where the hunt for jobs took people to other towns, even to distant ones. Families engaged in trade or other business also found themselves faced with a similar situation.

In all cases, the break-up of the joint family intensified the need for individuals to fend for themselves. The umbrella of the joint family having been blown by the winds of events, individuals were forced to rely on their own resources to find shelter. This was undoubtedly a good thing. It led to the development of more initiative among the Muslims and a realisation that they had to compete and prove their worth if they wanted to improve their lot.

It is true that this process is still in its early stages and that the Muslim has an uphill task to contend with (let us face it, there are reactionary forces interested in making it so). But the struggle will undoubtedly improve the individual, provided the challenge is accepted and the odds are not too loaded. There is evidence that the challenge is being accepted. The desire for a higher level and better quality of education has definitely increased. Muslim young men have been faring comparatively better in competitive examinations than before. Muslims are entering in a big way in certain trades, for example, motor mechanics.

Women have been the greater gainers from the break-up of the joint family and the weakening of its traditional-feudal character. Partition and then the riots created a scare among the Muslims living in India. Women going out were afraid to wear a *burqa* because that would unmistakably identify them as Muslims. Having once been forced by circumstances to put away the *burqa* they never wore it again. With *purdah* (or seclusion for women) out of the way, many more changes followed in a chain. To start with, the doors for women's education were now clearly open. Girls began to go to school and then to

college. Today, even lower middle class families consider it important to get their daughters through at least the first degree. After going through college it was natural that girls should seek and take up jobs. The social stigma attached to women seeking employment has now nearly disappeared. Already Muslim women can be found engaged in a wide variety of jobs.

The break-up of the joint family, greater mobility in search for employment, more emphasis on education both for men and women, disappearance of *purdah* and the entry of women in the class of the educated employed have greatly enhanced the opportunities for Muslim families to come into contact with non-Muslim communities. In fact, there is far more social interaction between Hindu and Muslim families now than there was before Partition. This would make one think that there ought to be a greater chance of mutual understanding, give and take, social and economic adjustment between the two communities. But facts unfortunately do not show this. Communal troubles keep erupting, some pretty nasty ones. Why is it that narrowing socio-cultural differences are not yielding the results they should? The difficulty seems to be that the environment of attitudes and responses is far more coloured by the state of Indo-Pak relations than by socio-economic realities.

This is not the place to analyse Indo-Pak relations but merely to point out that persistent hostility on the part of Pakistan and the reaction to it in India has caused the divided Muslim family, particularly in North India, to face up to a continuing situation of emotional and social stress. The more distressing part of it has not been the difficulty in choosing sides, as some might think, but in living in the midst of an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion when there are no indications that at any time in the near future things might improve.

The present population of Indian Muslims contains few fence-sitters.

Migration has long been reduced to a trickle. It is not a shrinkage in employment that has restrained migration but the persistence of military rule and the linguistic-cum-cultural segmentation of the population of Pakistan. The image of the new Islamic State is very much tarnished in the minds of Indian Muslims. Many whose relatives are there and even others have had an occasion or two to visit and gauge for themselves the flavour of life in Pakistan.

All too often these visits have proved disillusioning. The cultural gap between the man from U.P. or Bihar and the local Punjabi, the political and social domination of the Pathan or the Punjabi has usually been galling, more so because the U.P. man has always believed himself to be culturally superior. These conflicts assume an even more bitter character as the present state of affairs is a reversal of what prevailed immediately after Independence when the local man had not quite come into his own politically and the migrants had an upper hand.

There is 'very little' realisation in India of the fact that the Muslims of this country are a community which was written off by the founder of Pakistan and that it has stayed written off. Pakistan has done precious little to prove the contrary; in fact, its policies have consistently made things worse. Both Muslims and Hindus in India have to learn to look at the problem of their relationship to each other out of context with the state of Indo-Pak relations. The fact is that Muslims in India are an integral part of the Indian population. They belong to no other country. Suspicion and distrust does not help to generate the mutual confidence which is necessary between two large communities living together as one nation. Let us not write them off as Pakistan has. Let us not find political solutions by recreating the Muslim League. It is a neighbourhood problem and let us solve it as such.

## Economic cooperation

MAHFOOZ AHMED

IT is highly unfortunate that strained political relations should block all dialogues for fruitful economic cooperation between the two neighbours, India and Pakistan. Even a discussion on economic cooperation looks apparently odd in the context of the existing state of political relations. Yet, it is a fact that economic co-operation between India and Pakistan could be extremely beneficial for both countries. Theoretically, such cooperation may take the form of 'trading on a non-discriminatory basis' on the one extreme, or 'pooled import substitution, free mobility of factors of production and techniques, and promotion of extra-regional exports', on the other. Between these two extremes there are such variants as selective trade liberalisation, bilateral agreements, selective import substitution on a pooled basis, and/or cooperation in fields not normally linked through trade. However, the nature of actual cooperation would critically depend upon the state of political relations and more importantly on the degree of implicit 'national' benefits to each of the partners on a reciprocal basis.

Besides the strategic geographical location, there are important economic reasons which make a very strong case for closer economic ties between the two coun-

tries. Most of the requirements for mutually beneficial regional cooperation seem to exist in the case of India and Pakistan. For example, about similar levels of per capita income—\$ 68 in India and \$ 80 in Pakistan (at pre-devaluation exchange rates in 1967-68) signify identical levels of living and similar levels of wages. In the presence of an underutilised labour force, which is a common characteristic of both countries, the supply of labour or its pricing may not unduly discriminate against either country in terms of benefits through cooperation. Although the size of the two countries is different—India's population is about four times larger and its GNP three and half times larger than that of Pakistan—yet together they form a formidable size large enough for the exploitation of the economies of scale of even the most sophisticated techniques without the concomitant ills of monopoly.

**N**or are differences in the level of economic development very significant. Both countries depend heavily on the agricultural sector which contributes 42 per cent and 46 per cent of the national output in India and Pakistan respectively; the share of the tertiary sector in the national output is about 41 per cent. However, there is a marked difference in the relative position of the industrial sector in each country; it accounts for about 16 per cent of the national output in India as against 12 per cent in Pakistan.

The structure of industries in the two countries is also qualitatively different. For example, producer goods industries account for a much larger proportion of the total industrial output in India than in that of Pakistan. These differences in fact reflect the nature of import substitution that took place in the two countries since 1950. Pakistan seems to have achieved a notable degree of import substitution in important consumer goods such as cotton textiles, sugar, edible oils, food products, cigarettes, footwear, etc., and also in some intermediate

goods including paper and paper products, cement and jute manufacturing. In India, besides the rapid growth of consumer goods industries a considerable degree of import substitution has taken place in the important basic intermediate goods, particularly steel, aluminium and chemicals, and producer goods like machinery and machine tools, transport equipment, heavy electrical equipment etc.

Neither of the two countries depends significantly on foreign trade. Imports and exports formed seven per cent and 4.3 per cent of the GNP in India and 7.5 per cent and 4.8 per cent in Pakistan in 1967-68. These figures, however, do not reveal the crucial importance of capital goods in the total imports of Pakistan. Machinery, electrical goods, transport equipment, steel and chemicals for example accounted for about half of the total imports in 1967-68. In India, on the other hand, capital goods accounted for about 25 per cent of the total imports, while raw materials and intermediate goods, particularly cotton, fertilizers, paper and paper products and iron and steel, formed more than 50 per cent of the total imports during the same period. The important items of exports from Pakistan are: raw jute and cotton, cotton and jute textiles, hides and skins, fish, superior quality rice, leather goods, paper products, footwear etc. From India, the major items of exports are cotton and jute textiles, tea, sugar, iron and steel, iron ore, vegetable oils, chemicals, etc.

Thus, the industrial structure and the pattern of foreign trade clearly demonstrates a high degree of 'complementarity' as well as 'overlapping', both of which are essential elements of a mutually beneficial regional economic cooperation.

**A**lthough the trade dependence of both countries on other countries appears to be small, they have consistently faced an adverse balance of trade. The trade gap has been over Rs 5,500 million and

Rs 1,900 million on an average in India and Pakistan respectively during 1960-61 to 1967-68. As a percentage of the average value of exports in the corresponding period, the trade gaps work out to be 64 per cent and 77 per cent. Fortunately, for the massive inflow of foreign resources into both countries the gaps of this magnitude could not have been filled without seriously affecting the development programmes and policies. The declining tendency of foreign resources in both have already started misgivings on the feasibility of planning imports on a large scale basis without simultaneously raising exports. Any improvement in the balance of trade either through 'trade creation' or 'trade diversion', particularly from the so called 'difficult areas,' through any form of economic cooperation between the two countries would be highly welcome for both. Even when such arrangement leads to assured export outlet at the cost of more volatile existing sources, it would be definitely a positive factor for both countries in the long run.

**I**ndeed, India and Pakistan stand to lose by not collaborating economically. As it is, Pakistan faces the tremendous problem of import substitution in capital and basic intermediate goods which could be achieved only at extremely high costs (on this aspect there is near unanimity among economists). For India, the problem of making fuller use of her existing capacity in capital and intermediate goods is not merely a short-term problem. Further expansion of capacity in these lines is fraught with both limited domestic demand and associated ills of monopoly.

Both countries lose by competing with each other in the world market for selling cotton and jute textiles. An extremely costly import substitution has gone into building up the jute and cotton milling capacity in Pakistan and in earmarking a large area for producing raw jute and cotton in India. Much of the further ineffi-

cient allocation of resources could be avoided by common policies for producing and exporting jute and cotton textiles. Moreover, collaboration in non-traded fields may not only boost the foreign trade of both countries but also may lead to rapid growth of various sectors of the two. The non-traded fields include among others the cooperative development of water and power resources, transit facilities, exchange of technical knowhow and other skills, etc.

Thus there are strong economic arguments for close economic co-operation between the two countries. In fact, similar resources endowment, levels of living, almost similar stage of economic growth, peculiar patterns of ex-post industrial growth and foreign trade and the relatively higher rate of economic growth in Pakistan which to some extent neutralises the disadvantage of being a smaller partner, are an ideal configuration of factors essential for regional economic cooperation involving substantial mutual benefits. In fact, precisely for these economic factors Pakistan may gain much more under the regional economic cooperation with India, than from its association with Iran and Turkey under the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). The only strong argument for the RCD is the existing political understanding between these countries.

**T**he existing state of political relations between India and Pakistan may be regarded as one extreme when there is virtually no economic cooperation. The trade between them is at a standstill. In 1967-68 exports and imports from India to Pakistan were Rs 2.4 million and Rs 4 hundred thousands respectively. Indeed, renunciation of the present attitude of cold war followed up by some reduction in the defence expenditure may have substantial positive effects which may be sufficient to alter the entire complexion of the development programmes in both countries.

For example, a reduction in defence expenditure by one-third

would have released Rs 3,200 million in India and Rs 750 million in Pakistan in 1967-68. In relation to the domestic saving, these figures work out to be over 13 per cent in India and 11 per cent in Pakistan. This would certainly be a shot in the arm for the two resource-scarce countries and may go a long way in releasing the pressures on the balance of payment currently exerted by the mounting requirements for foreign debt servicing and declining flow of net foreign resources. More important could be the external (indirect) effects of such a reduction in the defence expenditure because of its close interdependence with many important sectors of the economy.

**R**enewal of trade on a purely non-discriminatory basis just as with any other country—a further step towards better political relations—would be greatly welcome in both countries. This form of cooperation does not bind either of the two countries formally and may be started without much concern about the extent of 'reciprocity' of benefits. Thus, the pre-war level of trade (India's exports and imports to Pakistan amounted to Rs 128 million and Rs 220 million in 1964-65 respectively) between the two, looks fairly impressive in comparison with the existing situation, although it was much below the peak level reached during the years immediately after Independence.

Conditions have qualitatively changed since then and figures for 1964-65 are constrained due to the none-too-close political relations during the pre-war period. The magnitude of trade on a non-discriminatory basis therefore may be raised considerably. In both countries capacity creation in industries has taken place at a fairly rapid rate and, as a consequence, the demand for various inputs has also gone up rapidly. In some branches of manufacturing, they have exportable surpluses.

Thus, India's requirements of cotton and jute have greatly increased due to the expansion of

her cotton and jute textile industries. In both of these items, Pakistan possesses a comparative advantage and hence could expand its exports by selling to India. India could also import certain other items exported by Pakistan such as hides and skins, fish and wool. Pakistan could also raise her exports to India by selling paper and newsprint, sports goods, carpets and rugs, etc.

Aside from the traditional items of export to Pakistan—coal and other minerals—India can supply a greater part of Pakistan's needs for iron ore for its two steel plants. It can also fit in effectively for supplying the capital goods requirements of Pakistan, in particular heavy electrical and transport equipment where India has created surplus capacity. There is considerable scope for increasing the exports of iron and steel and chemicals to Pakistan. As most of the additional implicit cost for producing capital goods in the presence of unutilised capacity are the domestic costs, India can very easily sell these goods to Pakistan at competitive world prices while Pakistan would gain in terms of transport costs by importing from India. Then there are consumer goods items like sugar and vegetable oils where Pakistan may gain by importing from India.

Clearly, a change in political attitudes and renewal of trade on a non-discriminatory basis would help these countries in resolving their balance of payment problems to a certain extent.

**B**ut, for India and Pakistan a more closer cooperation could be conceived in a regional framework. The most obvious elements of such economic cooperation are, firstly, agreement for allowing transit facilities to each other. For Pakistan, transit facilities for passengers and goods from West to East Pakistan and vice versa may imply substantial saving in transport costs. A rough idea of the magnitude involved may be obtained from the size of inter-wing sea-borne trade through the three major ports of Karachi, Chittagong and Khulna which was about

Rs 2,000 million in 1967-68. The number of passengers travelling between the two wings during the same period was over two hundred thousands by air and 50 thousand by sea in 1967.

For India similar facilities for Assam through East Pakistan would be very useful. The gains from transit facilities could be considerably enhanced by increasing the scope of such facilities. For example, India may allow Pakistan transit facilities to Nepal in return for similar facilities to Afghanistan and Iran. Aside from the gains in transport costs to both countries, such facilities would help in the growth of the transport sectors in each country.

**S**econdly, there exists a great potential in jointly developing the water resources, particularly of the eastern rivers and their tributaries. Whatever evaluation criteria used, there are tremendous short-term and long-term gains for both countries. In the short run, control of floods would have the direct effect of saving agricultural crops, goods and property and indirectly raising productivity in agriculture. Long-term effects are associated with the creation of the irrigation potential and the development of power generation. The potentialities of cooperation in this field are indeed vast as indicated by B. G. Verghese in his article in *The Hindustan Times* on March 29, 1970.

Cooperation in this field is within the realm of possibility and the necessary inspiration for it may be derived from the Mekong Valley Development Project which presents a singular example of international goodwill and cooperation. The example of the Indus Valley Treaty in itself provides sufficient motivation for cooperation in jointly developing the eastern rivers for which sizable help may be forthcoming from friendly countries and international agencies. Given the goodwill and determination for agreeing to such arrangements and the consequent short and long-term benefits, the existing irritant bet-

ween the two countries due to the Farrakka Barrage issue looks trivial and loses much of its significance.

**A**lthough not so obvious, yet the most important areas for cooperation of a more continuous nature, lie in the fields of agriculture and industry. The most important objectives underlying such cooperation may be: (i) best utilisation of the existing potential for the mutual benefit of both countries, (ii) creation of assured export outlets for some of their major exports, and (iii) exploitation of economies of scale through pooled import substitution.

Extremely fruitful cooperation could be reached in the field of agriculture, particularly in the context of the technological transformation of agriculture going on in the sub-continent. Both countries would gain substantially by the exchange of their past experiences and fruits of agricultural research. India could save considerable losses due to waterlogging and salinity in the most fertile regions of the Punjab by learning from Pakistan which has undergone a unique and fairly successful experiment in dealing with the problem of water-logging and salinity which at one time had threatened the very basis of the agricultural superiority of the Punjab region.

Pakistan could also provide technical knowhow for the tubewell development programme which was responsible for the remarkably rapid growth of productivity in that country even before the so-called high yielding varieties became the central element of the technological transformation. She could even supply the indigenously made equipment for the tubewell development programme which is currently proceeding at an unprecedented rate in the Indian States of Punjab and Haryana.

Pakistan stands to gain much more by utilising the fruits of the remarkably fruitful research in the development of the high yielding varieties in India. For example, India has gone far ahead in deve-

loping its own varieties which are suitable to different soil and hydrological conditions. It has now varieties of wheat which not only give more yield than the imported Mexican dwarf but are also better in disease resistance and grain quality. It has developed different varieties for different regions. Similarly, near breakthrough has been achieved in the development of the high yielding varieties of rice. The newly developed rice varieties in India are better than the miracle IR-8 and IR-5, as they are not only more productive but also suitable to local conditions in various parts of the country—a vital condition for their successful farming.

Finally, research seems to have been fruitfully completed for the development of high yielding varieties of various grains and suitable techniques of cultivation for the dry areas. Similar research in Pakistan is at an early stage. It could avoid unnecessary duplication by using the varieties developed in India. Due to the contiguity of Pakistan with India and similar soil and climatic conditions, all of Pakistan's needs for the new varieties and other technical knowhow could be met from India. Cooperation in this field in fact may reduce the otherwise heavy cost of trial and error which is an essential part of the introduction of new technology in agriculture.

**T**here is even larger scope for regional cooperation in the utilisation of the existing potential as well as in the development of certain industries with the basic intention of exploiting economies of scale. Indeed, both countries could agree to help each other in solving the short run problems which have arisen from the costly and inefficient export import substitution. For example, in India import substitution in the capital and intermediate goods did not always conform strictly to the tests of economic efficiency.

In Pakistan, serious restrictions on the import of consumer goods resulted in their domestic produc-

tion to the disadvantage of the growth of producer goods. As a consequence both countries have landed themselves in an uneasy situation with either considerable unutilised capacity (as much as 50 per cent of the capacity remained unutilised in many capital and intermediate goods in India), or plants of uneconomic size involving high unit costs of production (e.g., the installation of two steel plants—one at Chittagong with 1,50,000 tons ingot and another at Karachi with 0.5 million tons ingot capacity from imported scrap are smaller than the efficient plant size. A study on steel by the Economic Commission for Latin America calculated that as compared to the unit cost of production in the 'efficient size' steel plant of about 1 million tons of ingot capacity, the unit costs in plants of 0.5 and 0.25 million tons capacity were 18 per cent and 33 per cent higher, respectively).

The existing capacity of capital goods in India could be best utilized for supplying the needs of Pakistan till the latter succeeds in substituting these by her own domestic production, or till the domestic demand in India catches up. There are a number of ways in which Pakistan could be compensated for such an arrangement. For example, it can be assured of a steady market for its raw jute and cotton, paper and paper products etc., and/or of cost advantages over and above the saving of transport cost through the deliberate under-pricing of such goods to Pakistan; it may further be supplemented by agreeing on certain favourable models of currency payments.

**F**ree trade on a selective basis could also be made an instrument for raising the efficiency level in certain manufacturing activities in the two countries. Free trade in raw jute and cotton and their textiles within the two countries supported by common export policies for these items, would through greater competition lead to greater efficiency. It may also lead to rationalisation and long due modernisation of these industries in

India besides halting costly import substitution currently taking place in the two countries.

Free trade could similarly be extended to some of the other consumer industries particularly sugar, vegetable oil, leather goods, etc., with a view to raise the efficiency in their manufacturing. All such arrangements, however, have to be carefully balanced so as not to harm the 'infant' industries in either country. Such agreements involving the imports and exports of certain commodities may also result in a wider and assured market for them.

**T**he availability of an assured market would weigh very heavily in selective cooperation for pooled import substitution with a view to reaping the economies of scale in the long run. Thus, if Pakistan insists on substitution of certain of the basic intermediate and capital goods it would naturally look towards India for a sufficiently large and assured market. Similar assurances may be necessary for certain manufactured goods in India. Although the nature and scope of pooled import substitution cannot be precisely determined without a comprehensive analysis of the implicit cost and benefits, there is enough justification for Pakistan specialising in the production of fertilizers where it has comparative advantage due to its endowment of natural gas. The demand for fertilizer would be substantial and steady and economies of scale could thus be utilized fully.

Pakistan should also be able to meet a certain part of the growing Indian demand for paper and newsprint. Another item where Pakistan may be allowed to have an upper hand is the production of jute textiles through restricting the expansion of capacity in India. For India there exist many manufacturing activities where she would gain due to the extended market. Thus, a greater part of the capital and basic intermediate goods where economic size has to be necessarily large could be developed in India. Mutually ad-

vantageous sharing is possible in the field of chemicals where the demands of economic size are not so acute.

This superficial listing does not by any means exhaust the extensive existing possibilities and that which would arise in future for joint planning and programming of capacity creation in the manufacturing sector.

Then there is the entire field of transport and communication where cooperation between the two countries would be extremely beneficial mutually. Such cooperation may take the form of rationalisation and simplification of postal and telegraphic rates, development of regional air transport services, common policies for the development of shipping, agreement on improving rail and road links, promotion of tourism etc. Finally, simplification of travel formalities, e.g., abolition of the visa system, would go a long way in extending economic cooperation and mutual understanding with external effects for further economic cooperation.

It is extremely difficult to predict the scope and the course of formal arrangements for mutual cooperation which would obviously depend on the degree of political rapport on the one hand and the reciprocity of the implicit benefits that each of the two countries expects. Much of the uncertainty arises from the nature of political reconciliation between the two countries, which more appropriately may be expected to be achieved only gradually. Quick rapprochement however is possible once the basic hurdles are removed.

**B**esides the difficulties in estimating the trade creating and diverting effects and consequent currency payment and other long run problems, there is also a great deal of subjectivity in the evaluation of the benefits from regional arrangements. The degree of subjectivity varies with time and results from different shadow rates of foreign exchange, differences in time preferences, 'strategic

gic national' considerations etc. Both of these factors, i.e., political uncertainty and the problem of evaluating mutual benefits, put serious limits to the degree of objectivity and ultimately determine the scope of the formal agreement for economic cooperation.

For example, it would be highly unrealistic to think in terms of establishing a 'common market' even in the restricted sense of involving a 'customs union'. A common market in its true sense, i.e., involving free-trade under a customs union arrangement, joint planning and programming of pooled import substitution for exploiting the economies of scale or for achieving efficient production through greater competition, free mobility of factors of production and techniques, etc., could be established only after a sufficiently long period. Even in case of the West European countries whose dependence on the rest of the world through foreign trade was sufficiently large, where a certain degree of political understanding, already existed and which had other economic affinities, the formation of the European Common Market took a fairly long time. More time is needed to extend its scope from a basically customs union type of an arrangement to the broader form of the common market.

In India and Pakistan, where political understanding is at its lowest, the process of attaining the ideal form of common market would be much longer. Further, any such suggestion for the foreseeable future would be summarily set aside by Pakistan who would resist any agreement which may effect her 'infant' industries. However, the common market may be kept as the most desirable ideal objective to be achieved ultimately. In fact such an arrangement need not be restricted to India and Pakistan, but could be extended to Nepal, Afghanistan, Iran, Ceylon, Burma, Malaysia and also other less developed countries of South East Asia.

Indeed, cooperation in the above areas could be achieved through

partial and less general forms of arrangement. Thus, no formal treaty of agreement seems necessary for saving on account of defence expenditure and renewal of trade on a non-discriminatory basis. Closer forms of cooperation in other areas could be easily covered under such agreements as preferential liberal trade policies on a selective basis, bilateral trade agreements covering certain commodities, common trade policies with respect to the rest of the world, selective common import substitution policies, etc. Transit facilities, joint development of water resources and agreement to improve transport and communication links could be covered by treaties with or without international involvement.

The growth in the volume of trade through both trade creation and trade diversion that may result from trade liberalisation and other policies may create balance of payment problems between the two. Such problems may be handled through payment arrangement involving soft currencies or by involving the international agencies. More appropriately, trade liberalisation policies between India and Pakistan may form a sub-set of the regional cooperation being currently mooted by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. In other words, agreement for trade liberalisation could include other countries of South Asia. The consequent balance of payment problem among them could then be tackled through a multilateral clearing and payment agency.

In conclusion, we may further stress the need for closer economic ties between India and Pakistan for which there are strong economic arguments. There are many areas where both countries would gain substantially by agreeing to cooperate. Such agreement need not have to be of an all-embracing character like a common market. Most of the available areas for fruitful cooperation could be more simply covered under partial and selective type of formal agreements.

# **B ooks**

**THE RISE OF MUSLIMS IN INDIAN POLITICS:  
AN ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS FROM  
1885 TO 1906** by Rafiq Zakaria. Somaiya  
Publications, Bombay, 1970. pp. 427.

The ideational sources of the 'communal problem' lie in the syndrome of fairly unique historical factors of nineteenth-century India. The pattern of interlocking relationship between the British, the Hindus, and the Muslims developed along lines which while helping in the political modernization of India, also contributed to the politicization of the divided co-existence of the two communities, ultimately leading to the partition of the Indian sub-continent. For a more complete picture of the communal problem as well as of the making of Pakistan, an understanding of Indo-Muslim politics is essential. Zakaria's study demonstrates that the politico-religious environment of the late nineteenth-century India was, indeed, at the roots of the cluster of attitudes which shaped the emergence of Pakistan in the mid-twentieth century, and which continues to inform the communal problem of the sub-continent and also forms the back-drop of India-Pakistan relations. Only the cant has changed; the problems and responses remain the same.

Why did the Indian Muslims, or at least a great majority of them, carve out a different role for themselves from that of other communities? That the impact of *pax-Britannica* on the two major communities had several dimensions, both in time and space, helping in the building up of minority psychosis among the Indian Muslims is not a debatable point. And that a sense of separate Muslim identity was latent and germinal at the turn of the twentieth

century and could be easily manipulated by the Muslim elite to symbolize their own unity and distinctiveness at various levels of contrast, is also generally agreed upon. But equally germane to the rise of Muslim separatism in Indian politics was a fierce struggle between alternative Muslim elites. Unfortunately, the Muslim political debate in the nineteenth century is neglected most in Zakaria's study—after a fashion, that is, one gets the impression that this intra-Muslim debate has been deliberately side-tracked. At best, we find references to it only in the parentheses.

All in all, the volume under review brings a plethora of data and information on the condition of Indian Muslims and the causes which led to Muslim separatism in the nineteenth century. The interaction between early British rule and Indian Muslims, the interaction or lack of it between the Hindus and the Muslims, the clash of personalities and of nationalist forces, and the gathering of the storm is graphically brought out. The author's discussion of the Hindi-Urdū controversy, the Urdu Press, and the nature of Muslim leadership is very illuminating and full of details—obviously an evidence of careful investigation and painstaking research.

However, one may point out that it is a belated publication of a doctoral dissertation (submitted in 1948 to the London School of Economics), and hence repetitive of what others have already written. One would have hoped that Zakaria would find it possible to revise his manuscript in the light of fresh materials and interpretations now available. However, it is expecting too much of a politician.

For long, Indo-Muslim studies have suffered from the lack of an integrated structure and penet-

rating interpretation of the thought and conditions of the time and the men. However rich the data may be, the absence of even an *ex-post facto* theoretical structure, linking various parts of the study mars the usefulness of these attempts. Regrettably, Zakaria's study is no exception to this. The reviewer must conclude that Zakaria has contributed little to what we already know about the rise of Muslims in Indian politics in the period between the formation of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League.

R. K. Srivastava

### **PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA 1947-1966**

by G. W. Choudhry, Pall Mall Press, London, 1968.

Considering the indisputable significance of Indo-Pakistani relations, the literature on the subject is still surprisingly meagre; and therefore, almost any book which concerns itself with the problem is welcome. Choudhry's book is useful for two main reasons. First, it is more or less comprehensive in scope covering the fairly extensive period—1947-1966—and dealing with all major aspects of the relations between the two countries, viz., the disputes over the distribution of assets between the two successor States; the bitter quarrels in the sphere of trade; the canal waters dispute; the problem of religious minorities; and the major political controversies over the question of accession of the Princely States of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. A chapter is devoted to the development of near-crisis situations in 1950 and 1951; after a fairly long account of the divergences in the foreign policies of the two countries, the book concludes with a chapter on the 1965 war. Secondly, this is a handy book for anyone who wishes to know the Pakistani version of Indo-Pakistani disputes.

Choudhry's treatment of the subject makes it abundantly clear that a dispassionate approach required to make a sound study of such an emotion-charged problem as his country's relations with its major enemy, is sadly lacking. And, in case after case the domineering, intransigent approach of India is contrasted with the sweet reasonableness of Pakistan. This coloured Pakistani version is the result of an arbitrary selection of facts buttressed by observations from 'impartial' foreign newspapers and writings—an exercise, incidentally, which is quite easy for any party to undertake—but which does not necessarily prove the validity of the arguments presented. A clear case of mis-representation of facts is illustrated by the author's remark that 'the fact is, as Wilcox rightly points out, that India considers Pakistan a hostile state and Pakistan considers India a "proven aggressor"' (p. 230). Here Choudhry is not concerned with the truth of what one side or the other believes, and surely there is no dearth of evidence to show that India's image

of Pakistan is not that of a 'hostile State' but a 'proven aggressor'.

A recurrent argument, which allegedly provides the motivation for much of India's behaviour towards Pakistan and for its foreign policy in general, is that India has consistently and obstinately refused to concile itself to the idea of the independent existence of Pakistan (p. 89). This is an argument which needs to be examined critically. First, the views of the Hindu communal parties towards Pakistan, to which Choudhry refers (p. 213) are by no means the dominant element in Indian public opinion; nor are the views of individuals outside the government (pp. 214, 215) of decisive importance. As for the hope of some leaders of the Indian Government that reunion of the two countries would eventually result, even Choudhry concedes that 'this could be regarded as natural and even understandable on lips of men who throughout their lives had believed in the unity of India'. (p. 215)

As for later behaviour and attitudes, it is perhaps sufficient to quote Bhutto who in a moment of rare candour made a statement to the National Assembly in June 1964 saying: 'To be fair to the Indian Government and the former Prime Minister of India, I think relatively speaking, they had reconciled themselves to the two-nation theory...'. How is it that Choudhry fails to take note of such significant statements made by Pakistan's own government leaders? Secondly, one cannot ignore the fact that the Pakistani Government in projecting an ogre-like image of India is well aware of the effectiveness of a 'hate and fear India' campaign in staving off forces of disintegration. Thirdly, it may be pointed out that in depicting the 1965 war as unprovoked Indian aggression rooted in India's unwillingness to accept the fact of Pakistan, the author has either glossed over or suppressed certain vital facts of the story. Lack of space does not permit an elaboration of this point.

It is interesting that in analyzing the reasons which prompted the Pakistani Government to accept the accession of the Hindu majority State of Junagadh, which had no territorial contiguity with Pakistan, Choudhry says that the main reason was the hope that the principle of plebiscite would be accepted by India to settle the dispute not merely over Junagadh but over Hyderabad and Kashmir—in all of which the religious affiliation of the ruler concerned was different from that of the majority of the population. The result, according to the author, would have been that 'by the principle of plebiscite India would certainly get Junagadh as well as Hyderabad, but Kashmir would come to Pakistan'. (p. 74)

In conclusion, Choudhry expresses his hope of improved relations between the two countries in the future but no prescription is offered. This, perhaps, is the inevitable result of his understanding of the problem. Any remedy to be feasible must take account of the fears and sensibilities of both

the sides. Although on occasions he speaks of 'mutual distrust and suspicion', this has no real meaning for him as his account bears out. From Choudhry's belief that India is always and entirely in the wrong, the only legitimate inference can be that the remedy rests solely with India, a conclusion which can lead to no meaningful composition of the differences between the two countries.

It is indeed lamentable that when there is urgent need for rethinking on this unhappy problem on the part of both Indian and Pakistani scholars, Choudhry can do no better than to reproduce faithfully and uncritically the view-point of the Pakistani Government. Nevertheless, it behoves every thinking Indian not to dismiss the book for that reason, but to make sincere attempts to understand what the Pakistanis think and feel.

Sheila Saxena

**THE INDO PAKISTANI CONFLICT** by Russell

Brines, Pall Mall Press, London, 1968, pp. 481.

The 1965 armed conflict between India and Pakistan constitutes a watershed in the relations of the two largest and perhaps the most sophisticated of the emerging nations. The conflict not only opened a new era in their relations but taught a few lessons to the outside world also. Its significance is additionally evident from the fact that the event has attracted a good deal of journalistic and scholarly attention.

The book under review has been attempted by a travelling journalist who was in India during the conflict and had the opportunity of visiting the two countries subsequently. As one who has covered this area as a foreign and war correspondent over three decades, the author is well familiar with the immediate as well as distant political currents and cross-currents which occasioned the conflict. Though primarily a journalist, Brines has a distinct flair for research and scholarship.

The book is perhaps the most comprehensive work produced on the subject so far. Its very welcome feature is that it does not study the conflict as an isolated event. Firstly, it takes into account the developments at the global level, the pattern of relationship between major powers of the world and the policies of the USA, the Soviet Union, and China in this part of the world. A discussion as to why and how their policies cohere or clash in this region is attempted. Secondly, it analyses the historical background of the two countries, the dynamics of partition and the differences over Kashmir—all constituting causes of the conflict. Thirdly, the actual conflict is narrated in detail. Finally, the aftermath of the conflict—the Tashkent meeting is dealt with. The study concludes with a very balanced discussion on the lessons of the conflict.

The basic causes of the twenty three-year military and diplomatic contest over Kashmir between India

and Pakistan are very often misunderstood by western writers. Many of them think in oversimplified Hindu-Muslim terms and reach the erroneous conclusion that since the majority of Kashmiris are Muslims, the area belongs, or should belong, to Pakistan. They thus miss the real point. The author appropriately quotes Jawaharlal Nehru to highlight this fundamental point. '...it is not Kashmir, therefore, but rather a much deeper conflict that comes in the way of friendly relations between India and Pakistan...we cannot give up the basic ideal (secularism) which we had held so long and on which the whole conception of our State is founded.'

Aside from clarifying the basic position, the author pinpoints that military conflict between the two countries really began in the spring of 1965 with a test of strength in the Rann of Kutch. It was here that Pakistan, for the first time, used American supplied Patton tanks and other American arms which were given to her 'as protection against aggression, particularly by communist forces.' The author rightly concludes that Pakistan thought that she was politically and militarily capable of attacking India to achieve her objectives, a thought which was based on a highly under-estimated notion of the health and vitality of the Indian political system.

There has been some debate about how the conflict began: is it true that Pakistan sent several thousand specially trained and equipped infiltrators across the ceasefire line into Kashmir? The author's answer is unequivocal when he says: 'There is little reason to doubt that Pakistan had trained guerrillas for some time, with the encouragement, if not the actual participation of Communist China, and sent a considerable number of them into Indian Kashmir.' This should set at rest the controversy about responsibility of initial steps leading to the conflict. During the current election campaign in Pakistan some leaders have now admitted this fact.

Brines has done some loud thinking about the prospects of amity between India and Pakistan. He thinks that there has been lack of positive initiatives by the two countries. He also suggests that as a bigger country, India should be generous and through her deeds try to win the confidence of Pakistan. While one would not disagree with these generalisations, is it not too much to expect that desired results would follow simply if India changed her posture. Does such a thesis not ignore, or at any rate grossly under-estimate, the domestic compulsions of Pakistan's behaviour towards India ever since her creation in 1947?

K. P. Misra

**THE MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE**, by Z. A. Bhutto.

London, Oxford University Press, 1969. pp. 188.

The book is notable not for its scholastic value but because of the personality of the author who

# **Tourism is the world's biggest industry... ... and the fastest growing !**

Tourism is a Rs. 11,000 crore world business today. Roughly twice the size of the oil industry. In five years, it will be worth Rs. 18,000 crores ! An almost 75% increase.

Investment in tourism earns the most foreign exchange in the shortest time. For instance, Yugoslavia invested Rs. 38.3 crores in tourism in 1968 and earned Rs. 140.3 crores. A net profit of 250% ! And Spain could build two steel plants like Bhilai each year on her tourism earnings alone !

#### **What about India ?**

The number of visitors to India has increased. From 150,000 in 1964 to almost 245,000 in 1969. And our earnings from tourism have gone up to Rs. 33 crores in foreign exchange. But in terms of world tourism, India got only one out of every thousand world travellers last year. Yet we have just about everything to make India the world's most attractive tourist destination.

#### **What's missing here ?**


Nothing but broad-based public participation. And enough of what is known as the 'infrastructure' : hotel accommodation, transport facilities and tourist amenities. For instance, the city of Bangkok alone has more hotel beds suitable for tourists than the whole of India !

And when the jumbo jets come, bringing many thousand more visitors our way, we shall need all these amenities in far greater measure.

#### **What are we doing about it ?**

The Government is actively involved in the building of new hotels, improving air and transport services, providing new and better tourist facilities.

But that is not enough. Because Tourism is everybody's business. It involves people at every level all over the country. So join us in our efforts. Let us give the tourist the amenities he needs and see that he goes home happy. Each happy tourist means so many more will come next year. Shouldn't be too difficult for us. Isn't ours one of the world's oldest traditions in hospitality ?



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
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held high office at an exceptionally young age, and lent to the office of Foreign Minister of Pakistan elements of glamour, dynamism, and controversy unequalled in the history of Pakistan.

The book spells out the ideology and reflects the personality of the author. 'Obsession' is the striking feature of the author's character—whether with ideas, persons or countries. Obsession with America, China and India is the most noticeable aspect of the discussion of Pakistan's foreign policy which is mainly the theme of the book. Disgust of America, admiration of China and hatred of India—all blind and unmitigated—could be said to be the bases of Pakistan's foreign policy advocated by Bhutto and developed in this book. The rest is a mere elaboration in justification of the above hypothesis—which is an article of faith with the author. One need not, therefore, search here for the scientific analysis of Pakistan's interests and objectives in the realm of foreign policy.

According to the author, whatever positions were taken by the three global powers on Indo-Pak disputes (including the 1965 conflict) in the past were determined not by their treaty relations with them, nor by the extent of India's or Pakistan's identification with them, but by the global aims of those powers. This is particularly true of the U.S.A. which entered into military alliance with Pakistan only when it was convinced that India was unwilling to do so, just as the U.S.A. substituted Japan for China in its Asian strategy, when China turned communist.

Among the three principal foreign policy objectives of Pakistan spelt out by the author, the first place is occupied by 'a policy of friendship and good faith with China, a great power with whom Pakistan's basic interests conform.' Good relations with the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, but 'without pre-conditions and on the basis of non-interference', are second in importance. Strengthening of relations with the underdeveloped nations of Latin America, Asia and Africa is the third.

Bhutto believes that Pakistan's friendly relations with China are based not merely on common hostility towards India, though that is a major factor, but on other positive factors also. The author has, however not succeeded in stating precisely what those positive factors are, except indulging in vague generalities pertaining to the common approach of the two countries towards some international issues. The shortness of the chapter on Sino-Pakistani relations and the vagueness of formulations contained in this chapter only confirm the truth that opportunism is the sole basis of Sino-Pak friendship.

The author is at his venomous best while dealing with Pakistan's relations with India. One is confronted with the intriguing thought at the very beginning that it is the fear of Pakistan that has kept India united. Otherwise, its polyglot provinces

would have flown apart. Referring to Kashmir and other Indo-Pak disputes, the author says, 'it is better to have a stalemate and no solution at all than to agree to an unjust solution.' According to the author, besides Kashmir, there are other unresolved disputes with India, but one that is nearly as important as Kashmir is that of Assam and some districts of India adjacent to East Pakistan. To these, East Pakistan has very good claim which should not have been allowed to remain quiescent.

Bhutto also pleads that Pakistan should be strengthened, because a weak Pakistan would embolden India to discriminate further against Indian Muslims. A strong Pakistan is their best guarantee of protection, since India would hesitate to provoke an alert Pakistan. Pakistan should not be taken in by India's argument that continued confrontation between India and Pakistan will threaten the security of Indian Muslims. Pakistan must be strong and maintain confrontation. Co-operation with India will only weaken Pakistan. Having failed in 1965 to destroy Pakistan, India is now shifting her policy from confrontation to cooperation, to the 'Spirit of Tashkent'. The author is against the idea of encouraging inter-dependence between East Pakistan and West Bengal in regard to harnessing the common rivers, because that will render East Pakistan permanently dependent on West Bengal.

There is nothing new in these ideas, some of which are pretty well-known to the Indian intelligentsia since the days of Bhutto's Foreign Ministership. What is interesting about them is that they have been elaborately stated as a part of a painfully presented framework of Pakistan's foreign policy. So far as Indo-Pak relations are concerned, these are devastating ideas. It is surprising that they have been so insistently held by a person who aspires to play an important role in guiding the destinies of Pakistan.

If public opinion can be said to have any impact on foreign policy making in a democracy, and if what is known of the desire of Pakistani people to normalise relations with India is true, the ideas held by Bhutto are unfortunate. They can certainly not be said to be either responsible or representative. At best, they reflect the opinions of an extremist and marginal section in the Pakistani politics of today which thrives on India-baiting as the basis of its internal political strength.

However, the only good that this book has done, so far as India is concerned, is to lay bare the convictions of Bhutto before responsible sections of Indian opinion who would, as a consequence, be much wiser about the mind of a man who always threatens to be important in some way or the other in the affairs of Pakistan.

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